Prima Secundae Lecture 226: Circumstance, Specific Difference, and the Nature of Sin Transcript ================================================================================ Now this great, terrible topic of circumstance. What? Those things that stand there. Yeah, right, right, that's what it is. To the fifth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that circumstance is not able to make the venial sin a mortal one. For Augustine, it says in the sermon on what? What, purgatory, that if anger, right, is held for a long time, and drunkenness, I guess, if it is the, what, assiduous, right, huh? Because if you dedicate yourself to having too much, they pass into the number of, what, mortal sins, huh? But anger and what? What? Drunkenness are not from their genus. Mortal sins, huh? But venial sins, huh? When Christ turned the water into wine, right? I mean, you would not be doing that if it was mortal from its genus, right? Right. I was reading about a town there in Spain there where they had their festival every year, and they have free wine on tap. I said, I'm going there, Rosa. Yeah, it does. Make sure you go there and take a week. See if it's really true, you know? I know, and Rosa's uncle went to Italy there, you know, and he studied Italian, you know, and he stayed in some kind of a, his own, you know, and they, you know, they bring the wine there, you know, these carts, you know, big vats of wine, so maybe they could afford to open up the thing for free for a while. Therefore, but these are not from their genus on mortal sins, but venial's. Otherwise, they would always be mortal, right? And therefore, circumstances makes a venial sin to be, what, mortal? Morver de Magister, huh? That's the way they named, yeah. Was he bishop of Paris at one time, I guess? But his was a standard work in theology until the sum of the talents, you know? Morver de Magister says the 24th distinction, the second book of sentences. The delictatio, if it be, what, long-lasting, I guess, is a mortal sin, right? If, however, it is not morosa, it is a venial sin. But morositas, huh, long-lasting, I guess, is a certain circumstance. Therefore, a circumstance can make a venial sin a mortal one. Interesting argument from just there. Moreover, more do good and bad differ than venial sin and mortal sin, both of whom are in the genus of the bad. But circumstance makes of a good act a bad one. Just as it's clear when someone gives, what, alms on account of inane glory. Therefore, much more can one make of a, what, venial sin, a mortal one. But against this is that since circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed the quantity of its act, which it has in its genus. For always the subject is, what, preeminent to the, what, accident, huh? If, therefore, the act from its genus is a venial sin, it cannot, by circumstance, become a mortal sin. Since mortal sin in infinitum, huh? Isn't it? In a certain way exceeds the quantity of the venial sin, huh? So no number of venial sins adds up to mortal sin, huh? Put that in your calculating mind. Yeah. No amount of fish can add up to one steak, huh? That's right. Especially with salmon. Salmon steak is a contradiction in terms. I think it should be said, as has been said above, that when we treat it of, what, circumstances. A circumstance, in quantum use moody, as such, right, is an accident of a, what, moral act. It can happen, however, if a circumstance take on, what, a specific difference of a moral act. This is why it's so treacherous matter to talk about circumstances, right? Circumstantial evidence, huh? I can convict you sometimes. And then it loses the notion of a, what, circumstance, and constitutes the species of a, what, moral act. And this happens in sins when the circumstance adds the deformity of another, what, genus, huh? Just as when some, one, what, exceeds to the one that is not his own. There is a deformed act by the deformity opposed to chastity, right? But if one exceeds to not one's own, which is the wife of another, right, one adds a deformity opposed to, what, justice, huh? Against which it is that some, one, what? Yeah. Takes over what it belongs, an alien thing, right? And according to this circumstance of this, sorry, it constitutes a new species of sin, which is called adultery, huh? It is impossible, however, the circumstance about a venial sin becomes mortal unless it, what, brings in a deformity of another, what, genus, huh? For it's been said above that venial sin has deformity through this, that it implies the disorder about those things which are towards the end. But mortal sin has deformity through this, that it implies a disorder with respect to the last end itself. So if a philosopher gives up the pursuit of wisdom, what would you say? He's no longer a philosopher because he's no longer his ultimate end, right? Once it is manifest that a circumstance is not able of a venial sin to make a mortal sin when it remains a, what, circumstance, huh? But then only when it carries something over into another, what, species. And it becomes in some way the specific difference of a, what, moral act. It's the only treacherous thing there it is to talk about circumstances, right? So what's that thing about the laughter that was superfluous? And now you start to laugh about, you know, divine things, right? In church. