Prima Secundae
Lecture 168: The Hierarchy of Virtues: Justice and Wisdom

Transcript
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It's kind of a strange army he gives there. It's interesting. But if virtue be considered, not in terms of its object, right, which he says simply, but in order to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite to which it belongs to move the other powers to act, right? As has been said above, it is more what? Noble, right? And because virtue is said from this that it is the beginning of some act when it is what? Perfection of a power or ability. It follows also that the notion or the definition of virtue more belongs to moral virtues than to what? Intellectual virtues. Although intellectual virtues are more noble habits than digitare. My God, that's diction there, right? What about the first objection? It's more necessary and permanent, huh? Moral virtues, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the moral virtues are more permanent than intellectual ones because the exercise of them is in those things which pertain to our common life, huh? So you've got to eat every day, right, huh? So you've got to exercise yourself in the virtue of what? Temperance, right, huh? You don't have to do geometry every day, right? I try to do the jump every day, but I don't get in every day, right? But I eat every day just about, huh? Pretty, right? But it's manifest that the object of the disciplines, meaning of the intellectual virtues of the sciences, that the objects which are necessary and always having themselves in the same way are more, what? Permanent than the objects of moral virtues which are some particular things to be, what? Done, right? So it's this food in front of me that I've got an individual piece of, individual cake here, let's say, right? But I've got to use my temperance with, right? It's a particular cake, right? That, however, moral virtues are more necessary for human life, does not show them to be more noble simpliciter, but towards this. Yeah. So the secundum quid, right? Moreover, that the speculative, huh? Now, speculative is a Latin word for what? Looking. Looking, yeah. Theoretical is a Greek word, right? The... Moreover, the speculative intellectual virtues. In Aristotle, when he takes them up, the intellectual virtues, he takes up, he mentions five of them, right? It's become interesting, he mentions five, right? You have art, and prudence, or foresight, and then understanding, and then reasoned out understanding, episteme, and then wisdom, right? Well, these three are speculative virtues, right? Natural understanding, reasoned out understanding, Aristotle calls nous and episteme, and then sophia, huh? Wisdom, right? Right, huh? Okay. Those are the, what? Spectative virtues, right? Theoretical virtues. And then foresight, or prudence, and art, right reason about doing, right reason about making, right? Those are the practical ones, right? So he's saying, moreover, in these speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they're not ordered to something as, what? Useful. As useful as ordered to an end, they are more, what? Of more worth, right? Okay. And this happens because, according to them, in a certain way, there's begun in us, what? The attitude, right? Which consists in the knowledge of truth, right? You know, the famous words of our Lord, I am the, what? Road, he says, huh? In Greek, the word is odas, right? I am the road, the truth, and the, what? Life, huh? In Thomas, when he begins the third part, the Summa, right? He says, you know, it's about Christ who, according as he is man, is the road, huh? The via, to what? Our beatitude, right? But as God, he's truth itself, and life itself, huh? Eternal life, right? Truth itself, right? So he's, what? That's the end, huh? Truth, huh? Yeah, okay. So, insofar as the speculative virtues are aiming at knowing the truth, right? They are kind of a beginning of what? The attitude, huh? And that's important. That's for the excellence, right? Now, what's the definition, too, when you get to faith, which is in reason, too, right? But is faith more speculative or practical, do you think? Yeah. The same way that Thomas, you know, argued that theology is more speculative than practical, because it's chiefly about God, and you can't do anything about God, right? You can't do anything about him. You can't do anything about him, right? But he's the end, right? Okay. But what's the definition there of faith, right? Substance is hopeful. Yeah. Conviction of what is not seen, right? Now, substance doesn't mean, it's at the essence. It's not the beauty of vision yet, right? But it's a substance. The stasis, I think, is the word there, right? It's kind of like a foundation, right? You believe by faith what you're going to see in the beauty of vision, right? So you're kind of beginning the attitude there, right? You see? So you can see what Aristotle, or what Thomas is saying here, right? That the speculative virtues that have as their object truth, they're trying to know truth, and the end of man is to know the first truth, which is God himself, right? Then that's already, what? Kind of a beginning of the attitude. And that's the best thing there is, huh? That's the greatest good, huh? You know, Shakespeare calls reason, what? In the exhortation, he calls it God-like, right, huh? But when is reason most God-like, huh? Well, when it requires some wisdom, right, huh? And the more the knowledge it has has the character of wisdom, the more it is like, what? God, right, huh? So Aristotle, when he takes up wisdom there, at the beginning of the 14 books of wisdom, 14 books of first philosophy, 14 books, Meta-Tahuzika, after the books of natural philosophy, you know, he says that the science is divine, and both senses are divine, right? It's about God, and it's the knowledge which God himself