Prima Secundae
Lecture 230: Law as a Rule of Reason and Its Ordering to the Common Good

Transcript
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first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that law is not something of reason. For the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans chapter 7, I see another law in my members. Law of incubus and other lux fomitis, I guess they call it. But nothing that is of reason is in the members of the body, right? Because reason does not use a bodily, what, organ. Therefore, law is not something of, what, reason. That's a good one, huh? Moreover, in reason there is only the power, the habit, and the act. But law is not the power of reason itself. Likewise, neither is it a habit of reason. Because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues, which are, what, natural understanding, reason-out understanding, wisdom, art, and foresight about which one is said above. Nor is there an act of reason because then when the act of reason ceases, the law would cease. as in those sleeping. Therefore, law is not something of reason, huh? Yeah. So this is an either-or argument, huh? The disjunctive syllogism. Now, an error can come because you, what, don't reason correctly or because something you reason from is not true. So what is it in this case? Okay, then the either-or statement would not be correct, right? Because it's got to exhaust the possibilities. Moreover, law moves those who are subject to the law to acting correctly, rightly. But to be moved to acting properly pertains to the will, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, the law does not pertain to reason but more to the will. Isn't that what our friends, the Muslims, would say, right? The law kind of the assertion of the divine will, right? Rather than something of reason, you know? How many ways can you have? It's obviously the assertion of will rather than reason. According as the Eurus Presetis, the one law, yeah, like the scribes, the Pharisees. What is pleasing to the prince has the vigor of law. But against this is that to law it pertains to what? Command, you might say? Prohibit. But to command is the reason that has been said above. The ordinate. Therefore, law is something of what? reason, huh? The answer should be said that law is a certain what? Rule and a measure of acts, right? By which one is induced or led into acting, right? Or, yeah, refraining from acting, huh? For it is said, for the law is said from what? Binding, huh? Because it obligates, it necessitates one to acting, huh? But the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the first beginning of human acts, as is clear from the things for a set. For it belongs to reason to order to an end, huh? Which is the first beginning and things to be done according to the, what, philosopher, So Shakespeare right there, defining reason by looking before and after, right? That's what order is, huh? So when Thomas explains the six attribute of the wise meant that he orders everybody else around, because it's the highest perfection of reason, right? Which is proper to no order. Now, in each genus, that which is the beginning, is the measure and rule of what? Yeah. Just as unity in the genus of what? Number. In the first motion in the genus of what? Motions. Whence it remains, the law is something pertaining to what? Reason. So that's pretty clear, isn't it? You know how Thomas there when he takes up the substance of God, and he takes up in the summa's five attributes of the substance of God, that the substance of God, take the word in the summa theologiae that's simple, that he's perfect, right? That he's infinite, that he's unchanging, and that he's one, right? Then to some of these he has something attached to that, right? So to God being perfect, he attaches to the consideration that God is what? Good, huh? And to God being infinite, that he's everywhere. And to God being unchanging, that he's infinite, right? He doesn't attach anything to his being simple or to his being one, right? But it seems to me, you know, that you could attach to his being one that God is a measure of all things, huh? You have these famous words of Plato in the laws, you know, where he quotes the Greek philosophers who say, man is a measure of all things, and he says, well, that's not true. God is a measure of all things, right? But Aristoteles says it's a property of the one to be a what? A measure, right? And that's why the virtuous man, you know, is said to be, what? The most virtuous man, shall we say, is a measure, right? For other men, right? So Homer, in that sense, is the measure of all poets, right? Sure. Mozart is the measure of all musicians, you know? Mary is kind of the measure of all women, right? So on. But sometimes, you know, Plato will say that the perfect is the measure of the, what? Imperfect, right? So he put these two together, God being perfect, his being one, he could have something falling upon them, that God is the measure of what? Of all things, huh? So does Anger know whether it's enough? I remember the, this guy in the little pratnick store, right? Comes over, and he had a potted flower plant there, you know, in the back, you know, of the house there and so on. And the boy came over and he looked up at my friend and he knocked it over like that and smashed it. They require something, right? Intervention. So he gave it all and of course the ears are in their forehead, you know. But, you know, I used to give an example there, if you're walking down the hall and somebody bumps into you, should you get angry? No. And you have to say, well, why did they bump into