Prima Secundae
Lecture 159: Theological Virtues: Their Nature and Distinction

Transcript
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Conceded, right? To not what? To not serve the Republic, right? Or to not keep over it? Devoted. Who by an excellent genius, right? To give themselves to doctrine or teaching, right? And to these who either by the, what? Weakness of their strength, right? Or some other more grave cause received the Republic, right? And they concede, right? The power of administration and so on, and praise to what? Others, right? They start to know these things, right? And this agrees with what, Augustine agrees with this, right? Or agrees with what Augustine says in the 19th book on the City of God, right? That otsium, the idleness, the holy idleness. It seeks what? The charity of what? Truth, right? The just negotiation receives the necessity of what? Charity, right? Once if nothing, what? What sarsenon is that? If no one imposes that, right? One thing, give yourself over to what? The truth, right? Okay. But if it is imposed, why not to take it on the connecessity of what? Charity, right? Okay. Because like Thomas was talking about the religious orders, right? You know, that someone might have to do something practical in the religious order, right, huh? They support the others, right? But this is a necessity of charity, right? Or sometimes they want to make, you know, something like Thomas the bishop, but they always refuse, right? They give yourself over to the pursuit of truth. They got the decision in making what, uh, uh, Albert the greater bishop, I think he retired me as soon as he could. Didn't Greg, we always wanted him to go back to the monastery, but he couldn't. He made him a pope, you know? When Greg was saying, you know, that, uh, he died of his salvation, he made him a bishop, he made him pope, he really began. Okay. The fourth one, touching upon what the, what Aristotle calls legal justice, right, huh? Legal justice directly regards, what? The common good, right, huh? But by command, huh? It draws all the other virtues to the, what? Common good, right? As Aristotle says in the fifth book of ethics. You see, Aristotle, it's a whole book to justice, right? Because you've got to talk about, you know, commutative justice and distributive justice and this legal justice, right? Which, you know, in the definition of law, you know, it's an ordering of reason for the common good, right? So it's called legal justice because its object is the common, what? Good. And then you call these other ones in, what, service to the common good, huh? It ought to be considered that to the political virtues, according to me as they're here said, it pertains not only to do well towards the common, but also to operate or to do well for the parts of the common. To get to one's house, right, huh? Or also to some, what, singular, what? Person. Person, yeah, yeah. Well, that's quite a thing, this. We should stop there, huh? So the logical virtues next time, huh? 62 here. We just got through finding out that God is the end of the universe, especially the end of us rational creatures. That's the first of the three parts there of the third book of the Summa Concentile is. Now the second part, which is talking about divine providence now, right, begins in chapter 64, right? What's the significance of the number 64? First cube number. Yeah. It's both a square number and a cube number, right? So 8 times 8 is 64, and 4 times 4 times 4 is what? 64. So is 64 the first number that is both a square number and a cube number? No, it's not a square number. 64, and I think I always guessed that. It used to be, when I was a little kid, you know, on the radio or something like that, there's always, you know, this question, you know, 64 dollar question, right? Mm-hmm. It wasn't fair when I picked someone money, but it seemed like I picked someone money. No, 64 would be a kind of joke, but I always wondered why they took 64 as being the thing, you know? But Thomas says that a square number has a cube number, has the same meaning as the number being squared or cube. Yeah, you know, if 10 has a student signification in number 10, right, then 10 times 10, or 10 times 10 times 10, has the same meaning, right? Oh, yes. So you know, as soon as I turn it to 2 and 3, right, so if 64 is the first number that is both, what, a square number and a cube number, right, well then we have the 2 and 3, right? Yeah. I just, I can't do these numbers because I want to remember where the things happen, right? So I remember how the, you know, in the first book of the Summa God Gentiles, he begins to talk about the perfection of God in chapter 28. And chapter 28 is the second, what, perfect number. The first perfect number is 6. And the second perfect number is, what, 28. Is that right? Yeah. So it's appropriate, huh, that Thomas begins talking about the perfection of God in the 20th chapter, right? So it's appropriate, it begins the second part of the third book of the Summa Gentiles with chapter 64. I remember that now. Chapter 28, 63 is the last chapter when God would be in the end and how the division satisfies all our desires. I was reading, starting to read now with Beth again, you know. I guess the historical, Beth Macbeth was a very good king. Really? Yeah, yeah. The Scottish