Prima Secundae
Lecture 172: Faith, Hope, and Charity in the Beatific Vision

Transcript
================================================================================

And I started off with the dialectical place, you know, that comedy is the contrary of tragedy. We know from Aristotle's definition of tragedy, and what Shakespeare says in the prologue to Roman and Juliet, that the emotions in what? Tragedy are fear and what? Pity, yeah. Okay. Pityous overflows, right? The fearful passage of their death marked love, as Shakespeare says in Roman and Juliet in the prologue, right? And then I said, you've got to take the opposites of those, right? So pity is a form of sadness, it's maybe some kind of joy, right, in comedy, which is correct, it's just called mirth. Mirriment. And the opposite of what? Fear. Fear, which would be what? You know, it would be boldness, right? Oh. See? Okay. But then, as I studied it more, I saw, no, that's not what it is, right? And I remember reading, you know, a guy had done a translation of, I think it's Terence's comedies, right, which Thomas quotes sometimes in ethical matter. And he said, he kind of had heard, you know, faith, hope, and charity, you know, the greatest is a charity. But in comedy, the greatest is hope, right? It kind of seemed that hope was what you get that movement from in the comedies of Terence, right? And then I got thinking more deeply about emotions, and Thomas points out, right, that the principal passions are joy, sadness, and then hope, and what? Fear, right? So tragedy and comedy being the principal forms of fiction, right, they're going to deal with the, what, four principal passions, right? And since tragedy deals with fear and pity, a form of sadness, then comedy is going to deal with some form of joy, which is mirth, and then hope, right? Okay? You can see that, right? You study comedies, you know, so. I wonder that's what they were thinking of at the council, and it's best. Yeah, yeah, so they say, they give the four of those, right? You find those, Sunday Shakespeare number, it's the four together, too, you know. To the third, it should be said, it's very interesting, the objection there. To the third, it should be said that it regards the glory of the soul. There cannot be in the blessed desire according as it regards the future, right? For the reason already said, right? Now, there is said to be, what, hunger and thirst by reason of, what, the removal of, or boredom, yeah. Okay? And for the same reason there is said to be desire in the angels, right? Now, it indicates you never get, what, tired of this, right? Okay? Now, you don't eat food, of course, you know, you eventually don't want any more, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. Someone's trying to push another dish on you, you know, or another helping, you know, and, uh, uh, it's kind of embarrassing, you know, huh? And, you know, it's kind of disgusting after a while, right, huh? You know? But, but you're tired of the food, that food after a while, right? Let's not have this again, right? And, and, uh, my cousin, cousin Donald's in the Navy, you know, and of course, they order things, you know, and he says, they're, they're two actually served, nothing but spam, right? People were just stopping, don't say anything else in their mouth, but that damn spam stuff. But so, kind of metaphorically, you say, you know, you're going to always be hungry for God, right, huh? They say, you'll never be, what, bored, right? Because you never comprehend God, that's probably the reason, right, huh? You know? But even God doesn't get, what, bored with himself, right? But the average person would tell, you know, hey, what are we doing in heaven? We're going to be looking at God all the time. Oh, don't you know? Yeah, don't you get bored after a while? That's right. See something new, you know? It's like seeing the same movie over and over again, the same scene over and over again, you know? You don't realize that God is really infinite, right? You can't possibly be, become bored with God, huh? It's so marvelous, huh? These are ways of speaking, right, you know? That's what the scripture says in the time of Heracles, truth can never be confirmed enough, no doubts, to never sleep. There will be no doubts in heaven. You can't confirm it enough. Now, with respect to the glory of the body, huh, in the souls of the saints, there's able to be, what, desire, right? This is before the resurrection, right, huh? Not, however, hope properly speaking, right, huh? Now, why does he say this, huh? Nor according as hope is a theological virtue. For thus, its object is not the body, but God himself, right, huh? Not some created good, right, huh? Nor even according as hope is taken in general. Because the object of hope is not just the good, but the arduous good, right? That's why we say, you know, that it's necessary for the philosopher to have a kind of hope that he can find the, what, truth, right? Because truth is not only a good, but a, what, difficult good, right, huh? So if he doesn't have that hope, if he disparaids to find the truth, well, then it's a horror for him, right? So he can teach God to harbor it. Yeah. But we have, you know, the man is sure, you know, that God's going to give us the body at the end of the world, right? So that it's not arduously difficult, right, huh? A good of whose, what, inevitable