Prima Secundae
Lecture 181: Vice as Contrary to Virtue and Against Nature

Transcript
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I say, you know, Shakespeare is wiser than any of the modern philosophers, you know, far wiser. You know, you want to compare Aristotle, and it's ridiculous, right, you know, but why is Shakespeare so wiser than all the modern philosophers, you know, that's more of it, you know. Should modern philosophers be called by different names, because they're not humble the word is, the word is kind of equivocal, yeah, so you don't think that they're, you know, that God's wisdom is better than theirs, right? What I find striking is you're reading through a number of different ones, and it seems, they almost all seem to have an agenda, you know what I'm saying, they have an agenda that they want to get to, and the philosophy is for the sake of the agenda, so it's not like, let's try to understand truth and reality, and if they've got an end that they want to, and you see that, a number of them, it's like they're after something else, so excuse them. You can see that, you know, Karl Marx there, you can see the preface to his doctoral thesis, right, you can see the will that are involved, right, and you can see that in Sartre, it's so clearly in Sartre. He says, we're not atheists in the sense that we would exhaust ourselves trying to prove that God doesn't exist, right? We see it doesn't make any matter, it doesn't matter at all to us what he does or does not. Wow. You'll find out whether it matters. Nobody's not going to pay any attention to him, you know, whoever he is. I mean, I can see that, you know, it may be in some kind of doubt about whether God exists, you know, but it makes no difference when he does or doesn't exist. It's kind of stupid. Yeah, it is, it is, yeah, yeah. But you can see the will there, you know, the will. Somebody I knew was talking about somebody she knew who was supposed to be some brilliant intellect and he had passed away and he was quite vehemently atheistic and she said, you know, he didn't believe in God. And I said, well, now he does. And she didn't think that was very funny. What was it, this, this, you heard that testimony there, Cecil Rich is there, you know, she's on this program, she's the head of the Planned Parenthood or something, Federation, and, you know, they asked her, the guy asked her, you know, when do you think life begins? Well, that question's around me, she says, you know. You're all right. You know, to the bank here, I mean, you know. She says, get there by 5.30, she says. ...very single as well. Then he kind of struck me once that John XXIII was very attached to the invitation of Christ. And I didn't know that you knew that, but I didn't know it. And he called it the golden book. So he was learning from the invitation of Christ, right? And I remember in the life of St. Teresa de Sue, right? She was very much attached to the... Emory. Yeah, yeah. Now, you stand back, right? That's what it possibly does. When Aristotle was in the book of Poetic Art, he was going to talk about the invitation called tragedy and the invitation, called comedy and the invitation, called epic. That's all right. He stands back and he makes three, at least three very famous statements about man and imitation. And you know what those three statements are? I'm going to guess one of them. Man is the most imitative of animals? Yeah. Man is the most imitative of all the animals, right? And the second statement he makes is that this... Delights of the better, right? Man is delighted about imitation, right? That's why we all watch movies and fictions and novels and so on. And then, third, at first we learn about imitation. So you have to admire that great teacher of Aristotle, Plato, right? Because Plato's Dialogues are what? Imitations of people involved in philosophical conversations. And it's kind of an introduction to what? Philosophy, right? And they said that in the Asian world there, before you were admitted to the academy, you would read the dialogues outside the academy under the direction of a student, right? Already in the academy. And then after you kind of got all these questions you want the answers for, and you've been thinking about these things, and now you're ready to come in to be what? The academy, right? Aristotle himself wrote a number of dialogues. I don't think they've been lost, right? But he probably didn't write him in his course. Plato did, because they haven't done such a good job. I know when I first came to Assumption, they required four courses in philosophy of all students. And they were arranged in the perfect order. The first course would be a logic course, and the second course would be a, what, natural philosophy course, and physics. Third course on the soul, right? The agama. And the fourth course was the ethics course, right? So you had a nice foundation there, where advanced course was built upon you, right? But then when the Great Revolution happens, and times have caused a crush, you know, and so on, and the requirements were cut down, right? And people said, we've got an introduction to philosophy course, right? And because a guy might happen to take his first course on the logic course, and somebody else might take an ethics course, it's all, hmm, chaos. And of course, I had to introduce them