Prima Secundae
Lecture 180: Wonder, Literature, and the Fruits of the Spirit

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and the wonder with the beauty of this creation, this very wonder which leads us to God is also lost. And it seems like, well, it's involved in this because it causes us off more and more. Actually, the example there of Moses, right, he had the burning bush, right? If you've got a plant in the back yard, they call it burning bush, right? Really, it gets red, you know, at the end of the season, if you don't have the right conditions. And so Moses' wonder is aroused, right? But the bush is, what, not being consumed by the flames, right? Well, the burning bush is really a, what, metaphor for the incarnate word, right? And his divine nature does not, what, consume his human nature, right? So you have the divine nature there, represented by the fire, and the human nature by the bush, right? So he says something to really wonder about there, right? And, but in general, you wonder about these great metaphors, right? So if you say that God is, what, you know, metaphorically, fire is God, right? Well, fire is both, what, enlightens, gives light, and it warms, right? And, you know, they compare sometimes God, you know, to the sun, right? We say the sun enlightens the world before it warms it. And so God enlightens us by faith, and then he warms us by charity, right? So it's really, really beautiful, but the metaphors are there partly to make you, what, wonder, what is the meaning of this, what, metaphor, right? It's the meaning of this 12 fruits on this tree, right? So people who haven't gone through great literature, their wonder is what's stunted, right, huh? And they don't wonder about the, what, the great or important things, huh? We tend to wonder about what, the new fashion, whatever it, new fashion is, right? The new serious way of acting. On the website of my college's literature department, I was an English major as an undergrad, and the type of course is absolutely bizarre. As far as, like, generations of Shakespeare, and it gets worse. And so any sort of inculcation of wonder is blocked because of this type of literary education. You're not looking at the wonder, you're sort of disenchanting one with it, and it just becomes a political narrow game. I was listening this morning to Mozart's first quartet, you know, written in, when he's down in Italy, in Loda, Italy, you know, the Ian in Loditz, you know, beautiful little thing, you know, Kershaw 80 there. But in the same, when they had the first of the six Heiden quartets, which are probably the greatest of these quartets, and I just listened to the first quartet again, you know, just, it's absolutely incredible, that thing, it was really wonderful, you know, the thing there. I remember, you know, before I ever owned these CDs or records of the, you know, I used to come out of the library, you know, take out six LPs for two weeks in the St. Paul Public Library, you know. I remember, you know, they had to go down to the bus, take the bus downtown to return the CDs, you know. I mean, they were that new, you know, your records. And just once more, you know, and it's been a great to go down, I got one more record, play once more, you know, before I go down. And it's just absolutely incredible, you know. But Mozart's music arouses that wonder, you know. Homer and Sophocles and Shakespeare, those three poets, you know, they're kind of the supreme poets, Homer and Sophocles and Shakespeare. And the Greeks had to say, you know, that Sophocles is Homer writing tragedy and Homer as Sophocles writing epic, you know. But they saw, you know, the infinity between those two great writers. These metaphors and especially similes of Shakespeare just tremendous, you know. You can read it around as well as one day. Bill Postino, which was very, very popular, a postman in Italy who befriends Pablo Marruda, the South American communist poet who was in exile because it was communist and found to save him in Italy for a while. And it's essentially a communist propaganda film. But Marruda in the film is always saying, metaphor, as he's teaching the simple postman about poetry and he becomes a poet himself and finds the beauty that he gets of marrying through his poetry and stuff like that. But Marruda's idea of metaphor and it's power. It's a corrupted use, it seems. And it's certainly focused on the material creation, on the simple pleasures, but it's certainly not a transcendent focus on things that are higher. And that seems to be such a hallmark of our culture. We talk to young people and, oh, rap is so great because it's so real. But you say, oh, the transcendent thing is going on. And they're like, the perfection of the thing is noted according to its beginning, middle, and what? End, yeah. I don't have truth to that. To the third, it should be said that to not be disturbed in what? Sadnesses has the notion of something what? Delectable. Delectable, right? I was driving up to Quebec one time there. And I was taking the route to Maine, you know, and so on. Get across the border and you get, the route to President Kennedy, right? I mean, that's President Kennedy. But the road had all these potholes on it, so I wasn't making much of an honor to our president. And I was always stopping, I mean, slowing down to avoid