alone would have, or only God would have fully, right? I turn it into an effibli there, right, and I say, wisdom, as Lady Wisdom says, is the knowledge of God, right, huh? In both senses. It's the knowledge about God, and it's the knowledge which, but, God has, right? God's knowledge is chiefly of himself, right? And so in knowing himself, he knows all other things, huh? And so when you get to theology, that's even more like God, right, huh? than the first philosophy is, right, huh? So the more this knowledge has the character of wisdom, the more it's, what, like God, right, who's wisdom itself, huh? That's very interesting, huh? Shakespeare should see that, right? God like God. Of course, it strikes me, you know, that in even the education itself, Shakespeare works out the, what, definition of what? Reason, right, huh? And here you have the beginning of the image of the Trinity in man, right? Because in reason, thinks out the, what, definition of reason, then in the definition of reason, you have reason as understood, right, huh? And then when you understand how good it is, then you start to really love reason, right? This is the image of the Trinity in God, right? So it's especially God-like, huh? When reason knows itself and, what, then you love reason itself when you see that it's very good to have this ability for a large discourse, looking before and after. So it's really kind of marvelous that Shakespeare should touch upon that. So it's really good to see that it's very good. So it's very good to see that it's very good. God-like, right? He also says, surely he that made us with such large discourse gave us not the capability, God-like reason, to fuss on us and our youth, right? To go rusty and moldy and so on. I was reading about the part on the Incarnation there in the fourth book of the Superplanet Gentiles and Thomas, you know, it's beautiful what he does. He begins with the heretics and he kind of refutes all heretics and finally becomes a position of the church about this, right? And then once he gets through with that, then he has a whole chapter where he's saying that this is impossible, right? For God to become a man, right? And then he answers that, right? And after you know that what the church believes and you know that it's possible, right? Then you say, well, but is it suitable that God should become a man, right? And then he, you know, he has a whole chapter about 26 objections to it and then he, you know, shows us eight beautiful reasons why he should become a man and then he answers the 24. It's absolutely absolutely beautiful to see that, huh? But why do I want to get into that before? I don't know why. I think there's some reason here. Be attitude, maybe? Yeah, yeah. Anyway, okay. Oh, yeah, I was thinking of when Thomas begins that, he has to talk about original sin, right? Because that's something St. Paul seems to emphasize, right? And of course, St. Thomas is saying, you know, well, one can with probability estimate that there was something like original sin, right? And even the problem with the church, you know, teaches us in the Old Testament, right? I said, how clear it is, right? You know, where we have homosexuality now and this idea of homosexual marriage, but the chief, you know, the worst effect of original sin is the mind is clouded and have to make mistakes, right? And can't control its emotions. And so I said, there's plenty of evidence, you know. You've got to be really blunt what's going on, you know. It's just absurd nonsense that comes out of these people, right? It's insanity, yeah. If you remember Anthony Daniels, an Englishman physician who is also a very astute cultural commentator, why it's for the New Criterion, the Great Deal. And he spent many years in the English prison system and he's an agnostic, essentially. But he is in full concurrence with the doctrine of original sin because he's saying that that's the only thing that I've ever found that would explain a strange twist in the human soul from his incredible experience to the ability of the experience within the prison system as a psychiatrist. And so very, very interesting. That's what Chesterton met a man on the street who said, he used to read Chesterton's articles in the paper all the time and he came up to Chesterton one day and he says, I think the Catholic Church is the only thing left in the world that makes sense. The only sensible thing left in the world. So Chesterton said to him, are you a Catholic? He says, no, I'm an atheist. And then Chesterton said, well, when Thomas asked the first question of whether God exists, his first answer was, it seems not. So he said, so that's not the only reason. We'll see how reasonable the Church is but still not believe in God. We've got the benefit of the doubt. Maybe he'll work it out. So this happens, he says, at the end of the applied to the first objection. According to them, in some way, is begun in us, right? Beatitude, right? Which consists in a knowledge of the, what? Truth, right? To second, it should be said that according to the moral virtues, a man is said to be good, what? Simply, right? That's interesting, right? And not according to intellectual virtues, by that reason, because the, what? Appetite moves the other powers to its, what? Act, right? Whence through this also is not proved, except that more virtue is better, secundum quid. That's interesting, right? That he said to be, it's said to be better secundum quid, even though, according to the man, he said to be good simply, right? That's, that's, that's difficult, yeah. To the third, it should be said that prudence is, not only directs the moral virtues in choosing those things which are towards the end, but also in, what? Putting forward the end itself, right? For it is the end of each moral virtue to attain the middle in its own, what? Matter. Which middle is