to philosophy, right? But what I made the introduction to philosophy course B was mainly the dialogues of what? The Theda, right? Because you can introduce them to, you know, logic through the mean O, and a little bit of natural philosophy through the Theda, and so on, and the apology to ethics, and so on. And so that's the way to go, right? So I was kind of struck by the fact that he was saying that more than once, I don't know if you've talked about John XXIII, is love of the world, the imitation of Christ, right? You know, since that's the way to begin, and if I didn't say it to be sensitive, probably others that don't know about it, but... Thank you, sir. Yeah. But he called it the golden book, John XXIII, you know? That's kind of striking, huh? Yeah, the golden book. That's kind of interesting. Now, I'll think again about something more in the course here. The connection of what? Virtues, right? And if you put it in the form of a question, right? Can you have the love of God without humility? I don't think you can. And something like this with the philosopher, too, because the legend says that Pythagoras discovered wonderful things like the Pythagorean theorem, etc., and they wanted to call him what? Wise, right, huh? And Pythagoras says, don't call me wise. God alone is wise, huh? Well, what shall we call you then, huh? Well, if you have to call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right? So in the origin of the word philosopher, there's not only the meaning of the love of wisdom, which is in the etymology of the word philosopher, Sophia means wisdom, right? And philosophy means love, right? Sophia? But also humility, right? And that maybe you can't be a philosopher without what? Humility, right? Just like you can't be a what? You can't love God without what? Humility. There's a kind of connection between the two, right? Because wisdom, after all, is most of all God, right? Sophia, you have a love of wisdom in the way you're loving God, but you can't have that love of wisdom without having the, what? Humility. And then you know what's wrong with modern philosophy, right? There's no humility at all there. There's no love of wisdom in the way you're loving God, right? You know, it's striking how Socrates is always, what, hesitant to say, what? I know something, right, huh? And so it's always very interesting to come and when Socrates says he's sure about something, right? Why is he so sure about this, right? See? Maybe he really is sure. You can see it when you go into him, huh? And I think Augustine had that, didn't he have a phrase in the City of God where he says the love of God, usque contemptum sui, builds the, what, city of God? The love of God going so far as to have to tempt one's self, right? And then you're on with the love of self, usque contemptum sui, right? It's what, builds the city of man, huh? You know, the thing you got in your card there, from what, Therese, right? That was in a somewhat poetic way, but she's saying the connection between humility, isn't she, right? And charity, right? So you can't have that, huh? But it's interesting, huh? Of course, I woke up this morning, you know, I think my card angel was helping me, you know, and what came into my mind? What is Mozart's music? Leptation. And I said, well, it's a, what, beautiful and interesting likeness, huh, of the emotions, right? Partaking, more or less, of reason. In sounds, right? Then you can add harmony and rhythm and so on, right? And I say more or less, you know, because some emotions, I take a reason more than others, right? And sometimes, you know, like in the B minor, you know, solo, piano piece there, you know, it's kind of, he's suffering, you know, depressed or something like that. At the end, he gradually turns it, you know, at the end, you know, you're not going to stay in this, this thing. We have a letter of Mozart, you know, writing to his, what, father, right, huh, about the representation of Osman's aria there in the production for the Seraglio. And Osman gets very angry and loses his self-control, you might say, right? And so Mozart says, we've got to imitate this music, right? But not in a way that becomes, what? Displays into the air. Yeah. Or in other words, ceases to be, what? Music, right, huh? Okay. When Thomas talks about anger, he says that the angry man hears reason, but imperfectly. So that's why I say more or less, right, huh? Because sometimes, you know, Mozart represents somewhat an emotion that is, needs some correction, right? But it does it in the right way, huh? So that's what Mozart's music is, right? It's a likeness, huh? It's a interesting, it's a, what, beautiful and interesting, huh? A likeness of the emotions, huh? Partaking more or less of reason, right? So it's very interesting just to listen to this music. And of course, the emotions can't be beautiful, they don't partake of reason. They're ugly, right? You know, Thomas says that the irascible partakes more reason than the concubisable appetite. I was thinking about that. Is that because of the difficulty, or? Well, because it's, this is for the sake of that, you know, it can always be reason more, right? The concubisable is something just pleasing to the senses to go right towards it, right? See, but even the angry man is, I'm going to leave with you because you did this, you know? I'm