Prima Secundae
Lecture 188: The Connection and Equality of Sins

Transcript
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Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, hearty and angels, through the lights of our minds, order and bloom in our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So what did Vatican II promise, or say that Thomas is good for him? What did he say? What did Vatican II say? To penetrate the most into the scriptures. I said several things about, I don't remember what they're saying. I didn't say scripture, but in order to, what? Penetrate as much as possible into the mysteries of things. The mysteries of things, yes. And then you see the connection of one, what? Mystery with another. Yeah, yeah. I was looking at Thomas' exposition of the first decretal from the Fourth Order Council. That's a famous council in 1215. That's where I guess, they say St. Francis and Dominic met at the council a little bit. But anyway, in the first decretal there, it's talking about God, right? It says, he's what? Eternal, right? And he's, you know, all powerful and he's simple and he's unchanging, right? But you don't want a connection between this being eternal and this being, what? Unchanging, right? In the Summa Theologiae, you have the God being unchangeable in one question, and then immediately following and this being eternal, right? So the fact that we are in motion and subject to motion is why we're in time. And it's because God is unchanging that he has eternity, right? So you see the connection among these things, right? Well, Thomas doesn't correct before I thought it comes, of course. He just comes to each thing that it says, right? So you kind of see the excellence of Thomas in the Summa because he sees the connection of one thing with another. How many ways is God a cause? I think four kinds of causes, huh? And how many kinds of causes is God the first cause? Two and a half. Two and a half. Two and a half, yeah. The four kinds of causes are what? Matter, that from which something comes to be existing within it, right? And then form, right? Both the intrinsic cause of a thing being what it is, but also the model or exemplar that things are designed to look like, huh, in some way. And then the mover or maker, right? That's the third kind of cause. And the fourth kind of cause is the end. Yeah, that's the sake of which, right? So in what senses of cause has God a cause? The mover or maker. In the end? In the exemplar. Yeah, in the exemplar. The extrinsic form, right? It's not the intrinsic form, right? But how can he be a form and a mover and an end and not matter, right? What does the mover, the maker, the end, and the form, the exemplar, what do they have in town that could all belong to God who's altogether what? Simple, right? And matter can't be a cause. Which God is a cause, I mean. What is that? God is pure act, right? And form and mover or maker and end are all based upon what? Actuality. Because act is the end of passive ability, right? The mover, insofar as he has a form, right? He's able to act. And of course, the exemplar is an act. But matter is what? It has some ability, right? So God can't be a cause in the sense of what? Matter, right? But in the other three senses, he can, right? Have you ever seen this appropriation that they give in theology? They appropriate these three ways that God is a cause to the three members of the Trinity. So which one is appropriated to the Father and which one to the Son and which one to the... Yeah. Over a maker of the Father, power, exemplar to the Son, Yeah. And the end is the Holy Spirit. Yeah. The goodness of it. Yeah. Power, wisdom, and goodness. Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of beautiful to see that. What does it say in the epistle to the Romans, I think it is, chapter 11? That from him and through him and in him... Under him, yeah. And they appropriate that to the three again. From him, from the Father, right? Through him, the Son, and in him, the Holy Spirit, huh? And we can talk about that, but today we've got to talk about the comparison of sins to each other, right? So you know what I think of you. So let's look at the premium here, huh? Then we're not to consider about the comparison of sins to each other. And about this, ten things are asked. First, whether all sins and faces are connected, huh? I hope not, huh? We don't have promises. Secondly, whether all are, what? Equal, I guess, huh? Are we, yeah? Third, whether the gravity of sins is to be observed according to their objects, huh? Fourth, whether according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are, what? Opposed, huh? If I sin against charity, is that worse than to sin against temperance, right? I don't think we know certain. Fifth, whether carnal sins are more grave than spiritual. I'll bet he'll say the opposite, right? Sixth, whether according to the causes of sins is to be observed the gravity, huh? Of the sins, huh? Seven, whether according to circumstances, huh? Eighth, whether according to the quantity of the harm done, huh? Nine, whether according to the condition of the person against whom one has, what? Sinned, huh? And ten, this is now aimed at you guys, whether on account of the magnitude of the person sinning, right? That aggravates the sin, right, huh? So when he gets drunk, is that the worst sin in the back of the talk, huh? Because I'm just a lowly, worldly fellow, right? Okay? So we go to the first article, right? The first, first, then, one goes forward thus, it seems that all sins are, what? Connected. Oh, good, I think he's going to