Prima Secundae
Lecture 233: Human Law, Divine Law, and the Necessity of Three Laws

Transcript
================================================================================

Father, and the Son of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Amen. Holy Spirit. Amen. So up to Article 3, I guess. Whether there is some human law, right? To the third, one goes forward thus. It seems that there is not some human law, besides the eternal law and the natural law that we've talked about so far. For the natural law is a partaking of the eternal law, as has been said. That's the theological definition of that, right? But through the eternal law, all things are most, what? Ordered, eh? That's the superlative of order, right? As Augustine says in the book on free judgment, eh? Therefore, the natural law suffices for ordering all, what? Human things, eh? Therefore, it's not necessary there to be some human law, eh? Moreover, law has the aspect of a measure, eh? As has been said. But human reason is not the measure of things, eh? But rather the verse, eh? So when reason says, if I say, you're sitting right, because you are sitting right, it's true. It's measured by you're sitting right, you know? You're not sitting because they say you're sitting right, not even because it's true. Right? Yeah, yeah. That's the famous thing there in the laws there, you know, where Socrates or the Athenian stranger says, you know, he goes against the idea that man is a measure of all things, right? He says, no, God is a measure of all things. Therefore, from human reason, no law is able to go forward. Moreover, a measure ought to be most certain, eh? As is said in the tenth book of the, what? Metaphysics. But the dictate of human reason about things to be, what? Done is uncertain, according to that of the ninth chapter of the Book of Wisdom, that the thoughts of mortals are timid, right? And uncertain are our providences, right? And therefore, from human reason, no law can, what? Proceed, eh? Go forward, eh? But against this is what Augustine says in the book here on free judgment, on free will. He lays down two laws, one eternal and the other temporal, which he says is human, eh? Well, I answer, meaning Thomas, not me. I answer, it should be said, eh? This has been said, law is a certain dictate of the practical, right? Reason, eh? Now, a similar proceeding is found in practical reason and speculative reason, eh? And what is this likeness? For both go forward from certain beginnings to certain, what? Conclusions, right? As soon as I call this knowledge of beginnings in the practical, cinderesis, you find a strange word, right? Yeah. Natural understanding and the looking reason or speculative reason. So Aristotle calls it theoretical reason and Thomas calls it speculative reason. Perkins calls it looking reason, but they all mean the same, what? The word, yeah? So according to this, therefore, it should be said that in looking reason, right, speculative reason, from beginnings that are not able to be demonstrated, right, but are naturally, what? Known, like the whole is more than the part, eh? Are produced, huh? Conclusions of the diverse, what? Sciences, huh? Diverse forms of reasoned out knowledge, the knowledge, eh? The knowledge of which is not naturally placed in us, eh? But are found through the activity of, what? Reason, eh? So also, this is the likeness doubt between the two reasons which differ by their end, eh? So also from the presects of the natural law, as from certain, what? Beginnings that are both common and indemonstable, right? But you could add naturally known, as he says, right? It is necessary that human reason go forward to some things more, what? In particular to be disposed or ordered, right? Arranged. And these particular dispositions are, that are found according to, what? Human reason or by human reason are called, what? Human laws, observing the other conditions which retain to the notion of the law, right? And the definition of the law, as has been said above, huh? Whence Tully or Cicero, right? Says in his rhetoric, right, huh? That the beginning of, what? Is going forward from, what? Nature, right? Then from some things in, what? Yeah, from the usefulness of reason are found, right? Or we come to them. And then afterwards, things both by proceeding from nature in some way, right? Originally, but also proved by, what? Custom. Then law is what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So he quotes Tully, Cicero sometimes, right? Doesn't always agree with Cicero, but Cicero's pretty good in some ways. What did he say to, was it Jerome? Are you a Christian or a Ciceronian? Yeah. He was asked, what are you? And he said, Christian. And our Lord said, no, you're not, you're a Ciceronian. Yeah. The thing he had up there about the Christendom there, the calendar, you know, the other day, was it? You know, the Christendom, you know, he studied under a very famous