going to punish you because of this, right? So he's kind of giving a reason for it. this, right? Or you have a reason to fear something or a reason to hope for something, right? Okay. Then you see, you know, the pieces of Mozart's music where you see very much partaking of reason, like the last symphonies, right? Where the 36th and the 41st are both in the key of C major and they both represent magnanimity, which is the virtue that does great things in all the virtues. And magnanimity is basically a concern with what? The hope, let's move into great cleanliness. And then you have the 40th symphonies and the 38th symphonies, which imitate what? Courage, which is also what? Dealing with the irascible emotions. So that's why I say more or less. Because even if you're imitating, right? The irascible and the concubiscible, and both, you know, partaking of reason, the irascible even more so, right? So you see that the height of Mozart reaches there. They call the last symphony the Jupiter symphony, right? The English critics, you know, so we're going to call it a symphony. Well, it's the Jupiter symphony, right? Even greater things are waiting for us, you know, in question 71 here. And I don't think you can possibly get beyond the first and second articles, right? It's absolutely amazing the things he says in there, right? Okay. So let's look at the Ephraim again. Consequently, we're not to consider about vices and sins, huh? There's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? So you have to talk only about the love of God, but the hate of God, right? And about this, six things occur to be considered. First, about the vices and the sins in themselves. Secondly, about the what? Distinction of them. Third, about the comparison of them to each other, at which are worse. This is the beginning of question 71. Fourth, about the subject of sin. Fifth, about its cause. And sixth, about its what? Effect. Now, I'd say he's looking before and after, wouldn't you say that? Now, about the first, six things are asked. First, whether vice is contrary to virtue. That's a nice fundamental way to begin, huh? And secondly, whether vice is what? Against nature. Third, which is worse, huh? Vice or the vicious act. Four, whether a vicious act can be without, can be with, at the same time, with virtue, right? Five, whether in every sin there is some act, huh? Or just some sinable mission, which is? Hmm, there is sin-like contract. Yeah. And six, about the definition of sin, which Augustine lays down in the 22nd book against Faust. And who is Faust? With a kid? Yeah. And, you know, the time, I think Faust is the guy who, you know, Augustine was waiting to hear, you know. And Faust was talking very highly about great things, you know. And Augustine wasn't able to, what, to judge whether he was saying true or false things. And, but then he found out that he didn't know the, what, liberal arts, right? So how could he be up knowing all these most difficult things, you know? Sometimes there's a little bit of pride maybe in Faust, right? Thomas says that pride is a, what, cause of error in two ways, huh? What are the two ways that pride is a cause of error? Opposed to philosophy, obviously, right? Philosophy is the order of truth. Do you attribute things to yourself? Well, if I'm proud, I think I'm better than I am, right? And therefore I, what, attempt to judge things that are above the power, at least now, or in this short thing, right? Someone asked me a question, I was talking out there in California, the exam, in the discussion period afterwards kind of question, and I said, I think, I want you to knock my mouth on that right? I think I'll think about it. But the point is, if you think you're better than you are, right, then you think you're capable of, what, more than you're capable of, right? And therefore you try to judge something that is either above your powers to judge or it's above your powers to judge now, right? There's the story there of Father Boulay, you know, if you wanted to get a good teacher. And someone told him, well, there's so-and-so professor down at the University of Montreal, it's darn good, right? So I went down there, and every question you asked the guy, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, answering every question, all like that. I said, I'm not going to take this guy as a teacher. You know, I have to be, you're about to see Dion, right? He has to go see Dion's question. Hesitate and, you know, very careful, you know. I think this man is my teacher, right? But then the other way that pride is a cause of error is that you refuse to put your mind under the greater minds, right? I remember when I was first studying Aristotle and Thomas, and someone says to me, well, I'm going to do my own philosophy, right? Well, you're not going to get very far, right? How far did you get in geometry without Euclid, then? How long would it take you to discover, you know, a reason for the Pythagorean theorem, you know, Proposition 47, there in Book 1, on your own, right? I might never get there, right? I might not get to the first part, right? Yeah, and this is supposed to be the easiest science, right? What are the more difficult ones, then? What did we see last night? What, Thomas, in the ten categories? Yeah, but it's the only place I've ever seen anybody explaining the distinction