Prima Secundae
Lecture 153: Prudence, Moral Virtue, and the Role of Passion

Transcript
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You're probably going to just turn around, right? To the fifth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that intellectual virtue is able to be without moral virtue, right? Now this is a good question for me now. For the perfection of the before does not depend upon the perfection of the... After. Yeah, there it is, before and after there, right? But reason is before the sense desiring of our right, and moves it, right? Therefore, the intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of reason, does not depend upon more virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive part. Therefore, it is able to be, what? Without it, right? Moreover, moral things are the matter of Pudas, right? We saw it before in another article. Just as makeable things are the matter of, what? Art. But art is able to be without its own matter, right? Just as the metalworker without iron, right? I guess it's iron, isn't it? Fair enough. Therefore, also, foresight can be without the moral virtues, which foresight is nevertheless among the intellectual virtues, which among the intellectual virtues, most of all, would seem to be joined with the moral virtues, right? More foresight is a virtue, right? Taking counsel well, as is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics. But many there are who take counsel well, who nevertheless, what, lack the moral virtues, huh? And therefore, foresight is not able to be without moral virtue, huh? Is able to be, yeah. But against this is that to will the bad, to will to do the bad, right? Is opposed directly to moral virtue, but is not opposed to what? To what is able to be without moral virtue. But it's opposed to what? Prudence, huh? That someone, what? Should sin, willing. Yeah, as is said in the Sixth of the Ethics, huh? Therefore, prudence is not able to be without, what? Yeah. You know, it's a famous thing there, but the artist who knowingly, but, yeah, doesn't like art, right? The cook who knowingly ruins the beat. Get even with him now. But the man who knowingly does something immoral, right? He's worse than the man who unknowingly does. St. Paul excuses himself a bit, huh? For persecuting the church, huh? Well, Thomas distinguishes, huh? I am sure it should be said that the other moral virtues of reason, rather, are able to be without, what? Moral virtue. But prudence, or foresight, is not able to be without, what? Moral virtue. Yeah. And what's the reason for this? Well, the reason for this is that foresight is right reason about things to be done, right? But it's right reason about things to be done not only in universal, because then you'd be, you know, then you'd be the science of ethics or something, right? But also in the particular, the individual, in which are actions, right? But right reason presupposes the beginnings from which reason, what? Goes forward. But it's necessary for reason to proceed, right? About particulars, not only from universal beginnings, but also from, what? Particular beginnings. Yeah. Now, about the universal beginnings of things to be done, a man has himself rightly through the natural, what? Understanding of beginnings. Through which a man knows that nothing bad should be done, right? Or also through, what? Some practical science, right? You study the Indicamagian ethics, right? But this does not suffice to reasoning rightly about, what? Particular. Particularism. For it happens sometimes that the universal beginning of this sort, known by, what? Understanding or by science, right? Is corrupted in particular, right? By some, what? Passion. What's the expression? An offer, I couldn't resist. Can't resist. Just as to the one who is, what? Has concubiscence, right? For when concubiscence conquers, right? It seems that this is good what one desires. Even though it be against the universal judgment of reason, right? And therefore, just as a man is disposed to have himself rightly about the universal beginnings, either through natural understanding, right? Or through the habit of science. So also that he have himself rightly about the particular beginnings of things to be done, which are the ends, because it is necessary that he be perfected by some habits by which it becomes in a way to man a natural right to write the judge about the, what? In. And this comes about through moral virtue. For the virtuous man write the judges about the end of virtue. Because such as a man is, so does he and seem to him. Thomas will go back to that when he's talking about damnation, right? You can't change your habits there. Once you're out of time, you're out of time. And therefore, for right reason about things to be done, which is foresight, it's required that man have what? More virtue. Socrates didn't quite see that, huh? Now what about this before and after? These guys have looked before and after. To the first effort should be said that reason, according as it is grasping the end, comes before