Prima Secundae
Lecture 175: The Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Enumeration and Connection

Transcript
================================================================================

This Prima Paras talk about those gratia and gratis duna, you know? Right, yeah, yeah. Okay, now we get to the article four. Wow, that's really a fine out, you know? Going to have the seven distinguished right now. Very unusual. To the fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that unsuitably the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated. For in that enumeration there are laid down four pertaining to the, what? Intellectual virtues, to wit, wisdom, understanding, science, or knowledge they call it sometimes, and what? Consul. Which pertains, especially the last ones there, to what? Prudence, huh? But nothing is laid down that it pertains to art, which is the fifth, what? Intellectual virtue, huh? I've got to be careful, because these names can be equivocal, right? Because Aristotle speaks of what? The virtues of reason as being sapientia, intellectu, scientia, foresight or prudence, where counsel comes under, and then art, right? Here you've got four corresponding to, for the virtues of reason, but no one corresponding to art. Likewise, he lays down something pertaining to justice, to wit, piety, huh? Kind of justice towards God, huh? That seems to be a part, right? And something pertaining to what? Fortitude, right? To wit, the gifts, fortitude. But nothing is laid down pertaining to what? Temperance, huh? Therefore, insufficiently are the gifts numerated, right? Who's it saying? Was it Isaiah that does it, huh? That's kind of the main place for it, isn't it? I wish there were a gift of art. Yeah, I don't know. He was a little last minute. So you don't think Mozart was moved by the point he's correct? You didn't know where these melodies came from, right? You didn't know where they came from. What do you talk about in the spider's? Well, you get a super abundance, you know? It could be, you know, that heroic virtue, right? Mozart had heroic virtue, wouldn't you say? No. You know where the melodies came from, huh? Once I said, a melody cannot be defined, it's going to be hummed. Turned on the radio coming up, but of course you're playing. Ane Klein-Nach music, you know? Ane Klein-Nach music. Okay, now, second objection here. Pietas is a part of justice, huh? Towards your parents, right? But concerning fortitude, one does not lay down some part of it, but fortitude itself. Therefore, we're not to lay down piety, but ipso justitia. Hey, that's... Even I can understand that objection. Moreover, the theological virtues most of all order us to God. Since, therefore, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that they, what? Gifts pertaining to the theological virtues, huh? There you go. It's more and more diffused, huh? It's just... My mind is being exercised or tortured or whatever. Yeah. Yes, yeah. Moreover, just as God is feared, so also he is loved, huh? And in him someone hopes, and one is delighted about him, huh? But love and hope and pleasure are passions divided against, what? Fear. Fear. If, therefore, just as fear is laid down to be a gift, so also the other three ought to be laid down as gifts, huh? Moreover, to understanding is joined wisdom, which rules it, right? Fortitude, joined counsel, which rules fortitude. How they should be foolhardy, right? To piety, science. Therefore, to fear, there ought to be added some gift that directs it. But, unsuitably, therefore, are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, innumerated, right? But, au contraire, right? He's the authority of Scripture, and he gives the reference to Isaiah's in chapter, what? Eleven. Is that the only place where the seven are innumerated in Scripture that you can think of, huh? I thought there's another passage that names them in the other order. Yeah. One goes to the other, and the other one goes to the other one. Do you think there's another text found, or what? It seems to me there is. I could try to look it up here, but I'm thinking that one list goes from the top, you know, from high to the lowest, and from the lowest to the highest. But, I think they're both in Isaiah, but I can't remember. Okay. Now, it's unusual what Thomas does here. I mean, he's a, he's a, must be moved by the Holy Spirit or something, huh? The answer should be said, this has been said, the gifts are certain habits, right? Perfecting man to this, that he promptly follows the, what? The instinct of the Holy Spirit, just as the moral virtues perfect the desiring powers to, what? Obey reason. Okay. Because of that same, what? Like this, the ratios, right? Okay. Remember that one I was talking about last time that kind of struck me, you know, where Thomas is pointing out how the divine omnipotence, the divine power is both able to, what, generate the sun, who is God, right, huh? And to create us, what, creatures, right, huh? And, you know, one of the great mistakes of