Prima Secundae
Lecture 183: Wisdom, Philosophy, and the Divisions of Knowledge

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natural philosophy is not wisdom simply, but wisdom about natural things, right? The wisdom of nature, as Shakespeare calls it, right? So it's not wisdom simply, but qualified the wisdom of nature, right? And geometry, right? It's wisdom about continuous quantity, right? Medicae is wisdom about numbers, right? But if you compare first philosophy with God's wisdom, right? And God's wisdom is what? Wisdom simply, and first philosophy is wisdom, second and third, right? Our wisdom, right? Yeah. So I mean, you have to be able to see that distinction, right? It's kind of interesting. You might say in one way you'd call first philosophy wisdom simply, but if you understand the origin of the word philosophy, some people think the word philosophy means a love of wisdom. I don't think it does, huh? It's not in that sense that Aristotle uses the word philosophy. He uses the word philosophy for some kind of knowledge, right? A reason of knowledge, huh? But it's the kind of knowledge that a philosopher or a lover of wisdom would pursue, right? So the knowledge that has most of the character of wisdom would have most of all right to name philosophy if that's the name of the knowledge that a lover of wisdom pursues, huh? So Aristotle would sometimes call first philosophy, philosophy period, right? Yeah. Philosophy of what? Period. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But he won't call it an actual philosophy left, you know? Simply so, right? And philosophy in some sense is, you know, a less ambiguous word than wisdom in one sense, right? Because Aristotle's very clear that either God alone should be said to be wise. Only God is wise in the full sense, right? And man's only wise in some imperfect, very limited, qualified sense, right? But philosophy seems to, you know, if you look at the origin of the word, right, it's for man who already admits that he's not wise in the full sense, right? But that he has a certain, what, love of this thing, right? And this leads him to pursue a kind of knowledge, right? So I always say, you know, if Aristotle had access to the word of God, we'd have to agree that this is more wisdom, you know, theology than first philosophy, right? But it'd be because he knows that God is most wise, right? God alone is fully wise. He's always, Thomas is always quoting Aristotle's critique of Empedocles, right? Because Empedocles' theory about knowledge makes it include that we know something God doesn't know. So that's absurd. So it's really wrong with this theory that Pedicace has, right? Pedicace says, you know, by earth we know earth, and by water we know water, and by air we know air, and by fire we know fire, and by love we know love, and by hate we know hate. Because we have these six things inside of us, we know them, right? But then he speaks of God as having no hate in him. Which is very profound, right? And he says, well, then God doesn't know hate, right? So therefore we know something hate that God doesn't know. So that's, that's, yeah, he says it both in the Bible and he says in the metaphysics, right? You know, and it's very, very clear, you know, the Crucism. So, you have to admire Pedicace is how we saw something there, right? If there's hate in God, then hate is what separates things, you know? God would not be immortal, right? He would not be indestructible. Now in both of these divisions of being, you know, the two main divisions of being, into substance and accident, right? And being into act and ability, in both of these, one is said to be being, what? Simply, and the other to be being, what? So they couldn't have quit, right? So when I walked into this room, did I come to be? Some way. Yeah, you have to qualify, right? I came to be in this room. I didn't come to be when I walked in this room, did I? See? I came to be in the year 1935. Just met many in my mother's womb, you know? Popped out on January 18th. 1936, right? Made your debut. Yeah. Somewhere in 1935, I came to be. Simply. See? You come to my house for class, you don't come to be here. And the same with act and ability, right? If you're able to know something, you say that you know it. A lot of people do. Now if you're able to know something, you know it and ability, you've got to qualify it, right? You know? It's only if you know it actually that you would be said to know it simply without qualifying it, right? Without diminishing something, right? It's interesting how human names, you know, some of the names, you know, mean a little somebody, right? You know? Rose of the, my wife's name, it means little Rose, right? You know? But you kind of add in something, you know, kind of a diminutive, right? So that shows how important that distinction is, right? To understand ability and act, right? Or to understand substance