historians, you know, have gone back and studied it. And so it has a little bit on the historical, you know, the notes or the things, the historical Macbeth. And then the way he started, you know, this fictional Macbeth, right? And I guess it has something to do with the fact that he somehow interrupted the line of the Scottish kings, you know, and it was very important to keep the line, you know. And so, must have something wrong with the guy, you know. And then, you know, it was time to act as a priest, you know, writing about this, you know. And then it gets worse, you know, along, and he didn't find me, you know, but just like some people try to defend, you know, Richard III, that monster that Shakespeare hasn't made, you know. But they think, you know, that the people who defeated Richard III kind of blackened his reputation, you know. But he lived in the house, you know, in all these old stories. I was looking for one historian who was making the same point about the Borgic quote, you know, Alexander VI, you know, he's got a very bad reputation. He was Spanish, but he was making the argument that, you know, propaganda in those days, you know, the National Enquirer of those days was putting all kinds of propaganda against him, because they didn't like his policies, because he was Spanish and he was doing certain things that they didn't like his people. So, maybe he was a little bit of a bad guy, I don't know. You go to the grocery store now and you get all those things, you know. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you've written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're up to question 62 here, which is going to be on the theological virtues, huh? And the distinction of these, right? From each other and from the other virtues, huh? Let's look at the premium first, huh? Let's see, Dianna gave a whole course on what a premium is. Gee, kind of a little masterpiece, you know, huh? So careful Dianna was about those things, you know. Then we're not to consider about the theological virtues. And about this, four things are asked, huh? And the first is whether there are some theological virtues, huh? What does Aristotle say in the posterior analytics, huh? The question honest, huh? Does it exist comes for the question what it is, right? So in the Summa Theologiae, the first question after the one on the nature of the sacred doctrine is whether God exists, right? And then you have the whole treatise in the sense of God, what God is so far as we can know, right? And incidentally, I asked Lady Wisdom when I was out there with the grandchildren, right? Two or three times, I said to her, is God simple or put together? And she answered three times, God is simple. So, she's only about eight now, you know, so. She gets to be 20, but you can see it's going to come out of her mouth, I mean, you know. Boy. That's Sophia. It's Wisdom, that name. Sophia. Something. Okay, so you can see where he begins, right? You see how ordered this guy is? I remember when he kind of stopped sometimes and take the examples of Thomas and examples of Aristotle and explain that there's an order among the examples. He says if I was meeting a modern Thomas, I don't know what the order of his examples was, but these guys. But the order of these questions, right, is beautifully said, right? Then whether the theological virtues are distinguished from the two kinds he talked about before, the intellectual virtues and the, what, moral virtues, huh? And that's more general, right? And then the distinction of, what, they themselves. How many there are and which ones they are, right, huh? Okay. Why does it come before the fourth one? The ordinary, they are. The ordinary. Yeah, yeah. Now, I was mentioning, you know, Thomas there in the exposition of the sentences of Peter Lombard, right, he's got the best explanation, and I've seen the most explicit one, on what order is, right? And Thomas explains there that order in general means a before and after, right? And then he says it also includes distinction, right? But then he says more precise, or rather it presupposes distinction, right? And I sometimes show the truth of what Thomas says by the axiom of before and after. Now, the axiom of before and after is nothing is before or after itself. So today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday, but today cannot be before or after today, right, huh? And so distinction comes before, what, order, right, huh? So in the third article there, or the third question, he's talking about the distinction, right? And then in the fourth one about their, what, order, yeah. Yeah, so it's well-ordered, huh? So if you see the distinction of these four questions, you can also see, or you've got to see the distinction first, though, right? There's even a, what, distinction between distinction and order because things are distinct when one is not the other, right? But things are in order when one is before or after the other, right, huh? So distinction is distinct from, what, order, right? And distinction comes before order, which is a before and after. So they're very basic, right, huh? So these things have a way of coming back upon themselves, right? You know, when they talk about reason, now reason is really the only part of us that knows itself. And the Greeks had the