rhetorician, right? So, you know, something to be said for rhetoric, right? My interest in politics, interest in rhetoric, right? But rhetoric is kind of an offshoot of political philosophy and logic a bit, huh? So, I remember when my father's lawyer there, Gus Larson, would come, you know, to the board meetings, you know, the company there, and boom, boom, boom. Very orderly, you know? You can see something about the lawyer, right? A certain perfection of his mind, right, huh? You know? But, I mean, Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric, wasn't he? You know, and it gives him the style, too, you know, that there's, don't have, you know? And Chrysostom was, apparently, they wanted him to succeed, right? This great teacher of rhetoric, but he had better things to do. But, but nevertheless, he learned something from it, right, huh? And even Cicero has some things, right? Thomas will quote Cicero sometimes. You know, Cicero talks about, you know, how he threw the dust on the juries. He's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's, he's though, right? The natural laws of our taking of the eternal law, why do you need something beyond that, right? Well, it's because of the imperfection of our partaking of the divine law, right? What we know naturally is something very, what, in general, right? You have to descend down to the, what, particulars, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that human reason is not able to partake ad plenum, right, huh? Fully, right, huh? The dictates of the divine, what, reason, right? But in its way, let's say, in our human way, right? And therefore imperfectly, right? And again, he goes back to the likeness, to looking reason, right? And therefore, just as on the side of, what, looking reason, by the natural partaking of divine wisdom, there is in us a knowledge of certain common beginnings, huh? Not, however, of the, what, private or particular, right, knowledge of every truth, as it is found in divine, what? Wisdom, right? There's a Pythagorean theorem, right, in the part of the natural, a number of steps to get there, right? Yeah. Even in the straight lines intersected, these opposite angles are equal, right? You can come to that from things you know, but it's not naturally known, huh? Now, Augustine will sometimes speak as if that natural understanding, um, you're seeing things in the divine, what, mind, right, huh? And people kind of sometimes say what Augustine is saying, right? But you are partaking of the divine wisdom, right, in natural understanding. In that sense, you're judging things by God's mind, not by, what, your mind, right, okay? But it's something that is, what, you're not seeing God in himself, not the vision, right? But you're, you're, you're partaking of the divine wisdom, nevertheless, huh? Yeah, right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, make, fall in comparison there. And just as on the side of looking reason, through the natural partaking of the divine wisdom, there is in us a knowledge of some common beginnings, not, however, a proper knowledge, particular knowledge of every, what, or any truth, every truth, as it's in the divine wisdom, or is contained in the divine wisdom. So also, on the side of, what, practical reason, naturally, man partakes of the divine, what? Law. But according to certain common beginnings, huh? Not however, according to the particular directions of singulars, which are contained in the eternal, what? Law. And therefore, it is necessary further, that human reason proceeds to particular sanctions of the laws, right? Well, maybe in an actual law, there might be what you should, you know, take innocent life, and so on, right, huh? Now this guy Ford, or somebody, invented the automobile, right? And this can take human life with the greatest of ease, right? And maybe, you know, you shouldn't drive it too fast, then, maybe, huh? So you've got to kind of figure out how to make this driving cars around compatible with the law, thou shalt not kill. And maybe, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going to have a, you know, we're going we're going to have a different speed limit on the highway, because people shouldn't be walking on the highway, but in the city, we've got to have a, what? Yeah, because people do walk on the street, and cross the street, and so on, right, huh? And so on. But, you know, what speed should it be, you know? Yeah, and I go down Floro Street there, you know, the Floro Street school there, so, school days, 20 miles an hour. So, I finally learned to slow down to 20 miles, not even go 30 miles, right? Maybe that's too fast, I don't know. But, I mean, you know, it's just not very, the natural lesson said, right? Thou shalt drive your car at 20 miles an hour. In the school zone. In the school zone, yeah. Or the school hours. Yeah, yeah. When the lights flash. And so these are a lot. Yeah. But we don't partake of it