Prima Secundae
Lecture 204: Sin from Malice versus Passion and Divine Causality

Transcript
================================================================================

Whether the one who sins from certain malice sins more greatly than the one from passion. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that the one who sins from certain malice does not sin more greatly than the one who sins from what? Passion. For ignorance excuses sin either wholly or in part. But more is the ignorance in the one who sins from certain malice than in the one who sins from what? Passion. Because the one who sins from certain malice suffers ignorance of the principle, right? Which is maxima, as the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? For he has a bad estimate of the end, which is the beginning in things to be done. Therefore he is more excused from sin, the one who sins from certain malice, than the one who sins from what? Passion. Let's look at the reply. It's not objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the ignorance of what? Choice from which the objection proceeds neither excuses nor diminishes the sin this has been said above. Whence neither more, there's more ignorance, such more, greater ignorance, yeah, make it to be a, what? Less sin. Less sin, huh? We have to wait for the Bible to go a little bit more and latent upon what that means. Second objection. The more someone has something, what? Greater impelling to sin, the more, what? Less he sins. Just as it's clear about the one who, by greater impetus of passion, is, what? Sin. Sin. But the man who sins from certain malice is impelled by his habit, whose force or impulse is stronger than, what? Passion. Therefore, the one who sins from habit sins less than the one who sins from passion, right? It's kind of, yeah, I'm convinced to that, aren't you? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Most even beautiful answer to that. To the second it should be said that the impulse, which is from passion, is, as it were, from the outside with respect to the will. But the, what? Through habit, the will is inclined, as it were, from within. Which is not a similar reason, right? Well, you know, isn't there something like that when they talk about the good act, right? As a man who does something good out of charity, is that more meritorious than somebody who does something good without charity? Yeah. Because his will does it more, what? Inclination, right? More inclined to the good. But some of you might try to argue and say, you know, well, you know, then he's got more impetus to do good than the other man, right? That man's got, how do you think to incline him to do good? So if he does good, it's more meritorious, right? But he does so with the less, what? Inclination of his will. Speaking about the seraphim, you know, of course, you know. Dionysius, you know, says that the seraphim get their name from fire, right, huh? Well, why do they get their name from fire, right? Well, he says three qualities of fire, right? One is that fire always burns upward, right? Continuously, right? And that's the way their heart is going to God with love, right? It's always a saying to God, but continually, right, huh? Okay. And then the fire, what? Yeah. It burns things, absorbs them, right? And that's the way they're influencing the other, what? Yeah, yeah. And there's a third like this there. What was it? The, yeah, yeah. It was light, yeah. Who knew that? Very good, yeah. Yeah, the enlightened, you know, the fire has the light, and the light is the higher hierarchy. And the light is the lower ones, right? A beautiful, beautiful kind of explanation of it. I think that we have a record, because he's a consistent originator, so many times. He knows about seraphic, seraphic order, and all that. Very, very, very, very. Seraphic, yeah, I know. Okay. Very good. The second reply, the habit, say, intemperance, would be in a confused habit, right? Not in a will. That's where the habit would be, right? The outside of the will. Yeah, yeah. That was always, he's still doing it from choice. Yeah, but it's still making the, the habit influences more the choice, which is intrinsic to the will, right? But we'll see. That's good. Okay. Moreover, to sin from sin and malice is to sin from the choice of evil. But the man who sins from passion also chooses, what? Evil, right? Therefore, he does not less sin than the one who sins in sin and sin and malice, right? Now, to the third, it should be said that other is to sin choosing and other to sin from choice. That's interesting. The same kind of distinction you had at the other article, right? For the one who sins from passion sins, to be sure, choosing right, but not from choice, huh? That's interesting, right? Because choice is not in him the first beginning of the sin, but he's induced from passion to choosing that which, existing outside of passion, he would not, what? Choose, right? But the one who sins from certain malice, say, kundum se, as such chooses evil in the way that has been, what? Said, huh? In the first article. And therefore, choice in him is the beginning of sin. In account of this, he is said to sin from choice, huh? They're addicted. But against this, the objections, is