Prima Secundae
Lecture 229: Venial Sin, the Use of Reason, and the Nature of Law

Transcript
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The sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that venial sin can be in someone with only, what? Yeah, it's an odd article. For a disposition precedes, what, habit, huh? But a venial is a disposition for, what, mortal sin, as has been said above. Therefore, the venial sin in the faithless person, to whom is not, what, taken back, original sin has not been remitted, is found, what, before the mortal. And this, sometimes the faithless have venial sins with original, without, what, mortal sins. There's a disposition for mortal sin, but that's not to have mortal sin, right? In fact, tortured argument there, Thomas. Okay, for us, a sleek dimwits here. Moreover, less does it have a connection, an agreement venial with mortal, than a mortal sin with a, what, mortal sin. But the faithless subject to original sin is able to commit one mortal sin and not another. Therefore, also he can commit a venial sin and not a mortal. Quite interesting, huh? He's reasoning for the fact that they can commit this moral sin without committing that one. Therefore, they can commit the lesser sin without committing the greatest sin. Interesting argument, huh? You see, they could doubt to the place there, right, huh? What is more likely is not so than what is less likely is not so, right? More, there can be determined the time in which a boy is first able to be the actor of a, what, actual sin as opposed to the original sin which he has. And to that time when he arrives, he can be at least, right, able to stand for some brief spazio, huh? Before he, what, sins mortally. Because this also happens in the most wicked, huh, the most coloratis. But in that space, however brief, he can, what, sin venially. Therefore, venial sin can be in someone with original sin without mortal. Well, I'm perfectly convinced, aren't you? Fellow dimwits, huh? It's nice we have this book for beginners, huh, because I'm reading the, the, the reading, I should say, the question of Disputate, the Veritate, Bodhitate, as I say. And you've got sometimes, you know, 15 objections, you know, huh? So he gives you down about three years usually, you know? So he cuts down, you know, to a lot of pity, pity upon the dimwit beginner, yeah. Against this is because for original sin, men are punished in what? Of boys, yeah. Where there is not the pain of sin, says, will be said below. But in hell, huh? Push down men, yeah. On account only of what? Mortal sin. Therefore, there will not be a place in which can he punish the one who has the sin with the original only. Come to the age of reason, some venial sin, and then die, you wouldn't go to limbo. No, you're saying you would go to limbo, right? You would go to limbo. Yeah. But he's maintaining that that's not a possibility, that somebody which is the age of reason is missed on the venial sin, and then die. Yeah. Well, he's talking about... Well, this is the sed contra, right? Yeah. And I argue that you can have original sin, you can have original sin with just venial sin, right? Because you're a boy, right? That you can... Yeah. Yeah. This is the sed contra, isn't it? No, wait. It's the opposite, you need to. Yeah. There's no place to go for somebody who just has venial sin. Yeah. Venial with original. Right. Because his original sin is limbo. Mortal sin is hell, which would include... Well, if you didn't have mortal sin, you would go to hell, but it's limbo. So that's what he's saying. If you don't have mortal sin, you're not going to hell. If you have only original sin. Original sin by itself is a limbo. Any mortal sin, whether you're baptized or not, you go to hell. So he's saying there's no place for those with... Original sin and venial sin. There's no place. There's no third place. There's no third place. That's what he's saying. He doesn't say where they're going to end up. I say... I think he's going to be arguing. Well, there we are. Well, you see, the limbo is for those who just have original sin, right? They don't have... Yeah. They haven't had time, time yet to commit the venial sin, yeah. Answer, it should be said, that it is impossible that venial sin be in someone with original sin without mortal. There's no place for him because it's an impossibility. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Which is kind of strange. The reason for which is because before one comes to the years of, what, discretion, the defect of age, preventing the use of reason, excuses him from, what, mortal sin? Much more does it excuse him from, what, venial sin, if he commits something that from its genus is, what, such a... That's interesting. Maybe crying in church there this morning, then, is not being considered guilty of venial sin, right? Disturbing the mass. I've got a call in the jungle. 