the, what? Desire of the end, huh? You can't desire it unless you know it in some way, right? But the desire of the end goes before reasoning about choosing those things that are, what? For the end. Which pertains to prudence, huh? Well, Thomas is seeing distinction there, right? The way in which reason is before the appetite there and the way in which the appetite is before reason. Just as also in speculative matters, the understanding of beginnings is the beginning of reasoned syllogizing, huh? Well, what about the second objection, huh? To the second it should be said that the beginnings of artificial things are not judged by us well or badly according to the disposition of our appetite as the ends, which are the beginnings of what? Moral matters. But only by the consideration of reason. And therefore art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite just as prudence requires, huh? Is Thomas conducting himself what he said earlier? I was going to say, yeah. See? Yeah. But is that, you know, that desire of the end that is proper to the virtue, right? I mean, to the art, you know, is not a virtue perfecting, what? Maybe the sense appetite, right? There's got to be some intention of that end, right? what one intends to make, right? Sort of like... The cook didn't intend to make the food tasty, let's say, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I was thinking of that some years ago when we were talking about marriage, and some people think that marriage is something other than what it actually is. Are they actually getting married? They're intending something that isn't marriage. Is that a marriage? It happens all the time. Yeah, that's the problem. That's what we have. Moral, or excuse me, mental breakdown. I remember when Brother Richard was getting married, he was getting married, and the priest, you know, he was happy to marry them, you know, because he thought they'd stay together, you know. These married people, he thought, you know, they're not going to stay together, you know, at least they don't. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of discouraged that way. That's right. I know Father Abbott said that once about priests, I don't know, Boston, some big archdiocese, and I think they took a survey and had the clergy all meeting, and we had a big whole bunch of them, and lots of experience, many years have been around, and what did they find the least, or they might say the most difficult, what's the word, or what he was. The distasteful, the most disagreeable part of their priestly ministry, they all said, wedding preparations. The marriage prep, he said, it's like they're on another planet. They don't have any of what they're doing, and they don't care. So it's like the most uncomfortable and distasteful part of their priestly ministry. I'm more concerned about the flowers and that. Where did it start? I'd be real tempted if I were a marriage priest to say, just go to a JP, and we'll talk later. Finish the ceremony, and then come back to me, and walk to instruction. That'd be a real temptation. And the old shotgun winnings, you're more esteemable than the ones they have now. You think a shotgun winning would not be? I'm very seeing a woman say, you know, she's like this term, illegitimate child, right? You know. You might call it a love child. Yeah. I heard somebody say, I just read an article about, it was a comment about Donald DeMarco, who writes articles. And he was commenting on a comment from Peggy Noon, who writes Wall Street, a journal. She was at some play production. I don't know what the play was, but it was something from the 50s or 60s. And there's this moral dilemma in a scene, and this young woman is, she talks about her, she's pregnant, and she wants to have an abortion. She mentions this in the play. When the play was produced, that's meant to be a dramatic moment, and everybody's supposed to be horrified. She said she was at the play, and everybody cheered when she said that. Like, what? We have no judgment about these things at all. We don't get it. That's what she, he calls it, inculturation, not inculturation. When in culture, you're closed during yourself, and this is our complete system, and nothing else fits into it. So, there's no option for life anymore. That's not, that's off the radar. The only good thing is the worst you're doing. Wow. They're just closed in on their own universe. I was first in Worcester there, you know. I was still a bachelor, you know. I was living in a place that was rented out kind of rooms, you know, kitchen privileges and so on. We had to know a young man, and he'd gotten married, right? And they'd been married for a while. And they found out that his wife was, you know, taking, you know, at a… Conception pill. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Unbeknownst to him, right? Because she had no intention of having children at all. She just wanted to get married for social reasons, you know. And he wanted children very much, you know. And so, this seemed to me, you know, to be, you know, a reason, yeah, yeah. And so, I guess the, she was willing to, you know, testify that she had no intention of having children, right? She wasn't hiding the fact, right? Yeah. And I guess the priest who married them was convinced that she was, you know, in this situation, you know. So, I went and I went and talked to Canon Lord, you know. I said, well, you could have some witnesses beforehand, you know. Well, is she going to tell some witnesses beforehand, you know? But here she's willing to testify that she had no intention, you know, children. And the priest who married them was, you know, talking to her and him, you know, was convinced that this is what the situation is, you know. And the Canon Lord is saying that this is beforehand, like, she's supposed to have told you and you. You know, I'm getting married so often, I don't know if she's having children. But I mean, it seems to me like, you know, I mean, if they're lying, which I don't think they were at all, either one of them, you know, she's willing to admit. There's a call to judgment there. Yeah, yeah, it seems, I don't know, I don't know if, that seems to be, you know, reasonable, you know. I know it was said, I've heard from a fellow who said that way back when, who was his own wife or somebody else that he had talked to, but I guess back in the day, maybe in the 50s and 60s, since then I can't imagine anybody who does this anymore, but if a married woman wanted to have some kind of contraceptive implant in her body, they had to get the husband to sign agreement, otherwise the doctor wouldn't do it. Because it has to be agreement. Today, who cares? Who cares? Yes. At least they had some sense of what the purpose of marriage is, and it's a consensual. I'll see if you finish this article, yeah. The last, actually. Okay. To the third, it should be said, then, that foresight not only is bene conciliativa, right, but also bene edictiva, and bene, what, preceptiva, right? Mm-hmm. And especially that last thing cannot be, unless they're removed, is removed, the impediment of passions corrupting the judgment, right? Mm-hmm. And the command of prudence, right? So he says it's affecting the judgment and the command of prudence, not so much the, what, not so much the consul, right? The consul. What's the name of that diplomat that worked for Napoleon there? What's the Italian man? Yeah. He was good in consul, right? But he was kind of a scoundrel in his personal life, as far as I know, you know? I mean, he was pretty good for getting friends, you know, off, you know, with these deliberations with the victorious powers and Napoleon fell, you know, and so on. He was a pretty smart guy, you know, but he was not. Yeah. Mm-hmm. So, now before you, let me start a little bit. Mm-hmm. So we have to frame them here to question 59. Then we're not to consider about the distinction of the moral virtues, right? To each other, right? And because the moral virtues, which are about passions, are distinguished according to the diversity of the passions, it's necessary first to consider the comparison of virtue to passion. And then secondly, the distinction of the moral virtues according to the passions. And that's going to be the next question, right? You know, this is presupposed to that. So about the first five things are asked, whether moral virtue is their passion. It's emotion, right? You used to ask kids, what is love? I said, what's a feeling, yeah? I said, well, there's a love, there's a feeling for this. The end of all. You start. Secondly, whether moral virtue is able to be with passion, right? Well, that's an attack upon the Stoics, right, huh? You know, the Stoics seem to speak that way. And, of course, Shakespeare has that pun, you know, the Stoics, don't be such stocks, you know, like he said. No. Third, whether it can be with sadness, huh? That's very interesting. Fourth, whether every moral virtue is about passion, right? Or emotions. And whether there can be some moral virtue without passion, huh? He's a very thoughtful guy, Scott Thomas, you know. Never met anybody so thoughtful, you know. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that moral virtue is a passion, huh? For the middle is of the same genus with the extremes. But moral virtue is a middle among the passions. Therefore, moral virtue is a passion, right? What is it? A middle in the passions? Or does it establish a middle in the passions with the same? I don't see. More virtue and vice, since they are contraries, are in the same, what? Genus. But some passions are said to be, what? Vices. Such as envy and, what? Anger, right? It used to give us something in grade school there, you know, catechism, anger is a vice, right? Or something else. Then we find out that Christ is angry, right? At one time there, it did exorcism. Therefore, also, some passions are virtues, right? So some vices are passions, and some virtues must be passions, right? Because they're the same genus, contraries. That's a nice, interesting thing, huh? Moreover, mercy is a certain, what? Passion, huh? For it