saying, know thysautang, know thyself, right? But to whom is that addressed? Yeah, but especially our reason, right, huh? Because my hand can't really know what a hand is, but reason can know what reason is, right? And that's reflected in logic, right? Where, you know, you learn things like a definition, right? And now you can define a square, many things, but you can also define definition itself, right? There's a definition of definition. So it's kind of strange, right? So there's not only a definition of other things, but a definition of definition itself. Just like reason not only knows other things, but it can eventually know even itself as the ability for a large discourse, right? Looking before and after, huh? Okay. So I'm dying to know whether there are any theological virtues, aren't you? You wouldn't have any idea that there are, would you? I didn't look ahead. Some of these things, like the way they put these things, you know, they put the answer in bold, black, you know. They say something like that. Just look at the answer, get the answer, you know. So we have a copy of the summa here that was given to us from some library at this card, and it was the English translation of the summa. Yeah. And whoever the student was went through, and after each question went, yes, no, yes. Just look at the exam, you know, just to make sure you've got the answer. Sometimes I see people underlying Aristotle in the text or Thomas' text, you know, but everybody says it's important. They'll go around underlining those guys. Some, you know, Martin Flossian went in language because one thing, you know, it had to be stuck in there somewhere you want to call attention to. It was funny, you know, I was doing the text in the second book in the physics there. I used to do this last night. And Aristotle was giving the corollaries of the ways of cause. And he says you, second corollary, you should go to the, and the Greek was akrotatos, which means go to the highest cause, right? And I was mentioning to them how in Greek and in Latin, they speak of the cause as being above the effect, and the effect is, what, hanging or dependent, right? We used the word dependent, but depend means it, you know, to hang down like a pendant that woman's earring, you know. While in English, we tend to use more of the word ground for cause, right? And so we imagine the word of cause to be holding up the effect, right? So a little different image, but it's the same thing we're trying to get at, right? And I was reading a play by a guy called Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, right? And the last words, you know, Romeo says before he goes into the house of the caffernets, you know, he has some, you know, premonition that there's going to be something, you know, some consequence, yet hanging in the stars, right? Well, I mean, I see if you think of the stars influencing what happens down here, you think of the effect that's hanging upon the cause because the stars are above us, right? So he uses the word hanging, right, huh? Just like in Greek and Latin, sometimes we speak of the underlying cause, too, you know, but Suresh Tal speaks of the causes that's above the effect, right? And so you want to go to the highest cause, which means the, what, first cause, right? To the first, then, one precedes us. It seems that there are not theological virtues, right? For, as is said in the seventh book of natural hearing, the physics, virtue is a disposition of the perfect to the best. I mean, like, I was a person that I first heard as a kid. I call perfect that which is disposed according to its, what, nature, right? But that which is divine is above the nature of man, right? Therefore, the theological virtues are not virtues of man, right? The virtue is something that, what, perfects the nature of the thing, right, that has it, huh? Moreover, theological virtues are spoken of as divine virtues, right? But divine virtues are exemplars, like we learned in the previous thing there, which are not in us, but in God, right? The virtues of God himself are exemplars for us, right? So they're always holding up that priest there in Mass yesterday, the text about the love of God, right? Well, the love of God is an exemplar, right? That we're supposed to be imitating, right? So if God loves all men, well, then we're supposed to love all men and so on, right? So theological virtues then would be the virtues of God, right? Not the virtues of men. Moreover, the theological virtues are said those by which we are ordered to God. God, who is the first beginning, right? And the last end of things, right? So what does he say in the book of Apocalypse? I am the Alpha and Omega. And then he says a little bit later, I am the first, the Protas, and the Eschatas, the first and the last. And finally, after he says that a number of times, he adds that he's the Arche, the Telasa, the beginning and the end. And that's used in that division of theology, right? We consider God by himself, and then God is the beginning of things, and then God is the end, yeah. But God, from the very nature of reason and of the will, has an order to the first beginning and the last end. So, you know, I was reading there where Thomas was talking about the natural desire that we call wonder, right? Wonder is a natural desire, right? And