you? It just happened, you know? Now, if they go down the hall, some of the kids who go to high school, you know, properly knocking everybody, they get a little bit of anger, right? and, but now, if you're using my kid's safer target practice, right, that really requires some anger, right? But only reason can measure, you know, to see how much anger is or is not suitable, right? So how can the emotion be the measure of itself, right? To sleep, you know, whether you're sleeping too much or too little. You know, some people are sleeping too little, some people are sleeping too much. You know, To the second, it should be said. That's the one that had the disjunctive syllogism, remember? To the second, it should be said that just as in exterior things, one can consider operation and the thing worked out, right? As an example, building and the built. So in the acts of reason, this is a beautiful comparison that Thomas does. We often refer to this in logic, right? So also in the works of reason, we can consider the act of reason, as for example, to understand, right, and to reason, and something constituted to this act, right? Which in looking reason, first is what? Definition. Second is what? Enunciation or statement in English. Third, syllogism or in general, argument. So I used to always say, you know, see, first thing you've got to understand in logic is what is a speech and what is a, what, name, huh? Because logic is mainly about to be speeches. Definition, statement, and what? Syllogism, huh? Now what is a speech? And what's a name, right? Well, the definition of speech and name is the same except for one part, right? They're both vocal sound, signifying by human agreement or custom, right? But in the case of speech, having parts that signify something by themselves. And a name, not having parts that signify by themselves, right? So we used to have people next to us called Johnson, right? And Johnson was the family name, right? Now, do the parts of Johnson signify something? See, well, when it functions as a name of the family name of these people, does John mean one thing about them and son another? And when the name was first coined to that particular family, it started with John's son. Yeah, yeah, that's the etymology of it, right, huh? But is that the meaning of the name? See? No, that's not. See? Carol, you know, she's a Johnson, right? Well, she's a son of John? No, that doesn't mean that at all, right? See? So just the whole of the name Johnson means what? Her or her family, right, huh? See? My name is Berquist, which is originally Bergquist, right? And Berg, I guess, comes from mountain in Swedish, like in German. And Quist means branch, right? So I'm a mountain branch, right? I use always pun on that channel. A little branch off here. It's not a little tiny branch. Off the base of mountain, I'm a little branch, right? But is that really the meaning of my name? So a name is a vocal sound, right, signifying for human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself, right? Well, in the speech, you have at least two parts that signify something by themselves. Yeah. So white horse is speech, right? A statement is speech, right? So in a definition, when you say that, you know, square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, you have parts that signify something by themselves, right? And the genus signifies something by itself and the differences too, huh? And then the same thing in the statement, right? You say man is an animal, right? Man signifies something, an animal signifies something, right? And then when you say, when you syllogize, you put together statements, right, huh? See, the first thing you've got to understand is what? Speech, right? Because logic is mainly about three speeches, definition, statement, and syllogism. The logic of what? Definition and the logic of what? Statements, which is the peri-harmonius, and then the logic of syllogism, or you could say argument more generally. So you make a beautiful comparison there, right? And because reason, practical reason, uses a kind of syllogism, right, huh? In things to be done, as has been said above, huh? According as the philosophy teaches us in the seventh book of the ethics. Therefore, it is necessarily defined in practical reason, which has itself to operations. Something that has itself, like the proposition, in speculative reason to what? Conclusions. Now, poor Thomas, you know, he got into the habit of, using the word, propositio, for what? Statement, right? And it actually, proposition is maybe more properly the name for premise in the syllogism, right? Because pro-positio placed before, right? But, you know, we'll forgive him this little slip on his part, right? The other place where I get Thomas, you know, is he will follow in the question. The modernists say that. What's a proportion, right? Well, my friend Euclid says proportion is a likeness of ratios. Four is to six as two is to three. That's a, what? Proportion. What is two to three? That's a ratio, yeah. And I think that would be, if they had kept that, that would be quite a conclusion, right? But now they tend to call a ratio a, what? Proportion. Proportion, yeah. Yeah. And then, yeah, and then Thomas says, what's then four to six is two is to three? Well, that's proportionality or something. It has no one to do with it, you know. No, I'm going to correct him when I get to heaven, but I mean. No, no, no. Well, how many of you said? Thank you, man. After all, we should follow, you know, the geometry because they're the guys who see these things clearly, you know, ratios and proportions and, you know. He did, yeah, but