Prima Secundae
Lecture 194: Sin in Reason: Morose Delectation and Higher Reason

Transcript
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Now, a more difficult question here. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that in sensuality there's able to be what? Mortal sin, huh? For the acts are what? Known from their object, right? It's a famous thing in the anima, right? It says that the powers of the soul are known by their acts, and the acts are known by their what? Object, right? So by the music of Mozart, I know what hearing is. I don't know what hearing is, I don't know what the ear is, huh? But about the objects of sensuality, it happens that one can sin mortally, just as about the pleasurables, delectables of flesh, right? And therefore the act of sensuality is able to be a what? Mortal sin. And thus in sensuality there's found mortal sin. That makes sense, huh? Moreover, mortal sin is contrary to virtue. But virtue can be in sensuality. For temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, right? Parts are not rational, essentially, right? As the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, huh? So in the third book of the Ethics, Aristotle takes up in particular the virtues of fortitude and temperance, right? It takes up fortitude first, right? Because that's... And then in book five it takes up what? Justice, right? And then in book four it is a lesser moral virtues, but very important one is nevertheless. Liberality and generosity and magnificence and magnanimity, right? Philotemia, mildness, huh? And then the social virtues, the friendliness, sense of humor, what do you want to call it? Eutrapoleia, huh? Shakespeare speaks very well of that, you know? Even the etymology of it, huh? Easily turning, right? Eutrapoleia, the guy who can turn anything to send, kind of... Yeah, yeah. And that's what he describes Byron there in one of the plays, huh? Therefore in sensuality there can be mortal sin, huh? Because it's a ritual. Since contraries are apt to be about the same. Moreover, venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin, huh? But disposition habits are in the same. Since therefore venial sin is in sensuality, also mortal sin can be in the same. I think I saw that, huh? Then you'll pipe and smoke it. But against this is what Augustine says in the book of Retractions. All that's what Augustine's doing is correction himself, right? And has had in the gloss of Romans 7, 14, that the disordered motion of concubiscence, which is the sin of sensuality, is able to be even in those who are in what? Grace. In whom, however, mortal sin is not found. To take away grace. Therefore, the disordered motion of sensuality is not a mortal sin, huh? Am I going to get off this lightly or not? I don't know. I answer it should be said, that just as a disorder corrupting the principle of bodily life causes what? bodily death, right? When I was a boy, I thought everybody who died, died of a heart attack, right? Because everybody that I seem to know that died, died of a heart attack, huh? Didn't live long enough to get cancer, whatever it is they get now. So, a disorder corrupting the, what? Spiritual life, right? Which is the last end. Causes, what? Spiritual death, mortal sin. This has been said above, huh? Interesting, huh? Because in the body, you think about the heart, right? It's kind of the, it's an organ there, huh? Causes death. But to order something to the end is not of sensuality, but only of, what? Reason, I don't know, the orderer. For a disorder from the end is not except of the one to whom it belongs to order things in the end. Whence mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in, what? Yeah. I don't know if he means to exclude will, but I don't think he means that, does he? Sometimes will is said to be in reason, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the act of sensuality can, what? Run together, huh? To mortal sin. But the act of, what? Mortal sin does not have that it be a, what? From this that is a sensuality. You took the first part of the sentence, it wouldn't make any sense. But from this that it is of, what? Reason to which it belongs to order things in end. And therefore, mortal sin is not attributed to sensuality, but to reason. That's a very subtle thing he's saying there, right, huh? It's reason that orders things to an end. To the second, it should be said that also the act of virtue is not perfected through this that is a sensuality only, but more through this that is of reason and the will, to whom it belongs to what you choose. For the act of moral virtue is not without choice, huh? So Aristotle defines moral virtue in general in the second, what, book, right? How does he define it, huh? It's a habit with choice, huh? Existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason, right? So the choice is in the, what, very definition of moral virtue. And choice is an act of the, what, of will and reason rather than of