Prima Secundae
Lecture 165: The Connection of Moral Virtues and Charity

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He could have some judgment, yeah, but he'd be weakened by that, right? Because like courageous men, who seem to have real courage, but they're not temperate, they're not chaste, they seem to have good judgment in the area of courage, I mean, they seem to be able to... Yeah, but there's still one virtue there, though, of foresight, right? Which is somewhat corrupt, huh? That's not affected even in judging the things he's able to judge to some extent. That would be why it's explained to me, as I'm thinking this through, about a comment Francis the Salesman makes about two things. One is when he says, if you look at the pagan virtues, compared to vice, they look virtuous, but compared to the saints, they seem to have no virtue at all. And then he says also about St. Paul, the first hermit, we had his feast a couple weeks ago. He said, well, he didn't have an occasion to practice liberality or patience or anything, he lived by himself. He said, but he had the perfection of charity, so it wouldn't take him much to exercise any of those riches in any circumstances, because he had the perfection of charity. They think he couldn't be able to practice magnificence, huh? Probably not. But if we had the perfection of charity, it wouldn't take much. Yeah. Because if all that's lacking is the money, big deal. Okay, now, just to reply to the third objection, maybe, to touch upon your question a bit. The third objection is saying that can't you have one of the intellectual virtues without another one, right? So why can't you have that one moral virtue without the other ones, right? To the third, it should be said that intellectual virtues are about diverse matters that are not ordered, what? To each other. Just as is clear in the diverse sciences and arts, right? And therefore, they are not found in them, the connection which is found in the, what? Moral virtues existing about the passions and operations, which manifestly have an order to each other, right? Now, before you go into that, right? It manifests the thing about the intellectual virtues, huh? I was always struck, you know, in my early days, when you'd read about the great atomic physicists, some of them, right? They're pretty smart physicists, right? But some of them, you know, are kind of naive about communism, right? They said, we've got to give the secrets to the A-bomb, you know, to the Russians, so that, you know... Well, they seem to be lacking in political knowledge, right? Right, right, yeah. You know? And even Oppenheimer had some, you know, problems that way, you know? And, but... I mean, Oppenheimer had stayed under a board in Copenhagen and so on. One of the great guys. But you can kind of see that you can have one without having the other, right? And you can say, ah, how could a guy be so naive in this area and be so good here, right? That's the truth of what he's saying here, right? I mean, he doesn't think it's the same way that the moral virtues, right? Well, let's see how, why that is so. And therefore, there is not found in them the connection which is found in the moral virtues existing about the passions and the operations, which manifestly, Thomas says, at least manifestly him, right, have an order to each other, right? For all the passions, proceeding from certain, what? Primary ones, right? Certain ones that come first, to wit, love, and what? Hate, hate, huh? And they all, what, terminated some other ones, namely in pleasure and sadness, right? And likewise, all the operations, which are the matter of moral virtue, have an order to each other and also the passions. And therefore, the whole matter of moral virtues falls under, what? The one notion of prudence, right? Now, all understandable things have an order to the first, what, beginnings. And according to this, all the intellectual virtues depend from the understanding of the, what? Principles. Just as prudence from the, what? Moral virtues, right? As has been said before. Now, the universal principles, of which is the understanding of principles, they do not depend upon the conclusions, huh? About which are the remaining, right? Or the other ones, the other intellectual virtues. As the morals depend on prudence, in that the, what? In some way moves reason, and reason moves the appetite, huh? Do you see those connections then, a little bit? Is kind of connected, related to also his question about whether there's, how does he put it, whether there's, I think he asked about merit and meditation or something like that, and thinking over variables of the faith. And he was, yeah. If I go to Mass in the morning, they start thinking, gee, I'm hungry, you know? Why am I going to have a breakfast and they have one there? At least they're connected, right? One distracts from another, right? Mm-hmm. Fall asleep here at the church, I don't know. Like to have a nice coffee or a nice tea or something. So you've got to, you know, kind of go on experience there, right, to see that connection. But notice, reason is moving desire, and desire is moving what? Reason, right, huh? Do counsel out of fear, you find the character saying in Shakespeare's play, right? Am I being cautious, or am I counseling out of fear? They're connected very