is sadness about the, what? Evils of others, right? As has been said above, huh? But this, Cicero, right, huh? Hey, what? My marvelous speaker, right? Does not doubt to be called a, what? Virtue, right? When I was talking about that kind of romance on the, mercy and forgiveness romances, I call them, right? There'd be six of them in Shakespeare. Good place. As Augustine says in the ninth book of, what? The City of God, huh? Therefore, passion can be a moral, what? Virtue, huh? But against this is what is said in the second book of Ethics, that passions are neither virtues nor, what? Vices, I suppose. I didn't see any, right? Now, what does the Master say? See, I think Thomas should be called the Magister, not Lombard, but anyway. Thomas should be called the commentator, not of Eros, right? I think it should be said that moral virtue is not able to be a, what? Passion. And this is clear for a threefold, what? Reason, right? First, because passion is a certain motion, right? Because we use the word in English, we use the word, what? Emotion, right? Which comes from the word motion, right? Of course, when Aristotle takes a motion in the third book of the Physics, it's, and he talks about axial and patio, right? Okay? So by kicking you is, you're being kicked are kind of the same thing, right? But moral virtue is not some motion, right, but more a beginning of some, what? Appetitive motion, existing as a certain, what? Habit, right? It's more a habit than a, what? Yeah. And it's a source of some appetitive motion, right? Secondly, because passions from themselves do not have the, what? Of good or bad, right? Why? Because the good or the bad of man is to be in accordance with reason. That's what Dianisha says too, right? Whence passions, yeah, considered by themselves, right, have themselves to good and to bad according as they're able to agree with reason or, well, agree. Yeah. Convenire, come together with reason. It's kind of interesting, isn't it? That's kind of concrete, huh? You know, Shakespeare says, you know, something about love and reason don't keep much company nowadays, right? And that's, you know, to pity someone doesn't make them better acquainted, he says, you know. You know? But that kind of fits the word convenire, right? Come, I mean, you know, ethologically, huh? It's come together with, right? Come with, yeah. Yeah. But nothing such is able to be a virtue, since virtue has itself only to the, what? Good. Good, huh? As has been said above, right, huh? Third, because it being given that some passion has itself only to the good, right, or only to the bad, right? So we tend to speak of pity as, what, passion that's good, right? And envy is a passion that's bad, right, huh? So given that this is so in some way, it's a kundamalikomodum, right, in some way. Nevertheless, the motion of a passion, insofar as there's a passion, has a beginning in the, what? Yeah. And a term in, what? Reason. Yeah. In the conformity to which the appetite, what? Tends, right? But the motion of virtue is the reverse. For it has a beginning in reason, and an end in the, what? When there's that power. According as it is moved, what? By reason, right? When it's in the definition of moral virtue, it is said in the second book of the Ethics, that it is a habit, right? Electivus, meaning choosing habit or a habit with choice. In the middle, right? Consisting in the middle. Determined by, what? Reason. As the wise would, what? To you. So wise men is to measure these things, right? To get yourself a good, what do you call? Not many men are wise. Yeah. So, like I was saying, to the first therefore it should be said that virtue, according to its essence, is not a middle among passions, but it's a middle according to its effect. Because it constitutes a middle among the passions, right? So that comes up in the virtue of evidence too, right? There is sick that surfeth too much is in star with nothing, right? There's no mean happiness, therefore, to be constituted in the mean. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. So, like I said, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say The second should be said, if vice is said to be a habit by which someone acts badly, it is manifest that no passion is a what? Vice. If, however, a sin is called a what? Vice, which is a vicious act, right? That's nothing that prevents a passion to be a what? Vice. And contrary, to run together to the act of virtue, according as a passion is either contrary to reason or follows the act of what? Reason, huh? What's he saying here, huh? Why are envy and anger, those are the ones he takes here, right, huh? Why are they, what, in some way call it vices because incliners, I suppose, right? To do something, what, bad, right, huh? Every time you pick up the daily newspaper, which I'm glad you don't do, but there's always somebody who got angry with somebody and shot him or knifed him or something. So many vicious things going on out there, you know? And envy, you know, what envy does, right? You know, that's it. Well, at the end of