Prima Secundae
Lecture 158: Cardinal Virtues: Division, Distinction, and Overflow

Transcript
================================================================================

or according to the subject, right? Now, what is this distinction? We'll see when we get into the text here. And in both ways, there are found four, cardinal, what? Virtue, right? Now, the formal principle of virtue, about which we now speak, is the good of what? A reason, which can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it consists in the very act of reason, the very consideration of reason. And thus, there will be one principle of virtue, which is called, what? Prudence, right? In another way, according as, it lays down some order of reason, some reason of order, about something, right? Order means before and after, right? And this is either about operations, and thus it is, what? Justice, right? Or it's about emotions or passions, right? And thus is necessary for there to be, what? Two, what? Virtues, huh? For it's necessary to place the order of reason around the passions, and you consider repugnance of them to, what? Reason, right, huh? And this repugnance to reason can be of twofold, huh? In one way, according as a passion impels one to something contrary to reason, right? And thus is necessary that the passion be, what? Repressed in a sense, right? And from this is named temperance, right? You've got a temper, or called moderation too, right? You've got to moderate this thing, huh? So, your desire for the pleasure of food or a drink or something like that, you tend to, what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. So you need to mainly be, what? Moderated, right? That's what Aristotle says in the ethics there, right? You know, he's talking about how virtue is between two vices, right? But sometimes one of the vices is not named, right? Now, in the case of fortitude or courage, the two vices are named, right? Foolhardiness and cowardice. But in the case of temperance, intemperance seems to me excess, right? You know, we have a name for the person who doesn't enjoy his food at all or enough, right? Because that's so rare, Aristotle says, right? So sometimes I call it puritanism, something like that, you know, kind of inventing a word, right? Those seem to really have a word, you know? Another way, according as the passion tends to withdraw one, from what reason dictates you should, what? Do, right, huh? And thus the fear of, what? Dangers, right, huh? Or of labor, huh? And thus is necessary that a man be made firm in that which is of reason and is not received from it. And from this is named fortitude, right? It's almost like you're making something fortitude strong, right, huh? Well, my desire to eat and victory doesn't have to be made strong, so it's probably too much as it is, right? See? But it's, here in this case, you know, with fear, you naturally, what, tend to refuse that, right, huh? So most men are, to some extent, cowards, right, huh? You know? And what does the officer say? I'll be behind you, you know? Ho, ho. But they're the next step, right? You know? The officer doesn't do that, huh? And, uh, especially at the beginning of the American, you know, uh, war of independence, right? You know, the men were not used to battle at all, you know, and they kind of scattered when the English cops were going to start, lined up and start shooting, you know? And, uh, you know, uh, uh, uh, I mean, uh, Washington, you know, threw his hat down, and down, how am I supposed to fight with this kind of army, you know, but, uh, you know, you're not used to this, right, huh? So, there's two different ways, huh? Likewise, according to subjects, right, the same number is found. For fourfold is found subject to this virtue about which we now speak, right? Irrational by essence, which foresight or prudence perfects, right? And the rational by participation, which is divided into three. In the will, which is a subject of justice, and in the incubusable, which is a subject of temperance, and in the irascible, which is a subject of, what, fortitude, right? So, in Greek, what do they call those two last ones? Epithumia, right? Where temperance would be an epithumia, and then thumasa, which would be the rational appetite, right? And play to the public is like that, huh? You talk about how gymnastic and, what, music, right? Gymnastic is making you more gun-ho, right? You know, eat those guys, right? And, you know, Ed West Point there, you know, they had the words of MacArthur, you know, or on these friendly fields of this thing, they all do with their own battle, you know? It's preparation for that, right? But then music was to, what? You know, tame the savage beast and make you, you know? A gentleman, an officer and a gentleman, right? Not just an officer, but a gentleman, right? So, you know, these two different things, huh? In Mozart, you know, Mozart is very sensitive to the keys, right? So, let's say, G major, right, or B-flat would be more for representing the, what? The cubisible emotions, right? But D major, right, or C major, you know, for the irascible, huh? Interesting. You know, those last five symphonies of Mozart, you have the two symphonies, the 36th and the 41st there, which are, what, in C major, they're both representing magnanimity, right? Which is, it's sort of hope, you know, and doing great things, huh? It doesn't unwind too much in those last five symphonies, right? You have the middle