Avicenna, right, is that he thinks that the creatures received by God, from God, her modem natura, right? So God produces just one creature, you might say, and then you have to get, you know, that creature, more creatures, and so on, right? So he has a couple of mistakes there, right? He doesn't see that they proceed from the divine, what, power, through, what, his will, right? While, in the case of the Holy Spirit, he, what, I mean, in the Son of God, rather, he proceeds from the power, what? Not through the will, but through, what, nature, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, of course, this is, this is, this is really something to, important to see, and Thomas says, for the same power can be moved by different things, right? And he takes the example of our, what, our reason, right? Our reason is moved by nature to assent to the statement that the whole is more than the part, right? The quantity is equal to the same, equal to each other, and so on, right? But it's moved by the will to, what, to believe, yeah, no one believes in that he wills, right? So the same power of reason is moved by nature to one thing and by the will to nothing, right? You're making that as a comparison, right? So in likeness, the divine power, right, is moved by nature, right, in this generation of the Son of God, and later on the Holy Spirit is nature too, but it's moved, what, to produce us, right, us creatures, through his, what, will, right, and very subtle, right? Well, here he's coming back to this two-fold, what, likeness, right? It's kind of beautiful, you know, when Aristotle talks about metaphor there in the book on the poetic art, what is the greatest kind of metaphor, the most beautiful metaphors? Well, it's the one that's based on, like, the serratios, huh? I used to take the example in class, I said, now, suppose you have just one daughter, and that's, she's a beautiful girl, right, your only daughter, your only child, right, and today is her wedding day, right? And she used to go over sleeping, you know, and no girl over sleeps on her wedding day, right? You know, you talk to me, they wake up at five or four in the morning, or three in the morning, you know, all they think of, you know, is my dress perfect, you know, what can I do to just, and the kind of news, you know, huh? It's kind of beautiful when Shakespeare does it, right? The kind of news that Juliet seems to be over sleeping, right? And then they discover she's, what? Dead. Apparently, she's a very good thing. And there's all kinds of moaning and so on, but you have, finally, the great words of the, you know, of the father, you know, death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. I said, now, who could say it better than that? I challenge anybody to produce from any poet anywhere, right? You know? That's a beautiful metaphor, right? But what is it? It's based upon like this of what? Ratios. Death is to Juliet, like an untimely frost to the sweetest flower of the field, right? Isn't it beautiful, you know? And then when you get into the, you know, stronger and closer like this is, right? You have in the fourth tool of dialectic, right? Aristides says that the fourth tool of dialectic, the tool of likeness is useful for definitions. You see the likeness among things. You can bring out in what way they are like and therefore define them, you know? And then you can, you know, if you're trying to find a glass, you know, you compare these and you see what they are like. It's useful for what? Inductions, right? If you have to say likeness to induce. And then for syllogisms, ex-supifices, right? Okay? What I call if-then syllogisms, right? Okay? So Aristotle often argues from what? One ratio to what? Another ratio, right? By certain likeness between the two, right? Okay? But you can say also this is useful for what? You know, kind of like an example in a sense, or to manifest something by likeness, huh? And Thomas comes back to using the same what? Likeness of ratios, right? That the gifts are habits perfecting man to this, that he promptly follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit. Just as the moral virtues perfect, what? The desiring powers to what? Yeah, to promptly follow reason, to obey reason, right? So someone who has their moral virtues, right, they'll quickly follow reason, right? You know, you haven't acquired the moral virtues, you might be tempted to... Not follow reason, right? He's the way most people are, right, huh? But it's a beautiful thing there, right, huh? And he says, secret just as the desiring powers are by nature apt to be moved by the command of what? Reason. Reason, huh? So all the powers that are human, right, are by nature apt to be moved by the instinct of God as by a certain what? Higher power. Well, reason is what? Higher than the what? Than desiring powers, right? And they are naturally apt to what? Follow reason, right? But they don't follow reason promptly unless they're perfected by the moral virtues, huh? Okay? And so likewise, all the powers of man have