20. When, however, he begins to have the use of reason, right, he is not altogether excused from, what, guilt? From the guilt of venial and of mortal sin, right? Oh, I'm sorry. But first, it occurs then to man, what, thinking, is to deliberate, what? And he must think about himself. About himself? Or of himself. Thinking about himself. The sense is an obligation, I guess. Yeah. And if he orders himself to a suitable end, through grace he, what, achieves the remission of original sin. If, however, he does not order himself to a suitable end, according to the fact that in that age he is, what, capable of discretion, he sins mortally, not doing what is in his power. And from this there will not be in him venial sin without mortal, except until the whole was, what, taken away through grace, huh? That's a strange idea. I mean, is he saying then that the first, like, real moral act of the first, you know, something with the original sin, the first moral act is going to be either something that takes away the original sin, or something that's moral? Well, he seems to speak that way, yeah, but it's kind of strange, you know, in a strange position. It's interesting that he said about the first thing that occurs to a man is that I should reflect on myself. I should basically reflect on what, to order my life, how to order my life in some way that occurs in some way. I know that's what St. Abbasis says about if a man were to neglect the business of his soul, like the concern of his soul, at least when he changed the age of reason. If neglects that for the space of a month, you cannot create mortal sin just for that, for that neglect. That by itself is a mortal sin. That neglect is pretty serious. I thought you'd apply the objections here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that venue is not a disposition of necessity preceding mortal, right? But this is contingent, huh? Just as labor disposes sometimes for fever. Not, however, as heat disposes for the form of fire. To the second, it should be said that it is not impeded venial sin to be with one original sin on account of the distance or the convenience, but on account of the defect of the use of what? The reason. To the third, it should be said that from other mortal sins, the boy, beginning to have use of reason, is able to abstain for some time, right? But from the sin of the forth-going omission, he is not freed except when he, what? Turns himself to God, right? For the first that occurs to a man having discretion is that he thinks about himself. This gets interesting, huh? To which other things are ordered as to a, what? End. For the end is before an intention. And therefore, this is a time in which he's obligated from the affirmative precept of God in which the Lord says, be converted to me, and I will be converted to you, huh? Strange article, Thomas. This reply to objection three possibly reflect his own experience of the other boy that he sent to the monastery. And I just, because that was the thing, he's considering the case of... Faithless, yeah. Yeah, somebody with original sin. Yeah, with original sin. What I'm talking about is his turn to God, his remembering his turn to God at that young age, which he apparently did very, very well, to actually himself, to his end. Anyway, there's just a thought that occurred since he had entered a religious site as such a young boy. I think part of it, too, is, at least this is my reflection on what St. Paul says to the Areopagus, about God is not far from any one of us. And this thought is not foreign to being, you know, coming to recognize the light that's in it. God is not far away, so that this is the thing, it's an actual grace. And especially, I suppose if you consider that this is God's desire that we border ourselves at the right end so that this is the grace that should be offered to everyone. This is the thought. Well, Mark did a little question mark if you want to think a little more about that, you know, because it's difficult, right? What he's saying there, I think, is very difficult. Strange. And the reference they have down here, you know, the parallel text, you know, they're all to replies just from objections, you know, not a whole article, you know. It's a whole article, it's that same thing. But now we're up to law, right? Now, see, let's take a little break here because it's a little different thing now, right, huh? Okay. Interesting, my old professor there at the Surik there, you know, at the College of St. Thomas in the old days, now the University of St. Thomas, they call themselves, but he used to get together, I don't know, was it once a month there? or a couple weeks, something like that, with lawyers, right? Regular lawyers. And they would, you know, we read this treatise on law, right? And he'd talk about it, of course. We've got to realize this treatise on law here is theological, right? So the order in which you talk about the laws might be a little different than what a lawyer would understand, you know, and of course, he'd begin to see it after a while, you know? And I guess when it kind of came down to it, you had to kind of talk to the lawyers too. That's kind of interesting. I never sat into those things, you know? Many lawyers, many law students now were introduced, encouraged to read writings by a famous judge Cardozo, who was a very progressive lad, who was leading life to the legal profession over the last century and a half almost. And their perspective on law, I assume, is going to be very, very different. It's certainly not theological, it's very progressive, very political in certain ways. And it's a shame. When Aristotle talks about law there, like even the rhetoric there, you know, they talk about the so-called positive law first, right? And then you'll come and talk about the natural law, right? You know? And of course, when they think of law, they think of all, of course, the positive law, right? And decided another kind of law is a little, you know, less known to them, so we say. Much less known. And