of the ten, right? Maybe somebody else has it, right? Even Aristotle doesn't, you know, explain it in the categories. I'm sure you knew it, but, okay. I was writing my doctoral thesis, I always told that story. I'd go ask Econic, you know, when he thought about the thing, and I was writing about Deion, right? He kind of says, why are you going to bother to ask me when you've got Deion? Hey, hey, hey, hey, hey. I said, I don't want to hear what you say anyway. Okay, he says. But that kind of humility, right, you know? The great Deion. Okay, six is about the definition of sin, which Augusta lays down, and Kant of Fausto. Sin is something said, or done, or even what? Desired against the eternal law, right? That's a mouthful of definition, right? Let's look at the first one here. To the first, one goes forward thus. It seems that vice is not, what? Contrary to virtue. For to one, there is one contrary, as is proved in the tenth book of Wisdom, the Metaphysics. Now, what dialogue of Plato is that brought up that is one opposite of, what? One contrary to the thing. Yeah, yeah. Of course, Protagius is asked by Socrates, are prudence, and justice, and fortitude, and temperance, and so on, are these five names the same thing, or are they names different things, like ear, and nose, and so on? And Protagius says, well, it's like ear, and eye, and nose, and so on. Well, then Socrates starts to develop an argument that temperance is really the same thing as, what? Wisdom, right? Okay? And of course, he induces, by induction, right? Induces the statement that a thing is only one, what? Contrary. And what's the contrary of wisdom? It's foolishness, huh? Folly, right, huh? And what's the contrary of temperance, huh? Well, everybody knows a drunk acts like a fool, right, huh? In Shakespeare, you know, you had the word find, huh? You speak of a guy being find of a girl. right? But the original meaning of fond is foolish. And it has uses in Shakespeare's plays there where it has nothing to do with guy and a girl, right? In foolish, that's fond, that's stupid what you're saying, right? So to say you're fond of a girl means you're acting what? Foolish about it. That's quite true, huh? So folly seems to be the opposite of temperance, right? The drunkard acts like a fool, right? So if folly or foolishness is the opposite of temperance as well as what? Wisdom, then wisdom and temperance must be the same thing. Well that's not true, but there's a certain what? Connection between temperance and what? Wisdom. In fact, humility is put under what? Temperance. Temperance there in the secundae, right? Because it has the mode of temperance, huh? Restraining this desire for excellence, right? So he begins with that thing which Aristotle takes up formally in the tenth book of wisdom. But to virtue is contrary, what? Sin and what? Malice, right? Therefore they can't be contrary to vice, right? Because vice seems also to be a, what? Unsuitable disposition members of members of the body, or of anything whatsoever, right? So I used to say that a dull knife is a vicious knife, huh? But not in a moral sense. Moreover, virtue names a certain perfection of what? Power, huh? After some of the angels are named in Latin powers and some are named virtues, huh? But vice names nothing pertaining to what? Power, right? Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. Moreover, Tullius, and that's another name for what? Cicero. Cicero, right? Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. Cicero. 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It follows that virtue is a certain, what? Goodness, huh? But not the only kind of goodness, right? For in this, the good of each thing consists, that it have itself suitably, according to the mode of its own, what? Nature, right? But that to which virtue is ordered is a good act, as is cleared from things said above, from before. So three times he uses the word nature there. It's very striking, huh? I'm going back to the poetics there. I'm getting very careful when Aristotle uses the word imitation there, right? Because that happens with many words. This word is heavy degradation due to our commercial customs. So an imitation is a, what, cheap copy of something that's been successful on the market, right? So the word imitation has kind of come down in his sweat. Really? Yeah, yeah, the word, yeah. So I usually call it, you know, a, what, a likeness, right, rather than imitation, right? When Aristotle talks about imitation, he has a nice distinction of three, right? He says you can represent men as they are, or represent men as they are thought to be, or represent men as they ought to be. So there's a real, what, variety there, right? Okay. Now, why did I mention that, huh? In this context here. Well, we talked earlier about Plato's Dialogs, right? Which are a representation of men engaged in somewhat philosophical conversation, right? But in, what, this Greek society, right? Well, in the Greek society, homosexuality was, what? Accepted. Yeah, accepted, depends, right? And so people say, well, you know, they're all homosexuals, well, it's not true about Plato, right? But he's representing men as they are in Greek society at that time, right, huh? It's not saying he's representing men as they should be, okay? Now, how do we know that? Because Plato's, one of his last works