these potholes and so on. And this darn Frenchman is getting impatient behind me. And so he roars by me, you know, huh? And of course he kicked up a stone and I could hear it hit the side of my car, right? I knew it was going to leave a mark on it. It was a new car, you know, and I knew it was going to leave a mark, you know, huh? But the guy said, I don't have a response to send it out this road, you know. So he said, here, huh? To not be disturbed in sadnesses, right? Has the notion of something what? Delightful, right? Okay? And if faith is taken, right, huh? Insofar as it is a, what? Foundation, it has a certain what? Definition or a notion of something last and delightful according as it contains what? Certitude. Certitude, huh? Whence the gloss says, right, that faith, that is certitude about, what? Invisible things, huh? Okay? You see in the Bible there, you know, that church saves you from the, what, conflict of tongues, right? Most people just go through, you know, life, you know, even the academic world, right? They just, you know, what is it, even what Winnicott Chambers said, right, you know, when he became a communist, right? We admired because they were kind of really, you know, committed to their ideas, right? He went back to Columbia University after he became a communist and he says that he regarded ideas as ping-pong balls, right? You know, ping-ping-ping-ping, and knock them around, but you don't take seriously a ping-pong ball, do you, right? No big deal, you know, sleep and knock around. And that's what ideas are for most people in academic world, just play with them, you know, back and forth. And we take them seriously, right? Because you can't get truth anyway, you know, that's what they think, you know, truth is unattainable, and they literally can't find the truth, and so no one can find the truth, and it's not there to be found. So we just play with ideas, right? Knock them around. It's kind of fun to knock ping-pong ball back and forth, isn't it? It's kind of nice, you know? It's kind of nice to knock the ideas back and forth. You never resolve anything, right? It's not a reasoned out or understanding that you get to, huh? I know, I know, I know. I come to the fourth one, which is the contour, right? I wanted to multiply them, right? To the fourth it should be said, that is, Augustine says upon the epistle to the Galatians, right, huh? The apostle does not, what? Thus take that he would teach what are either the works of the flesh, right, or the fruits of the spirit, but they might show in what genus they should be, what? Avoided, meaning the, what? Works of the flesh, and those should be, what? Followed, huh? Once they were able to either, what? Enumerate more, or even less fruits, right, huh? Nevertheless, all acts of the gifts and of the virtues are able, according to a certain suitability, to be reduced to, what? The ones we give, right? According as all virtues and gifts, it's the Holy Spirit, huh? Necessarily, it is that they ordered the mind in one of the four said, what? Ways, right, huh? Okay. Whence the acts of, what? Wisdom, and whatever gifts are ordering unto the good, are reduced to, what? Charity, joy, and peace, huh? And these, more than others, are enumerated, because the ones enumerated here, more imply either the enjoyment of good things, or the sedation of bad things, huh? Which seems to pertain to the notion of what? Fruit, huh? Fruit being something delectable, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So there's a conclusion of the syllogism there. Is that a fruit? You know, if you think a fruit is something you're going to enjoy, so you're kind of thinking in terms of more of the, what? Appetite, right, huh? Okay. Hmm? Right? is coming. The fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that the fruits are not contrary to the works of the flesh which the Apostle, what, enumerates. For contraries are in the same genus. The species that are furthest apart are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits, and therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not, what, contrary to them. Moreover, to one, one thing is contrary. That's what Socrates argues, right, in the famous dialogue there in the Protagoras, right? There's only one contrary. He's trying to argue that wisdom and temperance are the same thing, right? Because the opposite of wisdom is what? Foolishness, right? And the opposite of temperance is foolishness. So, you know, the Anika mentioned the word fond there, you know. In Shakespeare, you know, fond originally means what? Foolish, right? And so to say that you're fond of the girl is to say you're acting foolishly over her raita. But again, we see that when a person drinks, you know, they tend to make a fool of themselves, right? So in temperance it's a kind of folly, right? Well, if a contrary has only one contrary, and the contrary of temperance is foolishness, and the contrary of wisdom is foolishness, well then temperance and wisdom must be the same thing, right? Of course, they're not, but there's a connection between the two, right? All my reports go with the modest truth, no more nor but so, and Shakespeare says that. Modest wisdom plucks me from over-credulous haste, right? So there's a connection between, you know, modesty and wisdom. So Socrates develops that idea in the Brutagoras, right, that there's one contrary to one thing. But many things the Apostle numerates are what? More works of the flesh than are the fruits of the Holy Spirit. So how can they be contrary if they outnumber them, right? And therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh are not contrary. Moreover, among the fruits of the Spirit first are laid down charity, gaudium, pax, to which do not correspond those things which are first enumerated among the works of the flesh, which are fornication, uncleanliness, and cleanliness, and what? I suppose shamelessness, huh? Pudhisitia, how they translate that? In modesty and modesty. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the, what? Works of the flesh, huh? But against this is what the Apostle says there, that the flesh lusts against the Spirit, right, huh? And the Spirit against the, what? Flesh, huh? I answer you, it should be said that the works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit are able to be taken in two ways, huh? In one way, according to a common, what? Ratsio or definition. And in this way, in general, the fruits of the Holy Spirit are contrary to the works of the, what? Flesh. For the Spirit, Holy Spirit, moves the human mind to that which is in accordance with reason, right? Or rather to that which is above reason, right? But the appetite of the flesh, which is a sense appetite, draws one to, what? Sensible goods, which are below man. What is a man if his chief could in market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast no more, right? So he's drawn to what he's below him, huh? The beast. Whence, just as the motion up and the motion down are contrary to natural things, so in human works or deeds the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the, what? Holy Spirit, huh? Because one is taking a distraction, the other is taking you down, right, huh? So we can say that in general. In another way, one can consider according to the, what? Particular reasons of the individual fruits enumerated and the works of the flesh that are enumerated, right? And thus, it is not necessary that individual ones, the singular ones, and be placed against singular ones, right? Or one-to-one correspondence, right? Because this has been said, and this is in the preceding article at 4, right? Where Thomas said, don't take too seriously what I'm saying, right? That the apostle does not intend to enumerate all the spiritual works, nor all the, what? Carnal works, right? Fleshy works. But nevertheless, huh? The indefatigable, Augustine, right? According to his certain adaptation, Augustine, in his commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, places against, what? Individual or singular works of the flesh, singular, what? Fruits, right? As to fornication, which is the love, right? Of seeking, what? Pleasure, divorced from legitimate, what? Marriage, huh? He opposed to that, what? Charity. Charity, through which the soul is joined to God, right, huh? In which also there is a true, what? Chastity, right, huh? But doesn't God speak that way sometimes in the Old Testament, you know, that you're kind of in what? What? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you abandon God, right? You kind of, you know, Okay. So the reason, kind of, you know, to adapt in a certain way, right? Okay. And to what? Uncleanliness, right? All these things are in the service of, what? Idols, on account of which there is war, I guess, against the gospel of God, right? As opposed to what? Peace, huh? I used to hear as a kid all the time people say, no rest for the wicked or something, you know? Yes. Isn't that in Isaiah? Isaiah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. And against what? Beneficia, what is that? Beneficia. Which class? And enmity and contentions and jealousy and so on. And this is dissensions as opposed to what? Longanimity to sustaining the evils of men among whom we, what? Live, huh? And to curing, what? The dignitas, right? And for forgiving, I guess, huh? Monitas. To heresies as opposed, what? Faith, huh? To envy, what? Mildness, huh? It's interesting. And to drunkenness and overeating, I guess. Continence, huh? What about the first objection, huh? Works of the flesh called fruits, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, that that which goes forward from the tree against the nature of the tree is not said to be its fruit, but more a certain, what? Corruption, right, huh? And because the works of the virtues are natural to reason, right? The works of the vices are against, what? Reason, right? Therefore, the works of the virtues are called fruits, but not the works of the, what? Vices, huh? You learn to appreciate kind of that Latin word, too, don't you? Felicitas, right? For happiness, right? Just take it from the same root of fruit, right, huh? For happiness, right? For happiness, right? For happiness, right? For happiness, right? Virtue is its only word. Since happiness consists in virtuous what? Activity, right? So it's well-called phlicitas, right? I told you how when I first started reading Nicomachean Ethics, of course, in the English Oxford thing, the word was happiness, right? But then you could read Thomas, the word is phlicitas. Then you read Aristotle, it's not that, you've done money in there, right? But phlicitas in some ways is a