in that distinctness, right? See? Or some other guy invents a gun, right? And maybe you shouldn't be shooting your gun off in the city or something. There should be certain restrictions as to shooting your gun off at, you know? I told you about my neighbor that used to, on New Year's Eve, you know, he'd shoot his gun off, his hunting gun, right? He used to come home, you know, with a, with a, with a, a lamb or, not lamb, but a, what he called it, something, you know, he'd shot up in northern Minnesota there, you know? But we were, I was waiting, we used to go to bed, we didn't stay up, you know, for, to celebrate on New Year's Eve, we used to go to bed, normal time, but you're waiting for the gun to go off and hope he's, he's sober when it goes off. I don't remember if he was against the law, I don't know, I mean, we never reported him, but. Yeah. Some areas, and I know, that's what areas I have most, I know, I consciously, probably violate the law when I shot a squirrel in our neighborhood or something like that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And there was a wolf coming into some places around here and attacking the man's kid and his wife, and he shot the thing, right? So I guess that was okay, but. Certain, certain, certain things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, as long as the wolf wasn't in a dangerous. Well, you know, my dad's got all these chickens, you know, but I don't think you have chickens in the main city, because you don't think you can, you'll think you're alone in the main city. Yeah, that's a good question. Maybe some cities do it, some cities. You know, where I have a cow in your backyard eating grass, I don't think you. The second it should be said, that human reason, by itself, is not the rule of things, right? But the beginnings that are naturally placed in it, are certain general rules and measures of all things which should be done by man. Yeah. Of which natural reason is the rule and the, what? Measure. Although it is not the measure of those things which are by, what? Nature. Nature. I suppose he means, huh? You've got to be careful about that, I think, because, I mean, the divine law is the measure of what? Things are by nature, right? And if we partake of the divine law, then we have something of, what? A measure that is by according to nature, right, huh? Things that are by nature, right? I sometimes say that the natural law is about things that are naturally known, but it's about things that are good or bad by nature, right, huh? So to kill innocents is by nature bad, right, huh? To drive on the right side of the street, it's not by nature bad. Even to drive on the left side of the street is not by nature bad, right? But you should maybe, you know, have some agreement as to what you want to do. Yeah. It's kind of funny when you're walking and, you know, how do you want to go to the right, you know, when you're, you know, when you're, to avoid any of the person coming on the sidewalk in the opposite direction, right? Yeah. In the winter here, when you're coming down that hill to your place, you know, there's hardly any room there, you know? You kind of really get over it to that. It's when there's a truck on the other side. Yeah, yeah. Now the third one is talking about being a measure, right? And the measure ought to be most, what, certain, right, huh? So they use this to measure things. No one gets kind of hot, it's going to kind of flatten out, right, huh? It gets in the hot weather, right, huh? It's not a certain measure, right? You need something that's not going to get longer or shorter in the temperatures that we normally have, right? But you've got to realize that measures are going to fit their, what, matter, right? Third, it should be said that practical reason is about things to be done which are both singular and, what, contingent, right? And it's not about things that are necessary, as is looking reason, huh? Aristotle's Senate calls reason the looking faculty, right? Practical is kind of an extension of that. And therefore, human laws cannot have that, what, infallibility that have the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences, like those of geometry, right, the Pythagorean theorem, and so on, huh? Interior angles of a triangle, we could have the right angles, huh? Marvelous theorem, okay? Nor is it necessary that every measure be in every way infallible and, what, certain, but according as is possible in its, what, genus, huh? Translation, you have to do something, you can take out a loan, you shouldn't take out a loan unless you're certain you can pay it back. Well, how can we be certain, I mean, there might be a stock market crash, and then we're about, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah I use Mozart to measure how good a musician you are, it's kind of, it's a little hard to do, yeah, but the virtuous man, as Aristotle says, is a measure of law, right? So admitting that there's a human law now, in addition, and now we've got how many laws? Three, yeah. Okay. Now, what the heck is this next article about now? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. And incidentally, Thomas is going to take up each of these in particular, these laws later. To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that it would not be necessary for there to be some, what, divine law. It's a divine law other than the eternal law, obviously. Because, as has been said, the natural law is a certain partaking of the eternal law in us. But the eternal law is a divine law, as has been said. Therefore, it's not necessary that apart from the natural law, and the human laws derived from it, that there be now another law that is divine. That's just multiple. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, in Ecclesiasticus, chapter 15, verse 14, it said that God left man in the hand of his own, what? Yeah. And let's use the word hand there, in the hand of his own counsel, right? Counsel over is an act of reason, as was had above. Therefore, man is left to the governance of his own, what? Reason. But the dictate of human reason is the human law. Therefore, it's not necessary that man be governed by another divine law, right? However, human nature is more sufficient than that of the irrational creatures. But the irrational creatures do not have some divine law in addition to the natural inclination found in them, huh? Given to them. Therefore, much less does the rational creature, must he have a divine law apart from the, what? Natural law. And Thomas is going to solve this in a way, something like the way he solved whether theology is necessary. Whether some wisdom beyond that of the philosopher's wisdom is necessary, huh? But against this is what David's, that David, what? Seeks a law to be laid down by God, right, huh? Saying, lay down the law for me, huh? Lejim poni mi, that's really interesting, huh? Lord, in the way of your, what? Justifications, huh? Interesting argument, huh? Now, I answer, meaning Thomas, the answer should be said, that apart from the natural law and the human law, there is necessary for the direction of human life to have a, what? Divine law. Two is not enough, you need a third. That's a good example of this, huh? Two or three. Yeah, but three, the first number of all, you say all. And this is an account of four reasons. Wow. Now, we've got to digest these four reasons, huh? First, because through law, man is directed to his own acts in order to the last, what? End. And if man were ordered only to an end, which would not exceed the, what? Proportion of the natural faculty of man. It would not be necessary that man have something directing him on the side of reason above the natural law and the law humanly laid down, right? That's the law we talked in Article 3, which is derived from the, what, natural law, right? But because man is ordered to an end, to the end of eternal beatitude, which excels, huh? The proportion of the natural, what? Faculty or ability, you might say, of man, huh? As Shakespeare said, for the faculty, these are the words, faculty. Capacity. Okay. Capability, yeah. Okay. Now, that's something like the argument he used to say that we need theology, right, huh? Because man is directed to an end that surpasses his natural, what, grasp, right, huh? So, to the best of my knowledge there, you know, when I first read the Nicomarckian Ethics, he's going to talk about the purpose of life, right? That sounds interesting, right? But he didn't talk about the big vision, that's for sure, first of all, you know? He talked about metaphysics at the end there, right? First philosophy, right? So he didn't know about this. So man is directed to an end that is not, what, natural, but is above the natural, right? Super means above, right, huh? I was a little annoyed, you know, thinking of how we refer to being and one and true and good and so on as the transcendentals, right? So what does that word transcendental really mean, right? And to transcend something means to step over it. So the transcendentals are the names that step over what? Yeah. Now, you know, the ancient philosophers there, you know, in the Greek tradition after Aristotle, they had great respect for the categories of Aristotle, that book, right? And for the book of Porphyry, the Isogogi, to the categories, right? Which is Isogogi to more than just the categories, but it was written as an Isogogi for that purpose. They referred to the Isogogi as the book of the five names, and the categories is the book of the ten names. It's kind of interesting, right? It's obviously not telling you exactly what the books are about, but they were so common with the thinking, right? So in the Isogogi, you learn the names, genus, difference, species, property, accident, right? And I'll say the euphora, right? Okay. So on. Some bebekahs. And in the, what, book of the