to be moved by this higher power of the what? Holy Spirit, right? By the instinct of God. And therefore, in all the powers of man, which, I don't see you going to qualify to accept, which are able to be beginnings of human acts, right? As are the what? Virtues. So also there are what? Yeah. Gifts. And that's in reason and in the, what, desiring power, but not in the, what, the digestive power and so on, right? Okay? For instance, power. So, now, here it gets very subtle. Reason, however, is speculative, practical, huh? Looking and doing, as I'd say in English, huh? And in both, there is considered the grasping of truth, which pertains to discovery, and the judgment about the, what? Truth, huh? That's interesting, huh? Tom sometimes would say that knowledge involves those two things, right? In other words, to learn, for you, I have to grasp what you're saying, and I have to be able to judge whether it's true or what? False, huh? Judgment is separating the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge, right? That's why we often say, you know, that makes sense, you know? We're expressing our judgment, right? But the sense is the beginning of our knowledge, right? Okay? And what? In geometry, right? We go back to the beginnings of the thing, the definitions, huh? In a cute angle, because of the tooth angle? See? So you know, they can't be, and you, what? Separate the true, they can't be, from the false, they can be, but by some beginning in our knowledge, which would be the definition of a cute angle, and the definition of tooth angle, right? That's what judgment means, huh? It means separating the true from the false by some, what? But you have to grasp what you're talking about, right? Before you can do that, right, huh? He says this is true both for looking reason and doing reason, right? Speculative means the Latin word for looking, right? Theoretical is the Greek word, but the English word is looking. That's why Shakespeare is the word looking. Now, for the grasping of the truth, reason, speculative reason, or looking reason, is perfected by understanding, the practical by, what? Consul. Okay? Remember what Brother Mark was saying, remember? Sias could think of all kinds of things to do, but he had no judgment as to what to do. So he'd come up with all kinds of things to do, and Brother would say, this is the one to do. So I probably had the judgment. But you're both imperfect, right? You don't have both, right? And notice the use of the word intellectum there to name that, right? Because the word understanding is equivocal, and you could sometimes use understanding for one kind of knowledge, right? And so sometimes we divide knowledge into, or knowing into understanding and sensing, right? And then understanding means, what? A form of knowing, right? Other times understanding means simply what? To grasp what you're saying or thinking, right? Okay? But not separating it, you know, to grasp what's true and what's false, right? But not being able to separate them, right? So you use understanding sometimes in that way, right? So when I, you know, translate Aristotle's word episteme, right? It means coming to a halt or a stop, right? It refers to an understanding that comes after the movement. Move. So I translate this as a reasoned out what? Understanding, right? But sometimes I change and call it a reasoned out knowledge because understanding might be something less than knowledge in the other sense, right? So it's kind of equivalent that way, right? So you have natural understanding and then reasoned out understanding, right? But natural understanding, which our astrologist calls new sort of understanding, that has a sense of judgment too, even more so than reasoned out understanding because reasoned out understanding depends upon natural understanding for its judgment. So as you regard apprehension of truth, looking reason is perfected by understanding, practical by counsel, right? But to rightly judging, perspective or looking, is perfected by what? What? Wisdom, the practical by what? No. Yeah. Now you've got to be careful because knowledge could have many senses, right? But sometimes we divide knowledge against wisdom, because wisdom gets a special name because it excels, right? Well, looking knowledge is better than doing knowledge, right? It gets the name wisdom. That takes care of four of the gifts, right? Now the desiring power in those things which are towards another is perfected by what? Piety, right? Of course, justice is also towards what? Another, right? Christophus says, you can't strictly speaking be just yourself, right? Well, he sometimes said, I owe it to myself. I owe this occasion or something, you know, I owe it to myself. I owe it to myself, but strictly speaking, justice is towards another, right? It's like we say sometimes, you're your worst enemy, right? You know, be a friend to yourself, right? But strictly speaking, you're not a friend to yourself. You're a friend to somebody else, right? But sometimes we do that. So, the desiring power