closely, right? What's that statement of false death? Because he has much flesh? No, but the... Discretion is a greater fine knowledge. Yeah, discretion is a greater part of my life. Yeah. Said like a real coward. That's the coward talking. It comes out in a serious way in Coriolanus, too, right? Where the other soldiers think he's foolhardy, right? And actually, he's the craziest man, right? The craziest man is, you know, looks to the people who are a little bit cowardly like a foolhardy man. To the fourth, it should be said, That those things to which the moral virtues incline, which are the ends, right? Have themselves to prudence as beginnings, right? But makeable things, huh? Don't have themselves to art as the beginnings, but only as the matter. And it's manifest, however, that although reason is able to be right in one part of matter and not in another, in no way can reason be said to be recta, right? If there be a defect in the beginning, right? Just as if someone errs about this beginning, every O is more than its part, he cannot, he's not able to have geometrical science, right? Because it would be necessary for him to recede from the truth, much in things that follow, right? That's a famous thing, Aristotle says, no mistake in the beginning, he's a great one in the end, huh? To take the wrong road, the fourth, there's not much difference between the right road and the wrong road, but the further you go, you become almost infinitely apart, huh? And more of things to be done are ordered to each other, right? Not, however, what? Makeable. Yeah. And therefore the defect of prudence... About one part of things to be done, and this is a defect also about other things to be done, huh? Which doesn't happen in things. As an example, I give a MacArthur there, you know, where the guy came through and he knew MacArthur. So he stopped to see MacArthur, you know, and he sat down and did a little breakfast or something like that. I mean, he ate some dinner like that, and the guy was eating, you know, and MacArthur was eating at all, you know. And he said, why aren't you eating? I said, I'm too tired to eat. So he went to bed, you know. He gets up the next morning, he's going off to another position, and so he didn't want to wake MacArthur up, you know. And so he said, say goodbye to MacArthur for me, I don't want to wake him up, you know. He said, wake him up? He went to the front two hours ago. Because all these things are related, right? Somebody else may not have gone to the front for another hour, a couple hours. Because of hunger or something, right, huh? Oh, yeah. Can I find another article in that here? Cut it off. Yeah, maybe we should start. Yeah, these things are about charity, huh? They're kind of connected, huh? Yeah. It's the... It's the... It's the... It's the... It's the... It's the... So, Article 2, I think, that's right. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order them in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Great girls. And help us to understand what you have written. God, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So, Article 2 here in Question 65, whether the moral virtues can be without charity, huh? Thomas is going to distinguish in the article, again, between the acquired moral virtues that Aristotle talked about, that are acquired by repeated acts, and then the infused moral virtues, right? So, I'll take into account some injections, and so on. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that the moral virtues are able to be without charity. For it is said in the Book of the Sentences of Prosperous, that every virtue, apart from charity, is able to be common to the good and the what? Bad. Bad. But charity cannot be except in the good, as it's said there. Therefore, the other virtues are able to be had, or can be had, without what? Charity, huh? That's using virtue maybe in a somewhat loose sense, huh? Because the bad don't really have, what? Virtue in the full sense. Virtue is what makes its ever good, right? It is activity good, huh? I used to say to the students, you know, what is the virtue of a knife? It's sharpness, right? What's the vice of the knife? Dullness, right? Which makes the bad knife in its activity bad. Moreover, moral virtues are able to be acquired from human acts, as it's said in the second book of the epics. That's when Aristotle gets the question of the virtues by nature, right, huh? But they're really not in a complete way except by repeated acts. But charity is not had except from infusion, right? Flowing in, huh? According to that of Romans chapter 5, verse 5, huh? That the charity of God is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, huh? was given to us, huh? So the charity is not acquired by repeated acts, huh? But by infusion. But the moral virtues are acquired not in that way, but by human acts, huh? Therefore, the other virtues are able to be had without charity. Moreover, the moral virtues are connected to each other insofar as they depend upon prudence. But charity does not depend upon prudence. Rather, it exceeds prudence, according to that of Ephesians chapter 3, verse 19. The dwelling above, right, huh? The super eminent, huh? Charity of Christ, the charity of Christ, exceeding all what? Science, it says, huh? But the moral virtues are not, what? Therefore, the