cause we have is not compared to us in the ratio of something, what? Difficult, right? Whence that is not properly said to be, what? Someone who has. Yeah. To hope to have something that's immediately within his power that he buys, right? And likewise, those who have the glory of the soul are not properly said to desire the glory of the body, which is going to be by redundancy, right? But only to, what, desire it, right? Oh, that's right. That's beautiful, huh? Okay? But as far as, you know, desiring to see God, that's not really desiring in strict sense at all, right? It's kind of a way of saying that you're never, what, bored or, you know, let's have something else, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, instead of those clickers, you know, changing the challenge out, just trying to avoid the advertisements or something or avoid the boredom of the thing, huh? But there won't be any evidence, there will be no deception there. Aristotle says there, you know, in the poetics, you know, that when the play is not so good, people eat more, right? It seems American to find their screen, you know, eating these big bowls of butter and popcorn, you know? And so, I remember going to a movie theater one time and they had a Shakespearean play, you know, on the thing on the screen, you know? And I had no intention at all to buy any candy or popcorn, you know? But since prison began, the big bucket of popcorn, and I thought it was something like that, you know? You know, you know, you know? You know, you know, the Greek teacher you'd be talking about, you know, you're sitting there with your girl there in the, you know, Greek theater, you know, chewing on your fig leaves, you know? So, I guess they didn't have popcorn those days, isn't it? Isn't that beautiful? I mean, what he says there, and you apply it to that third objection, right? That's what he's speaking, huh? Now, to the fifth, huh? It's interesting that he... He's already excluded, what, faith and hope, right, from glory, but now he says, oh my God, it's an afterthought. To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems it's something of hope, of faith, or hope remains in glory, right, huh? Okay, now, why is this so? For removing that which is proper or particular, private, right, remains that which is common, right? As it is said in the book De Causis, right, huh? They thought the book De Causis was by, what, Aristotle, right? But it's not by Aristotle, it's by a, what? It's by a, I think it's by a Muslim, right, you know, but it's taken from Proclus, you know, one of the Greek commentators there, right? And Thomas has a commentary on it, huh? And it's a pretty good book. Once in a while, Thomas corrects a few little things, but a pretty profound book, huh? We used to always say it's the last books of the wisdom, right? That rationally moved, there remains living, and living removed, there remains, what? Being, right, huh? But in faith, there's something that has something common with the attitude, to wit, knowledge itself, right, huh? But something that is proper to it, right, or private to it, namely, what? Enigma, right, huh? For faith is a... Dark, yeah. Enigmatic, yeah. Therefore, having removed the enigma of faith, there remains the knowledge of faith, right, huh? Kind of an interesting objection, huh? Moreover, faith is a certain spiritual light of the soul, right, huh? According to that in Ephesians 1, the eyes of your heart illuminated, right, enlightened in the knowledge of God, right? But this light is imperfect with respect to the light of glory. About which second light, huh, the light of glory, is said in Psalm 35, in your light we shall see light, huh? And Thomas sometimes applies that verse from Psalm 35, verse 10, to the aspect of the vision that you see God through God, right, huh? God is joined to our mind as the, what, form by which we see God, right? We can't see God through a created form, right? God himself has to be joined to our mind as that by which we see in order to be that which we see, as he is, huh? But an imperfect light remains coming upon it, a perfect light, just as the candle is not extinguished, the clarity of the sun coming upon it, right, huh? Therefore, it seems that the light of faith remains with the light of glory, right, huh? Now, wouldn't the light admit that our friend Euclid Galus, the Pythagorean theorem, wouldn't that remain? The greater light of the division, huh? Why not then the light of faith, right, huh? Moreover, the substance of a habit is not taken away through this, that the matter is, what, subtracted. For a man can have the habit of liberality, or retain that, even when he, what, loses money. So I can't be generous with my money, but I don't have any money, right? I still have the virtue, right? But he can have the act, right, huh? This is a foot story about magnificence, right, where you dispense large sums, you know, and endow a chair at the university or something. Open a museum, huh? But the object of faith is the first truth, not seen. Therefore, there being removed through this, that the first truth is seen, there can still remain the habit of, what, faith, huh? Against this is that faith is a simple habit. Now, something simple is either the whole is taken away, or the whole remains. Since faith does not wholly remain, but is, what, it seems that it's totally taken away, huh? So what's