and acts and that kind of thing. Okay? When I was doing geometry, did I come to be? No, I came to be a geometer. Okay? In 1935, I came to be. Without qualification. Uh-uh. When I leave here where you cease to be, I mean, if I said that was on the leave here, you'll cease to be. Yeah. Well, simply, I would hesitate twice to leave this room, you know? It's easy to be in this room. I can put up with that. You've done it before, huh? So that's a very important distinction, right? The ability to see a distinction is the definition of reason, isn't it? Mm-hmm. And the ability to see before and after is included. The ability to see a distinction, just like in the ability for large discourse is included in the ability for small discourse. So Thomas, he's got to find, you know, he's got a good reason there. To second, it should be said that a habit is not simplicitari pluris actus, it's not simply many acts, but in some way, that is in virtue or in potency, huh? Whence from this one is not able to conclude that a habit is simply more potent in goodness or badness than the what? Now, to the third it should be said, right? See, the cause is more potent than the effect, right? Mm-hmm. Ah. But now, how would you solve that there? Does this man objector know that there are many kinds of causes? To the third it should be said that a habit is a cause of the act in the genus of what? Efficient cause. Efficient cause, the third kind of cause, huh? The mover or the maker. But act is a cause of the habit in the genus of what? Final cause. According to which is considered the definition of good and what? Bad. So when Aristotle takes up that fourth kind of cause, he says that end and good are what? Basically the same thing, right? And therefore, in goodness and badness, act is preeminent to what? Habit. What am I? What have you done without Aristotle? What have you done without Aristotle? What have you done without Aristotle? You have great respect for Aristotle, huh? Or I guess, huh? Mm-hmm. Whether sin can be together with friction, huh? To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that a vicious act or a sin can not be done. be together with what? Virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same thing. But sin is in some way contrary to virtue, as he said. Therefore sin cannot be together with virtue. Okay, but maybe there's something about the different ways of being opposed, right? Moreover, sin is worse than what? Advice. That is a bad act than a bad habit, as has been said in the previous article. But vice cannot be together in the same with what? Virtue. Therefore, neither sin, because that's even worse. Oh, how clever these guys are. You must enjoy thinking these things up, huh? It's either way to say a really thing. How can I stump him tomorrow? Moreover, just as sin happens in what? Voluntary things, so also in natural things, right? The word peccatum there, you know, translated in English there, by sin, right? But it's got a part of sense in Latin. Ahamartia, in Greek, I guess. They use it for nature, right? So if a baby is missing a leg, that's ahamartia i peccatum naturi, right? It's sin of nature, right? So it says just as peccatum happens in voluntary things, so in what? Natural things, right? Of course, the word sin is just strictly. As it says in the second book of the physics. But never in natural things does there happen any sin, except through some corruption of the natural power. Just as a monster, and a monster originally were what? Something. Yeah, you're missing an arm. It's a monster, right? It doesn't mean monster in the modern sense of the word there. In the Hollywood movies, right? Okay. The monsters happen, some beginning being corrupted in the, what? Sea, as it's said in the second book of the what? Physics, right? Therefore also in voluntary things there does not happen sin, except in some, what? Virtue the soul is corrupted. And thus, the kadim and virtus cannot be in the same. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics. That to contraries, virtue is what? Generated and corrupted. But one virtuous act is not called virtue, as has been said before. Therefore, nor does one act of sin take away, what? Virtue. Able, therefore, to be in the same, right? So the man who has a virtue, if he performs a bad act, then he probably repents of it, right? Okay. We continue to do this, though. The answer should be said, huh? That ekakum, sin is compared to virtue as a bad act to a good, what? Habit, right? Now, in a different way is habit in the soul and a form in a, what? Natural thing, huh? For a natural form of necessity produces an operation suitable to it, huh? The example of the fire burning, right, huh? It's going to burn quickly there, right? Actually. Whence there cannot be, together with the natural form, the act of a contrary form. Just as there cannot be with heat, the act of, what? Cooling, huh? Nor, together