I mean, maybe the bad habit had begun already, you know. So some days I like to go back to these things, right? I like to call it, you know, the eight books of natural hearing. That's what they're called in Greek, right? Natural hearing, yeah. About the physics and all that. It didn't get the, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And metaphysics, you know. Metataphysica, right? You know, after the book's a natural philosophy, that's what it is. And because practical reason uses a kind of syllogism, right? And things to be done. This has been had above, according as the philosophy teaches in the seventh book of the ethics, right? You know, Aristotle is honored by Thomas always, you know. And Augustine is honored, right? And these are like, what, fathers, right? Just like my friend here, Washington, right, huh? He's the father of his country, you know, that's what we call him. But these are fathers of the life of your mind, right, huh? So they are our father in some sense, huh? They call Aristotle, you know, the father of logic. And as we call it father of other things, but he's kind of the father of our mind, huh? And Augustine is too, you know. And therefore, he's necessary, huh? And therefore, there is found something in practical reason that is thus towards operations or doings as the, yeah, or the premise, huh? In speculative reason is to what? Conclusions, huh? They're using prepositions more quickly, huh? That's okay, Thomas, yeah. And these universal prepositions of practical reason or deaction have the notion of what? Law. Just as the, just as the geometry, you know, from the axioms and the postulates, you know, deduces something, right, huh? So from the law, we deduce. what we should what do right now which statements propositions okay we don't again and these universal propositions of practical reason order to action have the notion of what law which propositions are sometimes actually considered sometimes are held habitually by what reason right ten commandments right to the third it should be said that reason has the strength of moving from the will the will is a cause in the sense of the mover every kind of cause from this that someone wills the end reason commands about those things which are towards the end but the will about those things commands to which what yeah it's necessary that be something ruled by reason right and in this way is understood that the will of the prince has the vigor of law otherwise the will of the prince would be more iniquity than law as we don't like to yeah i'm going to stop now i guess now you see we're going to see what the law is always ordered to the common good right that goes back to the honor i was trying to bestow upon the father of our country In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Let's look at the body there, the Respondio, in the Article 1 again, just a little bit here. Do some of you have the English text? Yeah. How do they translate Principium in English texts? You know, they say the reason is the first Prima Principium. Yeah. Okay. Now, why do they translate, because later on, it's second place when they say that the Yen, which is the first Prima Principium in Agendis, they probably translate Principium too, don't they? Okay. Well, right above there where it says the reason is, the Principium of Human Acts. Right, at least... It's the rule of the vegetable. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. Now, why do they translate the word Principium by Principle, which is the Latin-derived word, right? We get the word Prince and so on, rather than by the English word for Principium, which is the beginning, right? Why do they translate it that way? Well, you see, the problem is that the word beginning, right, or Principium in Latin, or the word archae in Greek, is a word that is equivocal by, what, reason, right? And there is an order of the meanings, right? But sometimes the carrying over the word from its first meaning to its later meanings, right, is interrupted, right, in those of us who have learned from the Latins or from the Greeks, right? And the English word has not been carried over, you see? And that's a little problem, right? I remember in grade school, how we used to be taught, you know, the difference between the principal with a P-A-L and the principal with P-L-E, right? And those are actually the, if you remember right now, the third and the fourth senses of beginning, see? So an Airstyle distinguishes the senses of beginning, huh? The first sense of beginning is the limit of a, what, something continuous, like the point is the beginning of the line, right? The line is the beginning of the surface. The surface is the beginning of the body. That's the first meaning, right? And the beginning, in that sense, is in the thing of which it is a beginning, right? Although it's not a beginning of itself, right? It's the beginning of the line, right? Then the second sense of beginning is also of something that is in that of which it is a beginning, right? But it's not that of which it is the beginning. And that's the, what, fundamental part of a thing, right? So the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house, right? And the, what do you call it, this thing of the ship there, you know, they build all things up. Yeah, anyway. And then there's some questions, what is the beginning of the body, human body? But anyway, the foundation of the house is the beginning, huh? Then the third sense takes a beginning that is not in that which is the beginning. And one of those would be the principle with P-A-L, right? Okay? Because the principle is not in the students, right? Or