Prima Secundae
Lecture 155: Moral Virtue, Passion, and the Distinction of Virtues

Transcript
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And I said, well, now, do the saints, what, pray for us, huh? Yeah, but do they pray for themselves? I said, well, just for their body. You want their body back? That's all they need, right? So they may be praying for us, you know. But now, when the number of the elect is completed and everybody gets their body back, right, huh? Then there won't be much reason to ask God for anything. You'll just be praising him and thanking him forever, right? Forevermore, but you didn't need anything, right? But now that you want their body back, that's all for themselves, but maybe they're praying for us, right, huh? There's a part I was reading by Thomas. He's quite clear about that, you know, that the saints know what goes on down here on the earth. It's kind of interesting. He's talking about that. So they may hear your prayers, right, huh? Then we pray for the souls in the purgatory. But I assume the saints do, too. So it's really kind of marvelous, this communion of saints. The marvelous, I have to go to faith. Yeah. Is it possible for the souls in purgatory to pray for each other? I don't remember anybody saying that. I think they could in some way, you know, pray, but... But I've never heard people say, you know. I remember somebody... I think many of us praying for them, you know, but see, the saints would also. Yeah, they can't merit for themselves. But I remember somebody said, I expressed it as, they can't pray for themselves. And he said, you mean they can't say, God, have mercy on me? And I said, well, he would say, I did, you're in purgatory. I remember Father Stanley, you know, this priest I admired the most of my youthful days, you know. And when my father died, she really told my mother, you know, never stop praying for him because we don't know when anybody gets out of purgatory, you know. But he's never saying, you know, well, now it's like praying for him. He's all the things. He's all the things. Yeah. I got plenty of indulgence today, so that's it. We've got, you know, if he's already in heaven, you know, then you expect those prayers are going to go to somebody else, right? Yeah. The heavenly recycling bin. Yeah. Just turn them over or something like that. Yeah. That's a little bit of a radical in the faith, me and the saints, let's see. I don't know if the Protestants have too much of an understanding of that. They kind of, a lot of them, it seems, they reject the idea that saints even know about us. And if they did, they wouldn't care or something. It seems kind of inhuman. Yeah. Well, it's just souls, right? You kind of get picked up very much from Thomas. You know, Peter's not in heaven, right? But the soul of Peter's in heaven, right? And so when he spoke to, I guess, Pius XII, right? That's part of the argument, right? That if Mary's body had not been assumed into heaven, right? Then Mary would not be in heaven, right? It would be the soul of Mary that's in heaven, right? But the person is the... So she had to be, you know, Your body had to be assumed in heaven, right? So Mary could be in heaven, right? Give us it. Get beautiful things in the... In Sumption Sondi Thani. Very good. Yeah, I have an article there about the... The grace of Mary's over the hypostatic order. You can see that, right, huh? Because of being the mother of God, huh? I think that's what I've heard some people say about... That's maybe one way of expressing why she said, I am the immaculate conception, Not just I was conceived immaculate. It's something that pertains to our own person. It's like a dignity of a person. Yeah, and it's kind of a... She's a mediatrix of all grace, right? So she's kind of... It's kind of a salative for causality there. You express it with the abstract, right? In a sense, huh? God is wisdom itself, right? Because he's the source of all wisdom, right? Not that we are immaculate conceived, but our purification, right? Comes through her, what? Intercession, right? Pray for our sinners now. And at the hour of our death, right? Yes. Well chosen, those words. In that second part of the Hail Mary is what comes to the tradition of the Church, right? It was not in Scripture. The first part is taken from the words of Scripture, right? Of the angel and Elizabeth, yeah. But the other words are very... The words of the tradition are very well chosen, I think, it seems to me. You follow the order of the other thing, too. It says, you see, Holy Mary, that corresponds, what? To the Lord's Word. And then, Mother of God, that's the second part there. Blessed art thou. This is the order. It is in the order, you know? It is in the order. I have priests say that the famous exorcism case that was the basis for the book and the movie is called The Exorcist. Yeah. A Jesuit that I