categories, you learn the ten names, substance, how much, how, and so on, quantity, quality, relations, and so on. Well, the transcendentals, they step over the ten names, right? In the book of the ten names. Where other names, like say dog, cat, courage, temperance, they, what? All into one. They come under one of these, right? Yeah. So all other names seem to come under one of these ten, but there's these that step over them, right? But in so doing, they become equivocal, but equivocal by reason, right? Well, it's kind of, so I'm going to call them now the six step overs, instead of the six transcendentals, right, huh? You've got to be, you've got to be concrete, right, huh? I saw another little interesting thing that just occurred to me, you know? You've read the Vatican II, huh? And I think it's in the premium, this magnificent premium to the one on the scripture, you know? The A variable? Yeah. I think it's at the end of that premium, I think. I think they're quoting, is it Augustine? that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end of that premium, it's at the end how that the whole world, by believing, might come to hope, and by hope might come to what? Love, right? Charity. And so, just like in the catechetical instructions, we instruct faith first, and then hope, and then what? Charity, right? But it's saying at the end of the quote from Augustine, and they use it again when they talk about Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob. Abraham begot what? Faith begot hope, and hope begot what? Charity. Yeah. I mean, that's very profound, huh? You know, and that's one of the two dogmatic constitutions of the Vatican II, right? So it's a great authority. What struck me was, having to run across a text in Thomas, you know how the emotions are more known to us than the acts of the will, and the emotions are divided into two kinds, huh? The concubiscible emotions, which concern what is pleasing or painful to the senses, right? So, this is pleasing to my senses, so I like this, I love it, I want it, and I don't have it, and I rejoice when I have it, huh? But something else, you know, like salmon, right? I hate, and I avoid if I can, and if it's forced upon me at a meal, well, I'm sad, and I suffer much as I eat it. But then, the irascible ones are the ones that deal with some kind of difficulty, right? So, hope and fear, hope and despair about some difficult good, right? Fear and, what, boldness, some difficult evil, right? Difficult to overcome. And anger, right, you know, difficult one, right? That's already present. Well, the names of the concubiscible and irascible emotions are carried over to the, what? To the will, right? So, with the theological virtue of hope, hope is not an emotion of hope, right? But it's a, what? Act of the will, right? It's taken from what's irascible then, right? Okay? Why, charity is a kind of love, right? And love is taken from the concubiscible, right? Okay? Now, it struck me, huh? That, what does Thomas say about the emotions, right? Which partakes of reason more, the concubiscible or the irascible? Yeah. Why, because it's a kind of this for that, right? So, it's kind of, you know, closer in some ways to, what, reason, right, huh? And now, going back to Ostoli there, right, huh? Talking about how the music of Mozart and the Baroque, right? Let's take Mozart as the measure of this, right? And most of the symphonic music may be the highest thing is the last five symphonies, right? Which are symphonies, what? 39, 40, 41. What did I do that? 36. Yeah. There's no 37th symphony. There's a 36th symphony and a 38th, but no 37th. Okay? But they kept the numbers anyway. So, the five last symphonies are 36, 38, right? 39, 40, and 41, right? What is Mozart representing in these, huh? Yeah? But also, as Aristotle says in the end of the politics, and he talks about music, right? He says that music represents not only the emotions, but also the, what, virtues, right, huh? Okay? Now, I've talked about the symmetry of the last five symphonies, like the symmetry of the five, yeah, the sun. And so, the first symphony in 36th is in C major, right? The last one, 41st, is in what? C major. And what do they represent, the 36th and the 41st? Well, hint is that the 41st is now known as the Jupiter symphony, right? But they represent magnanimity, right? Which is a virtue that does great things in all the virtues, huh? But magnanimity is about what? Oh! And then the 38th and the 40th symphony are about, what? Courage, right? Which is also the irascible, right? Okay? But 38th is more the aspect of the irascible, which is to approach the difficult, right, huh? The evil, to fight it, huh? And then 40th is more the patience to suffer, you know, the thing that you cannot completely control and so on, right? And then the 39th is E flat major, right? Which is not the concubisal key like the Mozart, the G major is, and so on, but B flat and so on. But