one there, the E-flat, you know, which is kind of in between, you know? So it's kind of relaxed a bit, but the magnanimous mantisens, you know, get two, because of the seven, two books, you know? But you get these love ares that would be G major, you know, or B-flat, and so on, so. When you compare Mozart with his great contemporary there, Joseph Haydn, you know, Haydn would change from one key to another, you know, kind of for a variety set, you know, and kind of, by Mozart it's always very significant, you know, it's a change in the emotions, you know, it changes the keys, and very, very sensitive to those things. I mean, he's a man, I suppose. Okay. So, it's kind of like in the, what, subject of the powers, right? In which, and so, if you study, you know, these different powers that we do sometimes in the Dhyan and so on, then you kind of see the significance of this argument, right? So, there's one that affects reason, and then the three desiring powers, right? Mm-hmm. You know, in the Republic, Plato, or Socrates, kind of convinces them of the truth of what he wants to say in the first book, you know, but then to be in the second book, somebody says, now, Socrates, did you want to appear to have convinced us or to really have convinced us? It's like, well, we don't want to convince you this is true. And so, well, how can you do that? Well, then Socrates said, well, I'm going to blow it up big, right? And so, he makes this famous comparison between the parts of the city and the parts of the, what? Souls. Souls, yeah. And so, he has the rulers, and then you have the soldiers, and then you have the common people, right? And so, there you have the three, what? Virtues, right? Well, then he's got a problem where you can put justice, right? And so, that's the, you know, the harmony of these parts of each other, you know? So, he doesn't quite distinguish the will from what the irascible, which is what the soldier has, you know? And the, I remember a student that I was teaching, you know, going out to the military base there, you know, and the soldiers say, I'm telling you, you're killing somebody with your own hands, you know? Scared the ricks out of here, you know? Well, the soldiers aren't like that either. I mean, you know, they're tough of these guys, you know? And the, but the very clearly that you had the soldiers. You know, separated from the common man, right, the common man and the laborer, you know, the peasant, so to speak, he was what, he's got to control his appetite, right, so he had these different parts of the soul, right, but if you can distinguish the will from the emotion, then you've got the four parts, so there's a lot of distinctions here, right, between emotion and operations and then between prudence, right, and the others. So you can divide it into three if you wanted to, right, and the emotions and the operations and so forth, so we're not going to move it forward, I don't know. It's interesting, I was wondering when you were studying temperance, why, you know, he puts meekness in temperance because it's a… moderating anger, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah but against this Is that Tully now, being in Cicero, right? In his rhetoric, right, reduces to these four, all the, what, others, right? So, we mentioned, you know, Socrates there in the cardinal virtues has piety in it too, but there's the four that we have. I answer, it should be said, that as has been said above, these four, what, virtues are taken, what, according to four formal, what, reasons of virtue of how to speak, which in some acts or passions are found, what, principally, right, for just as the good which consists in the consideration of reason is chiefly found in the command of, what, reason, not ever in counsel, nor even in, what, judgment, right? Sometimes they think of this as being the three acts, right? But the one that perfects them is the command, right? So, I guess he's considering his life, right, and thinking about, thinking about, thinking about counsel, right? Funny, judge has got to change, but not quite yet. Likewise, the good of reason, insofar as it is placed in operations, according to the notion of what's right and owed, right, is chiefly found in the exchanges and in, or in the distribution, right? That's talking about the two kinds of justice, right? Comitative justice and distributive justice, right? Which are to another with, what, equality, right? That's where these words are, equity, right, and equal, okay? The good of, what, refraining the passions is chiefly found in the passions which are most difficult to repress to it in the pleasures of, what? Pleasure? Of touch, yeah, so that's in food and sex and so on, right? Okay, and then Mary says something about people going to hell almost because of the flesh, right? So Mary was very much in need of being repressed, right? It was kind of a principled case, right? And I suppose, you know, the sexual desire or the desire to drink and so on, that causes more problems even in anger, I think, right? But the good of firmness and standing in the good of reason against the impetus of the passions is especially found in the dangers of, what? Death, against which it is most difficult, what, to stand, huh? Thus, therefore, the foresaid four virtues we are able to consider in two ways, huh? In one way, according to their common or general formal reasons. And according to this, they are said to be principled because they are