with lightness, the motion of what? I mean, excuse me, it should be lightness, yeah. Motion of descent, right, huh? Except perhaps in the violence of an exterior, what? Hoover. But a habit in the soul is not produced of necessity, does not produce by necessity its own operation. Because a man uses the habit when he, what? Wishes, huh? And that's a quote from Verwes. So the will is able to, is free, right? It can choose to do something or not do it, right? Or to do it in this way or to do it in, what? That way, huh? So if I go out to the, what? Restaurant, I could order, what? Salmon, right? Or not order it. If you want to. I could order it, right? It's possible. I could order steak, or chicken, you know. So. Whence the habit at the same time existing in the man, right, huh? He's able to not use the habit or to act, what? Contrary. Contrary, right? And thus is able that one having the virtue could see to the act of, what? Sin. Sin, huh? So notice how a weak man is, that he requires, what? God's help, right? Even when he has virtue, huh? Then you can still, what? Sin, huh? The virtue doesn't make you immune from sin, right? Now the act of sin, if it be compared to the virtue insofar as there is a certain, what? Habit. It's not able to, what? Corrupt it if it be one, what? Only. And that shows something about it not being fully opposed to it, right? In the full sense, right? You can't have the vice at the same time you have the virtue, can you? You can't be a tempered man and tempered man at the same time. You can't be a brave man and a coward at the same time, right? See? But the act is not opposed in that way, is it? For just as a habit is not generated through one act, so neither is it corrupted by one act, huh? So, the one way of understanding the term moral virtue is to say is from moss, right? Which means custom, right, huh? Oh, yes. But if the, what? Act of sin is, what? Compared to the cause of virtues, right, huh? Then it is possible that through one act of sin, some virtues are, what? Yeah. For any mortal sin is contrary to what? Charity. Charity. In this sense you can say that in one respect then, charity is less stable than what? Temperance, because it can be lost by one act, right? Temperance or courage not lost by one act, right? For any mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of what? All the infused virtues, insofar as they are virtues, right? And therefore through one act of mortal sin, right? Charity being excluded, right? There are excluded, consequently, all the virtues that are, what? Infused. Infused, huh? As far as this, that they are, what? Virtues, huh? Virtues, huh? I say this on account of, what? Faith and hope, whose habits remain unformed, right? After mortal sin, right? After mortal sin, and thus they are not, what? Virtues, huh? Virtues, huh? But venial sin, that is not contrary to charity, nor excludes it, right, huh? By consequence, also does not exclude the other, what? Virtues, huh? But the acquired virtues are not taken away through one act of, what? Yeah. So in some sense they are more stable, therefore you need those, right? Some people say, what do we need these virtues? Aristotle talks about, we've got all these infused virtues, charity and so on, right, huh? But that introduces kind of a, what? Instability in our life, huh? Because charity and silly virtues can be, as virtues anyway, lost, right? By one act. Isn't that the acquired virtues? Thus, therefore, mortal sin cannot be together with the infused virtues, huh? But it can be together with the, what? Yeah. So he's distinguishing this, very important. But a venial sin can be together, what? Both with the infused virtues and with the acquired. So he sees all the distinctions here, right, and necessary, right? Moral sin cannot be with the infused virtues, but it can be with the, okay? But the venial sin can be with both, right? Okay. Right. Now to the first, you know, it goes back to the distinction, right? There's not a contrary in the full sense there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that sin is not contrary to virtue secundum se, but according to its, what? Act. And therefore sin is not able to be together with the act of virtue. You can't have the same act being courageous and cowardly, right? But the early days of the American army there, you know, and Washington almost lost his cool, you know. How am I supposed to win with this kind of an army, you know? Because they were running away when the British were coming, right? I said, well, you know, these guys had no experience. They could battle over, facing up to the West Point three, you know, in the football games, and they'll cheer on the team saying, Fixed Panets, you know? Fixed Panets. Fixed Panets. Yeah, that was, you know, when they fixed the areas. That's what they did in Normandy, right after they landed. And they were, there was a bunch of German gunners, and