wonder is a desire to know the what and the why of things. And so, if you see the effect, then you wonder about the cause, right? But then if the cause has itself a cause, then you wonder about the cause of the cause. And ultimately, the end of this whole thing is to know the first cause, like Aristotle was saying there in the second book of physics, right? So, we already are ordered to God as an end, right? Actually, right? So, we have to have this other. Did you ever read the book of Boethius there, the Constellation of Philosophy, right? Well, he talks about how, in the first books he's investigating happiness, right? And he's a very smart guy, so he takes up false happiness first, right? Before true happiness, on the grounds that false happiness is more known to us. Okay? But then, as he brings out what true happiness is, it seems to be something altogether perfect, right? Then you realize that it seems to be God, right? And so, the more like God is the happiness that we pursue, the more, what, true is the happiness we're pursuing, right? We naturally want to be happy, don't we? So, he's saying that in our reason and our will, we're naturally ordered to what? To God, right? Thomas, in his commentary, in the eighth song, right? It's a beautiful passage where he says, how men sometimes forget this, right? And go off, you know? But those who hold on to this natural order, to God, are the wise, he says, and the pure. Well, excuse me, the wise and the simple, yeah. He calls them simple, yeah. I think he says simple in the sense of the, what? Pure heart, yeah? It was beautiful, beautiful sin. But now, against this, huh? The precepts of the law are about the acts of what? Virtue. But about the acts of faith, hope, and charity, there are given precepts, commands, right? In the divine law. For it is said in Ecclesiastes 2, who fears God, believe in him, right? And also, hope in him, right? And also, love him, right? Right, huh? Commandments of love and so on. Therefore, faith, hope, and charity are virtues ordering us to, what? God, right, huh? Thus, therefore, there are, what? Theological virtues, right? That's interesting, you know, that Thomas there in the third part of this, who we call Gentiles, he takes up law before grace, right, huh? He takes up law, he says, among the things that God commands us, is to believe him and to love him and so on, right? And later on, he takes up grace, he speaks about the effect of grace, being charity and faith and hope and so on, right? So he gets it from both angles, right, huh? So there's laws about it, it also seems to be, what? There seem to be virtues, right? There's laws about virtue. The answer should be said that by virtue, man is perfected towards those, what? Acts by which he is ordered and what? Beatitude, huh? Okay. Even Shakespeare says it, right, huh? The guy is studying ethics. That part of philosophy that treats happiness by virtue especially to be achieved, right? Okay. But there is, however, a two-fold beatitude or happiness of, what? Man, huh? Interesting uses both words there, right? I think I mentioned how when I first started studying the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and you'd have, in the English text, you know, they had the word happiness, right? And I'd go read Thomas and they'd have the word philicitas and then I'd read Aristotle in the Greek and the word would be eudaimonia, right? Well, happiness is named from luck, huh? It's a little bit like in Latin saying someone is fortunate, right? Or unfortunate, right? Shakespeare's play, the two gentlemen of Verona, one of them is going off, you know, leaving town and the other guy says, when you meet with good happiness, huh? Wish me, you know, partake of your happiness, right? And then, but philicitas comes from the word philix meaning fruitful, right? So, it doesn't seem to be saying the word philicitas that this is a result of luck or happiness, what happens, right? But it's a, what, result of the, it's a natural result of your doing what you should be doing, right? And, but eudaimonia comes from you meaning good or well and daimon, having a good daimon, right? Well, daimon there is not taken in our sense of something bad, right? But more like a, a guardian angel we'd say, maybe. And, socrates spoke about his, what, daimon that guarded him, right? And so, this, you know, speech there at the trial of Socrates there, in the Apology, Socrates says that the daimon always warned him he was in danger, right? Well, the daimon has not warned him now, huh? So, maybe death is not the bad thing that it is, right? Maybe the soul and being free from the body will become perfect in virtue, right? So, eudaimonia seems to say as if our happiness depends upon some higher being, right? Well, there seems to be a little bit of truth in all these, right? Because you can say, hey, luck has something to do with happiness, right? You know, if I get in an accident and I lose my limbs or I'm blinded or something, right? That's going to make me miserable. I can't really assume I'm going to do this anymore. So, luck has something to do with happiness, right? Misery, right? I find gold in my property, right? You know, it's everything I have and buy the property, right? But, it also seems to be the result of the natural result of what you do, right? But then there seems to be this question of some higher being, you know? I'm just going to see you, you know? It's interesting in Aristotle in the book on the poetic art, huh? He doesn't use the word eudamonia, but the word eutuchia, right? Which goes back to the Greek word for luck or chance, right? He said that's what the poet is emphasizing, right? So, I noticed Tom's used the word here, beatitude, which has the idea of being blessed by God, right? In philchitas, he doesn't use the word fortunate, right? So, there's the two-fold happiness or felicity of man. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen. One that is proportioned to what? Human nature, right? To which man is able to arrive through the principles of his own what? Nature, right? And this is what Aristotle is talking about in Nicomachean Ethics, right? He realizes that that happiness is not altogether perfect, right? And so he says, well, let us call them happy as men, he says. Another is the beatitude exceeding the nature of man, right? To which man is able to arrive only by the divine what? Power, right? According to a certain what? Partaking of the divine nature, right? According to that in the second epistle of Peter, first chapter, the fourth verse. That through Christ we are made consortes, sharers you might say, right? Of the divine what? Nature, right? So grace is like a partaking of the what? Divine nature, right? Taking apart, so to speak, right? And because the attitude of this sort exceeds the proportion of human nature, the natural principles of man, from which he proceeds to acting well according to his own what? Racial portion. They are not sufficient to order man to this foresaid beatitude, which is above his nature. Whence it is necessary that to be added above to man, divinely, ultimately some beginnings, right? Some principles, some beginnings, through which or by which is thus ordered to a what? Yeah. A beatitude that is above his what? Nature, right? Those are the two things that I say that Thomas is saying in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentile is that man and also the angels, right? They differ from other things in creation, right? By being free and having dominion over their own action, right? And by being ordered to an end that is above their natural end, right? And that's why there's law given to them, and that's why there's grace given to them, right? So just as through the natural beginnings, one is ordered to an end that is in accordance with one's nature, a natural, but not nevertheless without what? Divine aid, right? And these beginnings are called what? Theological virtues, huh? Both because they have God for their object, insofar as through them they are what? Rightly ordered to God, right? Third, also because they are poured into us by God alone, right? Third, also because only by divine revelation are these virtues treated for us in what? Second, yeah, yeah. That's the kind of reason why you call them theological rather than divine, right? Apart from the misunderstanding of what divine means there, you know? I used to, you know, what they said, theologically the best way? I used to be bothered by this way of speaking, you know, I would say about somebody. He has psychological problems, right? The problem is being named from the science that studies it, right? And that's how you name the problem correctly, right? Because the science is known from its subject, not the subject from the science, right? It's like saying, you know, instead of calling square and circle figures, you know, and so on, plain figures, you say they're geometrical objects or something. But if you take it as being something that has to be revealed, you know, then it belongs to that science which is based on revelation, right? So, well, if you know that theology is, what, about God and about him as the beginning of things and the end of things, then you can see a reason why these could be called theological, right? We can let them get rid of that. But I haven't bothered by the other thing, right? We speak of social problems, right, or political problems. It's funny, huh? See, you name things from the science that studies them? The same color as a visual datum or something? To the first, therefore, the first objection, right? Taking from the text there, go ahead, stop. To the first, therefore, it should be said that some nature can be attributed to something in two ways. In one way, essentially, right? And thus, the theological virtues of this kind exceed, what? Human nature. The nature of man. In another way, what? One can partake of a higher nature, right? Just as the fire? As the wood. The wood, yeah. That is ignited. And it partakes of the nature of fire, right? And thus, in some way, man partakes of the, what? Divine nature. And thus, these virtues belong to man, according to the nature that he partakes of, right? So he's not denying the connection between, what? Virtue and nature, but he sees a distinction in virtue. Nature is essentially what it is by, what? Participation. I know Serestado himself, in the Nicomagnetics, he talks about a part of the soul that is rational, essentially, like reason. And then he partakes of reason, right? So that distinction is not lacking. And so we can see the nature that God has, essentially, the angels and the