so, interesting. Not to them by nature, but their education or their schooling brings sort of an accent out of it. Yeah. But lawyers are usually some kind of creating and thinking, you know? They're usually a little more sharp, you know? You have to read that, aren't you? I know my father's lawyer was a very good lawyer, you know? And he came one time and, you know, ran the board meeting, you know? That's how order it was, you know? Just, you know? He headed up the chamber of commerce and so on, you know? I hope my father got, you know, got him as a lawyer. I always remember when my father died, you know, and my, you know, we were with, this is Gus Larsen, the great lawyer, and he was saying, this is unusual, you know, that my father does everything to my mother, you know? He says, most of the time they take out the money, he says, because you don't trust the wife. This is a compliment to you, you know, he said to my wife, my mother, you know? Because my father says, you know, no, full well she'll take care of the house of children, you know, and she'll go out and do wild things with the money and so on. But it's kind of funny, you know, the way he was used to his lawyer, you know, and, you know, they're all just tying up the money in various ways so that the wife, so someone would go down to the kitchen and we'd all go to the wife, you know, and these little lawyers are having to, you know, share those things, right? Yeah. So let's look at the preemies and then we'll take a little break, okay? To rest our dim-witted minds, right? Consequently, we're not to consider about the, what, exterior, what, beginnings of acts, right? Reference back to the first thing way back in question 49 there, right? If you look at the premium to question 49, right? After the acts and passions, right, we're not to consider about the beginnings of human acts. And first, about the inward beginnings, right? Secondly, about the extrinsic beginnings. And now we're beginning that second part, right? The inward beginning is what? The powers and the, what, habits, right? But because we've spoken about the powers in the first part, and you talk about the soul and so on, it remains to consider about the habits, right? And first, in general, secondly, about virtues and vices. And other things of the sort, which are beginnings of human acts, right? Okay. Now we come to the second part here, right, huh? Which is about the extrinsic ones here in question 90, right? Okay. So that's a distinction of two, I think, huh? Okay. But notice, when he says exterior, it doesn't mean that they don't become interior, but they come from an exterior, what? Source, you know? Because grace is something inside of us, too, right, huh? Okay. Now he says the outward beginning, inclined to evil, is the diabolus, right? Of whose temptation it is, we have spoken in the first part, huh? So what does the word diabolus mean there? I think I mentioned it last time, what it means. It means a seer. It's adversary, I think it was, yeah. Satan's adversary. Oh, yeah. Satan's adversary. Not adversary, it was, what is it, the... Occuse or slanderer. Slander is the word, yeah. Slander is the word, yeah. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I think I looked up in the dictionary, I think diabolus would slander, something like that, the word, you know, for the noun, you know. And I don't know who that's referring to his slandering God, you know, and he says to her, you know what, no, you'll be like God's, you know, if you eat this stuff. That's kind of slandering God, right, that God's trying to harm you, in a sense, but keeping you, or holding back in you. I think the Greek word, the first sense, is slanderer. Yeah, yeah. So he's an outward principle, right? Okay. But the exterior principle moving to the good is God, right, huh? Who both instructs us by law and aids us by what? Grace. Grace, huh? So you ask for grace to follow the law, right? Wentz first, about law, secondly, about grace, why not to what? Speak, right? I guess grace begins, it says here, in what question? 109, huh? There's going to be quite a few here. It's all about law, all the way to 109, huh? So he begins in the premium to question 109 there. He says, consequently, why not to consider about the exterior or outward beginning of human acts about God insofar as by him we are aided by grace to acting well, right? And then he divides that into, what, three again. First one, I consider about the grace of God, secondly, about his cause, third, about its effects. He looks before and after, doesn't he, this guy? Not very original, is he? He doesn't tend to stay in your own philosophy. Yeah, yeah. I told you how he compares, he complains about the, the, the veroists there, the Latin veroists, you know, they speak as if wisdom began with them. I think it's personal experience. Yeah, yeah. Okay, so we've got a lot of things to say about law, then I guess. It's lawful to say that, I guess. Okay. So let's go back to the premium here, to question 90, right? When's first about law, secondly, about grace, we're not to speak, right? And about law, we're not first to consider about law in what? Community, in general, right? Secondly, about its what? Parts. Yeah. Now what kind of parts is that? What do they call those parts? Hmm? They call them subject parts, you know, because the subject, here you're talking about the universal whole, which is set of many, right? So like the genus set of the