common to all their virtues, right? This is a different way of looking at it, right? Where they're not talking about four distinct virtues, but four qualities that must be found in all virtues, although some of them stand out more, one in particular than another, right? As that every virtue which makes good in the consideration of reason is called, what? Foresight, right? And every virtue which makes good what is owed and right and operations is said to be, what? Justice. And every virtue which, what? Restrains passions and depresses them, huh? Is called, what? Temperance, right? And every virtue which makes for firmness of the soul against some passions is said to be, what? Fortitude, right, huh? And thus, many people speak about these virtues, both the sacred, what? Doctors, huh? Fathers in the church. And also the, what? Philosophers, right? They quote Seneca down here, huh? But you also went in Cicero, right, huh? Okay. And thus, other virtues are contained in them, right? Whence the objections, what? Cease, huh? Okay, the thing is, it's not, what? Not putting one particular virtue into another virtue, but you're talking about general conditions that must be found in all virtues, huh? In another way, right? One can take these according as these virtues are named from what is, what? Principle in each matter, right, huh? And thus they are, what? Not general conditions as the previous way, but they are special virtues, right? Divided against others, right? So that first way of dividing is not giving you, what? Dividing? Species and virtues, you're not? No, no, this is something that's found in all virtues, right, huh? Okay. But each of these is found chiefly in some matter, right? And you can talk about particular ones. Because prudence is called, what is, what? Commanding, right, huh? Cheptiva. Justice, which is about actions, what? That are owed, right? Among what? Equals, right? Temperance, which represses concupiscence of the pleasures of touch, right? This is Aristotle, he teaches down the ethics, right? And fortitude, which makes one firm against the dangers of, what? Death, huh? And thus also the objection sees, right? Because the other virtues can have, what? Other principalities, right, huh? But these are to be principled by reason of the, what? Matter. So, but then you'll pipe and smoke it for a while, huh? What is the matter of... Well, see, magnanimity is about, what? Great honors, huh? Related to fortitude. Yeah, yeah, especially because that's most honorable, right, huh? But you can have, what's the great soul in there, you know, who rectified Athens, right? By changing the laws, right? Very just man, right? And very prudent man, right? It's especially hard to be firm in the face of death, right? Especially hard to be, what? Restrains, pleasures of sense of touch, huh? But, you know, when you talk about things like humility and magnanimity, right? Must be some other way that they're kind of principled, too, huh? Interesting, you know, for a long time there was this, you know, people reading what Aristotle says about magnanimity. Well, he doesn't talk about humility there, right? In the virtues in Nicomarcan ethics. And so, there's an objection to Thomas, he says, there's humility of virtue, right? Why does Aristotle talk about it, right? And so on. And Thomas says, well, by humility, one is first humble with respect to God, right? And then towards others, in order to God, right? Like towards the other or something, right? Where Aristotle is talking about those virtues whereby one is, what, disposed well for a life in the, what, city, right? He's not considering it in comparison to, what, God there, right? Well, peace in the city requires, what, justice, right? Often they say that justice is the work of peace, right? And so. And the very survivancy depends upon the courage of its soldiers, right? And then all the squabbles in the city, you know? Somebody rapes somebody's daughter or he gets drunk and runs somebody over or something, right? So that's really unnecessary, right? If men were just and brave and temperate, right, there'd be great peace in the city, right? Take a little break here now. You didn't give me any water today. You're losing your reward now, so you can take a cup of cold water. I'll bring it right now. But then doesn't he also speak besides these general quality of the virtue and special virtues, he also speaks about general strength in general in treating... Look here at Article 4 here now. To the fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that the four foreseared virtues are not diverse virtues and distinct from each other, right? This reminds me of the Pythagoras, right? Maybe in a sense, you know, Socrates argues some probability that they were the same thing, right? Is a sign of the two ways you can take them, right? Take them in so far as they really are distinct virtues, which Pythagoras is trying to defend, and then you can do what Socrates does there, right? And so they seem to be, you know, in conditions of the same virtue, right? Or any virtue. But anyway, we'll see what this says. So he's taking the Socratic side here first, right? For Gregory says in the 22nd Book of the Moralia, That is not true, what? Foresight, which, what? Is not just, temperate, and what? Yeah, yeah. It's funny in Shakespeare sometimes when you talk, you know, when the characters will say, you know, it's your fear that's taking counsel, you know, huh? As if, you