they had the Americans tied down. There was like a, there was a pathway along the beach or something, and they were stuck down below it, and being stuck down, you're a target. Yeah. So they couldn't figure out what to do, and their commanding officer, brilliant maneuver, he just said. Fixed Bayonets. Boo! And they just charged right at the end, and the Germans just froze. These guys got to be crazy. And they took them out. Took out the Germans. And all the, when the commanding officer said, Fixed Bayonets, they all went, what? I've never seen that one before. Yeah. Not one year. They had machine guns up there. Because especially in the 18th century, this is, you know, the guns are not too accurate, isn't it? Yeah. And so Fixed Bayonets is sometimes the way to do it. Yeah, the only way to do it. Yeah. That's a good story. Yeah. Okay. To the second one, huh? Although the vicious act is worse, right? Nevertheless, it should be said to the second that vice is directly contrary to virtue, right? Just as sin to a, what? Virtuous act. Yeah. And therefore, vice excludes what? Virtue. Just as sin excludes what? Act of virtue. Virtue, yeah. See what he's saying there? Right. And vice is to virtue as the vicious act is to the virtue. Virtue. And they exclude each other. But vice is not, the vicious act is not to the virtue. In the same way. Now, the third objection was taken from sin and nature. To the third, it should be said that the natural virtues act of, what? Necessity. And therefore, the virtue existing, oh, right? Perfect. Never is sin found in the act. But the virtues of the soul do not produce acts of, what? Necessity, right? Hence is not a, what? Similar reason. It's not sufficient to have the virtue, but you've got to use the virtue, too. That's what God said to St. Catherine of Siena. He said, what good is it for me to show you the steps across the bridge? Unless you take your feet and walk. Yeah. Do it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Perfect. In the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Cardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our enlightenment. Cardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you have written. Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're up to, I guess, Question 71, Article 5, I think, is where I left off. I went down to the grandchildren, and I said, I've got to still continue to do some reading, you know. But I can't read the Super Cali Gentiles on down there, right? So I said, I'm going to read the Compendium of Theology, right? I don't know if you had a chance to read the Compendium of Theology, by Thomas. I'm not covering children. No, the monk that stayed with Thomas, right? Kind of, you know, kind of his secretary, you might say. Asked Thomas, you know, to give him a kind of shorter explanation of theology and so on that he could carry with him, you know, on a daily basis and so on. So Thomas wrote this thing called the Compendium of Theology. He didn't complete the whole work, but the, but again, he follows the rule of two and three, right? And, of course, he divides the sacred doctrine there in the same way he does in his catechetical instructions, in the same way Dustin does in the Ingridian, on the Faith, Book, and Charity, which he wrote for this layman, right? He wants some orderly presentation of the faith and so on. And they divide according to what? Faith, hope, and what? Charity, right? So the first part corresponds to faith, the articles of faith. The second part is the one where they talk about prayer, which is tied up with hope, and that's expounding basically the Our Father, maybe the Elmery too, but basically the Our Father. And then the third part is on charity and the commandments, which we do the two commandments of love and the Ten Commandments. But Thomas finished the first part, and then he was doing the part on the Our Father, right? That's about as far as it goes, right? So if you're going to get the rest of the Our Father, you've got to go to the catechetical instructions. Well, that basically talks about the Our Father too, of course. And, of course, I think about this division, which is very good that Guston has, and Thomas chose it again. He's going to expound it more than he does in the catechetical instructions, right, for his friend, but I'm interested in the things he says in here, you know? But guess how he divides the part on faith, huh? He divided it into three or two. How does he divide it in that? He's going to fall to creed, but what he does is to recall, first of all, the definition of faith, huh? I guess it's in Hebrews, huh? It's the substance of things hoped for, right? The conviction of what's not seen, right? And then he says, what's hoped for is the, what, the scientific vision, right? And then he uses the text from St. John in the Gospel where Christ prays, you know, the eternal life is to see you and the