better word than happiness, right? Happiness kind of indicates where we start from, right? See, in the book on the poetic art, Aristotle is talking about tragedy and comedy and how you can represent men going from happiness to misery, right? In tragedy or from misery to happiness in comedy, right? But in the Greek word for happiness there, it doesn't use eudaimonia, they use it in Nicomachean Ethics. It uses the word what? Utukia, right? Which is like happiness, right? Comes from tukia, which means luck, right? And happiness comes from hap, right? You always say if you go to the two gentlemen of Rona, you know, you'll see that kind of the etymology of the English word happiness, right? When you meet good hap, you know, we should be a partaker of your happiness. One of the two gentlemen of Rona, you know, Proteus says to his friend there, Valentine, right? He said happiness is something that you're happy to get, right? While fruit is something, right? Fruit kind of suggests the fact that happiness is really the natural result of what? Doing good things, right? And misery is an actual result of... Thomas would say virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery. And that's what you can learn in Luther too. It's always somebody who's in a miserable situation. How'd they get there? By this or that vice, right, huh? People got the funniest idea of what virtue is, you know? If you tell them... They wouldn't tell them in school though, would they? They'd tell them that. Virtue is the way to happiness. Get some wise guy, My way to happiness is vice, you know? They'd make a mock you, I suppose. Objective happy, my way can be. Now, to the second it should be said, right? Why does he enumerate more works of what? The flesh than of the other, right? Or the famous thing that Dionysius says, Aristoteles says the same thing, that the good happens in one way, but the bad in what? Many ways, right? Hit the target, hit the bullseye is one way, and many ways to miss, right? Same way even with truth, right? Seems to be so many errors, right? It's amazing how many errors there are. That's why it doesn't make sense to say that the good we see in nature is a result of chance, right? The chances for bad outweigh the chances for good. Infinity, right? I always take the example, you know, if you break the leg of a chair and you say, okay, now go down and sell me a piece of wood to replace the leg, right? Well, how long do you want it? Just sell me a piece of wood. There's an infinity of links that are too long or too short, only one link that is just right to repair the chair with, right? That's a very simple thing compared to what other things are to be good, right? Just get the right leg, you know? The right link. Good is one and there's an infinity of bad, huh? How many ways to misspell a word, huh? I before he except... That's the most common mistake that I was a college professor, you know, the most common mistake, you know, I and E, you know, they get them in the wrong order, right? It's funny, too, the way people misspell words. They don't see what they want to say. The third day leaves you to go from what's been said already, huh? So, but going back to the second one here. Whence to one virtue there are many vices opposed, right? So, Aristotle takes up the virtues and the vices there in the ethics, and the moral virtues, the moral virtue is in between two, what? Two vices, right? So, courage is in between, the courageous man is in between the coward and the, what, foolhardy man, right? And temperance is in between the, what, the intemperate man and the... Courage, I would say, right? But that's true about truth, huh? It's in between two extremes, huh? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more nor clipped but so. They say more or less than the truth, they are the philems and the sons of darkness. They talk about the Trinity, huh? You've got the two main heresies there, what? The heresy of Arius, right? And the heresy of, what, Sibelius, right? Sibelius, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, they're all God, but they're really just one person. They've got different names from his different activities, right? He became a man, he's called the Son when he was... He sanctifies us, he's called the Holy Spirit, you know? And then you have, what, Arius from whom they're really distinct, right? But only the Father is God, and the Son is just a magnificent creature, and the Holy Spirit, another magnificent creature, but... So it's in between two, what, vices, right, huh? The same with the Trinity, I mean, the truth of the Incarnation is in between Eutyches, you know, the Monophysites, there's only one nature there, right? And then the, what, the stories, and those who say there's two, what, persons there, like there's two natures, huh? So truth is in between two extremes. One which is more than the truth, saying, what is not is. And one that's less than the truth, saying, what is, is not, huh? I swear to tell the truth. The whole truth, nothing but the truth. See, those aren't just repetitiously the same thing, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The whole truth is, again, saying that what is, is not. And nothing but the truth is the other area, right? What is not, is. I figure if I explain that to the judge, he won't, he'll put me in the jury