know, you're, you know? Powered, huh? Propositive Obama won't. Okay. Nor is that whole or integral, right? Perfect. Fortitude, which is not, what? Prudent, temperate, and what? Just, right? But this would not happen, what Gregory says, if the four, what? The four said four virtues were distinct from each other, right? For diverse species of the same genus do not denominate one another, right? Therefore, the four said four virtues are not distinct from each other, right? So he's speaking a little bit like Socrates and Dad like that. Moreover, of those things which are distinct from each other, what belongs to one is not attribute to another, right? But that which is of temperance is attributed to fortitude, huh? For Augustine, or Ambrose says in the first book on the offices and duties, huh? Rightly, that is, what? Called fortitude when each one copies himself, right, huh? And is not, what? Made soft, right? By illicit things, right, huh? Not meant by them, right, huh? And temperance also says that the mode or order it observes of all things, which ought to be, what? Done or said, we think, huh? Therefore, it seems that these virtues are not, what? Distinct from each other, right, huh? So we say somebody who remains temperate, you know, and their youth, you know, is being strong, right, huh? That's courage, right? So one thing is said, huh? Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that for virtue, these things are required. First, that if one is, what? Knowing. Knowing, huh? Secondly, if he is, what? Choosing, right, huh? And third, if firmly in immobility there, right, huh? He has this and operates, right? To temperance, right? But of these, the first pertains to foresight, which is right reason about things to be done. The second, to choose, right? To temperance, or maybe more, to justice. That one, not from passion, but from choice, he acts, right? The refrain of passions. Third, that someone on account of a suitable in operates, which contains sin of rectitude, which seems to, what? Pertain to, what? Justice, right, huh? And the other, firmness and immobility, pertains to, what? Fortitude, huh? The sacrifice is for a man as a soldier, huh? Therefore, each of these virtues is general to all virtues, right, huh? Therefore, they are not distinguished from each other. But against this is what Augustine says in the Book on the Morals of the Church, huh? That quadripartita, each of these virtues, right? Four parts is divided, huh? From the, what? Various affections of, what? Love, right, huh? And he joins under this the four virtues, right? Therefore, the four virtues are distinct from each other, right, huh? We can argue in both sides because there's some probability in both sides, right? Or some part of the truth in both sides, right? I answer it should be said that as has been said above, the four foresaid virtues are taken in two ways by what diverse people, right? For some take them insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, right? There are different conditions, right? Mm-hmm. Which are found in all virtues, right, huh? Thus that foresight is nothing other than a certain, what? Rightness of discretion in some acts or matters. Justice is a certain, what? Rightness of the soul, in which a man does what he ought to do in any matter, right? Temperance is a certain decision of the soul, which, what? Emplaces a mode upon some passions or operations, huh? And fortitude is a certain decision of the soul, through which is made firm in that which is in accordance with reason, huh? Against any impetuses of passion or labors of operations, huh? These four, thus distinguished, do not imply a diversity of habits, of virtuous habits, as regards temperance, justice, and fortitude, huh? For for any more virtue, from this that is a habit, there belongs to it a certain, what? Firmness. Firmness, yeah. That's the distinction between a habit and a disposition, right? In the categories here. Which is said to pertain to, what? Fortitude, right? Strength of man. From this that it is a virtue it has, that it is ordered to the good, in which is implied the notion of what is right and owed, right, huh? Which is said to, what, pertain to justice, huh? In this that it is a moral virtue, partaking of reason, it has the mode of, what? Reason. And it observes in all things. And it doesn't extend itself beyond what is, of course, a reason. This is said to pertain to, what, temperance, right? It doesn't extend something beyond. But only this, that is, to have discretion, which is attributed to prudence, would seem to be distinguished from the other three, right? One in three, right? Insofar as it is of reason itself by essence. But the other three imply a certain partaking of reason, right? Through the mode of application of some application to the passions or operations. Thus, therefore, according to the fourth said, prudence would be a virtue distinct from the other three. But the other three would not be, what? Virtues distinct to each other. It manifests that one and the same virtue is a habit and is a virtue and is, what? Moral, right, huh? But others and, what? Atmelios, right? Better. Take these, what, four virtues according as they are determined to special, what? Matters, huh? And each of these are to one matter in which chiefly is praised one of the general conditions, right? From which the name of virtue is taken. And according to this is manifested, the four said virtues are diverse habits