was working in a parish where I was long ago, I think he knew the Jesuit who did part of the exorcism or whatever, but he was involved with it. He said that one of the things that drove the demon, made him very angry and got him, let's say, afflicted him, was that part of the Hail Mary. Holy Mary, Mother of God. That was why he said it drove him absolutely bonkers. He didn't want that. It was really afflicting him. I don't know how to explain it, but maybe his personal trial and fall was over that particular truth or something or pertain to that. Because that really afflicted him. Well, somebody associated with the movie was on EWTN, being interviewed by Raymond Roy. And I guess this movie is one of the most people who are following the most frightening movie of all. Right. You know. But it was kind of interesting when he was talking about how this influenced the producer and so on, you know, about the faith and so on. Because the evidence is pretty strong there, you know. But anyway, then he, how do you get talking about Georgetown, right? Yeah. I guess in the law school at Georgetown, they've got a special unit there that's teaching women how to, you know, support their abortion stuff and the thing. And so the guy says, the demons are loose. It's strange to have been talking about all this, you know. In the movie, you know, where you're always, the demons are loose. He's on the campus there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The guy that wrote the book is a graduate of Georgetown. That made me the connection there. Yeah, yeah. But I think it was... Yeah, this is the guy who wrote the book, I think, yeah. Yeah, the guy that wrote the book, I think he placed the plot, he placed the story in Washington, D.C. But I think it actually was in St. Louis. And it was a boy in the middle of a row or something. Yeah, yeah. Well, that's a very appropriate to say that thing about his own mother. Demons are loose, right? Yeah, really. He's the one who brought the suit, the canonical suit against the school because they're no longer Catholic, he says. And so it's actually the Cardinal Lodge of Washington has approved that it go on in the back. He has no objection that this suit go on, that they take away their Catholic title. I was noticing there at the other Jesuit school, well, Marymount, right? I guess the administration finally decided not to accept this, you know, health thing with the abortion thing. And some of the faculty, of course, were very disturbed, you know, so we have a choice to make between being a great school in the Jesuit, Marymount tradition, or being one that obeys, you know, church students. Oh, boy. I said, Rosie, this is a clear example of this mindset of these people, you know, which is... Wow. Wow. Declaration of Independence. I don't know how many faculty say this thing, but I hope I can say a group of these things. Can we finish the replies here, I guess? One in the second. Second one, then the third one. To the third, it should be said that in some virtues are, what, passions as their own, what, matter, right? In some, not, huh? Whence there is not the same reason about all of them as we'll be seeing that are on it. Mm-hmm. Okay. Is it a table break? Is it a table break? Mm-hmm. I guess. To the fifth one goes forward thus. It seems that moral virtue is able to be without, what? Passion, right? For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more it, what, overcomes or excels, right? The passions. Therefore, in its, what, most perfect being, right? It is altogether without passions, right? More, then, each thing is perfect when it is remote from its contrary, and from those things which incline to the, what, contrary. But passions or emotions incline one to sin, which is contrary to virtue, of course. In Romans chapter 7, they are called the passions of sin, right? The flesh, what, fights against the spirit, yeah. The flesh is the place where the emotions are, right? As Faustus say, you know, I get more flesh there for us. I should be excused, right, for my life. Therefore, okay, perfect virtue is altogether without passion, right? Moreover, according to what? Virtue we are conformed to God, right? As Augustine himself says in the book on the morals of the church, right? But God does everything without passion, huh? Without emotion, right? And therefore, the most perfect virtue is without, what, all passion, right? That's a good objection. Hmm? That's a good objection. Yeah, there's some truth to that, right? Yeah. But there's some virtues that are about passions we saw before. But against this is that no one is just who does not, what, rejoice in just doing, right? As is said in the first book of the Ethics. But joy is a, what, passion. Therefore, justice is not able to be without passion. And much more of the other virtues, right? And there's a joy, maybe, but it's in the