in those things which are towards another is perfected by piety, huh? Later on, he's got to say, why do you say piety rather than justice, right? But piety is, seems to be a particular name. In those things which are towards oneself, right? One is perfected by fortitude against the fear of what? In dangers, huh? And against the desire, disordered desire of things delightful by fear. According to that of Proverbs 15, through fear of the Lord, one, what? Everyone declines from evil, right, huh? And in Psalm 118, constrict your, with fear, your, what? Flesh, right, huh? Fear from your judges, right? And thus, these gifts extend to all those things to which extend both the intellectual virtues, the first four, right? And what the moral virtues extend to, right, huh? Now, why don't you have something corresponding to art? That was the first thing, right? This is one of the objections against the first four, right? Why did you have prudence and perspective? To the first it should be said that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect man in those things, which pertain to living well, right? To which art is not ordered, but it's ordered to exterior things to be made, right? For art is right reason, not about things to be done, but things to be, what? Made. As is said in the sixth book of the, what? Ethics, huh? It can never be said, as regards the, what, pouring into the gifts, the art pertains to the Holy Spirit, right? Who is the chief one moving, not to men, who are as certain, what, tools of his, huh? When they are moved by him, right? So you get the word organ, you got the Greek word in there as well as the instrumentum, right? To temperance corresponds in some way the gift of, what, fear. Just as to the, what, virtue of temperance pertains that according to one's own reason, someone, what, recedes from depraved pleasures, right? On account of the good of, what, reason, right, huh? So also to the gift of fear it pertains that someone recedes from pleasures, depraved ones, on account of the, what, fear of God, huh? So he's referring to two things in that objection. One was that art is not, nothing corresponding to it, and Thomas explains, well, the reason why there's nothing corresponding to art, right? And then the other objection was that, what, there's nothing corresponding to temperance. Well, there is, huh? The way the fear of the Lord corresponds to, what, temperance, huh? What parts of temperance, do you remember? Tentral differences? Yeah. Let's give that question, that was interesting, but isn't it something simple, like? I remember the part of the ruins, but I don't know what I'm saying. We cast some blood upon the connection there with this fear of the Lord, right? Now, the second objection, right? Why piety rather than justice, right? To the second, it should be said that the name of justice is, what, placed upon things from the rightness of, what, reason, right? And therefore, the name of virtue is more, what, is more suitably a name of virtue than a name of a, what, gift. But the name of piety implies a reverence, huh? Which we have to father or to one's fatherland, huh? And because the father of all is God, huh? Also, the worship of God is called, what, piety, right? Okay. Now, in Socrates, there, in the dialogue called Pentegris, you know, he has the four cardinal virtues, but then he adds piety to them, right? Mm-hmm. And you have this discussion of piety in the utifro, too. And therefore, suitably, the gift by which someone does, what, has reverence towards God, right, huh? Or an account of the reverence he has for God, he does good to all, is named, what, piety, huh? What's one of the epistles, isn't it, there? This is piety, you know, take care of widows and orphans and so on. You've got to say, well, that's kind of strange. Because they're not your father, right? Mm-hmm. But it's because of your, your order of God, right, that you take care of the widow and the orphan, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? And therefore, suitably, the gift by which someone, an account of reverence for God, does good to all, is called, what? Piety, right? So that's interesting to explain, isn't it? That's a contrast, I know, since I thought about your husband, he talks about the gift of piety, and he says, because some people do good works out of, you know, kind of compassion for others. And he says, the difference, the way he explains it, because every human being is the image of God. Yeah. But we only know that because of our faith. So he says, just human mercy or compassion is to see the need. So he says, just human mercy or compassion is to see the need. in what is the image, whereas piety sees the image in the need. My teacher at Deconic, they had a famous text there, a famous work on the pieté de fice, right, huh? The piety of the Son of God towards his mother, right, huh? Filio-piety, they call it. To the third, it should be said, huh? The third question is about, now, why aren't there some corresponding to the, what, theological