take the opposite side. But it's said in the epistle of, what, James, chapter 2, that whoever, right, observes the whole law, but offends whoever in one of them is made, what? Guilty. Guilty of all of them. Doesn't sound very good, doesn't it? But it's the same thing to be guilty of all the commandments of the law and to have all sins, huh? Because as Ambrose says, and he's one of the, what, four or five great doctors of the Western Church, huh? Because as Ambrose says, sin is a going out of, right, divine law, transgression of divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commands, therefore, whoever sins by one sin is made subject to what? All sins, huh? Whew. An apostle and a Catholic Church. Moreover, every sin excludes the virtue opposed to it, right? But the one who lacks one virtue lacks all of them, as is clear from things said before. We're all connected, huh? We're all connected to human virtues. Prudence, huh? Right, the moral virtues are. Therefore, the one who sins by one sin is deprived of all the virtues, but who lacks a virtue has the vice opposed to it. Therefore, the one who has one sin has all sins. That would make you very sad, wouldn't it? Moreover, your department. All the virtues are connected because they come together in one, what? Beginning. As it had been had before. But just as the virtues come together in one beginning, so also sins. Because as the great Augustine says, huh? The love of God, which makes the city of God, right? Is the beginning and the root of all the virtues, huh? So the love of oneself, which makes the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins. As is clear to Augustine in the 14th book of the city of God. Therefore, also, all vices and sins are connected. So that the one who has one of them has the law. Simplifies confession, doesn't it, huh? I'm guilty of everything, Father. I did it all. I did it all. I committed all the sins that could be committed. But against this, some vices are contrary to others, huh? To each other. As is clear to the philosopher in the 2nd book of the, what? Ephesians. So cowardice is contrary to foolhardiness, right? So can I have both of those vices? But it's impossible for contraries to be at the same time in the same way. Therefore, it's impossible that all sins and vices be, what? Connected. Connected to each other, huh? Now, Thomas begins by seeing a, what? Distinction. I've seen the newsletter there, Thomas Aquinas College there. And once in a while, they have a student there that talks to the chairman and so on, you know? And, I mean, the board, the trustees, and so on. And I went around to Fr. Diage. He said, he taught me to read Thomas sentence at a time. So when I edit these for my own reading, you know, I divide them up, you know, in each little separate thought. My answer should be said that in a different way, it has itself the intention of the agent according to virtue, to follow reason, and in another way, the intention of the one sinning to, what? Depart for reason, huh? For of every man acting according to virtue, his intention is that he follows the rule of, what? Reason. Reason, huh? And therefore, the intention, what? All virtues. He intends, what? The same. In the same. And in account of this, all virtues have a connection to each other, and right reason of things to be done. And that's the definition of, what? Prudence. Prudence. What's the English word for prudence? Foresight. Foresight, right? Jesus has been said above, huh? But the intention of the one sinning is not that he be saved from that which is in accordance with reason, but more that he intends in some desirable good from which his, what? Sin has its species, right? But those goods to which the intention of the sinner intends, receding from reason, are diverse, right? Having no connection to each other. Nay, rather, among them, as we said in the objection earlier, are contrary, son. When since vices and sins have a species, or have their species, according to that to which they turn, it is manifest that according to that which perfects the species of the sin, the sins have no connection to each other, right? It's when I eat too much and we're trying to be an hour or two at the same time. For the sin is not committed in, what? Going from the multitude to unity, as happens in the virtues which are, what? Connected. Connected, huh? But more in receding from unity to multitude, huh? It's a crazy thing that some Dominican told me, his teacher said, you know, never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish. It's a little bit of an exaggeration, because I think you should affirm or deny, but it shows the importance of, what, distinction, right? I was asking my other class there, look before and after distinction, right? Don't you give away now. Okay, we're pretty slow coming up with the answer, right? What's before distinction and what's after? Answer the first part. What's before distinction in the mind? Yeah. Confusion is before distinction, right? Confusion is before distinction. Now, what does distinction be for? Yeah, what's interesting is. Why did we say that when Shakespeare defines reason as the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, that in looking before and after is included, understood, looking for distinction? Why was that? The question was, why does Shakespeare say? Well, when he defines reason as looking before and after, right? Why does that include looking for distinction? Because reason separates. Yeah. But what is the axiom that we have about before and after? Nothing is before or after itself. Yeah. So before you can see a before and after, before you can see some order, you have to see what? Yeah. If I couldn't distinguish between today and yesterday, I couldn't see that yesterday was before today. Or today is before tomorrow if I can't distinguish one day from another. If I couldn't distinguish between beer and wine, I couldn't see that wine is better than beer. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. I had plenty of beer left over here. But not every distinction is a division. But every division is a what? Distinction. That's very important to see, the distinction between distinction and division, right? Because why would Thomas say that there's no division in God, but there is a distinction in God between the Father and the Son, and between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, right? But God's not divided in two. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, right? Distinction is more general, but also... Yeah. If this is not that, right? They're distinct, right? But division is the distinction of the parts of some whole. So Thomas will deny it. He can speak of there being any division in God, right? God is not divided into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Then they'd be like parts of God, right? Which would be a great mistake, right? But they are distinct, because they're relative to each other, right? It says in the beginning of John's Gospel, if you look at the Greek, this man over here is going to go back and study Greek now, and all the words you say. But in the beginning of the Gospel, it says, in the beginning was the Word, and we see in English the Word was what? With God. Yeah. But in the Greek, it's what? And the Word was toward God, right? Which is the word you use in talking about the opposition of Galatians. Prosti, right? That's what Aristotle calls it, right? Adaliquid and Lactinam. Towards another, right? So, because of this opposition of relatives, the Father is not the Son, right? And the Son is not the Father, right? The Father is not the Son. The Son is not the Father, right? Illustrated over here, too. But, there's no division there, right? God is not a whole. God has no what? Parts. Parts. It's very important to see, right? Now, the definition involves a division, right? When I define the square, let's say, as an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? I'm, in a way, dividing the square into its genus and what differences, right? But not every division is doing that, right? When I divide number into odd and even, that's not a definition, is it? When I divide quadrilateral into square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and trypensium, right? Or into parallelogram and trypensium, right? So, you can divide into two or three, really. That's not a definition, right? So, distinction is before division, and division is before definition, right? So, that's another way that distinction is before something, right? But something that is a distinction, but a particular kind of distinction, right? But distinction, order, not the same thing exactly, right? But what is presupposed to the other, right? Distinction is kind of really very fundamental in our knowledge, right? And all reasoned out knowledge, you know, begins with distinctions, divisions, and definitions, huh? Definition having to do with the object of our mind? What's the object of our mind? The third book on the soul. What it is, yeah. What it is, yeah. What's the connection between what a thing is and definition? Definition is what? Yeah. Speech signifying what a thing is. Speech making known what a thing is, right? Let's turn it up with the object of our mind, what a thing is. I love to ask that question I get. Is the definition of definition, which I just gave him, right? Is the definition of definition the definition of definition? What would you say? I thought about the guy who was teaching philosophy in some state college here out west. He says to me, you know, looks down at the students' faces and they look up and say, like, why are you doing this to me? That's an expression for me. He seems to be saying, he says. So is the definition of definition a definition of the definition of definition? I think so. Gotcha. Well, that was a toss-up, brother. We can't even show up. But it's not signifying. The definition of definition is a definition of what a definition is in general, right? So when you define the definition, you say, speech signifies what a thing is. Well, not only does the definition of definition tell you what a definition is, right? But the definition of square tells you what a square is, right? So the definition of definition is not a definition of that definition in particular. But it's a definition of definition in general, right? And every definition is speech signifying what a thing is. It can't be one name, right? Now, how is Thomas going to answer these objections, right? I think it's based on what he says in the corpus about either turning towards something or turning away from something. The first, therefore, he says, it should be said that James speaks about sin not on the side of what? Turning towards conversion according as the sins are in fact what? Distinguished, right? But he speaks of them on the side of what? Turning away. Insofar as man, by sinning, recedes from the commandment of the law, right? Now, all of the commandments of the law are from one and the same. It says in what he himself says there. And therefore, God is, what? Held in contempt, you might say, in some way, in every sin. And from this side, it can be said that the one who offends