will, too, right? Thomas often quotes that passage of Aristotle in the seventh book about God's rejoicing, right? But not rejoicing, it is. Emotion. Hence, it should be said that if we call passions disordered affections, right? As the, what, stoics lay down. Then it is manifest that pure virtue is without, what? Passions, right? But if by passions we mean or call all motions of the sense-desiring power, it is clear that moral virtues, that the moral virtues which are about the passion, as about their own matter, are not able to be without, what, passions. So you can't have temperance without, what? Yeah. You can't, if you have no hunger or thirst, right? You can't have. But, yeah. And the reason for this is because, according to this, it would follow that moral virtue makes the sense-desiring power altogether, what? It does not, however, pertain to, what? Virtue, and that those things which are subject to reason should give up their own, what? Acts. Yeah. But that they follow the command of reason in doing their, what? Own acts, right? Whence, just as virtue orders the, what, limbs of the body, right? To suitable exterior acts, right? So, it, what, virtue orders the sense-desire to order, what, motions of its own kind, right? But the moral virtues which are not about passions as their, what, object, right? But about operations can be without, what, passions, right? And a virtue of this sort is justice, which is in the will, right? So, that's the reason why in God we can speak of, what, properly, not metaphorically, that God is, what, just, right, huh? But you couldn't say, properly, that he's, what? Yeah, or courageous, right? Okay. You couldn't even say metaphorically that he's temperate, huh? You couldn't even say metaphorically that he's strong, okay? There's something like this between what God does and what the brave man does, right? But not reading texts between God and what the temperate man does, right? Eating and drinking moderately and so on. Because through these virtues, the will is applied to its own act, which is not a, what, undergoing, right? But nevertheless, there follows to the act of justice, joy, at least a joy that is in the, what, will. And this is the joy that God talks about, it's more joy in heaven, right? That's even the angels, right? They don't have emotions either. You don't, you know, you're, you're, you know, it doesn't have any, you know, it doesn't have any, you know, it doesn't have any emotional about what you're converting, but it's joy, right, or your conversion. Okay. Which is not a passion. And if this joy is multiplied by the perfection of justice, right, there comes about a, what, a, overflowing, right, eh, a redundancy, eh, overflowing of joy down to the, what, sense appetite, right? And a famous example of that is, what, St. Teresa of Avila, you know, coming out of her cell and trying to dance and sing about it. Yeah. That's overflow, right? Right. Into the body, right, eh? Okay. I'm sure there was that too, that when the apostles met the risen Christ, right, there was, the body was, what, the joy in the soul. Overflowed into the, what, body, right, eh? You see that even as a philosophy, you know, if you're trying to understand something, all of a sudden you see it, ah! Even physically you feel, what, better, right, eh? But if you can't, if you can't solve it, if you can't, then, then kind of, you know, the sadness overflows in the body too, right? The body's tired, eh? According as the lower powers follow the motion of the, what, higher wounds, eh? And thus, through this overflowing, the more the virtue is perfect, then the more it, what, causes the, what, passion. It's interesting, right? Because it's an overflow, right, eh? Notice as we apply now to the first ejection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that virtue overcomes, what, disordered passions or emotions, right? But it produces, right, moderated ones, eh? To second, it should be said that it's disordered passions to lead one to, what, sin, right, eh? Not over ones that are, what? Yeah, yeah. It's more struck, you know, by the fact that tragedy, you know, is defined by Aristotle and defined by Shakespeare in the premium, in the prologue to Roman Juliet, right? It moves us to pity and, what, fear, right, eh? But doesn't that emotion of pity, you know, dispose people, well, to helping others, right? Didn't feel any pity, you know? But if you have concern about others, then you're going to feel pity, you know, when you hear that somebody is dying or sick or some other misfortunes happen to them, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? I mean, doesn't tragedy have kind of a civilizing effect upon people too, right? She expressed some interesting things, her body. It's better to be, what? How much better it is to be sad or, you know, to weep at good fortune than to rejoice in bad