one whom you have sent, right? So he divides it into two parts, right? One about the divinity of Christ, which, of course, is shared by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit too, and then on the humanity of Christ, right? So he divides it into those two parts. Well, then, in the first part, on the divinity, he divides that into, what, three. And he talks, first of all, about the substance and the operations of God, right? And then the second part is about the trinity, right? And then the third part is about the effects of God, right? Now, I was kind of comparing in my mind what Thomas does in the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Where he has this division of God in himself, God is the maker or beginning of things, and God is therein, then governor and so on, right? I say, well, why does Thomas do that differently here, right? Well, of course, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the first division he makes is into, what, two parts, right, these things that we know about God in himself, and God is the beginning and the end of things, by natural reason, huh, as well as by faith, right? Things that even Aristotle, the old pagan, right, was able to reason out, right? And then in the, what, that's the first three books, right? Then the fourth book, he does the same three things insofar as they are known only by faith, right, and so it's in those last, that fourth book, he takes up the Trinity and the Incarnation and the Eschatology, the last things, right? So, the Trinity is separated from the consideration of the substance of God as operations, so it makes a better balance there, right, to make the, or even you might say, right, the consideration of God in himself, God is the maker, the creator, and so on, and his main effects, and so on, and then God is the end and the governance that he has with a view to that end, huh? But in both cases, it's beautiful when he does it, right? But if you put the Trinity with, you know, it's a big thing, you got Trinity, right? I mean, it's no small thing, right? You have to, you know, separate the consideration of substance and the operations of God from the Trinity, and then the effects that kind of jam together, right? But he'll make that distinction between the effects between him being the maker and the end, right? So, it's beautifully, what, ordered, huh? Beautifully ordered, at least. So, you divide the thing into three, and then the first part into two, and the first of those two parts into three, right? Just the way he does it, huh? But when he goes through that, you know, it's so simple, like, when he's talking about some of the great things there that God's providence, you know, extends down to what they call the future contingent things, and it's very hard to understand, right? And Thomas says, uh, uh, three things, you know, indicate that this is not a problem for God, right? The future contingent. And he says, first of all, he says, the, um, infallibility is a divine foresight. And the second thing is, what, the efficacy of the divine will. And third, the wisdom of the divine disposition, right? I see. Well, now, I've heard all these things before, but they're spread together in a very complete way there, right? So, he begins with the, um, uh, infallibility is a divine foreknowledge, and then following the great, you know, atheist there, that God's knowledge is, what, not measured by time, but measured by eternity, and eternity is, what, all at once, endless life, right? And so, he's, he's, uh, the now of eternity, the eternal now, right, is opposite every now of time, right? And so, uh, you know, I have infallible knowledge that this man over here is sitting now, right? But I know that because he's sitting there now, right? I see him sitting there, right? And I'm very sure about it. But, you know, a half hour ago, I couldn't be saying that. I'm sure he'll be sitting. He may be called off to work there at the, uh, incoming, uh, uh, retreatants or whatever it is, right? So, uh, that's beautifully said, right, huh? And then the efficacy of the divine will, right? That not only what God wills comes about, right? But it comes about in the way he wants to come about, where he wants to happen necessarily or contingently, right? And then, uh, he gets to the third part there. And, uh, even those things, you know, where you could possibly fail, right, huh? God arranges so that you will not fail, right, huh? And the contingency will not happen, right? See, it's just beautiful the way he lays it out, huh? The same way he gets into talking about the Christ there, you know, just another example of a beautiful three in there, you know, he says, he's arguing that, uh, Christ's death on the cross was voluntary, right? And that doesn't mean that he killed himself, and it doesn't mean that the Jews are not responsible for his death and so on. But, um, he said, why did