species or the genus set of things that are less universal, right? And the other kind of whole is what? Yeah. The composed whole, yeah. Yeah, a lot of times they call it the integral whole, right? Okay. And somebody was writing to me from Rome there, you know, he's writing on, on a little bit about metaphysics and so on. And one thing that's come up there, I sent him a letter and then he sent me another letter back again as I'm going to reply to the reply. But Aristotelian will say, and Thomas will say this, that the wise man judges the beginnings, right? And not only the beginnings in the sense of the beginning causes, right? The first causes, but also the beginning statements, right? And Aristotelian spends, you know, a lot of time defending the axiom of contradiction there in the fourth book, right? And so, but Boethius also speaks of the, what, axioms as being the statements that are known to themselves by all men. And this is head up with the virtue of reason called understanding, right? Aristologist calls it nous, Thomas calls it intellectus. I call it natural understanding, you know, to distinguish it from this reasoned out understanding, right? Well, if these statements are known to themselves by all men, to some extent they're judged by all men to be true, right? Well then, what's the difference between that and wisdom, right? Why can Aristotle or Thomas say that the wise man judges these beginnings, right? You know, talks about them, right? Well, you see, Aristotle is not going to say that the wise man can demonstrate these things because these are the starting of all our knowledge, these things. He's only going to, what, make them known by distinguishing the words that make them up, right? And since the words that make them up are known by all men, that's what to do with natural understanding. What's the difference then, right? Okay, part of that, yeah. He knows them not as the beginnings, huh? And Aristotle, I think, discovered that the words in the axioms are all equivocal. He knows them not as the words in the axiom. He knows them not as the words in the axiom. He knows them not as the words in the axiom. equivocal by reason, not by chance. They are equivocal by reason. And does the man who has natural understanding know that? No, see? And so the wise man has a little more universal judgment, you might say, about the axioms. And I always say that the fifth book of wisdom where Estalo distinguishes, right, the meanings of these equivocal words, right? Usually when Thomas explains the division of the metaphysics, he says, because he said in book four that the subject of wisdom is being and one, and these are said in many ways, right? And then in the fifth book, he starts to distinguish the words. And this is the beginning of consideration of being as being, right? Distinguish the senses of these words. But it's also useful for what? Defending the axioms, right? And I used to use this one class. I told you this one, but I think it's kind of a clear example. Because people are always giving, the whole is more than a part. As an example of an axiom, right? And it's in the Euclid, you know, it's an axiom. And Aristotle will often refer to the axioms in the context of mathematics, right? Because they're more obvious there. Everything goes back to the axioms. More clearly there, right? And so I'd always begin by quoting a certain conversation between my mother and myself, right? And my mother didn't want to go. I was never studying philosophy. And she didn't like it when she heard me say that man is an animal. She didn't like that. It didn't sound right to her. And so she would kind of protest when I said man is an animal. And I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Oh, she said, that's better, she said. I don't know. So I think it's kind of a marvelous conversation, right? So I say, to be an animal, then there's not the whole event, it's only a part of man, right? And then I said, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant. So sometimes a part includes more than the whole. And my students say, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That must be accepted. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So the whole is not necessarily greater than the, what, part, right? Well, see, what's going is confusing these two different senses of, what, whole and part, right? Because if you take animal as a integral or composing part of the definition of man, the definition of man is an animal that has reason, something like that, then man is only part of that definition, and the definition contains more than animal, as my mother was happy to know, namely what? Reason, right? But then if you consider animal as a universal whole, which is said of man, dog, cat, and horse, right? It's said of more than man is said of, or the dog is said of, or cat is said of, right? And so now you're confusing those two different senses, right? Of whole and part, right? And, you know, to be a little more precise with the statement, you can say a whole is more than a part of itself, right? A whole is not always, what, greater than just any part, you know? So, you could say that New England is a part of, what, of the United States, but it's bigger than the whole of, what, Massachusetts, right? But then you're not taking part and whole of the same thing, right? Or part of the same thing that the whole you're talking about. And so the way that the wise man has a little