determined according to the right reason of prudence? As he said both in the second and in the sixth book of the ethics, right? So when Aristotle defines moral virtue in the second book, he says it's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason. And then he determines what right reason is there are prudence when it gets to the sixth book which takes up the virtues of reason. So he's putting the, what? With some qualifications, right? He's putting the speculative virtues, right? The virtues of reason before those of the, what? Moral. Moral riches, right? Moral. Moral. Moral. Moral. Moral. Moral. Moral. Moral. But now he's going to go into, among the moral virtues, which ones are greatest, right? And the question is, when the justice is, what? The chief among the moral virtues. To the fourth, one goes for it thus. It seems that justice is not the, what? Chief among the moral virtues, right? And you'll be asking the same question about who the wisdom is, the chief one among the riches of reason, right? For it is greater to give to someone of one's own than to render to someone what is owed to them, right? But the first pertains to liberality, generosity. The second to justice, right? Therefore it seems that liberality is a greater virtue than, what? Justice, huh? Of course, magnificence is supposed to be greater than liberality, because that's a great gift, right? So when somebody gives the money to finish a building there at Thomas Aquinas College, right? Now we say he's magnificent. Magnificent gift, right, huh? See? It's not justice, right? It's magnificence, which is sort of great sums. Moreover, that would seem to be greatest in each thing, which is most perfect in it, huh? But as it is said in the Epistle of James, in the first chapter, patience has a perfect, what? Work, huh? Therefore it seems that patience is greater than justice, right, huh? Moreover, magnanimity now, so that's what Mozart represents in the, what, 36th Symphony and in the, what, 45th Symphony, huh? Which are both in C major, right? Okay. Further, magnanimity does great things in all the virtues, as Aristotle says in the fourth book of Ethics, huh? The magnanimous man tries to be, what, excel in honor, right, huh? What's honorable? Acts of virtue. So he tries to, what, great things in all the virtues, right, huh? Okay. A lot of times Shakespeare will couple their magnanimity with, what, courage, right, huh? Because courage seems to be a very honorable virtue, right? So we give the Medal of Honor for, what, one glorious day on the battlefield there, right, huh? But you can be just all your life, or tempered all your life, and they're going to give you a medal, right? You know, tempered, you know, a lot of fun. Against this is what the philosopher, now who's he? Some guy. Somebody. He's a somebody. Somebody. Somebody. Somebody. I think, who's that comedy team in Britain? They have a lot of funny plays and stuff like that. Gilbert, so him. They have a line, if everybody's somebody, then no one's anybody. This is Antonio Mecilla, right? Mm-hmm. Philosopher. It's like Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right, huh? Didn't know Shakespeare. That's an excuse. A little sliver. But in the Federalist Papers right now, they say, in the words of Shakespeare, no, don't say Shakespeare, they say in the words of the poet, you know, long farewell to all my greatness, huh? Well, it's Henry VIII, right? Please call him the poet. It's a nice figure of speech, yeah? Mm-hmm. Tonamassia. What does the philosopher say in the fifth book of the Ethics? That's the book that's about justice, right? Justitia es pre clarissima, right? The most, what? Brilliant of the virtues, right? I answer, it should be said, that some virtue, according to its species, is said to be greater or lesser. Either simply or secundum quid. I can't get away from that distinction, Thomas, huh? He's really tied up with it, right? He's milking it for all his work. Yeah. And, you know, when he talks about, when Aristotle talks about being, right, huh, in wisdom there, the two fundamental divisions of being are according to substance and accident, right? And then act and ability, right? And substance is being secundum quid, right? And accident is being, what? Secundum quid, right, huh? And act is being simply, and ability is, what? Secundum quid, right? So it's kind of a fundamental distinction, right, huh? It's found in the most universal thing of all, which is a being, right? So that distinction comes up again and again, huh? But it also is tied up with one kind of fallacy, right? The fallacy that comes from mixing up what is simple with what is secundum quid, huh? It's one of the 13 kind of fallacies. But those are, what, mistakes that are not tied to any one particular science, right? They run through everything, right? So dialectic is, you know, kind of universal, like wisdom, huh? Aristotle compares dialectic to wisdom, right, huh, in terms of universality, right? You see that in this particular thing, this distinction of simply and secundum quid, right, huh? Simply, a virtue is greater, according as in it, more, what? What shines through, right? The good of what? Reason, huh? Because it's, what does it mean? It's what Shakespeare teaches us in the education, right? We should live in accordance with what? Reason, huh? It's what Dianus says, right? Aristotle teaches us, right? So, what is a good human act, you know? When one word, it's a reasonable act, right? So the more the light of reason shines through, right, the more it seems to be, you know, excellent, right? Simply, a virtue is said to be greater, according as in it, a greater good of reason shines, yeah. And according to this, justice among all the moral virtues excels, right, as being nearer to reason, huh? And that's why justice is in the what? Will, right? That's interesting, huh? That