virtues, huh? To the third, it should be said that the soul of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit except he be united in some way, right, to him, just as a tool is not moved by the artist except by some kind of contact or some other, what, union, huh? But the first union of man is through faith, hope, and what? Charity. Now, this is what, for instance, what he says here. It says, whence these virtues are presupposed to, what? The gifts. That's very interesting what he says, huh? As the roots, certain roots of the gifts, right? That's very interesting what he says, huh? Whence all the gifts pertain to these three virtues, huh? As certain derivations of the forested virtues. There he almost seems to be putting the gifts, I mean, the theological virtues above the gifts, right? Oh, you could say, below. Yeah, yeah, well, I mean, you say root, yeah. This is derivations, you know? The way he goes on there, there are certain things derived from the forested virtues, right? They're all perfecting those acts of the theological virtues, I mean, yeah. That's what, again, they speak of it in terms of grace. St. Bonaventure speaks of the grace, ramifying, it brings it out to the virtues, the gifts, and then the beatitude. It's all from one root. You know, the scripture says charity is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, right? So he has that connection with us, too, obviously, right? And there's a connection there, right, between that and its being, moving us by the gifts. So we've gotten beyond, a little bit beyond the Baltimore Catechism, right? I was saying to one of my wife's friends, you know, I said, so there's nothing wrong with the Baltimore Catechism. And the answers are quite good, I said. We didn't understand them very well, but, I mean, they're still quite good, the answers. I mean, they're thieves. Yeah, yeah. And I think they didn't even have the answers, you know. And then they'd always start to read these things, oh, yeah. And you kind of remember that you'd kind of memorize it as a kid or something, you know, and round them off, you know, in front of sisters, so-and-so. Sometimes the parish priest would come over, you know, and sit in on one of the classes, you know. If we didn't answer, you know, the question is just right, she'd say, oh, I was so embarrassed. But even if he fell to the parish, we couldn't answer that. For some reason, they stuck that, you know, they didn't, you know. Yeah, I was just helping to instruct a group of teenagers who hadn't been confirmed with their classmates, but they were leaders, and it was just a small group. And I asked them to name, and these are kids who were juniors and seniors in high school, what are the sacraments, and can you name the sacraments? They couldn't even name confirmation. They didn't even know one sacrament. And they were going to get confirmed. You didn't even name confirmation? They'd be confirmed. I remember this, one of my friends in the parish, he was involved in what they called a review of the faith, right? It wasn't a review. It was a first review. And he asked the class, you know, to name the seven sacraments. And he says, collectively, they couldn't go up and name the seven sacraments. Plus, they had things like graduation. He didn't kind of stare at voice of sacraments, you know? Bar Mitzvah. Yeah, it was a natural sacrament. Voice of Eagle Scout. Eagle Scout. The kids don't memorize it, and that's the age they should do some memorizing, especially, you know? Well, they call it a man named it, yeah. Bellarmine's Catholicism. That's very good. To the fourth one, no. Just as God is feared, so he's also loved, right? No one hopes, and so on. Therefore, just as fear is laid down to be a gift, so also the other three ought to be. To the fourth, it should be said that love and hope and pleasure have the good for their object, but the highest good is God. Whence the names of these passions are carried over, transferred means what? Carried over to the theological virtues by which the soul was joined to what? God, huh? But the object of fear is the bad, which in no way belongs to God, right? Whence it does not imply a joining to God, but more a withdrawal from those things, from some things, on account of the reverence that we have for God, huh? And therefore, it is not the name of a theological virtue, but is of a gift, huh? Which, in a more eminent way, huh? Withdraws us from evils, even than immoral virtue does, huh? Now, what about the fifth objection here? What directs this fear, right? To the fifth, then, it should be said that through wisdom is directed both the understanding of man and the affections of man, huh? And therefore, there are laid down two things corresponding to wisdom as it were the director. On the part of the understanding, the gift of what? Understanding. And on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. And it's kind of marvelous, right? It's the joke about, we say, Monsignor Diana's principal passion is fear, right? But you have this kind of in