fortune, right? Some people would say, really nice happens to them, you know, they start to cry, you know? They shouldn't be joyful, right? But kind of overcome. It's kind of an interesting thing. But if you rejoice when bad things happen to people, there's something wrong with you. He definitely stands these things. You know, I was reading my new Hudson edition of Hamlet yesterday, a little bit in the introductory sections here and so on. And he was talking about this famous British actress there in the 19th century, Ellen Fawcett, have you heard of her? And on the phone today with Uncle Warren, I said, have you heard of Ellen Fawcett? I heard of her, but anyway, he was quoting something that she had said about these. And she played many, many Shakespeare roles, you know, and so on. So I guess she started writing letters to her friends talking about how she regarded this or that female character that Shakespeare had, and they said, this is so good, you've got to put this in a book, right? And so she finally went to a book, you know, where she talks about, maybe about eight different female characters in Shakespeare, Juliet and Desdemona and so on, Imogen. And so I'm going to read it now and start looking at it. But in the beginning there she's saying, you know, we have an infinite debt to Shakespeare, you know, because he's represented so well what is most, what, really pleasing in a woman, right? What's really most noble and so on woman, you know? It makes a woman really, really good woman. And a beautiful text. Infinite debt, though, you know? I said, well, Shakespeare, you know, he understands women better than he understands themselves. I mean, there's another book, you know, I forget the name of the author now, but she wrote this book on the female characters of Shakespeare, right? And I'd seen it quoted in a number of these, you know, 19th century editions and so on. You know, it was out at Thomas Aquinas College that they had it in the library, you know, so I had everybody take it out for me, and I went to the thing when I was there, you know. But they're very, you know, appreciative of these, intelligent women, you know. I think this is the same woman who did the thing on the Madonna's too, you know, she went around to Europe and put a book on all the different Madonna's, you know, in Europe. But, I mean, we have a good understanding of what it is to be feminine, you know, in a good sense. So this, you know, in Fawcett seems kind of interesting, you know. What's the name of the book by the actress? I forget, it's called something like, some of the characters, the female characters, I forget the exact title of it, you know. Don't you see the Fawcett, the women's, the Fawcett thing? Yeah, the album in the Fawcett, yeah. You can even fit it around, you can find it basically in translation, you know. They have the book, the biography too, by her husband, you know. Which is apparently quite a good woman, you know. Very much a biography by Queen Victoria. So she dedicated the book to Queen Victoria. But, it's good to see these very perspicacious women of this sort, you know. Appreciating, you know, Shakespeare's representation of the woman, right? That's interesting. That's a more objection, right? To three, it should be said, that the good in each thing is considered according to the condition of its, what? Nature. Nature, right? In God and in the angels, there is no, what? Sense-desiring power, because there's no body there, right? Just as there is in man, no, the sense-desiring power. And therefore, the good operation of God and the angel is omnino, altogether without, what? Passion. He's not an emotional guy. Just as it is without, what? Body, right, huh? But the good operation of man is with, what? Yeah, just as it is with the ministering of the, what? Service of the body, yeah. So Thomas sometimes says about certain thinkers, they forget they're men. Angelism. Yeah, yeah. Connect them with moms, too. Okay, we've got time for one more. All right, so we're going to question 60 now, which is the distinction of moral virtues to each other, right? Then we're not to consider about the distinction of moral virtues to each other. And about this, five things are asked. I didn't know that. First, whether there is only one moral virtue, huh? It's strange you should have such an article, huh? Second, whether the moral virtues, which are about operation, are distinguished from those which are about, what? Passions. Third, whether about operation there is only one moral virtue, right? Fourth, whether about diverse passions there are diverse moral virtues, right? So courage is about, what? Fear and boldness, right? Contemperance is about, what? Yeah? Pleasure. And mildness is about anger, right? So there's going to be that. And five, whether moral virtues are distinguished according to the diverse objects of