that the sin which is committed from industry, right, huh? From this, merits a more grave, what? Punishment, huh? According to that of Job chapter 34, right? He, what? He strikes the impious, right? In the place of those, what? Seeing who, as it were, the industry receded from it, right? But sin is not, punishment is not increased except on account of the gravity of the guilt, right? Therefore, the sin is aggravated from the fact that it is from industry, or a certain malice, huh? And what does the master say, huh? Could they have a master like Thomas around, huh? Be in our company here, huh? Even using our company by the written word, and he can't be here by the spoken word, and I suppose he could, but... Answer, it should be said, that the sin that is from certain malice is more grave than the sin which is from passion, for a three-fold reason, right? Now, first, because since sin is chiefly, consists in the will, right? Chiefly in the will. The more the motion of sin is more, what? Proper to the will itself, the more grave is the sin, other things being, what? Equal, right, huh? Now, the more one sins in certain malice, the more the, what, motion of the sin is proper to the will. As it were, being moved from itself, rather than passion of something else, into the, what, sin. Then when from, what, the passion, one sins, as it were, from an extrinsic impulse, right, being moved to sin, right, huh? When's the sin from this that is... When's the sin from this that is... When's the sin from this that is... When's the sin from this that is... from malice is made what more grave and the more so the more vehement is the what malice from this that is from passion is diminished right and the more so the more the passion was what yeah did david have a real vehement passion there with i wonder about david and even wonder about peter you know with his uh you know denying christ you know how much i was brought up to him you know and then at times he was pope you know i mean secondly because the passion which inclines the will to sinning chito quickly right passes over right and then the man quickly returns to his good proposal being penitent about his what sin huh but the habit by which a man sins from malice is a what permanent quality and therefore the one who sins from malice more what think longer sins right once the philosopher in the seventh book of the ethics compares the intemperate man who sins from malice to the infirm man who continually what labors in sin i mean labors in the incontinent man however who sins from passion to the one who is what yeah i mean he's temporarily fat today or something you know but i guess it's every day he's miserable right sick you know so you're comparing the sickness of the body two kinds of sickness of the body right yeah yeah yeah yeah that's the way he's ordering these reasons because the first reason is more principle right third because the one who sins from certain mouths is badly disposed as regards the end itself which is the beginning in things to be done right huh and therefore his defect is more what dangerous than the one who sins from passion whose proposal tends towards a good end although this proposal is interrupted for the time being on account of what passion huh always the defect of the beginning is most worrisome once indian would would knock that into our heads in all the time that idea that the beginning but Aristotle talks about the importance of the beginning defect in the beginning is affects everything else a little mistake in the beginning he says is a great one in the end but if you're you know i'm way wide there the target there when i a little move over here one in the beginning so simpler defectus principi as pessimus once is manifest that he uh is more grave a sin which is from malice than one that is from passion i'm convinced by the master here he convinced me when i was at the first teaching in california i had a student you know he'd he'd come into class and almost every class he'd pose an objection you know huh because i had heard all these ones before you know so i'd decline that i then i'd answer his objection you know and then i could see he'd be like this you know he was objecting this and then gradually like this as soon as i answered it i could see him just in the body when he relaxed like that and uh he did said to me one day after the after the course of the organ he said yeah i always thought you know one day i thought i really had you you know i i gotta get this gotta get him today you know i've heard these before i mean yeah oh he's a good student he's a good student and he knew when the objection had been answered you know some kids might might not know when the the answer has been given now some of these objects i mean this is so classical i mean you hear them over and over again i mean it just you know so go on to the next one here Now we've got to go to the exterior causes of sin, right? What the hell is that? First on the part of God? What kind of a heretic is this? Secondly, on the part of the devil. Thirdly, on the side of what? Man, huh? About the first four things are asked. First, whether God is a cause of what? Sin. I was reading another text of Thomas today there. You know, he's talking