Socrates, too, right? That fear of being, what? Staken, right? That fear of thinking you know something when you don't know it, right? Now, he says, the reason for fearing God is especially taken from a consideration of the divine excellence. It's wisdom, what? Considered. That's very interesting, right, huh? Just fear of anyone anything. Take a little break down here. Yeah. To the fifth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the gifts are not connected. For the apostle says, in the first epistle of Corinthians, chapter 12, to others are given through the spirit the sermo, the speech of wisdom, right? To others, the speech of what? Science, according to the same spirit. But wisdom and sciencia are counted among the gifts of the, what? Holy Spirit. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to, what? Diverse people and not connected among each other in the same. Is that simply equivocation, the most common fallacy? Are you talking about these gifts of the gratia gratis donna? Well, moreover, Augustine says in the 14th book on the Trinity, that many of the faithful do not, what, shine with knowledge, although they shine by the faith itself. But to the gift of faith, right? I mean, to the virtue of faith, there follows something of the, what? Gifts. At least the gift of, what? Fear. Therefore, it seems that the gifts are not, what? A necessity connected one with the other, right? So they could have the fear without having the sciencia, right? Moreover, Gregory says in the first book of the Moralia, that wisdom is less if it lacks, what? Understanding. Understanding. And wisdom, understanding is valde in utile, so very useless. It does not subsist from wisdom. Probably. Vile is the counsel to whose work, for the fortitude is lacking, and great is the, what, fortitude destroyed, unless it be borne up or supported by the counsel. Nothing is science if it does not have the usefulness of piety, and much useless is piety if it lacks the discretion of science. Fear also, if it does not have the virtues, rises to, what, no genus, to no work of, what, good action, from which it seems that one gift can be had with another. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not connected, huh? Against this is what Gregory there sets forth, saying that in that banquet of the sons, we're not to, what, scrutinize, right? That they, what, feed each other, mutually, huh? Through the sons of Jacob, about which he speaks there, right? I designated the gifts of the Holy Spirit. That's another little text, or hidden, that curse. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected to this, that they, what, refresh each other, right? The answer should be said that the truth of this question can be had easily from the things foresaid, right? For it is said above that just as the appetitive powers are disposed to the moral virtues in comparison to the rule of reason, Now, unless he's coming back, right, to the, I'd like this again, huh? The man who can see I'd like this ratio, huh? So also, all the, what, powers of the soul are disposed by the, what, gifts in comparison to the Holy Spirit moving them. But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through charity. That's the same, the connection between those two. According to that of Romans 5, 5, that the charity of God is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, just as our own reason is perfected by prudence or foresight. Whence, just as the moral virtues are connected to each other in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected together to each other in charity. Thus, that the one who has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, of which none can be had, but without charity. Right? Sells it, huh? It is made. Yeah? The length of the virtues, huh? It's interesting how he's going to solve his objection over the last time. He sees a distinction there in the words, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that wisdom and science in one way can be considered according as they are gratia gratis date. Right, huh? That's opposed to gratia gratum facientum, right? Insofar as someone abounds so much in the knowledge of divine things and human things that he is able to instruct the faithful and to refute adversaries. Well, that's what Thomas has, right? If you can get rid of him, you can get rid of the churches, someone who the heretics said. When the Pope said, a vain boast, he says, but not a vain testimony. That's good. And this speaks there, the Apostle, about, what, wisdom and science, in that sense, huh? When, significantly, he makes mention of the sermone sapientiae scientiae, right? In other way, they can be taken insofar as they are gifts of the Holy Spirit, huh? And thus, wisdom and science are nothing other than certain perfections of the human mind by which it is disposed to following, right? The instinct of the Holy Spirit in a knowledge of divine or, what? Human things. Human things. And thus, it is clear that gifts of this sort are in all those