Prima Secundae
Lecture 199: Ignorance and Passion as Causes of Sin

Transcript
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So, we're up to Article 4 here. Not time for our break yet, I don't think. We'll finish this question at least. We haven't done Article 4 yet, have we? It seems like it's similar. Ignorance diminishes sin? Okay, it doesn't excuse totally. We've had that. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that ignorance does not diminish sin. Come on, give us a little bit, huh? That which is common to all sins does not diminish sin, huh? But ignorance is common in every sin. For the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that every bad man is, what, ignorant, huh? What a good, smart guy this Aristotle was, huh? And the other work was that the Edemian Ethics of Aristotle there. He speaks of how God originates all our thinking and willing. It's really kind of amazing that he saw that. It's kind of the unmoved mover, you know, in the spiritual acts as well as in the bodily motion that he did in the physics, right? It's really, really amazing. And Thomas is always pointing out how Aristotle, both in the Dianima and in the metaphysics, he criticized Empedocles, you know, for saying that we know something God doesn't know. Empedocles, you know, said that there's no, what, hate in God, therefore he doesn't know hate. He had a good reason to say that. And Aristotle said that, that's ridiculous, you know, that we would know something God doesn't know. Smart guy, Aristotle. Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin, huh? It's found in every sin, huh? Because every sin is diminished. Moreover, a sin added to a sin makes it a worse sin, huh? A greater sin. But ignorance itself is a sin, as has been said. Therefore it doesn't diminish sin, it increases it, huh? Reminds of the Greek law, you know, if you get into something crazy because you got drunk and went and did it, you got punished twice, once for the bad act you did, and the other for getting drunk. There's two sins, right? You punished it double, right? If I got drunk and went too fast or out of my lane, I'd be punished for driving carelessly, right? But also for being drunk, huh? This is like that, right? You get a double punishment. You get your sin, meaning you're a man of sin. You're guilty of the sin, but you're more guilty because you justified your sin. Moreover, it doesn't pertain to the same thing to aggravate and diminish the sin, huh? But ignorance makes the sin, what? More heavy. Ignoring, what? The dignity of God, right? He most gravely sins if you ignore that, huh? Therefore, ignorance does not diminish, what? Sin. Moreover, if some ignorance diminishes sin, this will most of all seem to be about that which totally takes away the use of reason. I blacked out. But this ignorance does not diminish sin, but more increases, huh? For the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, there, that's what I was talking about, that the man who is inebriated merits twofold, huh? Yeah, maledictions, huh? Okay, two things he's guilty of. So I go over the speed there when I'm sober. It's not as bad as if I go over the speed when I'm drunk. I could be punished twice. Therefore, ignorance does not, what? Diminish sin, huh? But whatever is against the notion of remission of sin, whatever is the reason for remission of sin, alleviates the sin. But ignorance is of this sort. For he said in the first epistle to Timothy, now, this is a great witness now of St. Paul himself, huh? I achieved, what? Missy accordion, mercy. Because I persecuted the church, huh? They were scared stiff at him when he was first converted, right? They thought, oh, no, this is it. He's not one of us. He's pretty bad, huh? He wasn't he? When they were stoning, what's his name, the first guy? Yeah, he was there, wasn't he? Holding. Consenting. Right, so definitely he consented. Yeah. Okay. Therefore, ignorance diminishes or deviates sin, right? The answer should be said that since, because every sin is voluntary, right? To that extent, ignorance is able to diminish sin insofar as it diminishes the voluntary character, huh? If, however, it does not diminish the voluntary, in no way does it diminish the, what? Sin, huh? Now, it's manifest, however, that the ignorance, which totally excuses from sin, huh? Because it totally takes away, what? The voluntary does not diminish sin, but altogether takes it away, right? But the ignorance, which is not a cause of sin, but has itself going along with, huh? The sin, neither diminishes the sin, nor, what? Increases it, huh? That, therefore, ignorance, which is able to diminish sin, which is a cause of sin, and nevertheless does not totally, what? An excuse from sin, huh? It happens sometimes that such ignorance directly and per se is, what? Voluntary. As when someone by his own, what? Spontaneity or something, that he might more, what? Freely sin, huh? And such ignorance would seem to increase the voluntary and the sin. Because from the intensity of the will to sinning comes about that someone does not, that someone wishes to undergo, right? The damnable thing of ignorance, right? On account of the liberty of, what? Sinning, huh? Sometimes, however, huh? The ignorance, which is the cause of sin, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly and or paratchitans. As when someone does not wish to work at study, huh? To labor at study, from which it follows him to be, what? Ignorant, huh? Or when someone wants to drink wine immoderately, that's me, from which it follows him to, what? Be inebriated and to lack discretion, huh? And such ignorance diminishes the voluntary, huh? And consequently, what? Sin, huh? When someone does not sin, it cannot be that the will, what? What is directly and per se born towards the sin, but paratchitans, right? Whence there is there less, what? Less contempt. And consequently, less, what? Sin, huh? So some ignorance can diminish sin, right? But some ignorance can increase it, right? To talk to the pastor, too, about the perfection for the people who voted for