about the, there's nothing wrong with Christ teaching the earth parables, which the audience let sometimes misunderstood. Is he a cause of their error? Is there anything wrong with that? It came from the defect of their mind, right? That they misinterpreted the thing, right? Anyway. About the first four things are asked. First, whether God is a cause of sin. These are fighting words now. Secondly, whether the act of sin is from God. Third, whether God is a cause of what? Blindness and hardness of the heart. It's one of the times in the Gospels there where Christ is said to be angry, right? With the hardness of their heart. Fourth, whether these are ordered to the salvation of those who are, what? Blinded or made. It's hard to see that they would be so. To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that God is the cause of sin. For the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 1, about some, that God turned them over to a, what? Reprobate sins. That they might do those things which are not suitable to do. And the gloss says there that God works in the, what? Hearts of men. To incline their wills in whatever he wants to. Whether in the good or in the bad. But to do those things which are not suitable. And to incline the will towards the evil is a sin. Therefore, God is the cause of sin for men, huh? Let's see if they applied the objections. I'm worried about this. To the first, therefore, it should be said, as regards the words of the apostle, from the text itself, the solution is clear. For God, what? Handed over, I guess. Some to, what? Reprobate sins. Already, right? They had a reprobate sins. To doing those things which do not, what? Sribal. He said to turn them over to their reprobate sins. In so far as he does not prevent them from following, what? Reprobate sins. Just as we are said to, what? Expound those whom we do not. Expose those. Expose those, yeah. Whom we do not, what? Defend, yeah. What Augustine says in the book on grace and free judgment, free will, once the gloss is taken, right, huh? That God inclines the wills of men in good and bad. That should be understood that in the good, he directly inclines the will, right, huh? In evil, insofar as he does not, what? Prevent it. This has been said. And nevertheless, this also happens from the merit of the preceding, what? Sin, huh? It's a good text, though, nevertheless, huh? Yeah, it's a related thing. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, in the book of wisdom, chapter 14, it is said, the creatures of God are made in hate and in temptation to the soul of men, huh? But temptation is accustomed to what? For provocation to sin. Since, therefore, the creatures are not made except by God, as has been had in the first there, it seems that God is a cause of sin, provoking men to sinning, right? He made woman. He made man-shima. Moreover, what is a cause of the cause is a cause of the effect. But God is a cause of liberia vitria, free judgment, free will, which is a cause of sin. Therefore, God is a cause of sin. God made my will. Oh, my will is a cause of sin. Therefore, God is a cause of sin. Let me apply the objections here, huh? I'll go back to the second one, first of all. To the second should be said, the wind is said that the creatures of God are made in hate and in temptation to the soul of men. Then, this preposition, what? In is not laid down causality, but what? Consecutively, right? For God did not make creatures for the evil of men, but this followed an account of the foolishness of men, right? Once he subjoins and in a, what, trap, I guess, for the feet of the, what, foolish, huh? That's why he made Bathsheba. Because through his own foolishness, they used creatures for something other than they were made, huh? So that comes up in a number of texts that use the word in there, right, huh? It's not laid down causality, but consecutive, right? What about the cause of a cause, huh? To the third, it should be said that the effect of the middle cause proceeding from it, according as it is subject to the order of the first cause, is reduced also in the first cause, right? But if it proceeds from the middle cause, according as it goes out of the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to the first cause, huh? Just as if the minister or servant does something against the command of the Lord, this is not reduced to the Lord, is in a, what, cause. And likewise, the sin that Librium Arbitrium commits against the precept of God is not reduced in God, is in a, what, cause. So if I send you to beat the kid, and I said, but, you know, do so gently, and you don't do gently, am I responsible for, right, the cause of what you did? Moreover, everything bad is opposed to the good, but it is not repugnant to divine goodness that he be the cause of the evil of what? Punishment, huh? And about this evil, it is said in Isaiah chapter 45, that God is creating evil, right? My goodness. And in Amos 3, if there is evil in the city that God did not make, huh? Therefore also to the divine goodness is not repugnant that God be the cause of guilt, right? To the fourth, it should be said that punishment is opposed to the good of the one who is punished, huh? Who is deprived of some, what, good. But guilt