Christ want to die? There's three reasons why he wanted to die. What are the three reasons why Christ wanted to die? He doesn't say that. No. He's got to touch upon that, you know, in the third of the three reasons, right? Well, the first reason why he wanted to die, which it is perfectly ordered where these are, the first one why he wanted to die was to assume the punishment for original sin, because, you know, once you do that, that's what God told him, right, Moses and so on, and so what. So, I wanted to die to assume the punishment. So, I wanted to die to assume the punishment, right, Moses and so on, and so on, and so on. So, I wanted to die to assume the punishment, right, Moses and so on, and so on, and so on. There's two different notes in. That's beautiful. It begins there, right? Now, what's the second thing he does? Well, that's going to be under the third one. The third one, the reason he gives, he wants to give us a good example, right? And then he singles out a good example of what? Charity and fortitude and patience, right? So those are the virtues, right? And obedience, right, is the fourth one, right? It's beautifully laid out there. It's almost the same as in Thomas' Criarch of Communion, you know, where he talks about diminishing the vices and growing the virtues. He mentions those same four, except for fortitude substitutes what? Humility, right, huh? Okay, but it's beautifully said, right? But what struck me was, those two, you're kind of aware. What's the middle one, right, huh? This is the spiritual sense of we're dying to the flesh, right, and going to the, what, spiritual life, right? It's a little bit like, you know, when they say we're buried with Christ in baptism and so on, right? And then when he goes on, he says, why do you want to die on the cross? Why that, right? Well, of course, he says, first of all, when you go back to Adam, right, they sinned by, what, taking that fruit from that tree, right? So he wanted to be nailed to a tree, right? I guess the cross was probably a tree, right? I don't know, you know, pages haven't much represented that too much. You don't usually see the cross in the form of a tree, but sometimes you see it in the form of a tree, right? So that's kind of beautiful, he ties it up with the first of those general reasons, huh? Then the second one, he says, why do you want to die on the cross? Well, because you, what, you're lifted up. Now, if I lift up, I'll draw all men to myself, right? This is going from the sense world to the spiritual world, yeah. And then in terms of the virtues, right, this is a very shameful death, and therefore some men are not afraid to die, but they don't want to die in a shameful way, right? Remember how Major Andre didn't want to be hung, right, by Washington, right? It's okay to be shot in the fighting squad. That's the way for a soldier to go, right? But I don't mean to be hung, you know, for a soldier, that's, that is, that is, you know. The crucifixion, of course, is worse than hanging, right? And so he wanted to, you know, be guilty, right? But he was talking about the reason why our forefathers there sinned, right? And he talked about our friend there, Eve, right? And she's guilty of five things, he says. He says, it's going to be laid out beautifully, right, huh? And her first sin was what? Pride, right? She's going to get all these great things, huh? What is her second sin, huh? He says, curiosity. You're like gods, right? That's interesting, pride and curiosity, right? Like the, curiosity is a disordered desire to know, right? You know, the big dangers for a philosopher is pride and curiositas in the sense of the, vicious sense of the word, right? Maybe it's curiosity sometimes for, for wonder, but curiositas, a lot in there, it's the disordered desire to know, right? And then, the food was what? Delicious looking, right? Beautiful, yeah. Gluttonic, right? For food, yeah. Yeah, yeah. The first three, right, yeah? And what's the fourth sin? Disbelief. Sin of disbelief, huh? Oh, no, that's, no. You're not going to die if you eat this. You're going to be, you know, gods, yeah, yeah. And then, what's the fifth sin, huh? Disbelief. Disobedience, yeah, right? But it is beautifully laid out there, you know? Now, I was kind of thinking about it, you know how, you know how when Thomas, in the secundae, secundae, the second part, the second part, he takes up the virtues more in particular, right? He takes faith, hope, and charity, and then he takes the four cardinal virtues, right? And then he attaches the consideration of other virtues to the four cardinal virtues, according as these virtues have a likeness, right? To the mode of the temperate, you know? So, these first three defects in our mother, Eve, are all tied up with what? Virtue or vice as opposed to that virtue. They're all tied up to temperance, right? Yeah. Curiositas is an excessive desire to