moral virtues are not going to do charity, but they are able to be had without them, huh? Well, Thomas would be distinguishing, as he said, these two kinds of moral virtue, huh? So, against this is what is said in the first epistle of John chapter 3, verse 14. Who does not love remains in, what? Death, right? But through the virtues, the spiritual life is perfected. For they are that by which one lives rightly, huh? As Augustine says in the second book on free will. Therefore, they cannot be without the love of, what? Charity, huh? That's a nice objection, huh? I answer it should be said, as has been said above, huh? That the moral virtues, huh? Insofar as they are operative of good in order to an end that does not exceed the natural ability of man, they are able to be acquired by, what? Human acts, huh? And thus acquired, they are able to be without, what? Charity, huh? Just as they were in many of the Gentiles, huh? But, according as they are operative of good in order to the last end, which is supernatural, thus, perfectly and truly, they have the notion of, what? Of virtue. And they are not able to be acquired by human acts, but they are poured into us by God, right? So these are the infused moral virtues. And moral virtues of this kind, that is to say, the infused ones, the ones that, according to us, in a sense, right, to an end that is above the natural capacity of our mind, they are not able to be had without, what? Charity, huh? So you see, he points out the distinction, I was going to give the reason why the infused moral virtues are not able to be without charity. It's interesting the way he develops this. It has been said above that the other moral virtues, as, say, the human ones, right, ones acquired by their acts, are not able to be without prudence, huh? But prudence is not able to be without the moral virtues, insofar as the moral virtues make one have oneself well towards the end, from which proceeds the, what? Yeah. So you have to both know, in a sense, the natural end of man, right? And you have to be well disposed in your desiring powers for that end, right? Otherwise, you're not going to be, what? Able to be prudent, right? And to find what is really suitable to achieve that, what? End that you will dispose towards the end. So he says, prudence is not able to be without the moral virtues, insofar as the moral virtues make one have oneself well towards those end, from which, huh? The reason of prudence proceeds, huh? The argument, so. But to the right ratio of prudence, much more is it required that man have himself well about the last, what? End, huh? And that comes about not through the moral virtues, but through, what? Charity, huh? That's more important than about the other ends, which are more particular, not the last one, that comes about through the, what? Moral virtues, huh? They don't need too much, right? It's not the last end, huh? He makes a nice comparison there to speculative reason. Just as right reason in speculative matters, maxi may, most of all, right, needs the first beginning that is not able to be demonstrated, which is that contradictories are not able to be true. They cannot both be and not be at the same time, right? I used to quote my friend Hamlet, right, huh? To be or not to be? That is the question, right? And it kind of, you know, take a little bit from his attention there. It's a question because you can't both be and not be, right? You know? If you had things that were not contradict you, right? You know? To be healthy or to listen to music, right? That is the question. Well, no, you can do both of those, right? But to be or not to be? That is the question. Because you can't both be and what? Not be, right? Aristotle says you can't demonstrate that, but he manifests it in the fourth book of wisdom. That's the... starting point of thinking. So can an odd number be even? Why not? It's very nature. Yeah, but an even number is divisible into two equal parts, and an odd number is not divisible into two equal parts, right? So you can't both be and not be divisible into two equal parts, so an odd number cannot be an even number, right? That follows from this beginning here, right? This indemonstrable beginning. Whence it is manifest that neither can what? Infused prudence, huh? Be without charity, right? Because prudence is what? The art that directs us towards the end, right? Finding what is suitable to achieve the end, right? But you have to be well disposed towards that end, because that's the starting point for the reasoning of what? Prudence, right? And since the end here is something supernatural, and you're well disposed towards it by this charity that's diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, you can't really have this infused prudence, right? Without charity, right? And neither then the moral virtues consequently, right? Because they all depend upon prudence. When Aristotle defines the moral virtues even there, he puts in the idea of prudence, huh? It's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us as determined by right reason. That means prudence, right? Just find out. But prudence falls under the intellectual virtues. Yeah, yeah. But the moral virtues are defined nevertheless with prudence in them, right? Because they, they're the what? Their habit with choice, right? And choice involves