Julius Caesar there, right? And he kind of praises Brutus, right? Others did what they did out of envy of great Caesar. He did out of concern for the common good, right? He thought he was going to make himself a tyrant. Villains, you know? He did out of envy, right? And that's true about, didn't it? Somebody's talking about Christ, too, isn't it? He's probably the Pilate, don't it? Yeah, yeah. Something else. Yeah, yeah. So envy is quite a thing, you know? One of the previous translations that Father Elias made of one of our hymns is a supplication on Friday, I think. Well, no, it's for Sunday. He gives a little overview of the history of salvation, the incarnation, verse by verse. And the old way he had it translated, it changed it probably to be more diplomatic. But he said, the envy is crucifying. That's what he translated. I think that's probably a more literal translation. I don't remember. I had to look at it. But they dropped the envious part. Yeah, I see that academic will, you know, envy there, you know. Well, where would you think? They say, well, that's half the faculty gone now. How many did I get to be saying that? Don't it survives? I'll show you that Latin, I guess, in virtue of Pope John Paul II, before he became Pope, and he was in Poland. There were only two cardinals in Poland at that time, him and Wyszynski. And he was commenting on something about, well, maybe it was the other way around, maybe somebody else was commenting on him, whatever it was. I think he was commenting about the cardinals of Poland. Yeah. And he's referred to Wyszynski as two-thirds of the cardinals of Poland. Even though there's only two. He's more than half the cardinals of Poland. So there's a legacy between the passion and the vice, right? The virtue, for that matter, right? It inclines you, right? So pity probably, but in glory words, it inclines you to do something good, right? And envy, you know, something bad, right? See women being envious of each other, you know, sometimes. What was I reading? All the evils, all the hardships and misery you bring on ourselves, right? By this kind of ending all of you. What was I reading? It was describing a woman going out and she does all these awful things to herself and she makes herself miserable so she can have a moment to look good in front of other people and stuff like that. And she's always miserable because she's worried about what everybody else is doing, whatever it is. She's like, see, how can this be happiness? What was I reading? I can't remember what it was reading. It was describing this kind of thing. They told the story of the woman coming in, you know, to the meeting at the White House there, you know, with the president's wife, not the prison one. And I guess the president's wife had on the same hat, this woman coming in. So this woman, when she saw it, she had the same hat on, she quickly took her hat and turned it upside down. So I'm like, what the heck? I don't care if I came out and some guy had the same hat I have, you know. I said, hey, I like your hat. I went up to Thomas Ward there one time to talk, you know, and the president of the college was there, Chris. And he had the same suit on that I had on, you know. So I thought, yes, I was good with both conservatives. We had the same style suit. But it didn't bother me. I'd try to turn my suit inside out. The third one now. The third should be said that mercy is said to be a virtue. That is the act of a virtue, right? Because we sometimes say that, right? That's justice, right? Justice will be done. That means it will be a just act. Same way here. Secondum quad, huh? The motion, that motion, right? The state of the soul serves, what? Reason, right, huh? When thus, what? Mercy is bestowed. The justice is conserved, right, huh? Whether it's given to something in need, right? Or when one, what? Forgives the one who's penitent, right? As Augustine says there, right? If, however, mercy is said to be some habit by which man is perfected, to reasonably take him mercy, right? Nothing prevents mercy to be said to be a what? Yeah, yeah. And the same reason is about similar passions, right? I was telling you about that case in the parish there, you know, where some woman was complaining to somebody about criticizing abortion, right? Because it makes some woman feel bad, right? Well, that's kind of a false, what? Compassion. Yeah, yeah, false mercy, you know. And so if I went to the pastor to complain about it, and he said, well, they should feel sorry about it, and he says, it's a serious sin, you know. Yeah, yeah. So I put her in her place, and I was just like, you know, you get the... That's the kind of thing Charles Bonnell refers to, he refers to some kind of pastoral practices where they refer to it as a kind of pious way, a loving way of dealing with a certain kind of penitence because their sins are sort of understandable, like young couples are constantly fornicating or something. It's just, well, you should treat them easily because, you know, they're just in love, and he calls them an impious kind of piety. Yeah. You're not helping them. Okay. Can I have one more, I think? Sure. Little kids come in the night. Up and down. You do. Up and down the steps. Up and down the steps. They don't come in here. No. They weren't there to come in. I was telling you earlier about the little kid next door, right? Did I tell you that story about the little one? He's in the kindergarten now. The last one, he came there. Of course, his mother was going around with him because he was a little kid. And he'd taken off his mask, you know, and his mother said, He took off his mask, he didn't want to scare you. You're concerned about me, you know? Don't give him a heart to that. That's so cute, though. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that moral virtue is not able to be with passion, right? For the philosopher says in the fourth book of places, that the mild one is the one who does not what? Yeah. But the patient one is the one who suffers and is not what? Led astray by it, right? Okay? And the same reason can be given about all the moral virtues. Therefore, every what? Is without passion, right? More of a virtue is a certain right habitudo, right? Habitudo, yeah. Sometimes it has a sense of relation, but disposition, right? In the soul, just as health of the body, as it's said in the seventh book of natural hearing. Whence virtue seems to be a certain health of the soul, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And vice is a sickness of the soul, right? He's sick, I say to some people. Okay. As Tully says in the fourth book of the Toscanon questions. But the passions of the soul are called certain, what? Sicknesses, right? Yeah. Of the soul, as Tully says, Cicero says in the same book. But health does not, what? Suffer with itself. Sickness, right? Mm-hmm. Therefore, virtue does not suffer with itself. Okay. Not compatible with it, right? Mm-hmm. We'd say that comes the same root there. Mm-hmm. The passion of the soul, right? Mm-hmm. Moreover, number three here, moral virtue requires a perfect use of reason, even in the particular, right? Mm-hmm. But this is impeded by passions, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics, that pleasure is corrupt. The, what? Estimate of foresight on Putin's. Watch out for pleasure. That's what Aristotle wants us about that. And Salas, though, says in his thing on what? Calon. On the thing, yeah. Calon conspiracy. That the soul does not, what? Easily see the true, where, what? Those things are active, right? The passions of the soul. Therefore, moral virtue is not able to be with, what? Action. Mm-hmm. But against this is what the great Augustine says in the 14th book about the city of God. But if the will is perverse, right, it also has, what, perverse motions, right, of passions, that's to say. Mm-hmm. If, however, the will is right, not only are the passions, what? Incomitable. Not guilty. Praiseworthy. Even praiseworthy, right? But nothing praiseworthy is excluded through moral virtue. Therefore, moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but can be with them. That's interesting. It's nice to take some of this to know. I know Mother Teresa used to say that, too, about that. I think she used an example of the emotions. If you see someone in need, and you have the emotion of compassion for them, you feel the city for them, then that actually can make your good deed more virtuous. Yeah. Because you move on somebody to be more generous or whatever. So is shame good? Mm-hmm. Shame? Well, there's a shame that's praiseworthy, and a shame that's shameful. Yeah. I answer, it should be said that about this there was discord between the Stoics and the Peripateticals, which are the Aristotelians, right? Mm-hmm. As Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God, For the Stoics laid down that the passions of the soul cannot be found in the wise man, or in the virtuous man, right? Mm-hmm. So there's Stoics, as Shakespeare puns on that, right? Stoics, he said Stoics. But the Peripatetics, I guess they were named because they walked around when he lectured, right? Mm-hmm. Who sacked Aristotle, what, instituted, right? As Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God, laid down that the passions could be together, right? Sino at the same time, with moral virtue, right? Mm-hmm. But the passions is reduced to what? The middle, right? So it tells us about human, right? Mm-hmm. So they start to think of the Peripatetics as being between the Stoics and the, you know, the Epicureans, right? Mm-hmm. And the Epicureans go in one direction, you know? Together. Yeah, yeah. One won't eliminate the passions altogether, the other ones are going to kind of give in to the passions, you know? Oscar Wilde. I can resist anything except temptation. Yeah. You know, he said, the best way to handle a temptation is to give in to it. Finishes it right off. It's very funny, but it's very wicked, too, what he's saying. Being down to the house, he said, isn't it serious? Yes. Now, notice that this is cautionary now. This diversity, as