having, what? Charity, huh? The second is going to solve that in somewhat the same way, right? Because there's a text there which said, many of the faithful do not excel in science, although they excel in faith, right? Augustine, same in the 14th. The second should be said, Augustine there speaks of science, expounding the foresaid authority of the apostle. Whence he speaks about science in the foresaid way, according to his gratia gratis, what? Data, right? I explained before, you know, that that means gratia gratis data, right? But Tom, somebody's divided that and they get the three of some grace, huh? Against gratia gratu, making one acceptable to God, right, huh? Well, even that is gratis data, but this keeps the common notion, right, huh? And the other one has something, in addition, most noteworthy, right? It gets the new name, right, huh? So it's not going to be one name, but the whole phrase, right? Which is clear from this, that he subjoins, that another, right, knows only what a man ought to believe on account of obtaining human or blessed life, right? Which is not accepted eternally. But the other is to know in what way this and what can be bestowed upon the pies and defended against the impious, huh? which by proper word is called science, okay? So it's equivocation of words in these cases, right? The most common mistake in thinking is Aristotle says in the book on Sistema Refutations, huh? Now, to theory it should be said that just as in one way the connection of the cardinal virtues is proven through this, that one of them is perfected in a certain way by another, right? So Gregory, in the same way, wishes to show, or prove rather, the connection of the gifts, right? Through this, that one of them without the other is not able to be perfect, right? Whence he sets forth before saying, what? Each one, I guess, individually. Yeah, if one is destitute of, right? If one does not, what? I guess it says the other. Yeah, yeah. Women's suffrage, huh? That's what I get through. We've all experienced that. Therefore, not one gift is said to be understood without the other, but that understanding it be without wisdom is not a gift, right? Just as temperance, if it be without justice, is not a virtue, right? I suppose you can say, you know, you can show the union through charity, all of them together, but then also the fact that one helps to confirm the other, right? I have to always say, you know, you can tell a guy's unorthodoxy by his attitude towards the Blessed Virgin. You know, there's something wrong with this guy, right? He doesn't have piety towards the Blessed Virgin, you know? Then I want to trust his theological judgment, huh? I remember this story about, was it before the definition of the assumption, I think it was, one of those mysteries of Mary? And this guy was saying, you know, I don't know if I can stay in, you know, if they define that. And the guy says, don't worry, he says, you're already out. And it's already done. It's a done deal. You're cooked. So we get time for another article? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. who do the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in the Fatherland, right? To the sixth, one proceeds thus, it seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not remain in the Fatherland. For Gregory says in the second book of the Moralia that the Holy Spirit, right, instructs the, what, mind, right, against singular, what, temptations by the seven gifts, huh? But in the Fatherland, there are no temptations. Temptations, I guess, huh? According to that Isaiah 11, 9, they do not harm, they do not kill in the, what, universal holy mountain, huh? Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit will not be in the pot to you, right? But the gifts may do other things besides just... Moreover, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are certain habits, as has been said, huh? But frusta, in vain, huh, are habits where their acts cannot be. But the acts of some of these gifts are not able to be in the Fatherland. As for Gregory says in the first of the Moralia, that the understanding makes things heard to be penetrated, right? And console prevents one from being precipitous, huh? And fortune makes one not, what, fear, I guess? Adverse things. And piety fills the viscera of the heart with the works of mercy, huh? But these don't belong to the state of the Holy, of the Fatherland. Therefore, these gifts are not in the state of Gloria. I suppose Thomas would be saying that there are some acts of the gifts that are not going to be prominent there, right? But there's, I mean, it's the whole story. More were the gifts, some perfect man in the contemplative life as wisdom and understanding. Some in the active life is piet and fortitude. But the active life, if this life is terminated. I thought you were used to say that, just to say, well, then you've got to get the active life in in this life. It won't happen in this life. As Gregory says in the Sixth of Moralian, therefore, in the state of glory, there