know, right? Yeah. That's right. That, huh? That, huh? That's what, by the way, you call it concupiscence of curiosity. Yeah, yeah. And pride is a, what, excessive desire for its own excellence, right? So, I guess, you know, I mean, just the way he had ordered those three, you know, and then you get to the, kind of the, crux of that, the disbelief and the disobedience, right? But, I mean, interesting that he begins from too much, wanting too much of a little, of a good thing, right? And I got thinking of the seven wise men of Greece, right? The first thing they said, you know, know thyself and nothing too much, right? And, you know, we used to always say, why does he say nothing too much and not nothing too little, right? Because nothing too little, you know, is true too, right? But emphasis is upon nothing too much, right? And so, you know, this love of its own excellence, right? Or this love of, what, knowledge, right? Or this love of pleasure, even of senses, right? These are all good things, right? She had too much of a good thing as he told, she was like, yeah, right? And so, that's kind of the way that someone who's, you know, quite innocent up to this point, right? Is going to be led, what, astray, right? It's a danger. And pride, too, is it pride? Pride starts from, what, even from good things, right? You're proud of your, what, knowledge, right, huh? I was saying to my students at night there, I said, I love to think about God, right, huh? And sometimes people, you know, say, well, he must be a very holy man, Mr. Perkins. He's always thinking about God, right? Which is true, every day, you know, I do a little bit of theology every day. I try to do a little theology, a little theology, a little bit of scripture, you know? And find time to do, you know, every day, and so on. And, but, that doesn't make me holy, you know? I mean, it's a good thing, you know, when someone denied their goodness of it, you know? But really, to be holy, you have to, what, love God above all other things, right? And all the things for the sake of God, right? And even yourself for the sake of God, right? I'm always struck, you know, by this argument that Thomas gives, where he says that creatures and whatever goodness there is in creatures, it adds nothing to the, what, goodness of what? Of God, right? And he says, you know, he has his two likenesses, huh, that kind of help our feeble mind see this a bit. One is the infinite distance between God's goodness, right, and our goodness, right? So, to use a mathematical analogy, our goodness is to God's goodness, not like a shorter line is to a longer line. Or by, you know, adding enough, you can get up there, you know? But it's like a point is to a, what, a line. So, if you add a point to a line, how much longer is a line? Yeah. No longer, right? And so, if you add our goodness, the goodness of all creation, right, of all the creatures, to God's goodness, that's no better than God alone. Or the other example Thomas gives is, of course, the goodness of the creature is partaking of the, what, divine goodness, huh? It's like a part of it, right? Well, Socrates and the arm of Socrates is no more than, what, no better than Socrates alone. So God, and what partakes as a part of what God has, is no better than God alone, huh? So, you think, you know, think of this in prayer that they have at the end of Matins, I guess, where, the Tideon, right, huh? Where all the angels, you know, are praising God and the seraphim, the cherubim in particular. And then you have the, what, the apostles and the prophets and the martyrs. right and then in general the church right so you're kind of you know anticipation of what heaven is like there we're all singing and and uh praising God you know and yet we realize that we all add nothing to him right he is so self-sufficient right it's an amazing thing right and uh and I got thinking you know you know about uh what the great Heisenberg said you know about he's given the history of quantum theory and he talks about how at a particular time the physicists began to what ask the right question and then he made the very interesting point that often he says to ask the right question is to go more than halfway to the truth right so when I try to emphasize this point with my students at assumption I draw a straight line on the board right and let's make the point here on the left we'll mark it call it ignorance and the point at the right we'll mark and call it knowledge right and the line represents the path from what ignorance to knowledge right okay now what is that path made up of right what's made up of questions and and the answers to these questions right but asking the right question is to go more than what yeah so if you mark a little point here it's halfway down the line and and some point beyond that we'll say the right question right and once you ask the right question you seem to go all the way right