in one is made guilty of what? Oh, because from what? Sinning for one sin, he incurs the guilt of punishment from this, that he is contempt from God. From contempt of whom comes what? The guilt of all sins, right? But is that Kersir Pratchitans, right? Because he intends to enjoy, right, alcohol to excess, right? It's a pleasure, I suppose. So he's not, in that sense, intending, per se, right, to depart from the law, right? If he intended to give up the whole law, that would be different, right? But then he would be situation. Now, what about the second objection? He talks about it being opposed to some sin and so on of race. To second should be said, this has been said above, not through every act of sin is taken away the opposed, what? Virtue, huh? For a venial sin does not take away, what? Virtue. The virtue, right? Now, a mortal sin takes away an infused virtue, insofar as it, what, turns one away from God. But one act of a mortal sin, but even one act of a mortal sin, does not take away the habit of a, what, acquired sin. virtue, right? Because that's produced by repeated acts, right? So it's not completely worn away by one act. But the virtues that are infused, they're lost by one mortal sin, right? But if the acts are multiplied to such an extent that there is generated a contrary habit, then it would be excluded the habit of the acquired, what? Virtue. That's what we were saying earlier, that you can't neglect the, what? Acquired virtues, just for the, what? Infused virtues, huh? Because they have assumed stability, right? That the infused virtues do not, what? Have, right? So grace does not take away the need for an actual perfect sin. Which being excluded, it excludes, what? Foresight. Because when a man acts against any virtue, he acts against, what? Foresight. They're all connected to that. And without foresight or prudence, no moral virtue is, what? Able to be. Able to be, yeah. And therefore, consequently, he excludes, what? All moral virtues are excluded as regards what is perfect and formal in virtue, which they have according as they partake of, what? Prudence, huh? So when Aristotle defines moral virtue in the second book of the Ethics, what does he say, huh? Having with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us, right? Has determined the right reason. What this right reason is, you find out, in the sixth book, is foresight, right? It's in the very definition of moral virtue. But there remains, nevertheless, inclinations to the acts of virtues, not, however, having the, what, full definition of virtue. But it does not follow an account of this, huh? That a man incurs all the vices or sins, huh? First, because to one virtue, many, what? Vices are opposed. Vices are opposed. So that virtue can be, what? Eliminated or removed to one of them, although another one is, what? Not. Not. Secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue as regards inclination of virtue to act. Whence remaining some, what? Virtuous inclinations. It cannot be said that man has, what? The opposite vices are sins. Now, it's different with the virtues as he points out and applies to the third objection. To the third, it should be said that the love of God is, what? The having together, right? Insofar as the affection of man has led from many things to something, what? One. And therefore, the virtues which are caused in the love of God have a, what? Connection. Connection, right? But the love of oneself, huh? Divide, scatters the affection of man in diverse things. That's my description of contemporary man. Insofar as man by loving himself loves for himself temporal goods, which are various and diverse. See these kids lined up, you know, get the new iPhone or it is, you know. Some of them are spending, you know, the whole week there trying to get, be the first one to do what they're talking about, huh? And therefore, vices and sins which are caused from the love of oneself are not, what? Connection. I'm glad to get out of that a little bit, you know. One of the sins you confess, the lies you confess all of them. You know, each confess, I suppose. Yeah. It'd be easier for the priest to just give everybody a great big penance. My last confession was three months ago since I'd done everything. Broke them all. I'm guilty of everything. You'd never, you'd never have to ask the penance is there anything else. You did it all. There's nothing else to confess. The second one goes for it thus. It seems to be. that all sins are what? Equal, right? Who would think that to be so? For this it is to sin, it is to do what is not what? Right to you or not listen to you. But to do what is not listen is reprehensible in the same way in all. Therefore to sin in one and the same way is reprehensible. Therefore one sin is not what? More grave than the other, right? And the same reason why you say this is a sin, I guess. Moreover, every sin consists in this, that man transgresses the rule of reason, right? Which thus has itself to human acts as a linear ruler in bodily things. Therefore to sin is similar to that which is to what? Go beyond the lines, right? But to go beyond the lines is so equally in one way even as someone what? He sees longer or what? Stands closer. Yeah. Because privations do not receive more and less. Therefore all sins are what? Equal. That's true, privations do not receive more and less. That first sentence of the objection to, what does he mean when he says which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporal things, for foil things? I suppose you're talking about being a carpenter or something, you know? Or even you