he going to do with this, huh? The answer should be said that some say, right, huh, that hope is totally taken away, right, huh? But that faith is partly taken away as regards the enigma, right, huh, and partly remains, right, as regards the substance of the, what, knowledge, huh? I wouldn't like to have a teacher, right, if the student has a confused knowledge of the subject in you, clarify things for him, right? The confusion disappears, but the knowledge remains, right? It's kind of hard to get your hand around this, huh, and your mind around this. Which, if it be thus understood, that there remains not the same in number, right, but the same in genus, right, then it is said most, what, truly, right? Because faith is a kind of knowledge, and what, division is a kind of knowledge, right, huh? So they both have the same genus, right, of knowledge, huh? For faith with the vision of the fatherland, right? Isn't that beautiful? Patria, huh? Patria in the fatherland, huh? That's how we pray, we say, our father, right? And hell be thy name, and then thy kingdom come, or the kingdom is the ordered society of those who see God, face to face, huh? So we call it the fatherland, huh? Patria. We're exiles now, right, huh? We're wandering in this valley of tears, huh? For faith comes together with the vision of the fatherland in genus, right? The genus here being knowledge, right, huh? But hope does not come together with beatitude in genus, right? For hope is compared to the enjoyment of beatitude as motion to rest in the, what? In the end, yeah. The motion's not in the same genus as rest, huh? If fatherland understands knowledge, the same knowledge in number, right, which is a faith, remains in the patria, right? This is altogether impossible, huh? For there does not remain the difference of some species being removed, right? There does not remain the substance of the genus the same in, what? Number, right, huh? For taking away the difference that constitutes whiteness, there does not remain the same substance of color number, such that the same color in number is sometimes, what? White, right? White, and sometimes blackness, right? For the genus is not compared to the difference as matter to form, so that the remains, what? The same in number, the substance of the genus, with the difference removed, as there remains the same in number, the substance of the matter, the form removed, huh? That's interesting, because Plato there in the dialogue called the sophist, right, huh? He says that likeness is a most slippery thing, right? He uses the superlative, right, huh? It's not just slippery, or very slippery, but most slippery, right? Got to watch out for slippery. Now, what does that mean, huh? Well, the mind is the vise apprehensiva, right? The power that grasps things, right, huh? And a slippery thing is something that is, what? hard to grasp, right? Where did they have that pole that you've got to try to climb up, that slippery pole? Huh? Is the Navy there? Was it some, you know? I can't remember what it was. What? Yeah, yeah. Isn't it one of the ceremonious things? You've got to try to... Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, something that's slippery, you know, it's hard to grasp, right? So you've got to be very careful of it, right? And then I take what Aristotle says in the book on Sins of Refutation, which is about fallacies, right? And then he speaks of likeness as being the cause of what? Deception, right? Okay. When I was a little boy, you know, I used to have these little ink bowls, you know, that you'd have at school, and there's actually a little hole in the desk there, and you'd fit your ink in there, you know. We'd try to put a girl's brick or something in there. We'd nasty little boys. I'd agree with that. No. But sometimes, of course. Because you'd have, you know, hanging down. But sometimes these things would be spilled, right? And the house would happen, right? So some of these little pieces of metal that looked like ink on top, you know. And you'd put it on your mother's white tablecloth. And you'd go, oh! And she reaches up, and then she realizes that this is a joke, you know. It's a piece of tin, you know, huh? But why does it deceive the woman, right? It's because of lightness, huh? Okay. As long as you have these artificial fruits, you know, they're, you know, some kind of wax or something, you know, and they'll stick them in there with the other ones, huh? I mean, Aunt Margaret used to take these artificial flowers, and she'd put a little perfume on them. People call it, people call it, people call it, but is that real or natural? Oh, yeah, that's real. So, it's lightness that is the cause of what? Deception, yeah. And then, I think I mentioned how in the tools of dialectic, right, huh? The third tool of dialectic is a tool of difference, and the fourth tool of dialectic is a tool of lightness, right? But the third tool is described as the ability to find a difference, right? But the fourth tool is not described as the ability to find a likeness, right? But the ability to consider a likeness, huh? And the Greek word is skeptics there, you know, we do it skeptic, huh? But you've got to see exactly what way things are alike, right? Because if you don't see their difference, you might exaggerate the likeness and then be deceived, yeah. Okay. Well, there's a beautiful likeness, but the genus is