is the work called The Laws, right, huh? And in there, there's a man called The Athenian Stranger. And he meets another man, and they go talking about what the law should be, right? And The Athenian Stranger proposes a law in the city against homosexuality, right? But the reason he gives is that it's contra fucina, it's against what? Nature, right, huh? Okay? So Plato sees the same thing that Aristotle sees, right? Advice is against nature, huh? And so it's very important that he emphasized the word nature in it three times, right? And then he's going to talk about this particularly, you know, in the second article, which is whether vice is, what, against nature, right? So according to these three things, something is found to be opposed to virtue, right? Either what virtue is directly, right, opposed to it, or what is consequently pertaining to virtue, or that act which virtue is ordered, right? And there are three things opposed to it. Of which one is sin, which is opposed to virtue on the side of that to which virtue is what? Ordered, right? For sin properly names a disordered act, just as the act of virtue is an act that is ordered, right? And as it ought to be, right? According that to the erotio of virtue there follows there be a certain, what, goodness, right? Then evil or malice is opposed to virtue, right? That's kind of a more general thing, right? But according to that which is directly of the definition of virtue, vice is opposed to what? Virtue, right, huh? For the vice of each thing would seem to be that it is not disposed according as is suitable to its nature. That's the fourth time he mentions the word nature, right? And then he quotes the great Augustine again, right? Once Augustine says in the third book on free will, free judgment there, that what? But what if you see something that is, what, lacking to the affectionate nature, I call that vice. That's five times I see nature as nature, huh? You've got nature in the brain, no question about it, huh? Now, if you go to the poet, right, huh? Now what is the most famous publication in the history of English literature, huh? You know, it's a folio, right? First folio, was it 16, 23, something like that, after Shakespeare died, right? Well, some of his plays are never appeared in print, you know, during his lifetime, right? We're all brought together, right? Well, they thought he'd written, right? And the editors who were fellow actors with him in the company and so on, they said he was the most gentle imitator of nature. And it's in Hamlet that you see Shakespeare's view of what literature should be, huh? Or the plays should be, right, huh? And as Kittred says, huh, in his edition of Hamlet, this is always taken to be Shakespeare's own view of what... So what does he say? Or stip not the modesty of nature, right? He says to the players, right, who have come to put on some plays, right, at the court, right? Or stip not the modesty of nature, for things overdone is from the purpose of playing, was in both in the beginning and now is to hold his work, the mirror up to nature. And then he says to show virtue of her own face and score in her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. Now that is perfectly, what, ordinate, right? He's saying you're going to hold the mirror up to nature first, right? Secondly, show virtue of her own face. And rather than saying vice of her own face, which would make it sound too philosophical and too pedantic, right, huh? He says scorn, which is the, what? Result of pride. And pride is the, what? Queen of the vices, right? So he says scorn, right? So it's virtue of vice, but it's said beautifully, huh? It's a figure of speech there, right? For vice. I mean for pride. And for vice, right? And then he says in the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. So nature is the measure of what is virtue and what is vice, huh? Because virtue is in accordance with nature. You're being disposed in a way suitable to your nature as a man, right? And vice, in a way that's not suitable to your nature, you're being disposed. So nature is the measure of virtue and vice, huh? So when the Indian stranger rejects homosexuality, it's because it's against nature, right? That's the measure, huh? Okay. But then, virtue and vice are the measure of the, what, the age, huh? By the virtues or vices that predominate in that, what, age, right? I think my age is getting worse, myself. It's worse now than it was in the fifties, I think, huh? You know? The corruption is sinking in deeper. But it's perfectly ordered there, right? Okay. In a different way, you know. I mean, when Jefferson orders, what, life, liberty, and just good and happiness, right? He orders them in what sense there? Yeah, but the order of really a being, right? Being, yeah. You have to have life before you can have liberty before you can be so happy. So he's got them well ordered there, right? And so we say, you know, when you attack, you know, life, you know, really undermining everything, right? But Shakespeare's got this, in the sense of what you can measure, right? So it's perfectly, what, ordered, right? But what, fire alarms, huh? What does he say? Stumbling on abuse, I know the passage, right? Yeah. For not so vile that on the earth dot live, but to the earth some special good dot give. For not so