the use of what? Reason, right? And that use of reason is the use of the virtue of what? Prudence, yeah. So the link is, right? That on the one hand, this infused prudence can't be without you being well disposed towards your ultimate end. You're well disposed towards your ultimate end by charity, right? And the moral virtues can't be, right? Even the infused ones without this infused prudence, right? Well then you can't have the what? Charity without the what? Infused moral virtues, yeah. But you can't have the, the moral virtues they're acquired by what? Repeated acts without charity, right? As the Gentiles, some of them had them. Human. Yeah, yeah. Now he goes on to the distinction we met last night there. Remember that? What kind of distinction did we talk about last night? Yeah, yeah. Which Thomas usually expresses in, the vacuum by Simplicitare in secundum quid. And he sees that kind of distinction here. Is clear therefore for the thing said, that only the infused virtues are what? Perfect, right? And Simplicitare, huh? Should be called what? Virtues, right? Because they order man to the what? Ultimate end simply, right? The other virtues to wit the acquired ones are secundum quid, right? That's the Latin has, huh? Virtues. Not however, Simplicitare. For they order man well with respect to what? The last end in some genus, but not with respect to the last end simply, huh? Whence in Romans chapter 14, upon what it says in verse 23, everything that is not from faith, and that's formed faith, is a what? Peccatum, right? Peccatum est. That's awfully strong, right? The gloss of Augustine says, where there is lacking the knowledge of truth, false is virtue even in what? Good morals, huh? It's a very tough way of putting it, right? But it's that distinction between simply and secundum quid, huh? And that first objection, as you said, is taking kind of a weak idea of virtue, where you say you can have what? Virtues in the bad as well as the good, right? That seems like a contradiction, right? Because the definition of virtue, even Aristotle's definition of virtue, it's what makes its haver good and its activity good, right? I should take the students and say, you know, he's a blur with my right eye, huh? He's kind of a blur over there. With my left eye, he's much more clear, huh? So I say my left eye is more virtuous than my right eye, right? Does that mean that I look at the girls with my right eye and not with my left eye? No. No. What's the eye's own act is to see things, right? And I suppose an eye doctor could say why this eye is more virtuous than that one, right? But it has more the virtue of the eye, right? That's my good eye, at least for a distance, right? Now for reading, this is my good eye, right? And this is my bad eye, right? So nature has been kind to me, right? So if I can't find my glasses, I can still do some reading with my right eye, and I can still, you know, see some clock in the distance, what time it is or something, you know, with my left eye, huh? But my friend has that sign in his kitchen, I think I've told you about before, huh? Much virtue in herbs, little in men. But there you see the common meaning of virtue, right? Now the same friend, he comes down, you know, if I've had an herb in the shelf there that's been around for a while, I'll say, this is not what I'm going to do. It's lost its virtue, right, huh? But our Lord used that connection too, right? And he said... The salt. Yeah, yeah. The salt loses its what? Virtue, you could say, right? It's... It's... It can't... Yeah, yeah. It's going out and run over, right? So you should always go back to that, you know, idea of virtue is what makes its hair ever good, right? So you can even speak of the virtue of a knife, right? Like sharpness is what makes it a good knife and makes it, what? Cut well, right? And dullness is like the vise of the knife, right? So it doesn't cut very well, huh? So you've got to find what is to man like sharpness is to the, what, knife. It's a little more complicated, right? But again, man's just making a little more of a study, right? I suppose the eye doctor, he's having my eye and telling me why I don't see him clearly with the right eye, huh? He's a blur over there. You see what I mean? Yeah, yeah. So in regard to the first objection, then he says, Virtues there are taken according to a, what? Imperfect notion of virtue. Otherwise, if moral virtue according to this perfect definition of virtue is taken, it makes its hair, what? Good, right, huh? So you could have virtues that are shared by the bad as well as the good, for example. In the full sense of virtue. And consequently, they're not able to be in the, what? Bad, huh? Now the second objection that says, well, some moral virtues are acquired from human acts. He admits that, right? And they can be had by, what? Without charity, right? The ones that are acquired by the good acts. But it's infused moral virtues that he pointed out in the beginning of the body of the article, that cannot be had without, what? Charity. Charity, right? And to the, okay, that's the answer to that. And the third one is, to the third should be said that although charity exceeds knowledge and prudence, nevertheless, prudence depends upon, what? Charity. And consequently, all the moral virtues infused, because they depend upon