the, what? Passions, right? First, whether there's only one moral virtue. Because if there's only one moral virtue, you don't have any distinction to be made, right? So this is kind of a fundamental question, right? Right. To the first, then, when it goes far thus, it seems that there's only one moral virtue. Who would think that? For just as in the moral virtues, direction pertains to what? Reason. Which is the, what? Reason. Which is the subject of the intellectual virtues, right? So also inclination pertains to the desiring power, which is the subject of the moral virtues. But there is one intellectual virtue directing in all the, what? Moral acts. To get foresight, right? Therefore, there's only one moral virtue inclining in all moral acts, right? Like I mentioned before, how in the dialogue called the Protagoras, right? Socrates asked Protagoras, are the cardinal virtues that we called him, right? And piety, he adds to the ones we have. Are the names of the same thing, or names of different things, right? And Protagoras says they're names of different things, right? Then Sarpy starts to argue that they're all, what? Yeah, yeah. And the most interesting argument is the argument that I mentioned, I think, last time. He argues that temperance and wisdom, practical wisdom, are the same thing, right? He does so because I think there's only one, what? Opposite, right? There's only one opposite of white, which is black, right? One opposite of virtue, which is vice, right? And what's the opposite of wisdom? Well, it's foolishness, right? But what's the opposite of what? Temperance. Well, it's foolish, right? You know, it's the man who drinks too much, and the man who says, woman makes a fool of himself, you know? And so, it seems that foolishness is opposed to temperance, and it's opposed to wisdom, but it's going to be opposed to one. So, it's got to be the same thing, right? Of course, you know, there's a similarity there between wisdom and modesty, right? Yeah, well, I mean, Shakespeare says, modest wisdom plucks me from over credulous haste there in Macbeth, right? Modest wisdom, right? I was looking at the Virgin Adventist there, and the guy who makes the wrong guess, you know, there is to which chest contains the picture of Portia, right, huh? There's a little scroll in there to put you in your place, right? If you had been wise as bold, right? Of course, there's a beautiful text from Dionysius the Aurology that Thomas comments on that the source of error is bold imagination, right? So boldness there, you might say, is what's opposed, right? But Socrates has this fear of being thought to know, the fear that he might think he knows, but he doesn't know, right? He's very concerned about that, right? And my friend Warren Murray said to Bob Monsignor, his predominant passion is fear, right? It's not that fear of being mistaken, right? You know, he's very careful, right? If you present some new hatched idea, you know, his reaction is to reject it, you know, and you've got to really defend it, right? To get anywhere, right? So you might say, well, you know, fear makes you what? Yeah, fear of the Lord is the beginning of what? Of course. Yeah, yeah. So you might try to make a case, you know, these are the same thing, you know, so. This is an interesting argument, huh? Why should there be one virtue and reason concerned with moral matters, right? And not also one then in this, desire of the person. Moreover, habits are not distinguished according to material objects, but according to their, what? The formal reasons of the objects, right? But the formal ratio of good, to which moral virtue is ordered, is one. To wit, the mode of what? Reason, right? And as Dionysius says, to be reasonable. That's what's called. To be good is to be reasonable, right? For man, that's what it means. One thing, right? Therefore, it seems that there's only one moral virtue. Moreover, moral things receive their, what? Species from the end. This has been said above. But the end of all the moral virtues, the common, is one. To wit, what? Like Augustine was saying, you know, the art of... Being happy, right? Okay. But the proper and near one's infinite. But there are not an infinity of moral, what? Virtues. Therefore, it seems they should be one only, right? Thomas says, what? Virtue is the road to wisdom, right? I mean, to happiness, right? Like, vice is the road to, what? Yeah, yeah. I mean, it should just be one there, right? One that directs us to happiness, huh? But against us is that one habit is not able to be in diverse powers, huh? See, I've been said above. But the subject of the, what? More virtues is the desiring part of the soul, which is distinguished by diverse powers, right? The will, the racial appetite, and the conceital appetite, huh? Therefore, there cannot be just one moral virtue, right? There may be at least three. I answer, it should