Aristotle, he takes up the moral virtues that are tied up with the emotions, you know, in books three and four. And then in book five, he takes up justice. And then in book six, he takes up the intellectual virtues, right? You can see it kind of in order there, right, huh? Because justice is, what, closer to the other moral virtues than the virtues of reason, but it's closer to reason than the other moral virtues, huh? Which is clearly, he says, both from the subject, huh, in which it exists, right, and from the object about which it is, huh? For, from the subject, because it is in the will, as in a, what, subject, right? But the will is the reasonable, the rational, desiring power, right, huh? So Aristotle speaks of the will as being in reason, right, in the rational part of the soul, right? And that's why you have will in God, but you don't have emotion in God, right? According to its object or matter, because it is about operations by which a man is ordered, not only in himself, but also to, what? To another. Whence it justices the prae clarissima, right? The most shiny, you might say, right, huh? Of the virtues, as is said in the fifth book, huh? Is that where I stop and praise it to the evening star or something? Remember something like that in there, don't you? Prae clarissima, right? The evening star, huh? I was getting quite a good style there. Okay? Among the other moral virtues, which are about the, what, passions, right? Or the emotions, right? Feelings. The more in each of them shines forth the good of reason, the more, right, about, what, greater things. Desiring emotions, subject of reason. Subject of reason. But most of all, in those things which pertain to man, is life, right? From which all other things depend. Depend. And therefore, fortitude, which subjects the repetitive motion to reason, in those things which, what, pertain to death and life, holds the first place among the moral virtues which are about actions. So he puts courage above, what, temperance, huh? Nevertheless, it is ordered below, what, justice, right? Where the light of reason shines forth even more. Is that with Solomon there, you know, whose baby is it? To whom should you give the baby, right? To whom does it belong? But the wisdom, though, of Solomon shows through, right? What he says, huh? Let's divide the baby and give each a share. Oh! You tell right away who the mother is, huh? I see, she says, good. Once the philosopher says in the first book of rhetoric, it is necessary for those to be, what, the greatest virtues, which are, what, more honored among them, huh? If virtue is a, what, a power or ability that does well, right, huh? On account of which the, what, brave and the just are most of all, what, honored, right, huh? These in war, to it fortitude, right, huh? And this justice is useful both in war and in, what, peace, huh? Okay. Now, after fortitude is ordered, what, temperance, huh? Which subjects to reason the appetite about those things which are merely ordered to life, huh? Either to the individual, right, or in the same kind of species, huh? So, therefore, in food and reproduction, right? And thus, these three virtues, together with, what, prudence or foresight, are said to be the chief ones, also in, what, in worth, huh? Dignity, huh? Secundum quid, huh? One virtue is said to be greater according as it is a, what? A prop, huh? Support or an ornament to a principal virtue, right? Just as substance is simplicitare, more worthy than accident, right? And nevertheless, some accident is secundum quid of greater dignity than substance, insofar as it perfects substance in some accidental, what, being, huh? Okay. Now, what about this objection from liberality, you know? It's pretty much it convinced me, you know? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the act of liberality must be, what? It's necessary for the act of liberality that be founded upon the act of, what? Justice. Justice. For that is not a liberal giving, that is not a giving of one's own, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Actually, they say about that. Liberals, they say the liberals owe people's money, right? Yeah, right. It wasn't politics. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Whence liberality is not able to be without justice, right, huh? Which separates one's own from what is not one's own, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But justice is able to be without liberality, right? Whence justice simply is greater than liberality as being more common in this way, right? And as being its, what? A foundation. A foundation, right? But liberality is a quundum quid, mayor, right? Since there's a certain, what, ornament of justice. And a supplement. A supplement of it, huh? That's why St. James would say that mercy can be able to be justice. Yeah. In that sense. It's interesting how, you know, Aristotle, I think when he gets into the books on friendship, you know, I think he speaks of friendship as being even higher than justice, right, huh? Because if you have friendship, you don't need justice, right? Because your friend will not only give you what is owed you, but he'll do more than that, right? And we need people to give you more than just what's owed to you, you know? I mean, pretty rough. We just got what was owed to us, you know? But, so no, there's an element of truth in the first objection, and in some way, liberality is what? Yeah, but they couldn't have quid, right? That's an order. To a second, what about this famous text on patience there from our friend James, huh? To a second should be said that patience is said to have a perfect work in the tolerance of what? Bad things, huh? In which not only does it exclude, what? An unjust. Trust, punishment, revenge, which justice also excludes, right, huh? And not only hate, which charity makes us devoid, right? Not only