Augustine says there, is more secundum verba, right? Mm-hmm. Than according to their very, what, positions, right? For the Stoics did not distinguish between the, what, intellectual appetitive power, which is the will, right? Mm-hmm. And what? Sense. And between, yeah, the sense, desire, and power, which is divided, by the irascible and the, what, accusable, or in epithumia, and thumas in Greek, right? They did not distinguish in, what, in this soul from the other affection of human affections, right? Mm-hmm. That the passions of the soul are motions of the sensitive, what, desiring power. Well, the other affections, which are not passions of the soul, are motions of the intellectual desiring power, which is called the will, right? Just as the, what, therapeutetics distinguished them, right, huh? But only, as you guard this, that the passions, they called some affections that were repugnant to, what, reason, right? Well, that would be a disagreement in words, right? But not in the thing. Mm-hmm. But if they arise from deliberation in the wise men or in the, what? Virtuous. Virtuous men. They cannot be, right, huh? If however they arise suddenly, this can happen in the virtuous man, right, huh? For the things seen of the soul, which are called, what, phantasms, are not in our power, but they will sometimes happen to the soul, right, huh? And when they come from, what, terrible things, right, huh? It's necessary that they move the soul of the, what, wise men, huh? That he be, what, a little bitter, I guess, at times? A little bitter, fear. Yeah. Terrible fear. Yeah. A fear. Or be contracted in some way by sadness, right, huh? Nevertheless, these passions come before the, what, work of reason, right, huh? Nevertheless, they, what? Prove. Yeah. As Augustine narrates in the Ninth Principle of God, said by, what, somebody called a jellius, Thus, therefore, if passions are called disordered affections, they cannot be in the virtuous man, right, huh? Thus, that after deliberation he consents to them, as the Stoics lay down. If, however, if, however, the passions are said to be, whatever, they cannot be, whatever, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot be, they cannot emotions of the sense of appetite, thus they can be in the virtuous man according as they are ordered by what? Reason. Reason, right? When Sarah Stiles says in the second book of the Ethics that what? Some. Yeah, they do not well determine the virtues to be what? Impassibilitatis, without passions, right? And rests because they say what? They speak simply. Yeah, but they ought to say that they are what? At rest from passions which are as they ought not to be, right? And when they ought not to be, right? They can hug your children, I guess, right? How about this text from Aristotle? Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher induces that example, just as many other ones in the logical books, not according to his own opinion, but according to the opinion of others, right? This is the point that Thomas makes more than once about Aristotle, right? For this was the opinion of the Stoics, right? That virtues were without the passions of soul, which opinion the philosopher excludes in the second book of the Ethics, huh? Saying that virtues are not, what? Yeah. How would you translate that, right? But not being able to be moved, right? Emotional, right, yeah. Yeah, by passion. But it can ever, however it can be said, that when it is said that the mild man does not undergo, it should be understood, does not undergo a, what? Disordered passion, right, huh? And that's the way Saul's objection from Tullius, right, huh? And it proceeds about passions according as they signify, what? Disordered affections, right? Now, maybe he's being too kind to the Stoics, right? You know, because sometimes they seem to, you know, to say, you don't have any things at all, right? Your wife and children are being killed and you just, you know, like you do anything about it, so I won't feel anything about it either, you know? Sorry, I always tell people who are pacifists, they say, do you think a man whose wife's being beaten and his children are being, you know, killed, and he should say, offer it up, dear? Turn the other cheek off. And that would be, you should go fight for that. So he says, a passion coming before the judgment of reason, if it overcomes, right, it prevails in the soul, that one consent to it, right, then it impedes the console and the judgment of reason, right? If however it follows, as it were, commanded by reason, right, it aids or, what, to carrying out the command of, what, reason, right? So if you're shooting, using my kids to target practice, right, and anger that comes from my considered judgment about this matter, what helped me to, you know? Or if you're stepping on my toe and I say, you know, you're on top of my toe, and you say, so what? That's your problem, buddy. You know, a little bit of anger would be, help me to carry out the pulse of this attack upon my toes. I better stop now so I can get home and for the...