the, so that's principle, right? Hence, always with the act of moral virtue, which perfects the desiring power, right, is also the act of, what, foresight, yeah, very good, which perfects the rational power, huh? And it's also the same thing, then, about moral, of mortal sin, right, as has been said, huh? Now, what about this argument from disposition, right? Well, Thomas sees a distinction here. To the third, it should be said that disposition has itself in three ways to that to which it disposes. Sometimes it is in the same and in the same, right? As the science that has begun, right, huh? He said to be a disposition for perfect, what, science, huh? Sometimes it is in the same, but it's not the same. As heat is a disposition to the form of, what, fire. Sometimes it is neither the same nor in the same, right? As in those things which have an order to each other, so that from one of them, one arrives at the other. Just as the goodness of the imagination is a disposition for science, which is an intellect. That's true, especially in geometry, right? And in this way, venial sin, which is in sensuality, can be a disposition for, what, mortal sin that is in reason. I suspect that he'd solve it that way, right? What disposes, right? You know, if your emotions are all disordered, it's going to dispose you to make a bad judgment by your reason, right? But the reason is a different faculty, right, than the faculty for the emotions, huh? So we've got time for another article here. Okay. to the fifth one goes for it does it seems that sin cannot be in reason for the sin of any power is some defect of it but the defect of reason is not a sin but more excuses one from sin for one is excused to send an account of ignorance therefore in reason there cannot be sin moreover the first subject of sin is the will but reason comes before the will since it directs it therefore sin cannot be what in reason it's interesting moreover there can be no sin except about those things which are in our power so to speak in us but the perfection and defective reason is not of those things which are in us some are naturally deficient in reason or what yeah some are so let's see on there the quick go therefore in reason there is what no sin but against this is what augustine says in the 12th book on the trinity that sin is both in the lower reason and in higher reason right i answer it should be said that the sin of any power consists in the act of that power as is clear from the thing said but reason has a double act twofold act one by itself you might say in comparison to its own object which is to know something what true another is the act of reason insofar as it directs the other what powers in both ways it happens for there to be a sin in reason and reason and first insofar as it wanders in the knowledge of truth which is then imputed to it for a sin when it has ignorance or error about that which is it is able and not to what no uh to the jesuit priest at one time he didn't like that at all secondly when it commands disordered acts of the lower what powers huh i'm going to seduce this young lady or something right or also after what deliberation it does not what coerce right the lower powers okay so it's in both ways right now i don't know or i'm mistaken about things i'm able to know and should know right then that's something what sin for one reason right and when i disorderly what yeah yeah sin reason so to the first there if it should be said that that argument proceeds about the defect of reason which pertains to its own act with respect to its own object right and this when the defect of knowledge is of what someone is not able to what to know and then such a defect of reason is not a sin but excuses from sin right huh as is clear in those things which are committed by the furious if over it's a defect of reason about that which man is able and ought to know it does not what altogether excuse man from what sin but that defect is imputed to him for what sin the defect of her which is only in directing other powers is always imputed to reason as he said because it can what do its own act now what about the order here of reason and will to the second it should be said which has been said above when when treated of the acts of the will and reason that the will in some way moves and precedes reason and reason in some way what will right whence the movement of the will is able to be called what reasonable and the act of reason is able to be called what voluntary right then and according to this in reason there's found sin either in so far as what its defect is voluntary or in so far as the act of reason is a beginning of the act of the will and to the third is clear the response from things said huh was that enough to chew on now with indigestion right other bullies always talk about intellectual indigestion right Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, do from the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. I agree, Thomas. Help us to understand what you have written. Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question 74, article 6. To 6, then, one goes forward thus. Yes, it seems that the sin of morose, dilictationis, it's kind of a what? Morose pleasure. Is not in reason, right? For dilictatio, pleasure, delight, implies the emotion of the appetitive what? Power, yeah. But the appetitive power is distinguished from reason, which is a grasping power, right? Therefore, morose pleasure is not in what? Reason, huh? I was reading in Thomas there, another text there, where he's saying that the appetitive act, and especially desire, seems to be like emotion, right? Why knowing is more like rest? And I'm just thinking of the idea of grasp, right? That's the idea of, you know, you're holding something at rest, so to speak. And by desire, you're kind of going out to the thing in search of it as it were. And so the emotions are well-named in that sense, and it's from motion. Not only because there's a bodily emotion, but because desire itself is that sort of thing. Moreover, one is able to know from the objects to which, what, power the act belongs, huh? So if the object is color, then it belongs to the eye and so on, right? Through this, that the power or ability is ordered to, what, the object. But sometimes the, what, morose pleasure is about sensible goods, huh? And not about the goods of reason. Therefore, the good of morose pleasure is not in, what? Reason. Reason, huh? Moreover, morosum, huh? Is something said to be morosum on account of the, what? Length of the time, right? But the length of time is not a reason why some act pertains to some power. Therefore, morose pleasure does not pertain, what? Yeah. But against this is what Augustine says in the 12th book of the Trinity. That the consent to a, what? Elicit, I guess? If one is contented only with the, what? Pleasure of the thought, huh? Thus, I think it's like having, right? A woman, right? But alone, it's a, what? Food that is prohibited, right? Yeah. Kind of a strange text there from Augustine, right? But to the woman is understood lower reason, right? As he expounds there. Therefore, the sin of morose pleasure is in reason, huh? This is obscure enough, isn't it? The answer should be said. This has been said. Sin happens to be in reason sometimes, right? Insofar as it is, what? Directing human acts, right? Now it is manifest that reason not only directs exterior acts, but also the inward passionism. And therefore, when reason fails fails in the direction of the inward passions, there is said to be sin in, what? Reason. Just as when one fails in the direction of, what? Exterior acts, huh? You can now take a little pause there, right? Now it goes in two ways it takes place, right? The reason, huh? Fails in the direction of the inward or interior passions in two ways, right? In one way, when it commands, elicit, what? Passions. Just as when a man from deliberation provokes in himself, I guess, the motion of, what? Anger or what? Yeah. Notice he takes those two things, anger and concubiscence, because they are what? Yeah, for the vehemence, huh? Shakespeare mentioned that metaphor there in, yeah, you like it, right? Yeah, in the very what? Yeah. But, you know, when Thomas takes up temperance, the virtue of temperance, right? And then he takes up other virtues that are similar to temperance, and he does so with the other ones, right? He takes up the mildness, which moderates, what? Anger with, what? Temperance, right? Because you have these two strong emotions, right? And Samuel Johnson, huh? You can see that anger comes out sometimes, huh? So much that, you know, Irving, not Irving, but Boswell compares it to, you know, you know, like going to erupt a mountain or something, you know? He's got to kind of avoid these things, right, huh? And I was just quoting earlier, the freak, even, he's very kind of mad at the Americans, right, huh? For their insubordination, huh? And he says, talking about, you know, your neighbouring being good to your neighbouring, I'm going to be good to every man, he says, except for the American, he says. And he goes, oh, and he gets me angry, you know, for some reason, huh? And, uh, it's kind of funny, huh? That's an emotion that needs, and Shakespeare has the famous, what, Coriolanus there, right, huh? Yeah, his anger, right? Once he gets his anger going, and he can't throw himself, huh? But I think men who are, you know, gain power, you know, tend to have some kind of an anger, you know, to kind of frighten their subordinates unless there's nothing else. So that's when it, when it, what, actually commands illicit passions, right? That's one way. Another way, when it does not repress, right, a illicit or unlawful motion of passion, right? As in someone after he is deliberated, that the motion of the passion arising is, what, disordered, right? Nevertheless, he, what, dwells, right? About it. And does not, what, expel it, right, huh? And according to this, sin of, what, indwelling, fulling on pleasure is in, what, reason, huh? Now, to the first objection, he says that pleasure is in the desiring power as in a, what, proximate principle or beginning, right? But it is in reason as in the first, what, motive, right? According, as has been said above, that actions which do not go out into exterior matter are as in a subject in their, what, very beginnings, huh? Yeah, I don't know why he's taking it up with pleasure in particular, right? Maybe that's a question for other, you know? What he's saying is in the direct column and the normal action. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So he's in the plight and the second objection he kind of gets into that. To the second it should be said that reason has its own, what, illicit action, right, about its, what, its own object, right, huh? But it has direction about, what, all the objects of the lower powers, right? Which powers can be directed and are able to be directed by reason, right? And according to this, also, pleasure about sensible objects pertains to, what, reason, huh? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. To the third objection from the idea that, yeah, pleasure is not said to be, what, remaining or dwelling, not from the, what, remaining of time, but from this that reason deliberates about it, right, by dwelling on it a long time, but nevertheless does not repel it, right, holding on to and evolving freely what at once is to attack the soul ought to be, what, rejected, huh, as Augustine says in the 12th book of the Trinity, huh, jump into the bush, right, Benedict, is it, Francis of Assisi? Okay, to the seventh one goes forward thus. It seems that the sin of consent and act is not in higher, what? Reason, right? For to consent is an act of the desiring power as has been had above. But reason is a vis apprehensiva. He doesn't want to say knowing, he says apprehending. Therefore, the sin of consent and act is not in higher reason. Moreover, higher reason aims at, what, the eternal reasons, at looking upon them and, what, consulting them, right? Thomas said, sometimes we'll stop in those two words of Augustine, in speciendes, right, which means looking upon them in themselves, right, and then counseling, for the sake of the lower thing, you're consulting, what is in accord with the higher, yeah. But sometimes it consents in act, not consulting the eternal reasons, right? For not always does a man think about divine things when he consents in some act. Therefore, the sin of consent and act is not always in higher reason. Moreover, just as through the eternal reasons a man is able to regulate or rule exterior acts, so also interior, what, pleasures or other passions. But to consent in pleasure without this, that, what, one states it should be, what, fulfilled by doing, is of inferior reason, as Augustine says. Therefore, also consent in the act of sin, sometimes, right, to be attributed to lower reason, huh? All the trouble that Augustine got us into by starting this distinction between higher and lower reason, huh? Moreover, just as higher reason excels lower, so reason excels the imaginative power. But sometimes a man proceeds to act through the grasping of the imaginative power without any deliberation of what? Reason, huh? Just as in someone from an unpremeditated, huh? Without meditating, moves his hand or his, what, foot, huh? Therefore, also sometimes reason, lower reason, consents in the act of sin without, what, higher reason, right? Didn't know it was a sin, though, to move your foot. Yeah, I know. I was thinking about those times where you ever wake up, shortly after you go to sleep, you wake up with a sudden movement like that, your arm moves or something, and why, I don't know. We're talking about the beard, too, you know, you can't hear. Yeah. You guys should know about that, right? But I wonder if Thomas had a beard. What do you think of a beard? Is he customary of a phrase? I don't know. I don't know. You should know for Tim as having a beard. I mean, you know, the paintings, they don't have a beard. Because, you know, I'll teach you to always talk about the painting of, I guess, the Dominican there, where everybody that you know, with the cross, the creation of the cross, and like that, and everybody's, you know, you know, kind of penitent, so looking down, and say, Thomas is looking up at the cross, trying to understand, what is this, you know? I don't know what it is, but there was a sting last time, though, in our parish, we were in the high, and down in front, it's interesting, because down at the end of the 19th century, or beginning of the 20th century, and one of the figures they had down in the front was all dressed in red, and he's got this very aquiline nose, and it's Newman, and he's stinking. And in the back is this big, jolly-looking friar, and we're going, Thomas Aquinas, listen to the Christchop, and he's like, hey! And Newman's on there, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, big, and the wisdom of God. Is this scene of the fighting? Yeah, so they've got, of course, they feel like the Jewish-looking rabbis, but then Aquinas in the back, and Romans down in the front, it's kind of weird. Okay, now, Guston's got this likeness here, where he compares the woman and what? Adam, To lower reason, right? And higher reason in their being tempted, right? For if, Guston says in the 12th book of the Trinity, that if, in the consent of using badly things which are, what? Sense, through the sense of the body, right? There is to be, what? Discerned any sin if, what? There be, what? Also, completed by the body, it should be understood that the, what? Woman is given listened food to the man, right? The will, superior reason is, what? Signified, right? Therefore, to higher reason pertains consent in the act of sin. I remember the parish there, we had the, the auxiliary bishop was our pastor there, you know, for a number of years, right? And, very holy man, you know. Of course, the ladies in the parish would always try to go to communion from him, you know, rather than just the regular priest, right? You know, so, you'd have all this, we'd go over to him, you know, and the poor priest not getting it. I don't think that you'd get any more from him, you know. But, what he was saying was that if Adam had not gone along with her, right, we would not have been, you know. We would have fallen nature. Yeah, yeah. I don't know what would have happened to her, but, yeah. But, I mean, we would not have, you know, descended to all of us, you know, this original sin, right. So, he's being compared to higher reason, right, and she to lower reason, well then, you know, his consent was what really done us in. Therefore, to higher reason pertains to consent in the act of sin. I answer, it should be said that consent implies a certain judgment about that in which one consents, right? Between which one consents. For just as looking reason, as I say, judges and gives a judgment about understandable things. So, practical reason, right? Judges and gives a position about things to be done, right? But it should be considered that in every judgment, the last, what, sentence pertains to the supreme judging power, right? Just as we see in speculative matters, that the last, what, judgment about some proposition is given by resolution to first beginnings, right? I was thinking, you know, a good question that's going to try to catch more on or something on this, you know. I said, does reason go from beginnings to conclusions or does it go from conclusions to beginnings? What would you say? conclusion? Yeah. But you might be inclined to say, you know, well, the conclusion is deduced from the beginnings, right? And therefore, reason goes from the beginnings to the conclusion. To go from conclusion to the beginning, I mean, it would be going backwards, right? But in the reasoning going to a conclusion you have to appeal to some higher. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What Thomas expresses in one text is he says, reason goes from the beginnings to the conclusion in the via in venienti, right? In the way of finding and looking. And then it goes from the, what, thing is found back to the beginnings, right? In via yurikandi, in the way of judging, right? So you go back there, right? And I know, this is I saw sometimes in, you know, I'm getting, working in ukulele a bit, you know, you followed the argument, you know, to the conclusion, right? And then you kind of see, now, can I resolve that conclusion back into the things that are more known, right? Whereby you judge it finally, right? But it's kind of interesting to see if the mind doesn't ... Kind of circle there in the mind, huh? So long as there remains some beginning that is higher, right, huh? Still through it one can examine that about which one is, what? Asking, right, huh? Because not yet is, what? Because still yet is suspended the, what? Judgment, as it were not having been given the, what? Final sentence of judgment, right? Okay. Sentencia, as we get the sense of the lumbar, right? It's like the opinions, you might say, right? Yeah, yeah, that's what it is. Okay. Now it's manifest that human acts are able to be ruled from the rule of human reason, right? Which is taken from, what? Created things. Which naturally man, what? Knows. And then further from the rule of the divine law, as has been said above, right, huh? Whence, since the rule of the divine law is superior, it follows that the last, or the ultimate judgment, right? Ultimate, rather, position, through which the judgment is finally or at last terminated, pertains to superior reason, which pays attention to the eternal reasons, huh? Which looks towards them, which aids at them. When, however, about many things it occurs to judge, right? The final judgment is about that which last, what, occurs, huh? Now, in the human acts, the last thing