in the other teachers, but the principle, what, commands and moves the other and is the source of their, what, actions, right? And therefore you get these words like monarchy or archi, comes the Greek word for beginning, but this is the extrinsic thing, right? Okay. And then the fourth sense of, what, beginning is more removed from the senses, right? And that is the beginning in knowledge, right? And then the, what, after that Aristotle says that every cause seems to be a, what, beginning, right? Well, those early senses of beginning has something like matter and something like the mover, which are more obviously a beginning, right? But that the form is a beginning is a little harder to see. And it's very strange that even an end should be said to be a, what, beginning. But when you call the end the beginning, you seem to have moved the word beginning as far as you can, what, move it, right? So when he says here that the end, the finis, finim, is the first beginning in things to be done, right, huh? That's the last sense almost of, what, beginning, right? But because you've lost, they carry over the word, right? Then they substitute the word principle, right? But principle in the sense of P-A-L would be pertained to the third sense of beginning. But it seems strange to call the principle of the school the beginning of the school, right? Because you're stuck on the earliest, what, meanings, right? Now, you know, in the beginning of St. John's Gospel, it says, what, in the beginning was the word, right? Is that the first sense of the word, word, that you have in mind there? Where the word is a focal sound, huh? Signifying by human agreement, you know, part of which signifies by itself, and that was God, you know? Now, the Greek word, of course, is logos, and the word logos in Greek is first placed upon the word, right, and upon speech, and then it's carried over and applied to what? The thought that the word signifies, right? But has the English word, word, been what? Carried over, right? So there they keep the word, right? But then you have to kind of move it over, right, huh? Because the word, word there is more the meaning of logos, which is thought, than the meaning of logos, which in English is stopped, you might say, is forward progress, huh? With, what? Word, word, yeah. There was speech, yeah. Yeah, yeah. So, but here, you see, they don't translate it that way, you see. So, you always got a little problem there, right, huh? But if everything that is done is done for the sake of some end, you can see why you call the end a, what, beginning, right, huh? But notice he uses the word, or actually two words, primum principium, the first beginning, right? Both of reason and of the end. Well, which is the first beginning, then, you might say, right? Because the reason is not the end, right? So, how can they both be the first beginning? Yeah. And the reason is the one that knows the end, right, and can direct things towards the end, right? But maybe it might be easier to see that law is something of, what, reason, just by saying that law, what, directs, right, people to some course of action, right? To some end, right? And to direct is, in a sense, is to order things, right? And then you see right away from the definition of reason that looks before and after that this reason, then, is going to be responsible for law in some way, right? It's something of reason, right? Okay? Thomas here is a little more, I don't want to say abstract, I don't like to use that word, don't really use the word, right? But, okay, so I just thought we'd talk a little bit about that again. So, law is something of reason, right? That's what we've learned so far, right? Now, we're in what is called a, what, discourse, right? So, when Shakespeare says that reason is the ability for a large discourse, what does the word discourse mean? Well, more generally, It means coming to know what you don't know through what you do know, right? And the two main kinds of discourse that are studied in logic are defining and then what? Reasoning, which is named from reason, right? Kind of the last thing, right? But the discourse we're in a sense involved in in this question is what? Defining, right? And you have to really define before you can reason. Listen, Socrates, I mean Aristotle says, Socrates is trying to syllogize. And the sign of this was that he was trying to define, okay? So you have to be able to define before you can really have syllogism, right? Middle term in syllogism tends to be a definition. Albert the Great, huh? Albert the Great divides logic into two. And Thomas divides it into what? Three, huh? You know my rule, you know? I sometimes say two or three or both, right? And I give my favorite example there. Aristotle divides, what? Plot into beginning, middle, and end. And praises Homer for seeing that that's what a plot needs. It's not about one man, what happened to him. But it's about, what? Yeah, course of actions that have a beginning, a little end. And he taught all the Greeks, that's the way you write a plot, you know? But then later on in the book on Poetic Art, he says that the plot has two things, right? Tying the knot or knots, and untying the knot or knots, right? That's why they remark at the end of Cymbeline there, you know, where Shakespeare unties. They keep on adding, how many knots he unties in one scene, you know? How does he do this so naturally, right? You know, but notice, is one of these divisions good and the other bad? No. So some days you can divide into two and into what? Three, both, right? Well, it's interesting that Albert the Great divides logic into two, huh? And