because he figures I'm going to fall up to him. I'm going to influence this. I start to instruct him now. What are you saying when you take that vow, you know, or take that... After this guy, yeah, he's going to hurt the jury too much. I don't know how they decide. I've always been called in once and, of course, it's kind of a fool that they didn't take me, so I don't know why. He's going to call his professor, maybe. I don't know why. We just had a brother call. The brother just got after him. He was going to try. Yeah, yeah. He's going to tell him. He's glad it's over here. I know we are. Sometimes things are not that clear, you know. You need to send somebody up. I'm not sure if they should send them up. An account of this is not, Mirim, not wonderful. If many are laid down to be the works of the flesh, then are the fruits of the, what? Spirit, huh? Okay, well that's the end of that question. I think we should go in the next question here now, huh? This is, we're going to go over to, what? Vices and sins, huh? So is there the same knowledge of the good and the bad, the same love of the good and the bad? Why is there the same knowledge of the good and the bad, and not the same love of the good and the bad? Because this is his knowledge right now, so he's going to go into the bad. He's going to go deeply into the bad. There's all kinds of horrible things coming up here. He's going to be depressing. Why is there the same knowledge of the opposites? This is a big thing for Plato and Aristotle, right? Right. And Socrates talks about that too. If you know one, then you know the other, because it's an absence of… If you know how to give somebody health, you also know how to take it away. I mean, is the definition of virtue something good? Yeah. It's a definition of vice something good. Yeah. Because knowledge is good. All knowledge is good. Yeah. Yeah. Well then, but is all love good? No. Because you become what you love. Yeah. So you ask students, which is better, knowledge or love? What do they say? Love. Yeah, especially the girls who say that, right? You say, well, then you find out that all knowledge is good, right? But not all love is good, right? If I love to torture you, is that good? That's enough. And so, how can you say that love is better than knowledge, if all knowledge is good and only some love is good, right? You catch them kind of that way, right? You don't get a second date. If you mention that, you don't get a second date. What did you say? You don't get a chance for a second date if you mention that on the first. See, Aristotle, in the beginning of the Dianima, right, he says that all knowledge is good, right? But some knowledge is better because it's about a better thing, or because it's what? Better known. Or certain, right? But then, you know, he says that those two criteria, the better object is the more important, right? But there's two of them, right? So, mathematics is better than natural philosophy, in the sense of being more certain, right? But natural philosophy is about better things, like the soul, and so on. I came to talk one time about this, and the question for afterwards, the guy says to me, I don't like the sex education that's going on in the schools. And so these young people shouldn't be hearing these things, right? And I agree with the man, right? See, does that contradict what Aristotle is saying, that all knowledge is good? I mean, if it would be bad for the student to have this knowledge, right, huh? And it is, I think, right, huh? His knowledge is such bad, huh? Yeah, in certain sense it's such bad. Yeah. It's because of what he might do with this knowledge, right? Yeah. His knowledge of how to make a bomb, is that good? Very useful. To make a bomb. Yeah. As such it's good, right, the knowledge of how to make a bomb, but is it good for a terrorist to know how to make a bomb? It's not good for the country, right? He knows how to make a bomb, and I wonder how these guys get all this know-how about how to make a bomb. They're diligent students of how to make a bomb, I guess. Sometimes they blow themselves up too, but that's kind of amusing, but kind of poetic justice there, right? Some of the early people, but again, there's a distinction there between the as-such and the apothecary there who sells the poison there, right, to Romeo, right? But is it bad as such to know that this is poisonous? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Good. Yeah. Right? I mean, you can use the knowledge that this is poison to avoid it, or to what? Get rid of something you want to get rid of, you know? Right? So it's not the knowledge of this poison that makes it, what, bad. It's not the knowledge as such that it's bad, but it's the man's desire to harm somebody else, right, that makes it accidentally be bad for him to have this knowledge, right? You've got to be very careful. You can say, you see, it would be better that he didn't know that this was poisonous, right, huh? You know, in Shakespeare's play there, Symbeline, right, the queen is evil, and she's talking to doctors. She wants to know about poisons, right? And he doesn't trust her one. And so he's giving her false information, right? And she thinks this substance that he's given her, right, will kill you, right, huh? But actually it kind of puts you to sleep like, you know, Juliet, you