and it's emphasized in the dialogues of Plato because Socrates um asked the slave boy you know how do you double a square the slave boy says you double the side and then Socrates by asking him questions the slave boy recognizes his mistake and eventually out of the slave boy's own answers comes the way to double a square that they can be diagonal on and Socrates I didn't teach him all I do is ask questions he gave all the answers well who contributed more to the discovery of the uh way to double a square Socrates the slave boy well Socrates by asking the right questions the slave boy seems to what teach himself right it's kind of a marvelous thing right well going back to this great suggestion there of Heisenberg about the right question right we see that in Socrates and Euthyphro right he teaches us one kind of right question because Euthyphro is asked to define piety right he's prosecuting his poor father for impiety so you better understand what piety is of you and uh so uh he says what the gods approve of right and Socrates says well is it piety because is it pious because the gods approve of it or do the gods approve it because it is pious which is it well the gods approve it because it is pious right then okay and um you know honor your father and mother right is it good because there's a commandment to honor your father and mother that makes it good to honor your father and mother or is the command to recognize that that is good and therefore commands it right well now it's being the great uh uh guy called Augustine I guess of Hippo right and the very religion he had to do was and he quotes the first definition of what the beautiful the beautiful is what pleases when what seen and he asked this cratic question to guess is it beautiful because it pleases our senses or does it please our senses because it is beautiful he said I have no doubt that it pleases our senses because it is beautiful right so you have to you know see what makes it beautiful and it's not our delighting in it that's an effect of it's being beautiful right and so I've been very much impressed with Socrates there you know taught us how to ask the right question and then I'm thinking about this again and then I was thinking about myself when I was reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics right he begins that with a little induction to show that the good is what all want right and then you have to ask the very important question is it good because we want it or do you want it because it is good it's important to see that we want it because it is good right this is a question again of Socrates would say or Shakespeare would say of cause and effect right which is the cause which is the effect right so then I got kind of a little more ambitious in my thinking here I was thinking about these things in the in the in the uh compendium and so on I'm saying now insofar as as the creature is good right the creature is like god didn't you see but now is the creature like god because he's good or is the creature good because he's like god which is it yes and you might be tempted to say well he's like god because he's what good right then because like god's in that relation to god right it's a little bit like you know we say um what's uh half of four what's two right okay but is it two because it's half of four or is it half of four because it's two it's two first yeah yeah and in the relation is the result of being two uh just and because it's two it's also a third of six right or a fourth of eight right okay it's not two because it's a fourth of eight okay but these things follow from it right so you might be tempted to say well it's because we're good that we're like god that seems to be a true statement right but uh and the likeness to god is kind of like a in effect of our beef good right but maybe if we're good our goodness came from god right as aristotle teaches us thomas is always repeating every agent makes something like itself right huh so in a way we're good because we're what like god because god is the source of this right i said that's pretty clever you know what he's doing and i said pretty clever you know but i carry an angel there and he says uh he says uh yeah yeah but um um god's will is involved in making these things and the object of the divine will is what good the good yeah so you've got to be careful there mr breakfast yeah okay it's a little bit of a point there you know it makes it kind of interesting to see these things huh so i recommend the compendium of theology right for your light reading when you're visiting your cousins or your grandchildren um beautiful though okay we're up to the fifth article now here in the 71st the fifth article now here in the 71st article now here in the 71st article now here in the 71st article here in the 71st article now here in the 71st article now here in the 71st article now here in the 71st article