that occurs is the, what, act, huh? But a preambulum, huh, walking before, right, is, what? The pleasure, which leads one into the act, or to the act. And therefore, to a higher reason, properly retains consent in the act. But, to a lower reason, which has an inferior or lower judgment, retains the, what? Preambulum judgment, right? Which is about pleasure, right, huh? Doesn't Thomas, you know, use the word preambulum, he talks about philosophy being kind of, for theology, preambula, right? Although, also, higher reason, it can judge about pleasure, because whatever is subject to the judgment of the inferior is also subject to the judgment of the superior, but then, not the reverse, huh? That comes up in the prima parts, right, when he takes up reason, right, huh? And then he asks whether higher reason and lower reason are two different powers in us, right? They're not two different powers, it's the same reason, but it's, one is looking at the eternal, and the other is looking at something more temporal, right? So, they're not really separate, what, powers. He does the same thing there, he asks whether looking reason and practical reason are two different reasons, right? They're really the same reason, right? But one is, you know, directing us in our actions, the other is just considering the truth in itself, or by itself. I often think of that distinction between what St. Paul speaks of, spirit and the soul, because the soul, anima, is looking towards the body, one is the spirit, one is the spiritual, God. That's right? Yeah, the sense of spirit has a sense of the part of the soul that is immaterial, right, huh? Involves the reason and the will, right? Spiritual way, the soul is defined as the act of a natural body composed of tools, right? So, sometimes it's called a soul in terms of it's being the act of the body, right? But insofar as it is not, it has a being that's not just in the body, right? A being that, as Thomas says, is not immersed in the body, right? Then, we call it a spirit, right? It wasn't a magnificat, right? My soul magnifies, O Lord. Spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, right? It's kind of interesting that she uses those two words, right? I know when she says, my soul magnifies the Lord, she's thinking of being the mother of God, you know? But then it's in her body, right, that she gives breath to Him, right? But her spirit being her will and her reason, right? Adverses in the Lord Himself, right? She's kind of magnifying, multiplying. God's presence and things, right? Interesting. Now, to the first objection, it should be said that to consent is an act of the desiring power, not absolutely, but consequently to the act of reason, deliberating, and judging. In this, for in this, consent is terminated, that the will tends to that which has been judged by what? Reason. Whence consent can be attributed to both will and to reason, huh? The second should be said that from this, that higher reason does not direct human acts according to the divine law, impeding the act of sin, right, huh? It is said to what? Consent, right? Whether it thinks about the what or not. For when it thinks about the law of God, in act it has what? Contempt, right, huh? When it does not think about it, it neglects it, right, huh? By way of a certain omission, right? Well, that could be a sin too, huh? Whence in all ways, consent in the act of sin proceeds from higher reason. Whence, because as Augustine says in the 12th book of the Trinity, that is not able to what? Perpetrating. It can't be discerned by the mind, huh? That sin has been efficaciously, huh? Perpetrated. Unless that intention of the mind, among whom or by whom, is what? The highest power of moving members to do something or prohibiting or prohibiting them from working, right? When it gives what way to a, what, yeah, resurs it, when Joshua comes back, he's slacked and will put all of us to shame, right? Everything, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it, I get it. And they say, you know, Aristotle's Greek, you know, it's pig Greek, you know, they say, you know, I tell you this book for him, he's, you know, flowerful, you know, yeah, yeah. But Thomas, I think he adopts that, right? But if you see his dedicatory epistles to the Pope, you know, then they have a different type of Latin or formal, but that's not appropriate for a teacher to do that. So I say looking reason rather than speculative reason, or theoretical reason, huh? People are so accustomed to those Latin or Greek words, you know, that they don't, well, what's that? To the third, it should be said that higher reason, through its consideration of the eternal law, just as it is able to direct or to, what, prohibit, you know, or restrain, yeah, an exterior act, so, so it can do this with the interior, what, pleasure, right, huh? But nevertheless, before it arrives at the judgment of higher reason, right, huh? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right?