know, is put to sleep by the function of that thing. And then she did the things of his dad, right? But anyway, he doesn't trust her, right, huh? Okay? Because he knows her, her evil, what, who, and the husband doesn't realize how evil she is, but at the end he finally reads, realizes how evil his wife had been. And so what he says is, who isst can read a woman? Who understands a woman, right? You gotta watch out for her. And so, so is it good that he keeps her ignorant, right? That's good, right? It would be bad for her to know, you know, good for her to be deceived as to think that she has poisons, but she doesn't, right? But is it the knowledge as such, then, that it's bad? Well, it's bad for her to have that knowledge, right, huh? Because she's gonna use it for evil, right, huh? So, it's accidentally, what, bad, right, huh? Okay. Is it bad for me to have a butcher knife in the house? It'd be kind of hard to some kind of meat, you know, you want to cut a nice, you know, you need a butcher knife or something, huh? Have a nice, nice, like, kind of orange up in the morning, you have breakfast in a nice orange. The definition of knowledge, in this particular case, the way that we would understand it, are true things. I know it's a simplistic kind of question, but I don't have a philosophy to really know if it's a worthwhile question. But it seems like there are all sorts of things that are considered knowledge which are, maybe partially true, or partially erroneous, and therefore their value may not, there may not be much in the way of utility. Any utility, or maybe a little bit of utility because of the truth that's mixed into the lies, for example. But so how do you understand the terminology? Well, I mean, the question is the distinction between the as-such and what? What would be happening, right? That's a distinction that's difficult for people to see, right? So this man was objecting. I knew where he was coming from. He was a Catholic man or something, you know? And I knew where he was coming from, right? But he was objecting to the statement that, the chair of Stalovex, that all knowledge is good, right? Only as we do that all knowledge is good, right? But one knowledge is better than another for this reason or that reason. And he was saying, well, then the sex education is good, right? Because all knowledge is good, right? Well, it's not good when the sex education is bad, right? And maybe even a part of them, now they actually say false things, right? But if you just give them the true facts, right? You know, then they're going to experiment or do something, right? So it's not good for them to have this knowledge, right? And they should be thinking about other things. and these things, and so does that make the knowledge bad, though, as such? I see there. But are there things that are considered to be knowledge, but yet are in and of themselves toxic because they're not necessarily true knowledge? Are untrue things our lives also? I told you I was reading the speeches of Vincent Churchill, right? Now, this is, you know, 38 to about 41, beginning of 41, right? Kind of a crucial time in the war, right? This book was printed in 1941, so I got the library sale, right? And it's kind of interesting to read it because you really get a sense of what it's like to be in England, you know, seeing what he was doing. But Churchill uses the phrase, you know, talking about the Nazis there, you know, perverted science, right? There's a lot of perverted science in the Nazis right now. But is the science itself, is the knowledge itself bad, right? No one knows better how to kill you than a doctor, let's say, right? You make it look, you know. But is the knowledge as such bad, right? Is the knowledge, this is poisonous to get some example, is that knowledge as such bad? Speaking of a book that a very twisted person that I worked with years ago had, it was a book on dirty tricks, how to get even with people. And it had all these sort of evil, nasty things to do with people who were making, like, movie traps in their sidewalks and stuff like that. I never went through it, but I mean... That sounds pretty good. Can you share this? So is that kind of... You still have a book? I don't want to... Well, I've been curious because I would have been curious in how to see what he was in it, but also, like, torture techniques with these evil interrogators and thumb screws and stuff like that. What is that knowledge? Well, notice here. Notice here. We see it's the same knowledge of, what, good and bad, right? Mm-hmm. Could I really know logic, right, without knowing, you know, which forms of an argument are, you know, have a conclusion, you know? If A is so, B is so, A is so, therefore B is so. That's good, right? But if A is so, B is so, B is so, therefore A is so. That's not, you know? Would I really be a good logician if I didn't know which forms were good, which ones were bad, right? Oh, interesting. You know? And I know how to, what, deceive my students, right? By my knowledge, right? Equivocal words, right? And I told you, you know, I would, showing importance of words of equivocal reason, right? I would actually convince the students that a part is sometimes more than the whole, right? You know? It's just a whole, yeah, within the whole is not always, you know? I gotta go and correct them, you