according to what? Distinguished according to a diversity of what? Objects. Objects, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Gregory speaks about the four said four virtues according to the first way of taking it, right? Which is according to these general conditions that are found in every virtue, right? Okay. For that which is a prudence bounds over, huh? Overflows in the other virtues insofar as they are directed by, what? Prudence, right? So you have a reasonable love and a reasonable fear and a reasonable choice and so on. Each of the other ones overflows in the others for that reason that You have a reasonable fear. You have a reasonable fear. You have a reasonable fear. You have a reasonable fear. You have a reasonable fear. Who can, what, do what is more difficult, is able to also do what is less difficult, huh? Whence the one who's able to refrain the desires for the pleasures of touch, lest they exceed, what, their mode, which is most difficult, right, huh? From this also is rendered more able to refrain audacity in the, what, dangers of death, right? Okay, won't be foolhardy, right, lest you proceed beyond the mode, huh? Which is nevertheless much easier, right? And according to this, fortitude is said to be, what, temperate, huh? Temperance is said to be strong from the overflow of fortitude and temperance. Insofar as the one who, by fortitude, has a soul that is firm against the dangers of death, which is most difficult, right? He's more able to retain the firmness of soul against the, what, impetus of pleasures, right, huh? As Tully says in the first book on the, what, duties or offices, right? That is not, what, constantinium, would that be? It's not inconsistent? Yeah. For a man to be unbroken by fear and yet vanquished by chiquity, and that he should be conquered by lust after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. And to this also is clearly the response to the second, right, huh? For thus temperance in all things observes the mode, and courage against all the, what, unsuitable or illicit pleasures, keeps the soul, what, unbent, huh? Or insofar as these virtues denominate certain general conditions of virtues, or through the four said, what, redundancy, right, huh? Okay? Overflowing, right? To the third, it should be said that those four general conditions of virtues which the philosopher lays down are not proper to the four said virtues, but they can be, what, appropriate to them, right, huh? According to the way everybody said, huh? Just like in the Trinity, appropriation, right? Right. Is the Holy Spirit alone, love? Is the Son alone, wise? Mm-hmm. Better appropriate them, right, huh? Right. May God the Father strengthen you, may God the Son enlighten you, and may God the Holy Spirit fund you with His love, right? Can appropriate these three moons of Trinity. We'll get time here for the last one, I guess we do. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now, what the heck is this? Division into three, huh? Perfect. Four. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems unsuitably for these four virtues to be divided into, what? The exemplar virtues, virtues of the purged soul, the purging virtues, and the political ones, right, huh? For as Maccobius says in the first book on the dream of Sipio, that those are the exemplar virtues, which are, what? In the divine, what? Mind, right? But the philosopher in the tenth book of the ethics says it's ridiculous to attribute to God, what? Justice, fortitude, temperance. That's right. Yeah. Therefore, these virtues are not, what? Exemplars, right? Moreover, the virtues of the purged soul are said to be without, what, passions, huh? For Maccobius says that the, what, belongs to the temperance of the purged soul, right? Not to repress cupidities, earthly cupidities, but holy to, what? Forget them, right, huh? Afforditude to ignore the passions, not to, what, conquer them all. It's like a stoic, almost in a sense, huh? But it was said above that these virtues are not able to be without, what, passions, huh? Therefore, these virtues are not able to be of a, what, purged soul, right? So, you know, getting back to the stoic business, huh? Moreover, the purging virtues, right, are those who, what, by kind of flight from human things, what, insert themselves only into, what? Divine things, right, huh? But this would seem to be vicious, right? For Tilly, or Cicero, in the first book of the offices said that, what, those who despise, huh, commands and the rules, right, that many admire, these not praise, but, what, I think ought to be given over to, what, vice, huh? Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, You say, well, two and a half, yeah. So this is the formal cause, in a sense, but the extensive form, right? Thus, however, that the divine mind itself in God is called, what? Prudence, right? Temperance, the conversion of the divine intention to himself. Just as in us, temperance is said to be that to which the concubiscible is conformed to reason, right? The fortitude of God is his immutability, right? The justice of God is the observance of the, what? In his works, as Plotinus says, right? Now, you can come back and say that, more properly speaking, you have in God foresight, right? But more universal foresight than we have, and justice in God, right? But there are no, what, emotions in God, so although he has an idea of what fortitude is, what temperance is, he doesn't have those two