is opposed to the good of order which is in God, huh? Whence it is directly opposed to the divine goodness. An account of this is not similar to the reason about guilt and punishment, huh? Whence it is directly opposed to the good of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the evil of the Punishment as opposed to my good, right? Not that God's good, the good is God, but guilt as opposed to sin as opposed to God. The good is just God, right? But against this is what is said in Wisdom, Chapter 11, about God. You hate none of those things which you have made, right? But God, what? Hates sin, right? According to that of Wisdom, Chapter 14. The impious is what? His impiety, right? Therefore God is not the cause of sin, right? He loves what he himself has made, right? He doesn't love what? The sinner or the sin, right? I don't know if he didn't make him to be a sinner. I answer it should be said that man is in two ways. A cause of sin, either of himself or of another. That's good to know. In one way directly, by inclining, what? His own will or that of another to sinning, right? In another way, indirectly. When to it, he does not restrain or draw back people from what? Sinning, right? When Ezekiel, Chapter 3, Verse 18, to the speculator, he said, If you do not say to the impious, by death you will die, his blood I will, what? Require from your hand, right? So we don't tell him that this is wrong, right? But God is not able to be directly the cause of sin, either of himself or of another, right? Because every sin is by recess from the order which is to him as into an end, right? For God inclines all things and turns them back, you might say, to himself as to the last end. As Dionysius says in the first chapter about the divine names. Whence it is impossible that to himself or to others he be a cause of what? Departing, you might say, which is towards himself. Whence he is not able to be directly a cause of sin. Likewise, neither indirectly. It can happen, huh? That God does not to some aid to avoiding sin, which if he gave, they would what? Not sin, huh? But the whole of this he does according to the order of his own wisdom and justice. Since he himself is wisdom and justice, right? Whence it is not imputed to him that someone's, another sins as to the cause of sin, right? Just as the governor is not said to be the cause of the submersion of the ship. From this that he does not, what? Except when he, what, subtracts the governing, when he is able and not to, what, govern. And thus it is clear that God in no way is a cause of sin. Stop here, I guess. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Lord, illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're up to question, what, 79 here? On the exterior causes of sin. And the first heretical thing here is on the part of God, right? Secondly, on the part of the devil. And third, on the part of man, right? It's quite a combination, those three. About the first, four things are asked. First, whether God is the cause of sin. Secondly, whether the act of sin is from God. Third, whether God is the cause of blindness, and obdurance, stubbornness. And fourth, whether these things are ordered to the salvation of those who are, what, blinded, or made stone, or hearts, or made obdurate. It's bringing the prosecutor with God, right? That's a little dangerous thing here, right? To the first, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that God is the cause of sin. For the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 1, about some, that God handed them over to a, what? Yeah, false sense, you might say. That they might do those things which are not what's suitable to be done, huh? Not fitting. And the gloss says there, huh? That the, what? God works in the hearts of men, inclining their wills in whatever he wants to, whether in the good or in the bad. But to do those things which are not suitable, and to incline the, look at the will according to the will, to evil, is a, what, sin, right? Therefore, God is to men the cause of, what, sin, huh? That's a pretty damning consideration, huh? Some, some heretic new scripture, better than we know it, you know, he could really give us a rough time, right? However, Wisdom, chapter 14, the creatures of God are made in, what, hate, huh? And in a temptation to the soul of man, huh? I used to be amused with this text of Edward the Great, you know, he's talking about women and the danger one, right? He ends up, his discourse saying, and if I said everything that I know about women, he says the whole world, he says, it'd be stupefied. But temptation is a custom to be called a provoking to what? Sin. Since they are for creatures, are not made except by what? God, as has been had in the first book, or shown there, it seems that God is the cause of sin, provoking men to what? Sinning. Moreover, whatever is a cause of the cause is a cause of the effect. But God is the cause of the free, what? Will, free judgment, which is the cause of sin. Therefore, God is the cause of sin. What a guy this Thomas is, huh? He must have been sweating when he wrote this, huh? Moreover, everything bad is opposed to the good, huh? But it is not repugnant to the divine goodness that he be the cause of the