know, right? But because, you know, they're mixing up different senses of the word, whole and part, right? I'll give you an example I use on, do you know that one? I'd say, you know, I always told my, it was a little story about my mother there. My mother didn't like it, and I said, man, he's an animal. And I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Which is, that's better, that's better, my mother would say. It's never what they call it. But I just said, man's an animal, she's saying, I see. So man is not just an animal, it's only a part of what man is. Yeah, okay. But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horrors, elephant, and so on, right? So sometimes the part includes more than the whole, right? So animal includes more than just man. That's only a part of what man is. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, you know? So there are sometimes the part that's more than the whole. So I know how to deceive people, right? Okay. And Aristotle raises his question when he gets to the rhetoric, right? Because rhetoric can be used for good or for bad, right? So if I'm good at persuading the jury, I can persuade the jury to what? The guilty man being innocent, or the innocent man being guilty, right? I can, you know. And Aristotle says, well, that doesn't make rhetoric itself bad, right? But you're, you're, you're, you're misusing this, right? Okay. I have to, like saying we shouldn't, we shouldn't teach the art of medicine because a doctor could use that to kill you, right? They do kill you, you know, borscht and so on, right? You have to use it, right? So, but does that make the knowledge is such bad? Well, then all knowledge would be bad if there's the same knowledge of good and bad, right? See, if I know how to cook the meat, I know how to spoil the meat, too, right? If I know how much salt or pepper or whatever it is, the seasoning to put on, I know how much to ruin the thing by putting too much on, you know, diminishing it by not putting the right amount on, right? So, all knowledge would be, what? Yeah. Because all knowledge, the same knowledge of the good and the bad, right? So, when the Apostle says, be wise in things which are good, but innocent in things which are bad, what does he mean if it is the fact that it's the same knowledge of good and bad? I don't know if that's exactly the same thing you're talking about there, you know? Be wise as serpents, right? Innocent as does, because the wise is in the mind, right? But the innocence is in the heart, right? And they often take an example, they have Othello there, right? And Iago, right? Iago is, what, wiser than Othello, in a sense, right? Understands things better, right? But he's not so innocent, right? You see? So, what is it? The will, right? And just like I say, you know, in the origin of the word philosopher, there's humility as well as the love of wisdom, right? Because, according to the legend anyway, Othello said, don't call me wise, right? God alone is wise. Well, what shall we call you? Well, you've got to call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right? So, there is not only the love of wisdom there, but also, what, in the origin of the word, the humility, that man is not wise in the way God is wise, right? So, man's wisdom is something imperfect compared to God's, right? Aristotle, you know, follows, you know, Pythagoras, Pythagoras, Pythagoras is at the beginning, kind of early, anyway, Greek philosophy, and Aristotle is at the culmination of the golden age of Greek philosophy, right? But he's still teaching what the other guy said, right? But humility is in the, what, in the love of wisdom is in the will, and the wisdom is in the reason, right? Thomas is very wise, but I think he's humble, right? And when he got through writing, you know, they say, when he got through writing, the part, the tertia parser on the incarnation, right? He's supposed to have gone in with the thing before the altar, or the crucifix of Christ, and said, you know, is this satisfactory in a sense, right? You know, and Thomas, the Lord was supposed to have spoken to him from the cross, right? You've written well to Thomas, right? So now I went to the College of St. Thomas, you know, we had two main academic buildings there that was, you know, kind of a, you know, kind of a thing, there was a statue of Thomas up there, right? And on the baby's got just a tongue, you know, you've written well, right? You know, and that's, that's where the thing came, you know? So it's in humility there, right, in Thomas' part, and you can see his humility with respect to, you know, Augustine or Thomas and the Church Fathers, right? What's his name? Cajetan, you know, who wrote the famous Kambia Nitsuma, the OJ, says that Thomas so reverence the Church Fathers, right, that he seems to have inherited the mind of all of them, right? The same way he reverence to Aristotle, he seems to have inherited the mind of what Aristotle, right? You can't say that about the mind of the philosopher, if they've inherited the mind of Plato, Aristotle, or even, I often think it's, it's not worthwhile comparing them to Aristotle, but clearly the distance is so great, you know. You should compare them to the very first Greek philosophers, you know, we're still way, way above them, you know, but, you know, or, or, or, or.