to the difference, like what? Matter is to what? Form, right, huh? And when Aristotle, or when Thomas orders the senses of being in, right? The first sense of being in is what? In place, right? The second one is part and whole, like my teeth are in my mouth, right? And the third sense is what? Genus in the species, right? Because the genus is a part of the definition of the species, right? And then the fourth sense is reversed, the species in the genus. But the species is in the genus, not in act, but in what? Built, you see. So quadrilateral is in the definition of square, right? But square is in quadrilateral, not as a private definition, but it's only in its ability, right? Because quadrilateral is able to be a square, but an oblong or a rhombus or rhomboid or a trapezium. Okay? And what do you think the fifth sense is, see? Form and matter, right? Yeah. But that's like species in genus, see? Because the form is in the ability of matter first, right? And the species is what? And the genus is just an ability for us to tell you how the difference. So there's a likeness there, huh? And Porphyry says that in the book on genus, species, difference, property, and accident, right? That the genus is the difference like matter is to form, right? There is a likeness there, right? But is it so much as to justify what's being said here, right? If I have a piece of clay in the shape of, what, a sphere and I mold it into a cube, right, huh? You lost the shape and you got a new shape in there, but it's the same clay in number, right, that you had before, right? Okay? But if I lose the vice I have and acquire the opposite virtue, right, does the genus of, what, my vice habit remain in my virtue? No, no, no, see? So in that way, the two are not alike, right, huh? So see how sort of a slippery thing, right? Because there is a real likeness in those two. And it justifies the order there of the senses of in, right, huh? And it justifies, you know, we talk about how when you carry a word over to God, right, huh? Very often you drop the, what, genus and keep the, what, difference. Because the genus is taken more from what is matter and material, and the difference is more like taken from act, right? Well, God is pure act, huh? So sometimes you can carry the difference over it to something that is pure act, but you have to drop the genus, right? Because it's like matter, right? God is immaterial and there's no passive ability in him, right? So we can see how hard it is to grasp the likeness of genus and difference and matter and form, because in some ways they are alike. And one does illumine the other. And even the order, as I said, the senses of being in, follows upon that, right, huh? And it explains many things why, why, why, as Father Boulay would bang into our heads, you know, we drop so often the genus and keep the, what, difference, right, huh? You know, I mean, you know, it's a Shenzhen God, right, huh? Well, Shenzhen us is really a demonstration, you know, these demonstrations of Euclid, right? And, uh, what is a demonstration? Well, it's a syllogism making us know the cause and that which is a cause and cannot be otherwise. Well, is God syllogized and that's how he knows? No. So you drop the genus out of the definition, but then knowing the cause and that which is a cause and cannot be otherwise, he knows that much better than we do, right? So the difference, you know, can be carried over to God, but why not the genus? Well, the genus talks about some potentiality that is not appropriate to God who's altogether pure act, right, huh? You know? So, what a wise man Plato was, right? Or Socrates, whatever he was. Socrates says it in the dialogue, right, huh? And, uh, it's the most slippery thing. I'm quoting it to everybody because they're always having problems with that, you know? They're always having problems with it, you know? Notice what he says here, I don't know if you have the Latin there or not, but None idem comparat to a genus a differentia, a second materia at forma. He's not saying that absolutely, right? There's no way there's a like this. There's a beautiful like this there, right, huh? Which is very useful. But not in this way, right? That there remains the substance of the genus, the same in number, with the difference, what? Removed, huh? Just as there remains the same in number, the substance of the matter, when the form is removed, huh? It's a beautiful example of what Plato was talking about himself. How Thomas, you know, he's skeptic, right? That he considers in what way they're alike. And he sees in what way they're alike. And sometimes he will reason from their likeness, right? And that's how you explain the order there of the senses of end, right, huh? And then here he sees that they're not like in this way, though, you know? Like when we compare our professors, right, and say, Well, these guys are alike, right, huh? But in some ways they're unlike, you know, huh? These guys are pretty iconic and beyond, you know? And in some ways they're alike, but in other ways, you know, they're not like in every way, right? I compare it to women, right? They're alike in some ways, but, you know. For genus and differences are not parts of the species, huh? Although in some cases he'll say they are, right, huh? Otherwise they would not be said of the species, huh? So strictly speaking, you can't say the letter C is the word