be said, that as has been said above, moral virtues are certain habits of the desiring part of the soul, but habits differ in species according to the special differences of their, what, objects, huh? Now, the species of, what, a desirable object, just as of anything, is to be noted according to a specific form, which is from the, what, agent, huh? Now, it should be considered, huh, that the matter of the one undergoing, right, suffering, has itself to the agent in two ways, huh? For sometimes it receives the form of the agent according to the same, what, notion, right? Insofar as it's found in the agent, just as in all, what, univocal agents, right? So if I produce a man, right, huh, I'm univocal, what, agent, right? He's a man in the same sense that I am a, what, man, right, huh? But if I produce a, what, cake, cake is not a man, right? It might be not cake, it might be a steak or something, right? Sometimes the matter receives a form from the agent, not according to the same, what, definition, you might say, right? Insofar as it is in the agent, as just in, what, generators that are not univocal, as the animals generated by the, what, sun, huh? I threw out too long in that example there. By, I mean, is Shakespeare a tragedy in a comedy, huh? Is Shakespeare a tragedy in a comedy? Well, he produced a tragedy in a comedy, right? And then the forms received in matter from the same agent are not of one, what, species, right? So I mentioned that, you know, I put Shakespeare's plays into four, what, kinds, right? The tragedies, comedies, and in between those, the two kinds of romances, right? He has six romances that you might call the mercy and forgiveness romances. And six of them that are the, what? Love and friendship. Love and friendship romances, yeah? Yeah. But he's, Shakespeare is a, what, equivocal cause of those four, right? That is to say that they don't have the same definition as Shakespeare, right? They're not four poets. Right. Or four men, right? Right. And then he says, huh? The forms received in matter by the same, or from the same agent are not of one, what, species of one kind. But they are diversified according to the diverse proportion of matter for receiving the, what, inflow of the, what, agent, right? You see this priority of Mozart to the Baroque composers there, right, huh? They write a piece for one group of instruments that can be easily transposed to other instruments, right? That was very commonly done, right? But Mozart adapts himself to what? The clarinet and the piano, each one of them, you know, in a way that really fits the instrument, right, huh? It's perfectly done by Mozart. Absolutely amazing. So then the forms received in matter from the same agent, right, are not of one species, but are diversified according to the diverse proportion of matter for receiving the influx of the, what, agent, right? Just as we see that from one act of the sun, this is the old somewhat questionable thing, are generated by purification, animals are diverse species, right? According to the diverse proportion of what? Matter, matter, matter, right, huh? But is the cook going to act on different things in the same way, huh? The mix is going to be according to the matter, right? Now it is manifest that in moral matters, reason is as the one commanding and what? Moving, right? But the desiring power is as the one commanded and what? And moved, huh? But the appetite, the desiring power does not receive the, what, impression of reason as it were, what? Univocally, right, huh? Because it does not become rational essentially, right? So it's not the man generating a man, right? But by partaking, as is said in the first book of the Ethics, right? Whence the desirables, according to the motion of reason, are constituted in diverse, what, species? According as they have themselves diversely to, what? Reason, right? And thus it follows that moral virtues are diverse in species or kind and not one, what? Only, right? It's kind of interesting if you compare, let's say, reason there to the racial appetite, right? And the kibble's appetite, right? Now, Aristotle brings out that moral virtue is between two extremes, right? So, temperance is between what? Intemperance, which is excess, right? And what, for want of a name, we'll call puritanism or something of that sort, right? Okay? And courage is in between what? Well, it's called cowardice and then foolhardiness is the word, right? Okay. Now, Aristotle points out that although it's in between two extremes, that doesn't mean it's equidistant between the two, right? And which is closer to courage, cowardice or foolhardiness? Yeah, yeah. But notice how it's named, foolhardiness, right? That the foolhardy man seems to be more a fool than a coward, right? Power little enough to get out of it, right? He seems to be using his reason, right? You see? Well, the foolhardy man