saints. Yeah. Are you satisfied with them? So far. He doesn't deny, he doesn't deny what the prophet says, right? Notice the virtues that are in the will, or the virtues that are in the emotions, they are in it, insofar as, what? These things partake of reason in some way, right? And therefore, they're human virtues, in that way. Okay, now there's a equivocation in the second objection. To the second should be said that these virtues are not called divine, as those by which God himself is said to be virtuous, right? But those by which we are made, what? Virtuous. Virtuous by God, right? And in order to God, right? Whence they are not exemplar virtues, but exemplar virtues, right? Exemplate. What kind of a clause is an exemplar? What's one of the four kinds of clauses, is it? Yeah, yeah. It's kind of an extrinsic one, right? You know? So my father's company there is on the wall of these patterns for the wagons, right? And so they take them down and they make something, according to that as an exemplar, right? To the third, it should be said that reason and will, are naturally ordered to God, right? Insofar as he is the beginning and the end of what? Nature, right? But nevertheless, according to the proportion of nature, right? But to him, according as he is the object of supernatural beatitude, right? Reason and will, according to their own nature, right? Are not ordered, what? Sufficiently, right? Oh, are you convinced that there are theological virtues now, gentlemen? Mm-hmm. To the second, then, one goes forward thus. It seems... It seems... The theological virtues are not distinguished from the moral ones and intellectual ones, right? For the theological virtues, if they are in the human soul, right, it's necessary that they perfect it either according to the intellectual part or according to the desiring part, right? But the virtues which perfect the intellectual part are called intellectual. The virtues, however, which perfect the desiring part are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinguished from the moral virtues and intellectual virtues. But we're more clear than that. I'm done. Figure that one out. Moreover, the theological virtues are said to be those which order us to God. But among the intellectual virtues, there is one which orders us to God, to wit wisdom, right? Which is about divine things. As considering the, what? Altissimum causa, right? That's the way. Imagine the cause to be above the, what? Effect, right? A lot of times we speak of the chain, right? You know? Which link is held up by the one above it, right? To get to the top, they would screw it into the ceiling or something. Okay. So, the other first cause would be altissimum, right? Therefore, theological virtues are not distinguished from intellectual virtues. Aristotle, and he calls wisdom sometimes in the sixth book, he calls it theology, right? Okay? When I was in college, he had a course in the philosophy department called natural theology, right? Moreover, Augustine, in the book on the morals of the church, manifests that in the four cardinal virtues, right? There is the order, ordo amoris, the order of love. But love is, what? Charity. Which is laid down to be a, what? Tail of a virtue. Therefore, the moral virtues are not distinguished from the theological order. Okay? It's in the Song of Songs, he doesn't get into the, what? I don't want to put charity and order in it. Yeah, yeah. Thomas said the whole question against the charity there in the secundi secundi, right? Right now, you know about the order of charity. So you're supposed to love the church more than yourself? Yeah? But against this is that that which is above the nature of man is distinguished from that which is according to the nature of man, right? But the theological virtues are above the nature of man, to which, according to nature, belong the intellectual and moral virtues, as is clear from the things that are above. Therefore, they are distinguished from each other, right? So, do you hear this in the secundi? Yeah, that makes sense to me. Sometimes Thomas has, you know, an objection, you know, our faithful and charity virtues. Where every virtue is either intellectual or moral, is not among the intellectual virtues, not among the moral virtues, therefore, that our virtues. That's a probable statement, right? That every virtue is either beneath the whole truth, you know? And moral virtues, too, which would be about human rights? Yeah, well, that's not going to get too complicated right now. Okay. We have to begin at the beginning. That's easy to swallow after you swallow this part. So our answer should be said, that it has been said above, habits are distinguished in species according to what? The formal difference of their what? Objects, right? Okay. Now notice, I can know the shape of this little box here by my sight and by my what? Touch. Yeah. But do I know it in the same way, the shape? I know it... Don't lose those things. No, it's a beautiful color. I know it through yellow, right? By my eye. And I know it through, what? Hardness or, you know? So the formal object is different, right? Even though the same thing is being known, right? Okay. So, I remember when students would start to study philosophy and learn what the philosophy says about God and say, that's what we were taught in