good, but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, which is the original meaning of Nietzsche, right? Stumbling on abuse, right? I listen to Bobby and I say, he revolts from true birth, stumbling out of use. But, you know, Planned Parenthood, revolts from true birth, stumbling out of use. But they see these great minds, like Shakespeare and Augustinevere and Thomas and Aristotle. Those four guys, you know. Shakespeare is wiser than any of the modern philosophers. No question about that. So, notice how he's ordered the objections, right? The first objection, you know, demanded that he distinguish the way different things would be opposed to virtue, right? The most direct advice, and that's what he's emphasizing. To the first, it should be said that those three things are not contrary to virtue according to the same thing. But sin is contrary according as virtue is, what? Operative of something good, right? Malice according as it is a certain, what? Goodness. But properly, vice is, what? According, opposed to according to the virtue. Okay? The second should be said, huh? That virtue is not only implying the perfection of power, which is a principle of acting, but also implies a suitable, what? Disposition to one of whom it is a virtue. And that because each thing acts according as it is an act. It is required, therefore, that something be, in itself, well disposed, huh? And that it ought to be, what? Operative of the good. And according to this, virtue or vice is, what? Opposed to virtue, huh? And Aristotle takes up the category of what quality and logic there. He distinguishes four species, right? And the first one is disposition, right? Or habit. And the second one is, what? Power, right? Natural power, I mean, lack of power. The third one is these sensible qualities. And the fourth one is, what? Figure and shape, right? And Thomas says, why does he give first, what? Disposition, right? Or habit. Well, he says, what comes first to the thing is its nature. And by disposition or habit, you're either well or badly disposed to the category of nature. So he puts that first there. It's not. It's pretty subtle, right, huh? But amazing, amazing. Okay. To the third, it should be said that Tulli says in the fourth book of the Tuscan and Touchings, that what? Sicknesses, right? Parts. Yeah. Parts of viciousness, right? And in bodies, morbum, in Latin, names the, what? Crutch of the whole body, right, huh? It's like a fever or something of this sort. Egotaxionem. A, what? Sickness. Weakness, huh? Fice when parts of the body are in conflict, right? And although in the body sometimes there is, what? Morbus, without egotaxione. When someone is, what? Inwardly, badly disposed. Nevertheless, he is not, what? He's not impeded. I don't know what a great thing is. From his customer operations, right? In the soul order, as he himself says, these two are not able to be, what? Distinguished by thought, huh? It's necessary that whenever someone is inwardly, badly disposed, he has a disordered, what? Affection. Because from this, right, huh? He's rendered, what? Weak. Weak for the operations he ought to exercise, huh? For each tree is known from its own, what? Fruit. Fruit. I was thinking about that statement when I was saying the Hail Mary the other day. Holy Mary, Mother. Hail Mary, full of grace. Blessed. Blessed is the fruit. Yeah. I said, well, you couldn't have a greater fruit than that, right? What's it say about the Blessed Virgin, right? On the journey home there, the program, you know, when they have, you know, it's always some of the Protestant ministers coming into the Catholic Church, you know, and it comes up a lot of times. You know, was the Blessed Virgin an impediment for you, you know, and some of them, it was, they've been all hesitant, you know, about that and so on. But if you take this thing, each tree is known from its fruit, right? Well, then, say who is. This is the greatest fruit, huh? But the vice of the soul, as Tully says there, is a habit, right? Perfection of the soul, inconstant in its whole life, and what? What does Tully say to his son there, this above all, to thine own self be true, it must follow the night, the day, thou canst not then be false to any man, right? So you've got to be true to yourself, huh? Otherwise you're really in conflict with yourself, huh? Whence vice is in more than a grittatio moribus, just as virtue is in itself more than health. For health is also played down to the second virtue, I suppose, of the body, though, right? And therefore to virtue more soon will be supposed vice than sickness, huh? But you didn't speak of that, you know, huh? I constantly see these crazy things being proposed every day in the newspaper, you know, or hearing about somebody proposed a crazy thing, and, uh, see, these people are really sick, you know, I just hear a first, most known reaction, but, you know, don't think of it, this is, this vice, of course, obviously, but I mean, you know, I usually think of, you know, they're sick, they're crazy, these people. Yeah, the only word that comes to my mind is just insanity. Yeah. Insane. What was it, I heard, there's a little item there in the National View there where they were, ended up, you know, describing all these crazy things going on, and, uh, they quoted the Mad Hatter, right? 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