anger, which, well, that's right, but it also excludes disordered sadness, right? Which is in some way the root of all the, what? The force, that's right. Yeah. And therefore, in this it is more perfect and greater, because in this matter it extirpates pull it up by the root. The root, yeah. I like that word, yeah. Yeah. And much ado about nothing there, you've got Don John, the villain, right, huh? He's got that sadness, right, huh? At the bottom, you know? He can't stand others that are enjoying themselves, right? And he does the horrible thing, you know? He's the indensation of poor hero and so on. But it's not simply, so did you dare, more perfect than the other, what, virtues, huh? Because fortitude not only sustains, what? Being molested. Being molested, yeah, without disturbance, which is at patience, but also at what? Bears at self. Yeah. Goes to them, right? When there's need, right, huh? Whence whoever is courageous is also, what, patience, but it's not convertible, huh? For patience is a certain part of Putin's, right, huh? For it, yeah. Well, as I mentioned, you know, you take Mozart's five last symphonies, huh? The first of those is the 36, right, and the last is the 41st, and they're both representations of what? Magnanimity. Magnanimity, right? And they're both in C major. And then the 38th, there's no 37th symphony, it's a mistake, and people thought it was his only. The 38th symphony and the, what, 40th symphony are dealing with, what, courage, right, huh? But the 38th is more courage in the strict sense, right? And the 40th is more like patience, right, huh? So you have those two things he talks about there, right? And then, you know, the odd one is the E flat major one, huh, 39, huh? You had a perfect symmetry there, you know, the five, huh? A, B, C, B, A, huh? Same symmetry you have in the Mass, right? We have the, what, the Kyrie, the Gloria, the Credo, Sanctus, and then the August Day, right? So the August Day and the Kyrie are prayers asking for God's mercy, right? And then the Gloria and the Sanctus are more praised, and then the Credo is the odd thing, right, because that's a profession of faith, right? So it's A, B, C, B, A, right? The same symmetry you have in Midsummer Night's Dream, right? A, B, C, B, A, that's everything you have to point out to me, right? Okay. I keep on looking at this symmetry anymore. Let's see where I can put it in. Now we come to the third objection, which is talking about magnanimity, right? That's what Mozart does in the 36th and the 41st. To the third it should be said that magnanimity is not able to be unless the other virtues are what? Preexistent, right? Let's see where I can put it in. Let's see where I can put it in. Let's see where I can put it in. As is said in the fourth book of Ethics. Once it is compared to the others as a, what? Ornament of them, right? And thus they couldn't equate as greater than all the others, right? But not, however, what? Simply because it presupposes them, huh? Again, this man is very hard to find, huh? Remember Warren Murray was directing somebody's very good thesis on Medanimity. He's trying to find a good example, but what they could find was Christ. Yeah. Okay, should we take a break now? Sure. On to wisdom here. So we're up to Article 5 right now, where the wisdom is the greatest among the intellectual virtues. The word sapientia is a Latin word, right? So we actually made a word out of it, sapiential, I think, to use that word sometimes in English, don't we? Sapiential, when it comes to the word sapientia. And I guess sapientia in Latin is related to what? To save it, right? So Thomas sometimes explains the word a little bit, you know, ethologically. Sapientia, sapientia, savory knowledge, right? I think it's a good way of describing wisdom, right? It's knowledge to save things, right? I noticed that with Shakespeare, you know, I tend to save your student minds. I was thinking, laying in bed last night, I was thinking of the way Shakespeare takes something, you know, as important as death, right? You know, you have, you know, just kind of recall the plays there, like in Macbeth, I mean in Hamlet there, where his friend says, you know, now cracks an oboe heart, good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing me to thy rest. I mean, just, nobody else writes that well, right? Or when Julia is found apparently dead in her bed there, and death lies in her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. You know, I'd tell you anybody to do that. Apparently there was a guy, you know, one of these photographic memories, you know, all these passages in Shakespeare, and you'd challenge anybody to take any form, anywhere, and, you know, he's a subject, and he'd talk. He'd top them. Yeah, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang. When I would be disobedient or some dishonorable thing as a child, she would say, more or less what it says in Lerba, sharper than a serpent's fang, as the tongue of an ungrateful child. That's more or less what he says. Yeah, yeah. Those curses, what was that play? Oh, goodness. Was it Richard? No. Yeah, Richard II. Was it Richard II? Yeah. That his, his, uh, who was the woman who was cursing him? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, I know what you mean. Yeah. Wow. Don't you know. I think I should memorize some of those things just to throw up to them sometimes. Yes, you know. That's your favorite politician. To the fifth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that wisdom is not the greatest among the intellectual, what? Virtues. Virtues, huh? For the one commanding is greater than the one to whom he commands, huh? But prudence seems to command, what? Wisdom. Wisdom, right, huh? Mm-hmm. For he said in the first book of the ethics, when Aristotle was talking about, you know, political philosophy, right? Which of the disciplines went out to be in the cities, and what ones each went out to learn, and up to what point? These are preordered by politics, right, huh? And so, you know, I guess in our state of Massachusetts, you know, there's an American history you have to learn in high school, you know, or you're supposed to learn anyway. Right? And they dictate that, right, huh? What things is to study, right, huh? Maybe you have to, you know, study some math, maybe, or something, you know, and so on. So if it commands, then it seems to be superior, right? Which pertains to prudence, as is said in the sixth book of the ethics, huh? I actually get the objection, you know, saying, well, isn't the logician the wise man the wise man, or is everybody else, right? Nor is nobody. Logician teaches all the other men how to think. So he commands them all, right? So isn't the logician the wise man, not the wise man? The first philosopher? I think there's some, you know, there's a probability there, right? Since then, among the disciplinas, right, huh? Wisdom is also contained. It seems that prudence is greater than wisdom, right, huh? Anybody be allowed to study wisdom, huh? Quite extensively be allowed to study it, and so on. Okay. Moreover, it's of the notion of virtue that it orders man to, what? Happiness. Happiness, huh? There's a text of Thomas where he says that virtue is the, what? Road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery. You see it every day in the newspaper, you know? You never have an article about somebody being really happy, but it's always somebody who's miserable out of some vice. For virtue is a disposition of what is perfect to the, what? Best. This is said in the seventh book of the physics. But prudence is right reason about things to be done, by which man is, what? Led to, what? Happiness, huh? But wisdom does not consider human acts, by which one arrives at, what? Beatitude, huh? Therefore, prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom, huh? So when Thomas says that virtue is the road to wisdom, well, ethics, you say, or prudence is about the virtues, right? So isn't that superior? Moreover, the more a knowledge is perfect, the more it seems to be, what? Greater, right? But we have a more perfect knowledge of human affairs, about which there is science, than about, what? Divine things, about which there is wisdom, as Aristotle, what? As Augustine distinguishes in the twelfth book on the Trinity. Because divine things are incomprehensible, right? According to that of Job chapter 36. Behold God, the great one, huh? Conquering our knowledge, right? Therefore, science is a greater virtue than, what? Wisdom, huh? Moreover, a knowledge of beginnings is more worthy than a knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom concludes from indemonstrable beginnings, which are known by, what? Understanding, right? Or what I call natural understanding. Just as the other sciences. Therefore, intellectus is a greater virtue than, what? Wisdom. But against this is what the philosopher says, in the sixth book of the Ethics, that wisdom is as the head among all the virtues of the understanding. I answer you, it should be said, as has been said, the magnitude of a virtue, according to its species, is considered from its, what? Object, right? Now, the object of wisdom excels among all the objects, among the objects of all the intellectual virtues, for it considers the highest cause, which is God, as is said in the beginning of the metaphysics. And because we judge about the effect through the cause, and we judge about the inferior causes through the higher cause, right? Hence it is that wisdom has judgment about all the other, what? Intellectual virtues. And it belongs to it to order all the other ones, right? But Brooker says, logic orders all the others. He doesn't have the objection, does he, huh? He couldn't face that, Thomas, huh? So how do you solve Brooker's objection, right? Maybe it's a secundum quid thing. It's one of them secundum quid thing. And it is architectonic, with respect to all of you. To first, therefore, it should be said that since foresight is about human things, wisdom over about the highest cause, it's impossible that prudence be a greater virtue than what? Wisdom, right? Unless, as is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, man was the greatest of those things that you are in the world, right? Jairus Talafine's, you know, laughable, but anyway. Whence it is, it should be said. That is, is said in the same book, that prudence does not command, what, wisdom itself, but rather the reverse, because as is said in 1 Corinthians, the spiritual one judges all things, and he is judged by no one, and wisdom is about spiritual things, that's the immaterial things, right? That's what I remember John C. Dion saying, you know, towards immaterial, that's the way it goes, the science, right? Mm-hmm. Now, prudence doesn't have, what, entrance into the highest things, which wisdom considers, but it commands about those things which are ordered to wisdom, right? In what way men ought to be to arrive at, what, wisdom, right, huh? When in this prudence, or the political, is a, what, servant, you might say, or minister of wisdom, it introduces to it and prepares a way to it. Just as the guy at the door to the king. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And that's why, you know, Thomas will often quote, you know, what the Lord says to Martha and Mary, right now, Mary hath chosen the better part, and it shall not be taken away from her, right? She's chosen the contemplative, you know, and will not be taken away from her because it will be continued in the next life and perfected there, right? But the practical life is, what, the lesser part, and it's going to come to an end at the end of this life, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. It won't be building houses or going shopping or the rest of that nonsense, right? Yeah. Yeah. And therefore, it has itself more near to what? Happiness. Happiness than what? Prudence, huh? Now, to the third, Mr. Armitage says we know more perfectly, like geometry, we know better triangles and circles and so on, then we know God, right? To the third, it should be said, as the philosopher says in the first book about the soul, one knowledge is preferred to another, either from this that it is about more noble things, or it's a more, what, certain, huh? If therefore the subjects are equal in goodness and nobility, that which is more certain will be a greater, what? Virtue. Virtue, right? But that which is less certain, but about higher and greater things, right, is preferred to that which is more certain about, what? Lesser. Lesser things, right? When the philosopher says in the second book on the universe, that it is a great thing, right, to be able to know something about celestial things, even by a weak and a probable, what, reason, right, huh? And that's because he thought that they have new bodies, right, very much higher than the bodies down here, right? And therefore, but they're higher to know, right? But to know them imperfectly was better than not, and to know well the things that are less. The text he usually uses is the one that he gives you from the parts of animals, where he says it's lovable to what? It's more lovable to know a little bit about the higher things than much to know about the, what? Lesser things, right, huh? Aristotle gives an interesting likeness there at that text there, you know. He says, just as a glimpse of somebody, what, we love right now is worth more than a, what, long view of someone we don't care about, right? It's a little view here of the, you know. It's preferable to a glimpse of the one you love than, I would say, the boss you have to see all day, you know, you know, you know, you care for the boss, baby. It's got a beautiful way, you know, kind of showing that. It's better to know imperfectly a better thing than, you know, I'd say about Homer, you know, I'm not up to really reading Homer really fluently in Greek, you know. In a good English translation, you're still better than the guys who are, what, writing in English. But you're getting Homer imperfectly, right, when you read him in translation, you know. If you read that in translation, like that, you know, it's an imperfect way of reading him, right, huh? It's better to know him imperfectly than to, what, anybody else, yeah. And I'd rather hear Mozart even on an imperfect machine. I hear a lot of people post on a perfect, you know, machine where everything's clear and no scratches on the thing or anything like that, right? Yeah. So, we apply to this the old distinction of simply and secundum quid, right? If wisdom is about better things than geometry, right? Although geometry is more certain for us, right, than wisdom, then geometry is better secundum quid, right? But simply wisdom is better because it's about better things, right? So, Thomas will stop and take up those two criteria that Aristotle gives by one knowledge is better than, what, another, right? And simply it's because the object is better, right? So, does this answer your logic objection? No. I'll answer that as soon as we get through these objections, okay? Wisdom, therefore, to which pertains, what, the knowledge of God, most of all, in this, what, the status of this life is not able to, what, arrive perfectly, right, as it be as where it is, what, possession, right? He says there it's not a human possession, it's a divine possession. And this is only of God, right, huh? Okay? This is said in metaphysics. But nevertheless, that modika, that small knowledge which is able to be had by wisdom, through wisdom about God, is referred to all other, what, knowledge, huh? Okay? Of course, you know, Dustin says, I'm talking about even the next life there, you know. Happily the man who knows God even if he knows nothing else, right? Visible the man who knows all other things, but doesn't know God. Happy also the man who knows God and other things, but not for knowing other things, but for knowing God alone, right, huh? So you know how I use Romeo and Juliet to bring this out, right, huh? Eye is not seen, ear is not heard, nor is it into the heart of man. The things that God has prepared for those who love him, right, huh? So when you see God, you'll forget everything, even yourself. Just like Romeo forgets all about Rosalind when he sees Juliet, right? But if Romeo gets to see God, then he'll forget about even Juliet, right? Even about himself. You know, my friend Warren Murray used to talk about, you know, talking about friendship, you know, and how you realize what perfect friendship is, right? And a lot of times the people you would like to be friends with, it's not possible because you're separated by distance or they did another age, you know, and so on. You'd love to, you know, to associate with Aristotle and Thomas and so on. You think, you know, you're going to spend your time in heaven and running around to meet these guys that you were interested in historically, you know. I'd like to go find Shakespeare, you know, talk to him and fight. Mozart, I hope they're there in heaven, and find Thomas and Albert and Gustin, so I'd listen to these guys, you know, but I think maybe as soon as he's taken over God, he probably won't be running around much, you know. That's what somebody said once. When Christ comes on the last day on the clouds of heaven, we're not going to pull out the sum and start reading about the parousia. Yeah, yeah, yeah. There must be some contact with the saints, though, in heaven. Yeah, well, we're supposed to go out by God in everything. Yeah. Even if it works. What about the knowledge of beginnings here? To the fourth, it