evil of, what? Punishment, huh? And about this evil, Isaiah says, this is said in Isaiah chapter 45, that God is crayons of marble, right? Creating evil, right? And Amos, huh? Chapter 3, the prophet, huh? Amos. If there is, what? An evil in the city that God has not made, huh? And therefore also, it is not, what? Repugnant to the divine goodness that God be the cause of guilt, huh? So, guilty or not guilty, would you as a jury at this point, huh? Say, huh? But against this is what is said in the book of Wisdom, chapter 11, about God, that you hate nothing of those things that you have, what? Made, huh? But God hates, what? Sin. According to that of Wisdom, chapter 14. Hate, for God, is the impious and his impiety, right? Therefore, God is not the cause of, what? So, yeah. How is he going to get out of this, huh? You talk about Houdini, I mean. Aristotle, there you know, in the metaphysics area, compares, you know, the mind when it's got arguments in both sides, you know, to the legs when they've been tied, and you can't go forward, right, huh? Until you're going to tie the knot, huh? And therefore, he says, when the mind here is posing arguments, it's in a similar situation, it's tied, huh? Unless you examine the knot and find out how to untie it, you can't go forward, right, huh? That's one of the reasons he gives there, you know, where you're going to have to consider the difficulties, huh? In Wisdom, huh? And then he goes through, what, 23 questions, right? The third book of Wisdom, quite a guy, and Aristotle, too. Dick Carnegie's just a Aristotle of somebody. That's a nice, nice Antonio Masia, I like that. I answer, it should be said, that man is in two ways, a cause of sin, either of himself or of another. In one way, directly, by inclining his own will, or that of another, to what? Sinning. In another way, indirectly, when he does not, what? Pull back, huh? Others from, what? Some from sin. Whence it is said in the book of Ezekiel, chapter 3, to the speculator, if you, what, did not say to the impious, death is, I will require from you, right, from your hand, his blood, right? The friend of Dolan the other day was saying, you know, we didn't give many sermons, you know, on the, you know, the church's teaching, you know, about reproduction and so on. Some of them are kind of afraid, you know. So one priest has told me, you know, he's in the parish there in some other city around here, but the guy in the parish is really tough, you know, and also he's got nobody coming to church. So they're afraid, right? God, however, is not able to be directly a cause of sin, either of himself or of what? Or another, right, huh? Why? Because every sin is by receding from the order which is in him, right, as in an end, huh? But God, however, inclines all, right, and converts, turns towards himself as an ultimate, what? End, huh? As Dionysius says in the first chapter of the Divine Names, and as Aristotle says in the 12th Book of Wisdom, huh? Takes you the 12th Book of Wisdom to get there. Whence it is impossible. Whence it is impossible. Whence it is impossible. that for himself or for others that he be a cause of their what? Departing from the order which is in himself. Whence he is not able to be directly a cause of sin. But likewise, neither what? Indirectly. It can happen, he says, that God to some does not give the aid to avoiding sin, which if he what? What? He stowed? What? They would not sin, right? But he does the whole of this according to the order of his wisdom and what? Justice, huh? Since he is wisdom itself, huh? And justice itself, right? Whence it should not be imputed to him that another sins as to the cause of sin, huh? Just as the pilot is not said to be the cause of submersion of the ship, from this that he does not what? The ship. Except when he subtracts his governing, when he's able and ought to be what? Governing. And thus it is clear that God in no way is a what? Cause of sin, huh? Now let's see if I can have the objections, huh? To the first thereof, what should be said as he guards the words of the apostle, St. Paul. From the text itself is clear the, what? Solution, huh? Which means the untying, right? Dissolution. Solution. Yeah. For if God turns some into a, what? Reprobate sense. Already, therefore, they have a reprobate sense to doing those things which are not, what? Suitable. He is said to hand them over to a reprobate sense insofar as he does not prohibit them but that they follow their own, what? Sense. Just as we are said to, what? Expose those whom we do not protect, huh? What Augustine says in the book on grace and free will, whence was taken the gloss that was in the first objection there, right? That God inclines the wills of men in good and bad should be thus understood that in the good he directly inclines the will. In the bad, however, insofar as he does not, what? Prohibit, huh? As has been said. And nevertheless, this also happens from the merit of a preceding, what? Sin, huh? So he lets some people follow their own will out, I guess, huh? To the second it should be said that when it is said that the creatures of God are made in hate and in temptation to the soul of men, this preposition in, huh? Is not laid down causality, but what? Consequently, right? For