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Russ, they got a table there across from an Italian man there. He started to, you know, like this, you know, like he's doing the bus of saccharine or something like that, you know? I just shook my head and he stopped, you know? But, you know. It's like, you know, he's being idle there and he's starting to go into blasphemy or something of this sort, or sacrilege, you want to say that, you know. Of course, there's little kids there, you know, the host with the neck of the wafers, you know. I don't know how many kids I run into do this as a kid, you know, practice, they come back from Mass or something like that. Yeah, yeah. I don't think that's blasphemous or sacrilegious, I don't think. But, you can see how, you know, you can get, you know. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I remember my sister and I used to, my mom had a box and we taped them together and those were my best friends. And of course I was very out on guard, my sister was my uncle boy. I remember your time. I was ahead of my time. Oh, we were serious and we liked doing that. It was something we admired. Yeah. Yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said that lengthness, and that's right, time, is not a circumstance drawing something into another species. Likewise, neither what? Frequency or what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. now the other thing when a mortal sin can become venial to the sixth one proceeds us it seems that a mortal sin can become venial right for the dist equal distance right between the this is a marvelous argument venial sin and a mortal and the reverse right but the venial sin can become mortal therefore a mortal sin can become venial that's that's uh convincing right senator moyham's famous essay defining deviancy now what defining deviancy down yeah he was talking about how i mentioned this in recreation the other night where uh society has a certain level of tolerance for uh behavior if you go beyond that level of tolerance it's it's a prescribed behavior could be criminal behavior deviant behavior but if you're having a problem uh preventing the deviant behavior you can either get tougher or you can redefine the behavior and that's defining deviancy down so what used to be deviant behaviors is just fine and dandy yeah once you change the laws yeah so there you go there's uh it's very very big in the 60s 70s yeah we can all these drugs you know legal moreover venial sin and mortal sin are laid down to differ according to this that the one sitting mortally loves the creature more than god but the one sitting venially loves the creature below god it could happen however that someone committing that which is from its genus immortal sin loves the creature below god as if for example someone not knowing that fornication simple fornication is a mortal sin and contrary to divine love commits what fornication that's nevertheless that an account of divine love he would be prepared to forego fornication if he knew by fornicating he acted against the divine what therefore he what and thus mortal sin can become venial right now i was reading reading a doctor the other day and the doctor he said i was always pro-life and he's always opposed to abortion right but in his practice he was he was um uh contraceptive or giving product to contraception right and then he read uh paul ii's encyclical there in mani vitae there and had a great impression upon him and he stopped you know but but was he what is he doing he probably thought it was okay you know and some of these pro-life people you know in the other churches there you know they they're in favor of uh contraception you know it's hard to know they don't know they don't know that is a serious thing okay more of this has been said above more does the good differ from the bad than the venial from the mortal because they're both bad but an act which is of itself bad can become good it just as homicide can become an act of justice right as is clear in the judge who kills the thief therefore much more does mortal sin become venial i know but against this is that the eternal never can become temporal but mortal sin merits eternal punishment venial sin temporal punishment therefore mortal sin can never become venial the answer it should be said that venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin huh that's a strange use of the word perfect huh my house is totally wrecked huh completely completely wrecked that's very incomplete now my house but the imperfect to some addition can come to what perfection whence venial through this that there is added to it the deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin becomes what mortal just as when some says an idle word that he might what fornicate and his hindu is bad but that which is perfect cannot become imperfect by addition huh and therefore mortal sin cannot become venial through this that there is added to it some deformity pertaining to the genus of of venial sin for one does not diminish the sin of the one who fornicates that he says an idle word right but is more aggravated on account of the added deformity right yeah it can be however that that which is from its genus mortal could be venial on account of the imperfection of the act when it does not perfectly attain to the ratio of a moral act since it is not deliberative but sudden huh subito right good extictis parties and this comes about to a certain subtraction to wit of deliberate reason and because from reason deliberating it has a species of a moral act hence it is that through such a subtraction the species of the act is what dissolved to the first therefore it should be said that the venial