one is the art of defining, huh? And the other is the art of, what? Reasoning, right? Now, Thomas divides it into three, huh? According to the three acts of reason. Understanding what something is. And then composing or dividing in a statement, which is the second act. And then putting statements together to conclude, right? Albert will put the peri hermeneus, which is about the statement, right? With the remaining books, right? And so he'll divide it just into two. Two kinds of, what? Discourse, right? And there's not to be three kinds of discourse corresponding to the three acts, right? But Thomas brings out something. He goes back to Aristotle in the book on the soul, where Aristotle distinguishes the first two acts of the mind, right? Understanding what something is, and then understanding the true or the false by composing or dividing, affirming or denying these simple things you've understood, right? And then you add the third act, which is reasoning, right, that we study, especially in logic. So we're trying to define this, right? How do you distinguish sacred doctrine as a whole into two or three? What are the three main distinctions of sacred doctrine? What is that? Well, you see, I was graduating from Revolve there, because I've been working on this Rhodes and all this sort of stuff, so I was thinking about, theology wasn't part of my thesis, but sacred doctrine. There seemed to me to be three main distinctions of sacred doctrine as a whole, right? And one was that followed by Augustine in the Incredium, right, on faith, hope, and charity, and followed by Thomas in his catechetical, what, instructions, right? And that's a distinction into three, right? And so Augustine and Thomas, who are kind of our greatest mind, it seems, with faith, they would talk about the creed, right? And then with hope, they would talk about the Our Father, and maybe the Hail Mary, but mainly the Our Father, right? And then with charity, they would talk about the Two Commandments of Love and the Ten Commandments, right? So this gives you kind of the whole sacred doctrine, especially for a beginner, right, huh? Thomas has these, I guess it was in Naples there, you know, that part of his life that he did the catechetical instructions, right, huh? And he also followed that in his thing for his friend there, that was his confessor, I guess, but he wanted a little bit of a short kind of thing. And he wrote the Compendium of Theology to quite finish it, but he was divided according to faith, hope, and charity, right? And that kind of covers everything, but it's kind of interesting, that division into three, right? Now, in the Summa Contra Gentilas, which, as you know, is my favorite work, how does he divide sacred doctrine into two or three? Three, yeah, yeah. That's a little complicated because he divides this three by what? Two, right? But the basic distinction of three is you consider God by himself, right? And then God is the Arche, the beginning, and then God is the, what, the end, right? So that's the first, second, and third book of the Summa Contra Gentilas, right? So far as those three things can be known by natural reason as well as by faith, right? And then the fourth book, right, is those same three things, but as you're known only by faith, right? So you take the Trinity up there, and you take up the Incarnation and the last things there. So, now, is there any division of sacred doctrine as a whole, though, into two, you see? And it's a hint right here where we are now, see? Because the part we're in right now, I mean, before we talked about the distinction of the theological virtues into faith, hope, and charity, right? And that was used by both Augustine and Thomas Fowling, his master Augustine there, in the catechetic instructions, right? Okay? But now you have the distinction between, what, law and, what, grace, right? And so, is the Bible, you know, kind of a complete sacred doctrine? Thomas Fowling, Thomas Fowling, the words of the scripture there, that the law was given by Moses, right? But grace and truth came through Jesus Christ, right? And so he divides the Old Testament as a whole on the basis of law, right? And the New Testament on the basis of what? Grace. But the Old Testament, he first divides into what? Two. With the distinction between the law of the king, right? Which is given in the Pentateuch, right? And reminded of in the prophets, right? And then the law of the father in the sapiential books and so on. And even in the sapiential books, they say, why, son, you know? So it's the law of the father, right? Why, this one on the mountain there, it's the law of the king, right? And I think it's kind of interesting because as you go from the king to the father, you're getting a little more gentle, right? And if you get to Christ, you'll say, I call you now friends, right? But the New Testament is divided into what? Three parts, right? So the Gospels, the origin of grace, Thomas says, right? The Epistles of St. Paul, the nature of grace, right? And then the Apocalypse, the Catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse, the effect of grace, which is the church seeing its origin and its development and its final stage, right? You know, it's beautiful, right, huh? But I used to, you know, think about those three, you know, when I got my doctorate there. And it really struck me how wonderful that is that you have those three different ones, right? And they're all wonderful in their own way, huh? I was laying in bed this morning and I got thinking of the two Summas, you know, and how they take up the substance of God. And they both have the same five parts.