Obama. Some of you may have sinned in ignorance. But there's this ignorance chosen. The first effort should be said that the ignorance by which, according to which everyone bad is ignorant, right, is not the, what? Cause of sin. that the truth should be said that the truth should be said but something fouling the cause to the passion or habit inclining in sin so when David pursued Bathsheba that was passio which made him ignorant at the moment that this was adultery and after he became habitual he had to get rid of the man too so the man when he quits the sin his mind is saying this should be done therefore there's not a sin so he's ignorant of it being a sin it's some of the consequence upon his passion or habit Mozart's opera, Don Giovanni Don Giovanni's got the habit he loves them all but especially the young beginner but it didn't seem that bad to him glory of your money to us he says we're drinking his dinner there I guess sometimes Mozart would make the last act of the scene when he goes down to hell right, the end of the opera but then there's another part after it's where the characters you know, I'm glad and they all get a little better now it's a beautiful thing though crazy, great opera Kirk, you guys have something interesting about Don Juan and about Faust and he said that they're both characters that only appear in Christian times it's kind of a complete giving over to one more spiritual vice one more carnal vice but it's something that it's kind of like a whole rejection of Christianity, right? to find fully in the pagan, right? yeah, it's like the anti-Christian exactly yeah, yeah I think there's some some subtlety of that you know, just reason that you really have even in Greek grammar a symbol like Faust makes a deal you know, with this special knowledge and power yeah or do you have a living teen you know, it's completely Don Juan, right? I mean, they try the Kellogg's Conquest you know, 1003 in Spain there's a Kellogg area there one reason is perhaps because none of the pagans had a concept of really a rational deity even in Islam although it isn't bound by reason either so the whole concept of God being reason is very important I think that's interesting what Kierkegaard said there you know Connick said Kierkegaard is closer to us you know these other modern philosophers he's more a believer you know the second should be said that sin added to sin makes what? more sins it does not however make always more sin greatest sin who was saying that you know the kid you want five dollars you want four ones because you always take the four ones right because it's more money right I was saying this the other day my father when he was trying to teach me this he had a quarter and three pennies and he said who has more money I do I got three you got one because forte perhaps right they do not come together in the same sin but they are what many sins right and it can happen that if the first diminishes the second that both together do not have such gravity as one sin only right just as homicide is a more what grace sin done by a what sober man than it comes from a what drunk man although here there are two sins so you got to watch out it's all together logical punishing people more right they want to discourage people getting drunk too because variety yeah more reason of the ratio of this falling sin than it's what gravity right being drunk now to the third it should be said huh this is going back to Ambrose now he's another great doctor to the third it should be said that the word of Ambrose can be understood about ignorance simply affected huh not real or can be understood in the genus of the sin of ingratitude in which the highest grade is that man what does not recognize what benefits or can be understood about the ignorance of infidelity which subverts the foundation of the spiritual building huh in case you need time to explain Ambrose too huh to the fourth what about this huh to the fourth it should be said that the drunk merits two what maledictiones two maledictiones that means you know saying that of him right huh on account of two sins that he commits right to which drunkenness and another sin that follows from the being drunk right but nevertheless the drunkenness by reason of the ignorance joined to it right diminishes the following what sin and perhaps more than is the what gravity of the drunkenness itself right this has been said or it can be said that that word is induced according to the ordering of Pitykus right the legislator was Pitykus one of the seven wise men I forget in Greece I think so yeah who laid down that if the drunk the drunk if they struck people right would be or fully huh punished right huh not regarding what yeah which the drunk ought more to have but because utility because more injured being drunk than yeah as is clear through the philosopher in the second book of politics huh I guess so I guess so I had a VIP thing on last night you know they gave me right and so I went in the VIP room you know because the speaker's going to be there before dinner and so on and went up to the bar there and took out my you know $20 I was going to get a couple of wines from Rose and I and oh that's on the house he says you know so by the way you know that VIP I have the VIP room right so I mean I could drink a lot you know so I'm just saying any driver yeah Skyward was in Skyward being at a wedding reception years ago right and I guess the band is hired to play to a certain time right and then it's you know they kick off right everybody's having such a good time that the father of the bride ever was asked them that they would you know play for another hour and he would you know increase their thing but that was a mistake because the next hour people got so drunk that the fight started to break out between the two families and so on he says never extend you know if you're going to stop playing the band at 10 o'clock let them stop and go home you know so take a little break now because because you Well, again, without you. Okay. Then we ought to consider about the cause of sin on the side