differs from the mortal is the imperfect from the what perfect is the boy from a man now a boy can what yeah from a man can come to be from a boy but not the reverse the old man can come in jail once the argument is not not cogent now the second should be said that it would be such ignorance that the sin altogether what excuses it the excuses altogether the sin just as that of the man who is what mad or furious then from such ignorance the one committing fornication sins neither mortally nor venial if however the ignorance is not invincible then the ignorance itself is a sin and contains in itself the defect of divine love insofar as a man neglects to learn those things which he is able to be conserved in the divine love the good of his soul yeah for more than a month that itself is a moral sin yeah he doesn't do anything else yeah a lot catholics don't you know take the time to learn the church's position on some of these things and the third to third it should be said as augustine says in the book against lie right a mediceum those things which are in themselves bad by no end can they come what to be well homicide however is the killing of someone innocent and this in no way can what be done well but the judge who kills the thief or the soldier who kills the enemy of the republic are not what alongside suggestion says in the book against free will we'll just stop there now before the start of another question son holy spirit amen thank you god thank your guardian angels thank you thomas aquinas god our enlightenment guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds or the luminary images and arouse us to consider more correctly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor help us to understand what you've written father son i know it's the fourth article here with a good angel or bad one can sin venially i guess neither one of them can but for different reasons right show you how pure are these good angels right now don't even have venial sins so why is why is the word to see why is it why can it be said of understanding but not of discourse or reason okay okay okay yeah in the ninth book of wisdom and aristotle is talking about activity there and so on and he contrasts um uh motion right with energy or something of that sort and if you think of the difference between walking home right and seeing that painting over there right when i'm walking home have i walked home when i'm seeing that picture have i seen it you see the girls in class there you know when you're loving someone if you love them yet yeah you see so when you're what discourse is like emotion right discourse is what defined as coming to know what you don't know what you do know right so you're coming to know right so when you're coming to know have you come to know well not fully right so when you understand something you understand what a square is let's say have you understood it yet what it is yeah what what's the perfection of reason huh in terms of the legs right are the names derived from the legs what is perfection of reason understanding yeah so who understands the most well i mean yeah maybe among men who understands the most yeah because wisdom is the name of the highest perfection of what the reason right huh okay but now uh i'm always struck by the fact that the word understanding and the word substance have the same etymology right is there a connection between understanding and substance they don't mean the same thing right but is there a connection right yeah what is that yeah the senses don't know substance right so i know your size right and some of my senses right but what you are you know your substance i know that only by my what reason and substance is sometimes taken as opposed to accidents right which exist in substance but also substance is taken more generally is what a thing is and that's what the reason wants to as is an object right what something is and you know the latin word for to understand is to understand is intelligere right the way thomas explains it it comes from into slagere right to read within and of course the word nature in all its meanings right has the idea of something within so the nature of a thing is what it is right and that's within the thing and so intellectus and latina fits in there right but also this english word understanding right they have a a little different etymology right then as thomas explains the etymology of a word is not its meaning right my name was originally my last name was originally bergquist and my father dropped out the g right and the etymology of bergquist is what berg is mountain and quist i guess is branch so that's not the meaning of it huh see if bergquist was there you don't mean there was a mountain branch in your room and fit in your mountain branch um or or my name is duane right and i guess they said that means um poem i don't know i'm not a poem i don't i'm not bit out of words i have a lot of words about that bit out of them sometimes you rhyme yeah yeah the hebrews closely they say that that means mine right that's that's what i think of myself um thomas is always giving the etymology of lapis in latin right that it laid it pet him you know i don't know if that's a good etymology or not but that's not what the name means it doesn't mean hurt the leg but it means the thing that does hurt the blood right so the latin word intelligere and the english word to understand right might have the same meaning right but not the same what etymology right and the latin word substance and the latin