more, what, universal judgment, a little more distinct judgment, right? And a judgment enables him to defend the axiom against an argument, right? And in the second book, you know, of natural hearing, the physics, so-called, when Aristotle's talking about nature, right, and he works out a, thinks out a definition of nature, right? And then he says, now, shouldn't we have shown that nature exists before, right? We consider what nature is, huh? Because the question, does something exist, right? Comes before the question, what it is, right? And Aristotle says, well, we didn't have to do that because it's obvious in our experience, right, that nature exists. But there are some people who want to prove that nature exists, huh? And so, Aristotle says, they think they don't know what they do know. And that's an odd state of mind to be in, to think you don't know what you do know. How can you possibly, you know, how can this be possible, right? And Aristotle manifested by something more known that Socrates was always showing, that men do, in fact, think they know what they don't know. Well, if they can make that mistake, can't they make the reverse mistake, huh? So you can think some effeminate man is a woman. You could make the opposite mistake of thinking some masculine woman was a man, right? If someone could think that Miller's is Budweiser, someone could make the mistake of thinking that Budweiser is Miller's, right? Because you make the mistake because you can't quite separate all these Millers and Budweiser, let's say, or even a man. And so, if you can make the mistake of thinking you know what you don't know, it must be hard sometimes to distinguish what you know and what you don't know, right? So then the opposite is possible, right? That you can think you don't know what you do know. And it's because of a sophisticated argument that the one purpose gave to students that makes them think that they don't know what they, in fact, what? Do know, right? Yeah, yeah. Very common thing, right? So the wise man doesn't make the mistake of thinking he doesn't know what he does know, right? But the man who merely has natural understanding of the axioms, right? And if he asks the average person on the street, does a whole, you know, have more than the part? Yeah, oh, yeah. He admitted, right? But then when he gets his objection, you know, it's kind of a doubt, right? Like you have it with a faith or a sudden movement of doubt, you know? Maybe it isn't so, you know? But it's because you can't solve that objection and the wise man, of course, sees that, right? It's really kind of a marvelous thing that Aristotle saw that these things are, what, equivocal by reason, right? And then he wanted to distinguish the meanings and show the order of them, right? Of the meanings, huh? And that way he confirmed the foundation of all reasoned out knowledge, yeah? Descartes was saying, I think therefore I am was thinking that he knew what he didn't really know because apparently he really didn't understand himself and his human nature considering the intention. Yeah, but in a sense he was not wrong saying I think therefore I am, you know, in his thinking he knew that he was, right? I mean, that's something obvious, right? But he thought maybe he understood what the thought was more than he did, right? He didn't say I think therefore I think I am. No, no. That's what the moderns say. Let me give you another thing here, just another example of this thing, huh? Suppose someone said to you, do you have a body? And you say, yes, I have a body. Do you have a soul? And you say, yes. Now, is the soul the same thing as the body? Okay. Now, once you say the soul is not the same thing as the body, then you think the soul and the body are two different things, right? Well, if they're two things and one is not the same as the other, right, then which am I? And probably the only reason we'll answer is to say, I'm the soul, you see? And this is what Plato says, right? So the soul is somehow in the body, like in a prison or whatever, I don't say it's in there, but it's not the body, right? And you know, in the famous conversation there with Socrates in the last day of his life, where shall we bury you, Socrates? You know? And Socrates says, you'll have to catch me first. You see? Because Socrates is thinking of himself as being, what? The soul, right? And they have a hard time catching the soul, right? When it leaves the body, right? And therefore, you know, what's this question that we're going to bury me, you know? It's got to be beautiful, you know? I used to love to explain. Socrates is the same, you have to catch me first, you know. And even though they associate with Socrates, they still think of him as the body, right, you know, and so on. But what's the defect in that argument? It seems to be good, right? So I have a soul and I have a body, they're not the same thing, right? There are two different things, the soul and the body, then which one am I, right? And then you've got these, what? What? Was the soul something or nothing? It's not something that's equivocation on a thing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. In other words, the soul and the body are two things, but not in the sense which a man and a dog are two things, right? Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle talks about how the soul and the body are one thing, right? And how the soul is the, what, first act of a natural body composed of tools and how matter and form are one, right? Because that's hard to understand, right? And so they're not two things in the way that a, what, man and a dog is. Yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body. Yeah, yeah, he didn't understand understand the unity of the soul and the body. Yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body. Yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body. Yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body. Yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body. Right. And, I mean, the soul is kind of, I don't know, some gland up in the brain, the connection is, you know. Yeah. Yeah. But you can't really understand the substantial unity of man, right? You have to understand matter and form, right? It's a little bit like, you know, we don't understand at first the substantial unity, but we see at least the union of what? If you have a wooden chair, right, are, is the wood and the shape of the chair two things, like the chair and the table are two things? Yeah. I mean, the chair, I mean, the wood and the shape of the wood, right, that makes it a chair, one is the actuality of the ability of the other, right? Right. While in the case of the table and the chair, right, one is not the actuality of the other, right? They're really two distinct things, right? So the distinction between the wood of the chair and the shape of the chair is different than the distinction between the table and the chair, right? That's kind of a stepping stone. That's not a substantial unity, but it's a stepping stone to understanding the union of the soul and the body, right? And I'm one thing, right? This union of soul and body, right? That's why Thomas will say that St. Peter is not in heaven. The soul of St. Peter is in heaven, right? But St. Peter, when you say St. Peter is in heaven, let's say what? And just like when you say, and the word was made flesh, right? You mean what? The word was made man, right? But using flesh there for man, right, there's a reason why you do that. You went all the way down to the lowest part of us, you might say. But it's not, it's a synecdoche, right? Where we say, he's a brain, you know? He's not just a brain, right? Well, he decides that part of him, right, huh? Or so-and-so, you know, he kicks all the field goals, you know, he's called the toe, you know? I've heard that one. You know, things like whole and part and things like a thing, even, you know, they've got many, what, meanings, right, huh? I always talk to my students, you know, when you leave the classroom or you leave my house or whatever it is, you will cease to be, you know? In some way you will cease to be, huh? You'll cease to be in this room and so on. But you're kind of forced to distinguish these things, huh? And Aristotle's kind of the first man to see really clearly that these fundamental words, the words we use everywhere, and especially in the axioms, and especially in wisdom, right, these words are all equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes you hear me try to explain, you know, kind of the different ways that a word can be equivocal by reason, right? And you have to kind of understand those things. But only Aristotle really understood that fully, you know? And other people kind of, you know, followed him, like Thomas and people like that. But Aristotle says in the book on Sophistical Refutations that the most common fallacies are the ones that arise from speech, right? And especially from equivocation of the words, right? So only the man who distinguishes in order the senses of these words equivocal by reason, the axioms, can defend them, right? From the most common arguments against them, right? So, I'm going to talk about law before we talk about grace, right? And about law, we're going to first consider it in common, and secondly, about its parts, right? I was mentioning that parts, they call those parts sometimes subject parts, right? As opposed to composing parts, right? So, a composed whole, the name of the composed whole is not said of its parts. So, the arm of the chair is not said to be a chair, right? And the, why the universal whole, of course, is said of its, what, parts, right? But it's not put together from them, right? So, when you say man is an animal or a dog is an animal, you're not saying a man is composed of dog, cat, horse, and all these other things, right? See? So, but most people, you know, even though I developed that statistical argument in class, you know, people, ooh, ooh, you know, from what does I'm dealt? Oh, I just said I didn't do everything so I'm correct. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Of course, the principle here is to go from the general to particular, right? Because we know things in a confused way first. Now, about law in general, three things occur to be considered, huh? So, two and now three, right? First, about its very essence or nature or substance, right? Secondly, about the difference of the laws. And third, about their, what? Effects, huh? So, the first thing he's going to do is going to be to define law, right? And about the first, four things are asked. First, whether law is something of reason. So, not the laws that, that, uh... Secondly, about the end of the law, right? Third, about its cause. And fourth, about its what? Yeah. Okay. You want to do a little break now before we undertake? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.