are not be all the gifts of the, what, Holy Spirit. But against this is what Ambrose says in his book on the, what, Holy Spirit, you know? That city of God, right, huh? The heavenly Jerusalem, right? He's not washed by the, what? Movement, I guess. Yeah, some terrestrial river. Forever, but proceeding from the font of life, the Holy Spirit, huh? By whose, what, brief taste we are satisfied, right? Mm-hmm. In whose, what, celestial spirits overflow, filled with the, what, seven spiritual virtues, right? Friendly. The answer should be said that about the gifts, we can speak in two ways. In one way, she carries the essence of the gifts, and thus they'll be most perfectly in the Fatherland, as is clear through the authority of Ambrose, what, induced, huh? Based on some of the texts we just quoted there, huh? The reason for which is that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind, and momentum involves the will as well as the reason, right? Mm-hmm. To following the motion of the Holy Spirit, which will be most of all in the Fatherland, right? When God will be... All in all. All in all, yeah. So, I mean, you've got to obviously be prompt to follow him there, right? As is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 15. And when man will be holy, what's subject to God, right? Mm-hmm. But in another way, they can be considered as regards the matter about which they act, right? And thus, in the present, they have some, what, apparition about some matter about which they will not have an operation in the state of glory, right? And according to this, they will not remain in the Fatherland. Just as has been said above about the, what? Cardinal Barchuson. The first, therefore, it should be said that Gregory is speaking about the gifts according as they belong to the present, what? State. State, yeah. Thus, huh? We are, what, protected by the gifts against, what, the temptations of evil things. But in the state of glory, the evils seizing through the gifts of the Holy Spirit would be perfected in the, what? Good. Good, huh? To the second, it should be said that Gregory, as it were, each of the gifts, huh, lays down something that passes away with the present state, right? And something that remains even in the, what, future, huh? For he said that wisdom, huh? Refreshes the mind with, what? The hope of eternal things and the certitude of them. Of which two things, what? Hope passes away, but the certitude remains. So if you have the beating of vision, you'll be certain that it's going to remain forever, huh? And about the understanding he says that it penetrates in that which is heard, right, huh? Refreshing the heart and enlightening, it's, what, darkness, right? Of which hearing won't pass away because man will not teach his, what? His brother, right, huh? As it said in Jeremiah 31, but the illustration of the mind will, what, remain, huh? About consul, he says that it prevents one from being precipitous, which is very necessary in the present, right? And again, that by reason it, what, fills the soul, which will be necessary even in the, what, future. About fortitude, that it is not, what? Fear and awareness. Yeah. Which is necessary in the present. And again, that, what? The place is the food of confidence. It sets out the food of confidence. Yeah. Which will remain also in the future, huh? About science, he lays down one thing to it, that it, what, overcomes the fast of the... Fasting of ignorance. Yeah. Which pertains to the present state, yeah. Yeah. But that, what it adds in the, what, stomach of the mind, huh? Can be understood figuratively, the filling of it to a thought. Knowledge, right, huh? We'll be stuffed with knowledge, right? Which pertains to the future state, huh? About piety that the, what? Viscera. Of the heart. Of the heart. Of the heart. Of the works of mercy. Yeah. Which, according to the words, pertains only to the present state, huh? But that, what? Intimate affection for one's neighbors, right? Designated to, what? Viscera. Viscera. Retains also to the future state, huh? Which piety will not exhibit the works of mercy, but the affection of congratulation. I want to congratulate you. Congratulations. Just knowing you get to the public answer, congratulations. A job well done. About fear, he says, that it, what? Guards the mind lest it be proud about present things, right, huh? Which pertains to the present status. And it, it, what? Strengthens us about future things with the food of hope. Which also pertains to the present state, right? As regards hope. But also, the future state it pertains that, what? Strengthening of things hoped for. Here hoped and there they're attaining, right? And the third, then, that argument proceeds about the gifts as regards their, what? Matter. For the works of the active life will not be, what? The matter of the gifts in heaven, I guess. But all will have their acts about those things which pertain to the contemplative life which is the Vita Vyata, right, huh? Can I stop now or we should go on? Hmm. I don't know.