should be said that truth and the knowledge of indemonstable beginnings depends on the definition of the, what, terms, right? Or if you know what is a whole and what is a part, at once it is known that every whole is greater than its what, or part, huh? But to know the definition or the ratio of being and of non-being, and of whole and part and of other things which follow upon being, from which, as from what terms are put together of the indemonstable principles, pertains to, what, wisdom. Because ems dimine, being in common, is the, what, proper effect of the highest cause. God is the cause of being as being. And therefore wisdom not only uses the indemonstable beginnings, of which there is understanding, concluding from them, as the other sciences do, but also, what, judging of them, right, then, and disputing against those who deny them, right? So Aristotle spends a good part, almost half of the fourth book there, right? Defending the principle of what? Contradiction, right? We used to always quote Shakespeare, to be or not to be, that is the question. It's a question because you can't both be and not be. You can both be and not be, wouldn't be a question, right? But, you know, the meanings of the word all in part are taken up in the fifth book of wisdom, right? As well as the meanings of the word being, right? So the wise man, what, judges these things, right? So Aristotle speaks of wisdom as if it judges both the conclusions of the other sciences and it judges the beginnings, right? It knows them in a sense better than natural understanding of them. I used to give you a simple example in class there. I'd say, the whole is more than the part. Is that always so? And the teacher would say, yeah. And I'd say, well, when I said that man is an animal, my mother didn't like that. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Well, that's better, she said. So animal is only a part of what man is, right? So, okay, yeah. But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? So sometimes the part includes more than the whole, right? Oh, oh, oh. See? So students are now in doubt that the whole is, in fact, always more than the, what, part. Well, how do you solve this, right? See? Well, if you know the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle would distinguish between the composed whole, which is put together from its parts, and the universal whole, which is set of its parts, right? And if you stick with the same meaning of whole and part, right, the whole is always, what, more than the part. So universal whole is set of more than the, what, subject part, right? And the composed whole is composed of more than one of the parts of which it is composed, you see? But I was mixing up the two, right, huh? When I say animal includes more than man, I'm taking animal now, not as a composing part of the definition of man, where it's less than the whole definition of man, but as universal whole, which is set of man, dog, cat, horse, and so on, right? So, you can see that the man of natural understanding can't even defend that the whole is more than the part against the sophist burquist, right? Unless he has the wise man, Aristotle, there to correct him, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. The same way with the word before, right? And Aristotle distinguishes the sense of the word before in the twelfth chapter, the categories, but also he does it in the fifth book, you know, in a little different way. But then you can see the truth of the action that nothing is before or after itself, right, no? But if you mix up those different senses, something will end up being before itself, right? Because you had different senses than before, right? You can't distinguish those, right? So you can kind of see how the wise man is wiser than the man of natural understanding, right? Even as he carries the, what, indemonstable beginnings, right? And he can defend them, right? He can judge them better, right? Nothing, something? The old teacher Katsurik said, you know, philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing, right? But nothing is a being of, what, reason, right? But the other guy couldn't separate those senses very much, you know? Pretty rustling, you know, he tried to show that even numbers are equal to all numbers, right? Because you can make it corresponsive, you know? One, put two, two, four, three, six, four, eight. It's an even number for every number, right? So therefore, the even number is equal to all numbers. Therefore, the part is equal to the whole. How do you answer that, say? They kind of say, well, that's a little difficult. I can just, you know, put two, two, two, two after each one of them, right? Because you're multiplying these beings as a reason, right? But you can see how people get, you know, denying something as fundamental as a whole is good enough if they don't have, what, some wisdom, right? How about logic, right, huh? Well, logic is about the road of reason as reason, right, huh? But that presupposes the, what, the natural road, right? So the wise man knows, what, the natural road, which is the basis, even, of the road of, what, reason as reason, right? Natural road comes before, what, the road of reason as reason. That's why he directs more, right? And the wise man actually distinguishes and shows the order of the three roads, huh? So by doctoral thesis, when I worked on that, you know, I was, what, doing one of the things the wise man does, huh? Okay? But if there's no road beyond, or before, you know, the road of the, what, that the logician considers, then the logician would be, what, it seems. There's a road before that, huh? Jerry Stahl talks about it in the second book. We'll see. So he's considering what is the best among the, what, moral virtues, and what is best among the virtues of reason. Now to the means. Now to the means.