God does not make creatures for the harm or evil of men, but this follows on account of the foolishness of what? Man. Whence it is subjoined and in, what? A trap, you might say, right? For the feet of the, what? Foolish, huh? Scipient, huh? Mus to sapientia, right? Savory knowledge, huh? There's truth. Who, through their foolishness, use creatures to something other than they were, what? Made for, huh? To the third it should be said that the effect of the, what, middle clause proceeding from it according as it is subject to the order of the first clause is reduced also in the, what, first clause, right, huh? But if it proceeds from the middle clause according as it goes outside the order of the first clause, is not reduced to the, what, first clause, huh? Just as if the servant, mister, does something against the mandate of the Lord, huh? This is not reduced to the Lord as to a, what, clause. And similarly, the, uh, that's not my fault, huh? And similarly, the sin that, what, free judgment commits against the prescriptive God is not reduced in God as in a, what, clause. I was quoting that thing from Mozart's sister there, you know, how Mozart is conducting. He could tell, does he note off, you know, what instrument was making the thing off? So, if somebody makes a mistake, huh, is it attributed to the conductor, huh? No, because he's not following the order, you know, of the conductor, right, huh? You know, when I was going to get, was it the Magic Flute of Mozart, you know, and I was looking around and then they said, wow, yeah, von Karajan, that's the guy I want, you know, conducting, right? So, I was looking and reading some of the views of it, you know, and it's kind of funny, because, you know, they're saying that von Karajan had an absolutely iron hand, you know, everybody was doing exactly what he said, right? But in one scene, he thought that one of the, the sopranos or something, he was trying to assert himself a bit. But they might, you know, get off if they didn't, you know, follow the thing. You know, they tell the story, you know, of a prima donna there, that there wasn't doing what she was supposed to do with Handel, you know, and Handel just, you know, picked her up and held her all over there, you know, and brought her back. So she had to do exactly what he wanted, you know, huh? Yeah, if you're a Handel at least, huh? Yeah, he's a great man. That was John Paul II's favorite musician. Oh, yeah. That's what I read in this, yeah, yeah. And John Paul. I mean, Ben Diggins was Mozart, I think, you know. But those are my two favorite composers, too, I think. I know when I was, when you get the Christmas time there, you know, they got the, yeah, on the side, you know, and I remember in the store down in Boston there, you're like, oh, look at all the different performances. I said, what's the one I'm going to get, you know? And some of them would say, you know, Handel, and some would say Handel-Mozart, because Mozart, you know, perfected it, I guess, you know. But I said, oh, Beecham, that's what I want, Beecham. Performance. My brother Mark said, you know, Beecham taught the other guys how to conduct Mozart. What years was he conducting? Oh, during the, you know, Second World War in the 84, you know. He was talking about, you know, the orchestra doing exactly what he did, you know. He'd be rehearsing, you know, and he said, okay, gentlemen, I see you can play it backwards, now let's play it forwards. But he really built that guy, you know. The Jupiter Symphony of the day in the classical music station in Boston in the car there, and I said, I knew this guy was playing it too fast, you know. We were seeing one time, too, Toscanini's version, he's playing Mozart's Jupiter Symphony like a Beethoven symphony. He's playing it. He's playing it. He's playing it. I didn't understand, you know, how to play Mozart. Beecham knew exactly how to do it. It was important to some performances. I remember saying to my own teacher, talking between Beecham or something like that and some other performance, and I said, there's much difference between Deconic and Maritain and St. Thomas. So, no, it can't be that much difference. To the fourth it should be said, that punishment is opposed to the good of the one who is, what? Punished, huh? Who is deprived of some, what? Good, right? But guilt is opposed to the good of the order which is in God, whence it is directly opposed to the divine goodness. An account of this is not the same reason about, what? Guilt and punishment, huh? Punishment, in a sense, is putting back order into things, right? He slammed his fist against the wall. He said, I'm going to put your head through this wall! Poop! Where she hit the wall, there was already a large crack. So, I thought, oh! Got our attention! We had a test sister, her nickname was Sister Corona, but her nickname was Cannonball Corona. Unfortunately, she didn't have her, but, you know, they talked about, you know, coming down, where kids would sit with their pencils, you know, at the top of the thing, and come down with the pointer, you know, wham! And she actually cracked the pointer. And she said, I'm going to put her in the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle of the middle.