prudence. Now article three is going to be, in a sense, the reverse, isn't it? In article two, article two is saying, can the, what? Moral virtues be without charity. And the answer is, no, if by moral virtues you mean the infused ones, right? Okay, now he's going to say, can charity be, what? Without the moral virtues, right? That's a little more difficult question now. Why should the higher depend upon the lower, right? If the lower should depend upon the higher, it's not so strange, is it? But there's some necessity for the infused moral virtues to be there with charities there, huh? That's all. That's all. That's all. To third, one goes forward thus, it seems that charity is able to be had without the other, what? Moral virtues, huh? For to that to which something one suffices, it is unsuitable that many things be ordered, right? But charity alone suffices to fulfilling all the works of virtue, huh? As is clear through that which is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 13. Charity is patient, charity is benign, and so on, so on, right? Okay? Therefore, it seems that charity being had, all the other virtues are what? Superfluous, right? Okay. What? That's a good objection. Yeah. Moreover, who has the habit of virtue easily does those things which pertain to that virtue, and they are in themselves, what? Or by themselves, pleasing to him, right? Whence, as Aristotle says, the sign of the habit is the pleasure which comes about in the, what? Work, right? There's a problem there, you know, when Aristotle's talking about the acquired moral virtues, and he says, it's by doing brave things that we become brave. It's by doing just things that we become just. How can this be? If we do just things, must we not also be just already, right? And if we do brave things, must we not be brave? So what does it mean to say that by doing brave things, we become brave? A brave man, we're doing just things, right? We become a just man. If you do it imperfectly? Yeah, yeah. And it's difficult to do them, right, huh? Okay? But once you acquire the virtue and it becomes a habit, then it becomes easy, and it becomes pleasing and agreeable, right? It's perfect. Yeah, yeah. So, this is a sign that you've acquired to have it, right? That's now, what, pleasing to eat moderately and drink moderately, right? And pay your debts and so on, right, huh? I don't have to struggle, you know, to pay somebody what I owe them, right? I don't have to struggle, you know, to put the plate away when I've got enough to eat, you know? No, I don't have to worry, I need, you know? I enjoy, you know? Putting the bottle away, but I don't know. That's a sign I've arrived, right? I don't enjoy it. That's true, even in a way, about the speculative riches, too, right? If I enjoy doing Euclid there, you know, then I have something to have in the challenge, I think, right? You first begin, you don't enjoy doing it, maybe, huh? Did you enjoy it for the first moment? No. Yeah, but once you have to have it, then you kind of enjoy it, right? But many, having charity, right, huh? And being without, what, mortal sin, right, huh? Nevertheless undergo, what, or suffer difficulty in the works of the, what, riches, huh? So maybe you'd find this in the lives of the saints, right, huh? He's a man who has charity, and he's without mortal sin, but he's still having, what, difficulty controlling his temper or something, right? Nor do they please them, secundum se, as such, right? But only according as they were referred to, what, charity, right, huh? Therefore, many have charity who do not have the other, what, riches. Moreover, charity is found in all the saints, huh? But some are saints who nevertheless lack some virtues. They see how much Jerome he had a temper, didn't they? See how much Jerome? For as Bede says, huh, these are great, uh, for as Bede says, the saints are more humbled about the virtues which they do not have than they glory about the virtues which they do have. Therefore, it is not necessary that who has a, what, who has charity have all the, what, more than she's, huh? Those are pretty good objections, right? But against this is that by charity the whole law is fulfilled, huh? For it is said in Romans chapter 13, the 8th verse, who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the, what, law. But the whole law cannot be fulfilled except through, what, all the moral virtues. Because the law commands about all the acts of virtues, as is said in the 5th book of the, what, ethics, huh? Therefore, the one who has charity has all the, what, moral virtues, huh? And Augustine also says in a certain, what, epistle, huh? And the charity includes in itself all the, what, hard-known, what, virtues, huh? He's a big authority, Augustine, right? If you look at the catechism of the Catholic Church, you know, and you see how many quotes there are from Augustine, right? It's amazing, huh? A lot by Thomas, even more from Augustine there, right? But those two guys, you know, they got really a lot of quotes, huh? So when Augustine says so, it is probable, right? I answer it should be said that with charity, at the same time, huh? Are poured in all the, what, moral virtues. So what we called before the infused moral virtues, right? Now, Thomas gives a reason why this is so, huh? The reason for this is that God does not less