virtues, what? Rar. Right, right? And that's why, too, you know, I think when he takes up these virtues in the secundi secundi, he takes up, what, prudence first, right? And then justice, and then fortitude and temperance, right? Because the first two are found more in God than the second two is kind of a very extended, almost metaphorical sense, right, and temperance even metaphorically. I think Thomas says that fortitude can be said metaphorically in God, but temperance is not even metaphorically, right? Is God chaste or, you know, temperate, you know, sober, you know? It's not even a likeness there for metaphor, right? But, and it's kind of a reverse order, but Aristotle does, right? Because he takes up fortitude and temperance first, then justice, and what do you say? There's a difference in the order of ethics and moral theology, right? And because man, according to his nature, is a political animal, that's Aristotle's famous statement in the politics, right? Man is a political animal. Virtues of this sort, insofar as they exist in man, according to the condition of his nature, are called, what? Political, right? Insofar as man, according to these virtues, has himself rightly in carrying on, what? Human things, right? According to which mode, up to this point, we have, what, spoken about these, what? Virtues, right? But because it pertains to man, that also, he, what? Draw himself to divine things as much as possible, right? It's the famous thing that Aristotle says in the 10th book of the Ethics, right? You know, he disagrees with those, he says, being men, we should think of human things, and being mortal, mortal things. He says, no, no, we should strive to be, you know, to divine things as far as possible, right? Okay. And this, for us, in sacred scripture, is in many ways, what? Commended, right? Right, huh? As even said in Matthew 5, be perfect even as your heavenly Father is, what? Perfect, yeah. It's necessary to lay down some virtues to be in the middle, right? Between the political ones, which are the virtues that are, what? Human, right? And the exemplars, which are the divine, what? Virtues, huh? Which virtues are distinguished according to the diversity of, what? Motion, and the term, or in the motion, right? For some are the virtues of those, what? Passing over and tending towards a divine, what? Likeness, right? And these are called the purging virtues, right? The purifying virtues, right? Thus, also, that, what? Prudence, all things, huh? By the connotation, divine things, right, huh? And all the thinking of the soul, it directs towards God, what? Alone, right, huh? Temperance, he leaves aside insofar as, what? Nature will allow, right, huh? Which requires use of the body, right, huh? Fortitude, that the soul does not, what? Fear and account of, what? Excess in the body, right, huh? And excess to higher things. Justice, that the whole soul consents to the way of this thing, what? Proposed, right? But some virtues are those, what? Now, attaining to some divine similitude, right? Following them? Which are called the virtues of the soul, now, what? Purged. Purged, yeah. Thus, that prudence only, what? Looks upon divine things, right, huh? Temperance doesn't know what earthly, what? Desires. Fortitude ignores the passion. Justice with, what? A divine, what? Yeah. That it wouldn't divine things by, what? Perpetual, what? Covenant. Covenant, you might say. Theda, right, yeah. Imitating him, right, huh? Which, virtues are said to be those of the blessed, right, huh? Okay. Or of those most perfect in this life, huh? Okay. So, maybe you won't get to the virtues of the purged soul until you get to the blessed, right? Unless you're among the most perfect, right, huh? Mm-hmm. The process, process of the application, canonization? Yeah. Degree, I mean, they're distinct species of virtues, but their virtues live in a higher degree. To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That the philosopher speaks about these virtues according as they are about human things, right? That justice is about buying and selling and so on, right? Fortitude about fears, temperance about give a sense. And thus, it is ridiculous to attribute them to what? Yeah. God, huh? Okay. To the second, it should be said that the human virtues are about what? Passions. Passions. These are the virtues of men living in this world, right? But the virtues of those who seek what? Full beatitude are what? Without what? Passions. Without the passions, yeah. Once Plotinus says that the passions of what? Soften the political virtues? That is, reduce them to a middle, right? But the second one, the purging ones, take away them, huh? The third, which are the purged soul, they are forgotten, right? And those in the fourth, the exemplars, one cannot name them, right? Although it can be said that he speaks here about passions according to signify some disordered emotions, so you see, they're all suspicious of those stoics, right? But this is an element of truth in this distinction of these three kinds of virtues, or four kinds of virtues, you know, in Maccobius and Platonius and so on. Now, to the third, now we're, you know, practical man is a little bit disturbed by this. To the third, it should be said that to desert human, what? Human things, where necessity is laid down, is what? Vicious, right, huh? Otherwise, it is virtuous. Once a little bit above that, Tullius, what? Premises, huh? These, perhaps, it should be considered.