it's more, it's, you know, more cheerful and so on, right, huh? You know, it's the relaxation of the great man, right? But you can see the emphasis in Mozart there in the last symphonies is upon the irascible, right? And this partakes more reason, right? And this is what Ostley says that they do, right? They say excellence, right? Okay, well, if Abraham begets Isaac and Isaac begets Jacob, right? Isaac is closer to Abraham, right? So if faith begets hope and hope begets, what, love, then hope is closer to faith, right? And therefore closer to reason, right? I mean, there's a little connection there, right? Because hope is like the irascible, which partakes more reason, right? And love being like the concubiscible, right? Is further from reason, right, huh? And hope goes more to what? I mean, love goes more to the thing itself, in itself, right? You know, further away from reason, huh? So maybe there's some connection there, right? In the fact that faith gives rise to love, right? Through what? Hope, right? Because the irascible takes your reason more than the concubiscible, not, you know? There's some analogy there between the distinction there, right, and the emotions, huh? What if there's something to that? I don't know what you think. Because it really is striking when you stop and think, you know, what it says, you know? And they're quoting Augusta, aren't they? They're like hope. I mean, faith begets hope and hope begets love. But it's also in this explanation of my friend Matthews there, the gospel, right, huh? Abraham begot Isaac, right? Isaac begot Jacob, you know? They go through all the names. They all got some name to have the virtues and so on. But I remember the first three, at least. Belief begot hope and hope begot love. But why? Why didn't belief begot love immediately, see? Did Abraham begot Jacob, huh? Well, in the remote way he did, right? I told you this guy worked in the back of the store. He saw me on my grandchildren one day, you know, in church there, you know. I reached one of them, you know, the whole tube being filled up. He says, you know, you're responsible for this, he says. He's a nice guy. He died a few months ago, you know. He went to his funeral. But he's a nice guy. So, in a sense, Abraham's responsible, right? He's going to have all these offspring as numerous as the stars, as the heavens, and so on. Sands of the sea. I wonder if there's something to that, you know. I mean, that's authoritative, huh? That hope is in some way closer to what? Yeah, to faith, yeah. And I mean, it's something to do with that, huh? It strikes me, you know. I don't see any guys that are around to check it out with them. But, we used to always joke about it. Senior's first reaction is always to kind of reject whatever you say. So, you really got to, you know, establish it, right? I told you when I was writing my thesis there, you know, and I, something that bothered me, you know, in my philosophical thinking, you know, since I was in college. And it became essential to my thesis, you know. And finally, I was reading something in Thomas. And I was following, of course, when it's in your net. But, then. the two together. I had it, you know. I said, I better check this after, you know, five years, you know, of not being able to solve it. So I come down and I start, you know, I push in the early way. He said, I know where you're going. He said, Monsignor, you know. I said, well, damn there. Can I go there anyway? He said, okay. But that's very interesting, it seems to me, you know. See how Mozart's five last symphonies can help you to understand the order there, right? You know, looking before and after, as Shakespeare would say, right? These men are the measures, huh? Let's go back to this wonderful text here. What's the first reason, huh? Because we're directed to an end, right? That is above our natural, what? Capacity to know, right? And so on. But because man is ordered to the end of eternal beatitude, which exceeds the proportion of the natural human faculty, right? Therefore it's necessary, right? That above the, both the natural law and the human law, that one man be directed to his, what? By a law divinely, what? Given, huh? Okay. I see that's something like the reason he gives for why we need theology, right? And Nicomachian ethics is not enough, right? To direct us to our last end, right? If you're having a last end, it's something of our natural ability, right? Even this nitwit, or dimwit here, you know, knows a little bit of first philosophy, right? So I can reach that goal, right? So as Thomas Aquinas says, Aristotle sees the end of man as the contemplation of God by natural, by first philosophy, right? And that's within the capacity, you know? We can know something about God, right? But he's not anyway, right? But that's not our last end that's directed to, huh? Secondly, because an account of the incertitude of, what? Human