perfectly act in the works of grace than in the works of, what, nature. But thus we see in the works of nature that we do not find the beginning resource of some deeds in something without finding in it those things which are necessary for perfecting those works. Just as in animals are found the organs by which they are able to be, what? Perfect the works to which the soul has the power of doing, huh? Is manifest over the charity insofar as it orders man to the last end is the beginning of all the good works, which can be, what? Ordered to that last end, huh? Whence is necessary that with charity, at the same time, are poured in all the moral virtues by which man is perfected, perfects the, what, each kind of, what, good deeds, huh? And thus it is clear that the moral virtues infused not only have a connection on account of prudence, but also on account of, what, charity, huh? And that who loses charity through a mortal sin loses all the moral virtues infused, okay? That's a serious thing, right? That's what I was mentioning before, you know, when people said, what do you need these acquired moral virtues, right? These moral virtues that are secundum quid virtues, right? And that are acquired by repeated acts, right? Well, if you do one eating too much, you don't, for that reason, lose right away the virtue of what? Temperance. That was acquired by repeated acts, huh? You have to start overeating for a while, you know, before you start to make that virtue. start to go away, right? So they have a certain stability, right, that the, what, acquired, I mean the infused moral virtues don't have, because they're tied with, what, charity, when you lose charity, you lose the, what, all of them, right? So you need those, what, those acquired moral virtues as well as the infused ones, even though infused ones are more perfect, right, huh? But they're not as, in one sense, as stable, right, as the acquired ones, huh? Mother and father brought me up to be just, you know, and says, just can't be unjust, I just can't take somebody else's money, you know, somebody to have some money, I just can't take it, I try, but I can't, you know? There's instability there, right, huh? We were playing down there at the, we have parks there in Minneapolis and we found a billfold, right, huh, my brothers and I, you know, and somebody lost his billfold, and so we went down to the, in section stand there, somebody was a billfold, and they had no record of anything like that, you know? So we brought the billfold back home and so on, and sure enough, they appeared in the paper, the guy said he'd lost his billfold in the place, right, huh? So, we called him up and he came out and we could identify him as a person who, you know, that was his billfold. He wanted to give us an award, you know, my father would go, nope, nope, don't take any award, you know, so that, you know, and just like that, you know, huh? So you're kind of brought up, you know, huh? So Aristotle says in the Ethics, you know, it makes a great deal of difference how you're brought up, right? Or he says, or rather, all the difference, right? You know, we get to use repeated acts, right? Now, I never listened to bad music around the house, you know, but my brother Richard Marcus would never tolerate any bad music in the house. We didn't think of doing it, you know? So, there's a sense of stability in those things when they're built up as, you know, as a child, huh? Now, what about this first objection, right, huh? Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that in order that the act of a lower power be perfect, right, there is required that not only is there perfection in the higher power, but also in the, what? Lower, yeah. So if the chisel isn't good, that's going to influence what? Michelangelo, right? Won't be able to make the Pieta, so he did, right? You get the wrong screwdriver, right, and it's just not going to work, right? That's a big deal with the screw thing, but, you know, if you have the right size screwdriver, it just doesn't, yeah. So even though that's the lower power, right, it requires that, huh? If the principal agent, huh, if the chief agent, huh, has itself in a suitable way, does not follow a perfect action if the instrument, if the tool is not, well, what? Disposed. Disposed, right, huh? Whence is necessary in order that man act well in those things which are towards the end, huh? That he not only have the virtue by which he has himself well about the end, but also the virtues by which he has himself well about those things which are toward the end, huh? For the virtue which is about the end has itself as chief and a motor, a mover, with respect to those which are, what? To the end, huh? And therefore, with charity, it is necessary to also have the other, what? Four virtues, huh? Because the lower power needs to be, what? Perfect, right? In order to obey, right? It should be higher power. It seems as if our souls being made for the lower virtues, that it's kind of a safety feature built into us in a way of giving us the stability so that when we do sin gravely, there is a greater chance, I guess, that we'll lose. Yeah, but now he's talking about the infused moral virtues here, right? Yeah, yeah. I was just mentioning, apropos of the fact that you lose them, you lose charity, right? Yeah. So one act could