of the sense-desiring power, right? Whether the passio or the emotion of the soul is a cause of what? Sin, huh? Did you ever see how Thomas in his prayer is there for confession, right? He deals with these three particular causes. But he's like, you know, by the sins of weakness, right? He's offended God the Father, right? By the sins of ignorance, right? You know, I mean, the Son. And by malice, of course. That's the three things he offended the whole trinity, right? I mean, it's pretty serious. And about this he asks eight things. Whether the passion or the sense-desiring power is he able to move or incline the, what? Will. Will, right? Can hunger move my will? I wonder. Secondly, whether it can overcome reason against its very, what? Knowledge, huh? Whether, third one. Whether the sin that comes from, what? Passion is a sin from infirmity, huh? Because you attribute to the Father, what? You appropriate strength, right? To the Father, huh? So, sin of infirmity, right? It's like sitting against the Father. Fourth, whether this passion, which is the love of oneself, is a cause of all, what? Sin. Don't they try to teach you to love yourself? Love it too? High school now or grade school or something? Yeah. Fifth, about those three causes, which are laid down in 1 John 2. The concupiscence of the eye, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of, what? Life. So that's the source of all evil, right? Those three, huh? There's one psalm there where you have the, some things applied to man and applied to the son of man, right? And you have three animals, huh? That's put under him. And one is the beast, and one is the fish, and one is the birds. The birds are superbia vitae, and the fish are the concupiscence of the oculorum, because that's where you trade, by the sea, and then the beasts are, of course, concupiscence of the flesh, huh? So he's overcoming all those. John the Cross has a lot of things on these three, you know? John the Cross. Six, whether the passion which is a cause of sin diminishes it, huh? Seven, whether it wholly excuses, huh? The order is reversed here, right? There was some ignorance, huh? Eight, whether the passion which is from passion, the sin which is from passion can be, what? Mortal, huh? To the first end one proceeds thus. Yes, it seems that the will is not moved by the passion of the sense-desiring power. For no passive power is moved except by its own, what? Object, huh? But the will is both a passive power and active together insofar as it is moving and moved. It's a moved mover, as Aristotle says. As in the third book about the soul, the philosopher says universally about the sense-desiring power. There you have that Antonia Messiah again, right? Now this expression that you have sometimes, the king of kings, right? That's kind of equivalent almost to Antonia Messiah, right? What we call Shakespeare the poet of poets or something like that or Mozart the musician. It's like saying he stands out in that particular kind like you do when you name them by Antonia Messiah. Since, therefore, the object of the will is not a passion of the sense-desiring power but more the good of reason, it seems that the passion of the sense-power does not move the will, right? So the object of the will is the good as known by reason, right? That's the moved mover, right? The moved mover is the will. Moreover, the higher mover is not moved by the lower as the soul is not moved by the body. But the will, which is the desire of reason, is compared to the sense-desire as a higher mover to the lower. As the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, that the appetite of reason, desiring power of reason, who is the desiring sense-power, just as in the heavenly bodies, the sphere moves sphere, but the higher sphere moves the lower and not the lower the higher. Therefore, the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sense-habitatin. Further, nothing immaterial is able to be moved by something material, but the will is a certain immaterial power, for it does not use a, what, bodily organ, since it is in, what, reason, the rational part of the soul, as Aristotle says in the third book about the soul. But the sense-desiring power is a material power and is founded in a, what, bodily organ. Therefore, the passion, the sense-appetite is not able to move the intellectual appetite. Well, I'm convinced at the time being, aren't you? But again, this is what is said in Daniel 13. Concupiscence subverts your heart. Yeah. Yeah. Daniel was the boy that wasn't here at that time. He said, well, let's interrogate these guys separately, right? They contradict each other, right? So in Bathsheba there, right, that seems like there's an example there of sense-desiring moving the will, right? The answer should be said that the passion of the sense-desiring power is not able to directly draw or move the will, but is able to do so indirectly. What does that mean? In this, in two ways. In one way, according to a certain, what, abstraction. For since all the powers of the soul are rooted in one essence of the soul, it is necessary that when one power is, what, intensified, you might say, right, in its own act, another is, what, yeah, or even wholly impeded, right, huh? So they said Mozart's ears are so sensitive, right, that the whole man is in the ear when he is listening to these things, right? So you're so, what, taken up with that that you don't notice other things, huh? My brother Mark was visiting a friend there in Michigan, you know, and some of these guys were artists and so on, right? And they're all taken up with their eyes, you know? My brother describes, you know, if they come into a room like this, you know, and they, they see green, you know, oh, I've never seen a green, you know, or a red shade just like that, you know? They're completely taken up with their eyes, you know? I suppose some of the poets are completely in their, what, imagination, right? There was a book sale one time and I picked up a book, you know, from the road clubs there in England, right? It's describing, you know, England, taking all around England and what you could see and so on, so it's kind of interesting and doesn't cost much and, uh, There's a mountain there in Wales, huh? They say if you sleep at the foot of this mountain, you'll wake up either mad or a poet. Well, it isn't too much difference if you're mad than a poet, right? But kind of in the imagination, right? Yeah, I don't know. The poet is so totally distracted. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I would teach you to define the poet as a man with his brains kicked out. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Okay, so he's pointing out a couple of things here, right? One, that these powers are all rooted in the one's soul, right? And that intention isn't required, right? So when something becomes very strong in one of them, right? Then the other ones, yeah. That's when you get angry, right? It kind of occupies you, doesn't it? Another way, on the side of the very object of the will, this is the other way. What is this? Which is the good apprehended by reason. Now, how does it interfere with that? Well, the judgment and the grasping, those are two different things, right, of reason, is impeded on account of the vehement and disordered grasping of the imagination and the judgment of the, what? Estimated power, and these are two of the internal senses, huh? So the reason, the use of reason depends upon what the internal senses do, and they're affected by the, what, sense appetite, and therefore affecting the will inside of its, what, object, object, right, huh? As in clearing those who are out of their mind, huh? Amentibus, huh? It is manifest that the apprehension and imagination follows the passion of the sense appetite, huh? So the poets are always talking about this, right? And the judgment of the estimated power. Just as the disposition of the tongue, that the judgment of the, what, taste follows the, what, disposition of the, what, tongue, huh? Whence we see that men who are existing in some passion, right, do not easily turn their imagination away from those things by which they are, what, by which they are affected, yeah. Whence, consequently, the judgment of reason, plurum quae, often, right, many times, follows the passion of the sense appetite, and consequently, the motion of the will, which is apt to follow the, what, judgment of, what, reason, huh? Christel speaks in the rhetoric, you know, how dramatic somebody, you know, you kind of want to say that the whole class of them are bad, right? That's kind of true, you know, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So he thinks his wife is unfaithful there in simple, on posthumous, right? It's just a denunciation, a wonderful denunciation of all womankind, you know, as if all vices are originating with them, you know, and he said, they're not even faithful to their vices, you know, because they're always changing one for another one. It's just really a beautiful denunciation, you know, but your reason's kind of overtaken, right, huh? By this, but he gave some, you know, somebody of some class or some race, you know. My brother was going to Notre Dame, his landlord was scared stiff of black people, right, because her husband had got beat up by some black guy or something, you know, and he thought they were all, you know, didn't like them in the neighborhood at all. He made her very nervous. So what are the two ways, then, that the will can be influenced by the sin's appetite? In what way not, no? It can't be influenced directly, right, no? But because, what, all the powers are rooted in the one soul, and you have to have, what, intention, right, huh? If one power is very, what, very strong, right, and your intention is very much directed towards that, huh? Yeah, yeah. My cousin Dow, you know, he said, you know, he used to listen to Baroque music, you know, but it was kind of a covenant to his reading and studying, right? And then he didn't appreciate Mozart, he said, but then he realized he had to give his full attention to Mozart to really appreciate him, right? And then he began to realize how good Mozart was, right? I think it's interesting, though, right, huh? Because when you're studying, and this is background, some people use classical music kind of background to calm their emotions down a bit, you know? They're not really listening to it, what, fully, you know? And of course, Mozart stayed with nobility, you know, playing on cards, and half listening to the music, right? But you can see that, what he's talking about there, right? And so that's one way it affects it, right, indirectly, right? And the other is that it affects the internal, what, senses, right, which are necessary for a reason, and therefore they affect the will, even on the side of its object, which is, yeah, yeah, yeah. We know how our judgment is affected that way a lot, huh? We know how our judgment is affected that way a lot, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh So he says to the first objection then, right? The first, therefore, it should be said that through the passion of the sense-appetite there comes about some change about the judgment of the object of the will, right? Like we said, because reason is affected as judgment by the internal senses, right? And the internal senses are affected by the passion. Although the, what, passion of the sense-appetite is not directly the object of the, what? The will, right? Like the good is known by reason, huh? So Beesheba was quite a good, right? His judgment was telling him, this is sin for her, you know, to come up to the palace, right? Yeah. The painters I see in the pictures don't do justice to her. The second should be said that the higher is not moved by the lower directly, but indirectly in some way it can be moved, right? And that is by this kind of abstraction he said, right? And similarly one can say to the third objection, right? About the material, the material being moved by the material, right? Not directly, but by this distraction-abstraction. Okay, now we can look at another article here, I guess you've got time for it.