could say just to draw a line. You could say draw a line and you go if you're short of the line little or much it makes no difference if you're still short of the line. It's like my dad used to say I'm going to play golf. So at least get it past the hole because then you've got a chance it's going to go in. But if you never hit it in a hole it's never going to go in. That's kind of what he's talking about. If it's short, it's short. It doesn't matter how much. How's this correct in something? He's not showing this picture here, you know? If you have to use this, what, thing? The level. Yeah. And you say, well, either it's low or not, right? And you're putting it, lumping it all together and it's not low, right? It's not right. Yeah, yeah. Same thing, right? Yeah, yeah. So one way it's right and the other way it's wrong, right? Same thing, right? It's fixed in the two lines. It's like they say you measure three times, cut once. Because if you cut it short it doesn't matter if it's a little or a lot. It's short. That's it, you know? Whoever sins are opposed to virtues but all virtues are equal. Did he say that? Talias? Cicero? These paradoxes, huh? How can you be so stupid? Therefore all sins are what? Sin. Now there's no authority there. But against this is what the Lord says to Pilate in John 19. Who handed you over to you has a greater sin, right? Yet it is clear that Pilate had some sin too, right? Therefore one sin is in fact greater than another, right? Adultery is worse than what? Fornication, right? I answer it should be said. Oh, it's those crazy guys. I think it's Stoics, right? And it should be said that the opinion of the Stoics was, which Tullius, and that's one of the names of what? Cicero, right? Pursues in the book called the Paradoxes, right? That all sins are what? Equal, right? And from this is derived the error of certain what? Heretics. Heretics, huh? Who laying down all sins to be equal, right? Say therefore that all punishments in hell are what? Equal. Equal. That's not what Dante said, right? And as far as can be perceived from the words of what? Tulli. Tulli. The Stoics removed from this, that they considered sin only on the side of what? Privation. Insofar as it is a what? Beceiving from reason, right? When simply estimating that no privation or lack be seized more or less, they laid down all sins to be what? Equal. Equal, right? Privation is a kind of what? Non-being, right? How can non-being be more or less, right? It's just non-being. But Thomas, huh? But if one diligently, lovingly considers, he will find that there is a two-fold genus of what? Privations or lack. For one is a simple and pure lack, huh? Which consists in being what? Corrupted. Corrupted, right? Just as death is what? A lack of life, huh? So is one man more dead than another? You know, if you work in the mortuary, this guy is more dead than that guy, huh? This guy just came in, so he's only a little dead. This guy was here yesterday, so. Yeah, it seems like, you know, it's kind of a privation, right? Not more or less, huh? And Tenny, brother, it's really dark. Darkness, right, no? It's a privation of life, huh? And such lacks or privations do not receive more or less, because nothing remains, right, you might say, of the opposite, what? Habit. Habit, right, huh? Whence one is not less dead, someone, the first day of death, as you were saying, or the third, or the, what? Fourth. Than after a year, right? So we can say he's been dead a longer time, but is he more dead? No, then he's dead. When the cadaver, huh? Body, corpse, was what? Already dissolved. Dissolved. Dissolved, yeah. Even those things, his bodies are preserved, right? They're just as dead, aren't they? Yeah. It's insane there. And likewise, the house is not more, what, dark, if the light is covered by many, what? Vails that covers, yeah. If it is covered by one veil that excludes the whole, what? Light. Light. So I suppose you cover the window, right? And you get something that covers it so much that anything else added would not make it any darker, right? You know, you can, I can stay inside the room and you can keep on putting things on the outside. It's getting darker, it's getting darker. There's another privation that is not simple, but retaining something of the opposite habit. Opposite habit. Habit there is taken as the opposite of what? Privation, right? Privation is not having something you are able to have, should have, in a strict sense, right? Which privation or lack consists more in, what? Being corrupted, right? Emotion. Than in being, what? Corrupted, yeah? Just as, what? Sickness, what? Which lacks a due... Commensuration of humors, right? Thus, however, that something of it, what? Remains, huh? Otherwise, the animal would not remain to live. And it's similar about ugliness, huh? Nose of this sort, right, huh? So you know it's going to be longer and longer, right? But these privations we see more or less on the side. of that which remains is a contrary habit. For much does it refer to what sickness or pertain to sickness or ugliness, right? These are two different vices of the body. Well, they're more or less from the suitable commensuration of humor as, remember, as one, what, he sees, right? So they give me pills there to regulate my, you know, heart there, you know, and sometimes they make me stronger, you know. So they don't do that for a dead man at all, right? And therefore, and likewise it should be said about vices and sins. For thus in them is deprived the suitable measurement of what? Reason. Reason. That not holy is the order of reason what? Taken