english word understanding have the same etymology right but they don't mean the same thing huh why intellect to intelligere and to understand mean the same thing but they don't have the same etymology right but nevertheless if a man knows the meaning of a word he may see something in the etymology whereby he can lead you by the hand to understand it right so when you say that the wise man most of all understands right and you're led you know from this idea of the word substance right that in a sense to understand to know what stands under something right does the wise man you know understand most of all does he most of all know what stands under so where a stoutle spends in the 14 books of wisdom two of the books seven eight are devoted to what substance right and Aristotle says wisdom is about being but being is fundamentally substance right so he devotes that's the main subject of wisdom huh substance huh so books seven and eight are devoted to what substance uh more material substance and then books uh 11 through 14 he investigates the material substances right um but the wise man's ultimate goal is to know what yeah to know the first causes right okay and we speak of the underlying causes of things right and the english word for cause was the word ground right so in the legal terminology you know grounds for divorce right cause for divorce right and um so that uh the causes is uh imagined right and logically speaking to stand under the effect right and uh hold it up or supported right and uh so to understand effects means to know their what causes and so the man who knows the first cause he most of all understands right but the man who knows substance very much understands too right and then Aristotle takes up what the axioms right to defend them right and then he uh spends a good deal of book four defending the first axiom but the axioms are the statements that what understand all other statements huh because they support them right you go back to the greek theory you know hypothesis wouldn't be necessary hypothesis you know something that stands under right you fall under facey sounds placed under and then the words in the axioms Aristotle what knows what stands under those words huh so he distinguishes the senses of the words used in the axioms and used in wisdom right and the order of those meetings right so he most of all what understands right but you can kind of go from the can be led by the hand from the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand of the hand the etymology of understanding, right? To see that he most of all knows what stands under. Christel talks about wonder, which stands under the whole philosophy. It gave rise to it, but it comes from the legs to stand. You got the running ones, which I'd have with that jumping and stumbling, right? But I don't think there's any one from sitting, right? Yeah, circus, you know, teaches a quote all the time, right? The man sitting, he makes wisdom, yeah, but he becomes wise, right, because he's getting, you know? I was reading in Thomas there today about the faith there, to believe, huh? What's the definition of to believe here, the theological, what is that, the act? Right there? What? Yeah. How would you define that? Yeah? To ascend for something not seen on the face of a witness or something? Well, the way Thomas does it, he follows his master there, Augustine, a hippo, right? And Augustine defines it as what? To ascend while thinking about it, okay? And what Thomas shows is that this separates the act of to believe, right, of believing, from every other act of reason. He says, ascent separates it from doubting, right? Where you don't know whether it is so or isn't so. It separates it from, what, opinion, where you don't ascend fully, right? It separates, and then, while thinking about it, separates it from natural understanding, right? And then reasoned out understanding, it's closer, right? But reasoned out understanding, the ascent comes after the, what, the discourse, right, huh? And then that quiets it, right, huh? In the case of the act of faith, it is we're ex-equo, you know, to ascend to it firmly, right? And yet thinking about it because you don't, what? Yeah, you don't understand it, right, okay? Well, then you get to this interesting definition of theology there by St. Anselm that people quote, right? That it's belief, right, or faith, but belief seeking understanding, right? Fides, quaerens, intellectu, right, huh? To use the Latin, right? You can see how it kind of arises in the very nature of the, what, act, right? Because reason is moved to ascend by the will, right? And it ascends firmly, but it doesn't have the evidence, it doesn't see it, right? And therefore, the mind, what, thinks about it, wonders about it, right? And that naturally gives rise to, what, theology, right? So I was giving an example there the other day, and I was saying, you know, why should you love God, right, huh? Well, by faith you know you should love God, right, huh? This is the first of the commandments, right? Love your neighbor. But why should you love God, right, huh? Well, that's belief seeking what? Yeah. I was suggesting my favorite book, and say, Thomas has five chapters there, 37 through 41, I guess it is, where the first chapter shows that God is good, right? The second chapter shows that he's, what, goodness itself, right? Not just good, but he's goodness itself, that whereby all things are good. And the third chapter from that shows that there couldn't be anything bad in God and not