be that, right? You know, with poor David there with Bathsheba, right? So you're going to lose the, what, infused moral virtues at the same time. So I mentioned at that time, that's the reason why we say you have to try to get these acquired virtues too, right? Even though they're not as perfect virtues as are the infused one, right? But they have one thing about them, which is that they are more, what, stable, right? Because they're produced by repeated acts rather than infused all at once by God, right? Okay. And they're infused with charity, so you lose charity, you lose, what, them, right? The idea is Simo, right? As opposed to before and after, right? You get the acquired virtues by repeated acts after many repeated acts, right? Okay. Okay. He's saying that you need the infused moral virtues to dispose. The lower power is to obey and to hire him. Yeah. Yeah. But with the acquired moral virtues, that gives you sort of a basis in order to seek a confessor and to repent of your mortal sins and to re-acquire the infused virtues. It's sort of like a, there's a symmetry in a way. Yeah, yeah. You know, a lot of popular, you know, Christianity don't have these distinctions seen and taught, you know, between the acquired moral virtues and the infused, right? Yeah. And the necessity of both for different reasons, right? They don't care much, no. I don't see the distinctions at all. I don't care much, yeah. Distinction is the most fundamental thing, in the sense, the mind sees. I was reading about the Word of God, the Son of God, and Thomas says, you know, the Son of God, he says, can do nothing from himself, but he can do everything through himself. Why can't he do anything from himself, huh? Well, God's operation is the same thing as the substance, and he has his substance, his nature, from the, what, the Father, right? So he can do nothing from himself, but only from the Father, like he says, huh? But, because he has received the divine nature, then he has a power, infinite power, right? So, and he's the same as his power, right? So through himself he can do all things, right? I said, gee whiz, I would sort of get all confused in that, you know, not see that distinction, right, huh? It's kind of amazing, you know, that you can say the Son of God can do nothing from himself, but only from the Father, right? But he can do everything to himself, huh? But he can see those distinctions, right? Just like Boethius and Marius Aristotle for seeing the distinction of the ten highest genera, you know? He could see, you know, these highest genera under which everything falls. Gee whiz, you know? He's really amazed at that, right? Now, what about the second objection, right? That sometimes even those who have, what? Charity, right? Has some difficulty in some particular matter. To second should be said that sometimes it happens that someone having a habit, right? Undergoes difficulty in operating and consequently does not, what? Sense, pleasure, and agreement in the act on account of some impediment, extrinsicless, huh? In an extrinsic way, coming upon him, right? Just as the one who has... the habit of science undergoes difficulty in understanding on account of what steveness or self infirmity right huh okay can't remember something right and likewise he says the habits of the what infused moral virtues right undergo sometimes a difficulty in operating on account to some contrary dispositions left over from preceding what acts so was it uh some of them regard the body's kind of a what not a guy you can trust right so i mean i may have something to do also with maybe not having the what the uh acquired virtues right huh okay so you have certain bad acts and then you're kind of what yeah you don't take pleasure maybe in in the acts of the infused virtues right because of something outside of them right left from these bad acts that you were engaged in i visited you know on the trip forward italy the mate casino there right huh and that's where benedict is buried him mate casino and and i think he finished the the uh the rule there right and scholastic is very there too uh sister you know and uh but uh in his early days there you know he was being tempted you know they were calling some girl i guess he knew and he jumped in the what thorn voice yeah then he was cured right which he says difficulty does not in the same way happen in the acquired moral virtues right huh because they are acquired not all at once but by the exercise of of acts and by which is taken away what the contrary dispositions huh or is it in the confessions there where augustine is suffering though from what is it to think right it's quite bothersome right huh that could interfere with your thinking right even if you were well disposed to think what was it that you said he is suffering about toothache remember augustine okay that can make it hard to think right you have a headache or something right okay what about saints not having some of the virtues huh well it's for the same reason they said that you know some saints are said to not have some of the virtues that is the infused virtues right insofar as they undergo some difficulty in their acts right for the reason already suddenly applied to the second objection although they in fact do have the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit of the habit