judgment, right, huh? Especially, huh? Perkipui, right? Perkipui means what? Chiefly, yeah, especially, yeah. Thomas says, Plato and Aristotle, the philosophy, perkipui. Because an account of the incertitude of human judgment, especially his judgment about contingent things, right, in particular, it happens that, what, about human acts, diverse are the judgments of diverse people. That's certainly true, right, huh? That therefore man, without any doubt, would be able to know what he should be done, right? And what should be avoided, right, is necessary, and that he be, what, directed in his own acts through a law given by God, right? About whom it is, what, stands that it cannot be, what, mistaken, right? I told you it was out in California there. Someone was impressed with my mind, you know, so she wanted me to come and speak to this meeting of the, what do they call it, the cessation of university women, right? So I said, well, there must be educated women, so I guess I have to give them a fairly solid thing in something ethics, right, huh? So I gave this talk, and anyway, afterwards, I was talking to the ladies, you know, and one of these says, it wasn't just nothing that the church tells you to do? I said, yeah, that's enough, yeah. This is what Thomas was talking about here, right, huh? Notice he gives us reason second, because in a way, man can, to some extent, judge these things, right, huh? The first argument, in some sense, is stronger, right, huh? But the second shows, what, a reason too, right? We need this, right? Okay. The same thing we see in theology, right? Can we know that God exists? Yeah. But maybe most men aren't able to understand the proofs for the existence of God, right? Or can we know that the human soul is immortal by natural reason? Yes, and yes, we can, but most men cannot, what, follow the arguments, right, huh? So we need, you know, to be instructed by the faith, you know, for the most part, in these matters. Now, you talk to Trinity, though, then you have something you can't know, right? Even Aristotle didn't know this, right, huh? Even though he talks about using the number three, you know, to praise God, right? You know, but that's because of the perfection of three, right? Not because he, he, he, he figured it out, yeah, that Thomas says that. That's one of the objections, you know, in talks, you know, can we know by natural reason? They say, well, Aristotle talks about three, you know, but he used to read it, you know? Third, because about those things, man can, what, about which is able to, what, judge, right, huh? But the judgment of man cannot be about interior, what, motions, which are, what, hid, right? But only about exterior acts, which, what, appear. And nevertheless, for the perfection of virtue is required that man be rectified, right, in both acts, right? And therefore, human law cannot, what? Yeah, it's the idea of, inhibit, right? And to order sufficiently interior acts, he cannot, it cannot be, yeah. And it's necessary that, for this, the divine law come upon this, right? And they found this guy, you read about the trial, you know, they found this guy who, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But now the question, whether they're going to put him in jail forever or give him the death sentence, and, of course, they're trying to, the defense lawyers, they're trying to say, you know, well, he's just under the influence of his older brother, you know, and that sort of stuff, you know, and all this sort of stuff, but you don't really know what's going on inside people's minds, you know, huh? You don't really know what, it seems very well. Here you think of Christ, you know, in the Sermon on the Mount, right, you know, where he says, you look at the woman with, you know, a lust in your thing, you're already committing adultery in a sense with her, right, huh? Even though you don't go to the exterior act, right, huh? So that's, you can't order those things sufficiently, right? That's kind of a subtle reason, right, huh? Thomas is quite a fool here at the reasons he gives, huh? But he orders them, too. Fourth, because, as Augustine says in the first book of the Free Judgment, the human law is not able to, what? Punish or prohibit all things which come about badly, huh? Because when it takes away all evils, it also would follow, they would take away, what? Many good things, right, huh? And would impede the usefulness of the, what? Common good, huh? Which is necessary for human life, huh? Whence that nothing evil would, what? Be not prohibited or not punished, remain not prohibited and not punished, it's necessary that there be a, what? Divine law, to which omnia peccata are prohibited, right? Okay, and you see this, didn't they say, in the Sermon on the Mount, don't you? Now, so he sees this in his knowledge of the Psalms, right, huh? Now, I was just recently at a funeral there, Mrs. Schmitz died. I heard about it. Yeah. You know, she was...