catechism or something, you know, huh? So how can, you know, there's no difference between philosophy and theology, right? We're not knowing the same thing in the same way, right? So he says, the object of the theological virtues is God himself, who is the what? Last end of things, insofar as he exceeds the knowledge of our what? Reason. But the object of the moral virtues, intellectual virtues and the moral virtues, is something that is able to be comprehended by human what? Reason, right? Comprehend is kind of a perfect grasping there. Whence the theological virtues are distinguished in species from the moral and the intellectual, Sufficient, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues perfect the understanding and the desiring power of man, according to the proportion of, what? Human nature. But the theological virtues perfect reason and the will in a supernatural way, huh? To the second, it should be said that the wisdom, which is laid down by the philosopher to be intellectual virtue, considers divine things according as they are able to be investigated by human reason, huh? But the theological virtues about those things which exceed human reason, huh? This is what Aristotle says when he says that wisdom is a divine knowledge, right? He says the knowledge which either God alone has or only God has most of all, right? So he admits that the human wisdom is something less than the divine wisdom, right? So if man could partake of the divine wisdom, right? There would be wisdom in an even higher sense than Aristotle was getting by his natural reason. But Aristotle himself would admit that, right? Because he says either God alone should be said to be wise or God, what? Most of all. So I said, you know, that a Catholic philosopher wasn't just in theology, it was kind of a contradiction, right? And Aristotle would say, what's the matter with you? You know? I run into some, you know, Catholics, you know, in philosophy, you know, but that's theology, you know? You study philosophies so you can venture to study theology, right? And you study the lower so you can study the higher. If not, you have, as Albert the Great says, a perverse attitude towards knowing, right? Unless you'd be forced to it by necessity, right? The reading of Thomas' first teaches at the University of Naples, huh? He had Martin was teaching him logic, right? And Peter of Iberia, Ireland, was teaching him natural philosophy, huh? And they were translating there, you know, the commentaries of Averroes and so on, you know, at the University of Naples and that area. But of course, this is the origin of the word philosopher, right? That they wanted to call Pythagoras, what? Wise. Wise. And he says, don't call me wise, God alone is wise. Well, what the hell should we call you then? You've got to call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right? So it's not only the love of wisdom in the origin of philosopher, in the etymology of the word is in there, but in the origin of philosophy, but in the origin of philosophy, In a word, there's also this humility, right? That we're not wise in the way God is wise, huh? Who is it? Was it on the Greek? Where is there, you know? Athena comes on the album. No, I don't need you, you know. That's asking for trouble. Even they could see that, you know. Okay. So kind of the more strict name for metaphysics is not wisdom, but first philosophy, right? It's first in dignity and worth among all parts of philosophy, right? But the word philosophy indicates you're talking about a human thing, right? God is not a philosopher. To the third, it should be said, it's order of mortis, right? Order of love, virtue. That although charity is love, not horror is every love charity, huh? When therefore it is said that every virtue is an order of love, it can be understood either about love, communitar dicto, said in common, or it can be understood about the love of charity, which informs all the virtues, right? If therefore it is said of love, commonly said, then it is said, each virtue is said to be an order of love, insofar as for each of the cardinal virtues there is required an ordered, what? Affection, right? But all, but the, what? Every, what? Root and beginning of affection is, what? Love, huh? So why do I want steak? Because I like steak, right? Why do I enjoy steak? Because I like steak, right, huh? Why do you hate them? Because you like steak. Or am I concerned, or am I afraid that the steak might get spoiled, right? Because I love steak, right? So it gives rise to all the affections, right? So Gus is looking at the, what? He's looking before and after, like Shakespeare says, right? He's looking at the root, right? The love is the root of all the other, what? Fashions, right? Why do we hope to understand what Thomas has written? Because he'd love to understand it. He'd love to understand this stuff. And therefore, that's what he hoped to, right? Why do you fear you might not understand it? You'd love to understand it, yeah. If, however, it is understood about the love of charity, right? One is not given through this to understand that every other virtue essentially is charity, right? But that all the other virtues, in some way, depend upon charity, as will be made clear later on, right? Marvelous mind these guys, that's the end of Thomas, huh?