seems to be without reason, right? Okay? He's named from fool, right? But now, which seems to be more foolish, the puritan or the, what, intemperate man, huh? The intemperate man, yeah. So, I've seen this, you know, in relatives, you know, where the husband has a tendency at wedding receptions to drink too much and so on. And I remember this fun woman, you know, she's terribly afraid of her husband's going to drink too much. And then he starts to make it. So, yeah, yeah. So, which is closer to the temperate man, the intemperate man or the puritan? Puritan seems to be closer, right, huh? Okay. So, the foolish man is more, what? Like the courageous man, but the foolish man in the temperance. You can see how the matter is different, right? It's kind of interesting, huh? Fear, we all think of fear of making people, what, more thoughtful, right? You know, they say when you run a political campaign, you've got to run and scare it, right? But when you go into a big game with, you know, if you're fear you could lose, you know, you've got to be more careful when you're ending and so on, right? What was the false section? Discretion is a better part of valor. Oh, great source, like Paul. Yeah, yeah. As if the coward is more discretion, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said, right, that the object of reason is the true, right? But there's the same reason of the true in all moral things, which are contingent things that are, what, doable, right? Whence there is only one virtue directing in them, to it, foresight, huh? But the object of the desiring power is the desirable good, of which there is a diverse reason according to the diverse relation to, what, reason directing them. You can see that, in a sense, in the use of the word fool, though, you're right, huh? I mentioned before how the word fond, huh, means fool, foolish, right? And we're custom, you know, to say the guy is fond of the girl, right, huh? And forget that first meant you're being a little bit foolish over this girl, right? So that's kind of interesting, though, right, huh? But when you say foolish, you're talking about the relation to reason, right, you know? And, of course, they say it's different in the case of, what, the irascible and the concupisable, right? But it seems to be more foolish, right? And the courageous man is closer to the pu-hardy man, right? Or the tempered man is closer to the purity, right? So the man doesn't drink at all, you know, it seems to be more temperate than the man who drinks to excess, obviously, right? So I'm going to say what's scripture, if you don't make tiffy, God, core hominis. Yeah. The second should be said that that is, what, formal, that that which is formal is one in genus in account of the unity of the, what, agent. But diversified in species in account of the diverse habitudes or relations of the ones receiving, right, huh? You know, I classify Shakespeare's tragedies there, you know, and I start off and I say, well, there's ten tragedies, right? But there's three, I call them the Northern European tragedies, right? One is sent in Denmark, there's Hamlet. One in ancient England there, that's King Lear. And then Scotland, Macbeth, right? I call them the Northern European tragedies, right? And then you have the, what, the Southern Italian tragedies, or the love tragedies, huh? Romeo and Juliet and Othello, right? Well, see, Hamlet and King Lear and Macbeth, right, are not really, what, love tragedies, right? In the way that Romeo and Juliet is. But you kind of, you know, you think of the South as being more the passionate lover, you know, huh? And so you can see how he kind of, his reason, you know, tends to look for a different location to make the love tragedies and Northern European tragedies, huh? You know, the German critics, they'll call, you know, I don't like this way of speaking, but they call Hamlet a tragedy of thought, you know? But he's so different from Robert and Juliet, or poor Othello, you know, huh? It's always Othello is the most tragic of Shakespeare's tragedies, right, you know? In the way, I don't say necessarily the best one of them, but the most tragic, you know, like, Aristotle says, you know, the Euripides is the most tragic of the poets, you know? But it doesn't mean he's as good as, of course, Sophocles, and Sophocles is the greatest of the Greek tragedies, you know? But you can see how Shakespeare in a sense has adapted himself to the matter, right? To the third, it should be said that Moralia, right, do not have their species from the last end, but from the, what? Yeah. So there's not one moral virtue, you know, this is the moral virtue whose object is, what? Happiness, you know? But from the proximate end, right? Which, although infinite, what? In number. Not infinite in, what? Species. Right, huh? Let's go see that right there. You've got to stop right now. Mm-hmm.