cat. Or the letter A is the word cat, right? You can't say that my arm is a man, right? My foot is another man. My nose is another man, you know? But they all make up to me, right? And he wouldn't say the leg of the chair is a chair, right? But the genus is said... The what? Species and the difference, right? So you can say a square, that's a quadrilateral, and you can say it's equilateral, right? And just as a species signifies a whole, that is something composed from matter and form, material things, so the difference signifies a whole, and likewise a genus. But the genus denominates the whole from what is as matter, right? Okay, that's where the likeness comes in now, right? Difference from that which is as form, but the species from both, huh? For just as in man, the sensitive nature has itself in a material way to the understanding nature. But animal, however I said, what has a sense nature, rational what has an understanding nature, man that has both, and thus the same whole signified to these three, but not from the same thing in it, huh? The one from matter, the one from form, the other from both. Once it is clear that sense of difference is not, as it were, designated of the genus, with the difference removed, the substance of the genus is not able to remain the same, just as it ought to remain the same animality if they, what? There's another soul, a kind of soul, constituting the animal. Once it's not able to be that the same in number knowledge, which first was enigmatic, afterwards becomes, what? A clear version, huh? And thus it's clear that nothing the same in number or species, which is in faith, remains in the fatherland, but only the same in, what? Genus, huh? I'll take my example, maybe a simple one to see there. When I lose a vice, right, and gain the opposite virtue, right, huh? Do I keep the habit of the vice, but lose the badness of that habit? Doesn't take any sense, does it, huh? I acquire a new habit, right, huh? Doing other kinds of acts that produce that habit, right, huh? So I have a new habit as well as, as well as, what, a virtue now, right? It's not this, like, the habit of the vice remains, right? It may have made any sense, would it? To the first objection, therefore, it should be said that when you remove rational, there's not to remain living the same in number, but the same in, what? Genus, huh? To the second should be said, huh? That the imperfection of the light of the candle is not opposed to the perfection of the light of the sun, right, huh? Because they're not to regard the same, what, subject. But the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to each other, and they regard the same, what, subject. Whence they're not able to be, what, simul, just as neither is declared to the air with the obscurity of it, huh? You can't have the day with the night at the same time, right? But notice again, Thomas' ability there to see in what way these things are not like each other, right, huh? And it seems, you know, that the light of faith and the light of glory and the light of the candle, the light of the sun, yeah, the candle, you know, one's a greater light, one's a lesser light, and here the lesser light remains with the greater light, but here they don't, right? What about the man who remains a generous man, but he has no money left, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'll tell you, magic flute, huh? He loses the magic flute. To the theory it should be said that the one who loses money does not lose the possibility of having money, right, huh? And therefore, there suitably remains the habit of the reality. But in the state of glory, not only an act is taken away the object of faith, which is the, what, non-seen, right, and the definition of faith, right? The substance of things hoped for, the conviction of what is not seen, right? But even the possibility of not seeing it, right? On account of this debility of beatitude, it's eternal. And therefore, it'd be in vain that such a habit would remain, huh? What, my, this guy had it. Did you say so, Joshua? You envy or you emulate the clarity of his mind, huh? You strive to be, huh? The other composers say, you know, I forget what I was saying that. If we cannot, you know, equal Mozart, at least we can try to, you know, imitate the clarity of this music. Now, how about charity? Does that remain? It's Article 6 now, right? To the 6th, one goes forward thus. It seems that charity does not remain after this life in glory. Because, as is said in 1st Epistle of the Corinthians, chapter 13, the 10th verse, when there comes about what is perfect, there is evacuated what is imperfect or ex parte, right? That is what is imperfect. But the charity of the via, right, is imperfect. Therefore, it will be what we move, coming the perfection of what? Glory, right? Moreover, habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. But the object of love is a good grasp. So the first cause of love is the good, and then the second cause is what? Knowledge, right? But they kind of go together, right, as Thomas says in the treatise, right? It's the good as known, right? If Romeo did not see the beauty of Juliet, right? He had no love for Juliet in the beginning of the play, right? Never seen her, right? Since, therefore, other is the grasping of the present life, the knowledge of the present life, and other the grasping of the future