to be loved, or any reason not to love him. And then the fourth chapter shows, following Augustine, that God is the good of every good, right? And the fifth chapter that God is the summum bonum, right? That is good, right? But now you, what, getting a little understanding, right, of something you believe firmly you should love God, and that your salvation depends upon that, and so on. And, but now you're starting to see why it's so, right? Or as a child, you know, when they're explaining to us, when you make your first confession, and so on, and you meet somehow the distinction between the venial sin and, what, mortal sin, right? And you learn that, you know, venial sins, even a large number of them, don't add up to, what, mortal sins. Thomas says, all the venial sins of the world don't add up to a, what, mortal sin, right? But now you might wonder why is that so, right? Because you don't maybe fully understand that, right? I mean, if you had a million venial sins, well, that would be enough, you know? You know? I mean, I mean, does a penny add up to a dollar? No, but you get a hundred pennies, it's a dollar. And you get a hundred and twenty pennies, it's more, right? So why wouldn't, you know? It's a number, right? Venial sins, why wouldn't they add up, right? So, if it is, we follow St. Anselm there and say, well, theology is the least seeking understanding, right? Why is it that venial sins, you know, never add up, right? Whatever their number, to one mortal sin, right? Yeah. Yeah. I mean, it's not just that the venial sin doesn't go as far as the mortal sin, because then you can go, you know, add on to there and catch up with them. But, that with the mortal sin, you break the very, what? Beginning, right? You break the order to God as a, what? End, huh? Okay. Why, venial sin, you don't do that. You just don't proceed as quickly and as surely and, you know, towards God, right, huh? But you're not choosing a different road, right? You're not choosing another thing as your end, right? Like what Shakespeare says, revolts from two births, stumbling on abuse, right? Well, then the very beginning is corrupted, right, huh? It's like Aristotle says, you know, if you end up denying the principle of contradiction, which is the beginning of all the axioms, he says, it's an actual beginning of all the axioms, huh? He says, then the only alternative is a return to the life of the plant, right? And you just come up to philosophical life, right, huh? You know? Yeah. I know, I always quote that thing from Whitaker Chambers, you know, when he actually became a communist and he came back to his friends at Columbia University, you know, and he had a kind of contempt for them because they treated ideas like ping pong balls, right? Something you play with, right? That's what ideas are for you, something you play with, knock back and forth, you don't take them seriously, though. Now it's fun now, let's go into something else. You've been knocking those around for a while. You've given kind of up the end, the goal, right? You're no longer seeking, what? Wisdom, yeah. Wisdom, knowledge of the truth, right? You've given up the pursuit of the end, huh? I think of my professors, you know, kind of, you know, the spirit of reaching the end of thinking, just to know the truth, right? And so they just kind of, you know, play along. And as one professor said, you know, it's better than digging ditches for our living, you know? Well, that's true, you know, it's hardly the purpose of the life of the mind, you know, to have an easier life than the guys out there. I have a neighbor, and I see him leaving around five o'clock in the morning, you know, or something like that, and he's five-thirty, he's gone. And so I said to his wife, your husband gets off really well, he's working in Boston, some kind of construction, you know, and he's out there in the cold, you know, in this kind of weather, you know? Yeah, so it's not easy to be going and knocking with the students, you know, but they've given up the end, right? So they're no longer really a philosopher, right? There were one professor there, you know, my brother Mark was there, I work with him, you know, some dean out there in California, St. Mary's. What do you think philosophy is? That was an imaginatively pleasing picture of the world. You don't have the end there anymore. The end, huh? So you start to understand why the moral sin, right? Or like I say, in marriage, I'd say, you know, why is adultery really, you know, different than, you know, than not turning the light off or something, or some, you know, thing that annoys somebody, you know, or leaning the light on or something, you know? You're not walking in front of the door. Yeah, yeah. All kinds of little things that bother us, you know. Then you take the trash out. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But adultery is contrary to the very, you know, in their purpose, you might say, in the thing, right? You know, the confusion about marriage in the modern mind is just kind of, you know, semi-formalization of friendship of some sort, you know? We like each other, so let's get married for a while, see how it works out, you know? And so on, and so on. But, I mean, you don't see that the children are really the end of marriage, right? Once you've given up the end, then anything goes. Even this homosexual marriage makes sense, so to speak, you know, in quotes, because they've lost the beginning there, right? And so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and