away. Taken away. Otherwise, bad, if it is, what, integral, will destroy itself, as is said in the fourth book of ethics, right? I was reading Thomas there in the, um, part of the Summa, the first human part of the Summa there. He's talking about distinction, right? And, uh, he's talking about, does evil entirely, what, eliminate the good, right? Well, of course, since the subject of evil is something good, it can't entirely destroy the good, right? If it would destroy its own subject, then it'd be nothing, right? And he quotes this text of Aristotle, right there in the Prima Paras, there, let's see, quote it again. The deconics say that Aristotle is somebody. He's somebody. For there cannot remain the substance of the act or the affection of the agent unless there remains something of the order of what? Reason, right? And therefore, it pertains much to the gravity, huh, of the sin, whether more or less one receives from the rightness of what? Reason. Reason, right? And according to this, it should be said that not all sins are equal, right? And Aristotle is talking in the second book of the Ethics about virtue, and he wants to lead into the idea that virtue is in the middle before it's us, right? Either too much nor too little, right? And what does he compare it to, huh? It's more known that virtue lies in the middle. He goes over to the arts, right? The practical arts, right? And so now he's cooking steaks for all these people here. You can cook the steak too much or too little, right? When you put salt in something, you can put too much or too little, right? And so you can see very clearly the piece of the arts if you cut a piece of wood, right? You know, if the leg of the chair is broken, you want to cut a piece of wood. You can cut a piece of wood that's too short or one that's too long, right? And then you say, well, virtue lies in that middle, right? But obviously you can depart from what it should be more or less, right? So, you go from the Baroque and the Classical period to Romantic period and so on, music starts to get less beautiful, right? And then it becomes positively ugly, right? You see some of these rock bands, you know, even the characters who are playing, they look, you know, ugly, you know? It's scary, yeah, it's scary looking, right? I went to the factory store there, I'd see guys come in, you know, with Grateful Dead on there, right? And I didn't know nothing about, there was the name of a band called Grateful Dead, you know? I just thought this was some sick slogan, I'd like to be dead, you know? Please kill me. I said, I thought to myself, what a sick thing there is for all I'd say, Grateful Dead, I'd be grateful if I was dead or something. And I realized there's people who follow a band around, you know, when they go on their concert tour, so... But the deadhead, you know, beautiful. No? Ugly. Being a deadhead isn't being beautiful. Yeah, I know, they rejoice in the times of deadhead, right? It's funny they call them deadhead, not dead foot or dead elbow or something, no, deadhead. It tells a lot right there. The first effort should be said that sins are what? Not listened to commit, on account of some disorder that they have, right, then? Whence those that contain a greater disorder, right, are more what? Illicit, right, then? And consequently, they are what? More grievous sins, right, then? Somebody asked me the other day, you know, what's your favorite play of Shakespeare? Well, it's kind of a hard thing to say, you know? If I have to say something like you say, King Lear, right, huh? But when you have sons or daughters, both in there, right? Who are doing awful things to their father, right? And leading to his death, you know? So this is even worse than doing it to a stranger, right? Mm-hmm. Even more, more assorted there, right? Mm-hmm. It's much more severe than as you like it, but it's brother against brother, right? Which is worse to connive with the death of your father or your brother? It's serious, right? Mm-hmm. It's pretty serious, but it seems like giving more to your father, right? Yeah. Because you owe your life to your father, you owe your life to your brother. So King Lear is dealing with this aberration, you know? Revolts in true births, don't abuse him, as Friar Lawrence says. Even more so, a dramatic sorrow that King Lear has, right? He has these two evil daughters, you know? Revolting him. Go and read the English critics and some of them, and it was just painful. King Lear, you know, to see, you know? It's a beautiful play, you know? Mm-hmm. The first time I saw it, being active, you know, it was close to them to you. Oh, really? The actor, you know? Wow. Playing these things, you know, as well. But really, well done, too. The second objection, that argument proceeds about sin as if it were a pure, what? Privation, right? That's the distinction he saw. One business is dead as another, right? If you chop your head off like these terrorists in these days, huh? Yeah. You're not more dead than somebody dies in his bed, right? Yeah, yeah. You know, when they wake up in the morning, they're dead in the bed. Virtues are equally, proportionally, and one in the same. Nevertheless, one virtue precedes another in worth according to its species. And also, one man is more virtuous than another in the same species of virtue. Nevertheless, if the virtues were equal, would not follow if the vices are equal. Because the virtues have a connection not over the vices or the sins. Mm-hmm. Supposed to help you hear this, Eric? At your own risk. The third one precedes us. All right. All right. All right. All right.