life, it seems that there does not remain the same what? Charity. Moreover, of those things which are of one what? Ratio, one definition. The imperfect can arrive at the what? Equality of perfection through a continual what? Growth. Growth. But the charity of the via, the road, can never arrive at equality of the what? Charity of the fatherland. No matter how much it is what? Therefore, it seems that the charity of the road does not remain in the fatherland, right? I don't know if I interpret that right, but, you know, Christ says, you know, there's no one greater born of woman than John the Baptist. And then he says, but he who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than him. You know, it seems to me, what I understand it is, he's talking about the charity of the person who sees God face to face will be greater than even the charity of John the Baptist in this life, right? Well, John the Baptist could have a higher, you know, status in the next world, right? As if, you know, the charity of this life is never equal to the charity. And I don't think I'm interpreting that right. You could be. You know? That's in an interpretive of Christ himself, because he was the least in the kingdom of heaven. Yeah. But against all this nonsense is what the apostle says, huh? First epistle of Corinthians, chapter 13, verse 8. Caritas unquam excedita. Charity is never, what? Extinguished, yeah. Excedita falls out. Now, Thomas, with his usual clarity, right, huh? With enviable clarity. That's why he's talking to me on the phone, you know, and he says, he's telling the students up there, you know, two things you need to be a philosopher, right? One is a good mind, and the other is humility. And one without the other is not enough. You're humble, but don't have a good mind, you're not going to be a philosopher. If you have a good mind, you're not humble, you're going to. I told you what my old teacher, Kisurik, said, you know, he says, he was the best guy in the whole philosophy department, right? In fact, nobody else is worth listening to, you know. And Kisurik was the whole thing. He says, compared to Aristotle, he says, I've got the brain of an ankle worm, he says. And then he's other, you know, second-rate professors would ever say that, you know. Yeah. Compared to Aristotle, I've got the brain of an ankle worm. You know, De Connick was so much more famous than Dian, you know. And, you know, but yet his respect for Dian, you know, his humility. The face of Dian was kind of a marvelous thing to see, you know. Everyone up there, you know, and De Connick made it perfectly clear that Dian was the greatest mind up here, you know. And American Girl students went up there, you know, and you had to know Mrs. De Connick, you know. And De Connick made it perfectly clear that Mrs. De Connick that I'm not the greatest amount, but she admired her husband to him greatly, you know. But he was Dian, you know, huh? So it's interesting to see that, you know, the David Hume, you know. Oh, you know, the favor of Aristotle's decayed, you know. His time has come and gone. Okay, the answer should be said, that when the imperfection of something is not of the definition of its species, right? Nothing prevents the same thing in number that before was imperfect to afterwards be, what? Perfect. Perfect, right? Just as a man is perfected through growth, right? And whiteness by, what? Intensity, right? But charity is, what? Amor, huh? It is love. Of whose definition there is not any imperfection, right? For it can be both of something had and not had, right? And of something seen and what? Not seen, right, huh? Interesting. So I say to the guy, I'm going to introduce you to her. I'm going to read a marvelous, beautiful woman tonight. He's already, he's already, he's already falling in love. She's unseen, right? And so you need that good, he's got to give him more. The time comes. Okay? I'm going to give you the best meal you've ever had. I'm hungry. I've already in love with that meal, right? Does he know how to prepare a steak, you know? Hey, it's limp. Knock it off. Once charity is not, what? Yeah, evacuated, huh? Made empty. For the perfection of glory, but it remains the same in, what, number, huh? Marvelous thing that charity is, isn't it, right? Now, what about the imperfection of it, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the imperfection of charity, per-achidens, has itself to it, huh? Why? Because it is not of the definition of love, imperfection, right? Removing, however, that which is per-achidens, it nevertheless remains the substance of the, what, thing. Whence the imperfection of charity removed, there is not taken away charity, right? Now, I was thinking of this example I was using earlier there about a guess and understanding, right, huh? A guess, by definition, is what? Got imperfection in, right? Does understanding, by definition, have imperfection? But yet you can understand something more or less, can't you, right? And some things I understand, you know, and then as I study them more, I understand them better, right, huh? So my understanding is becoming, what? Is growing, right, huh? I'm understanding more, right, huh? But it can be the same understanding in number, right? That is, what? Being perfected, right, huh? Why, a guess, seems to me to be, by definition, something, what? Imperfect, right, huh? Imperfect, right, huh?