Prima Secundae
Lecture 239: The Eternal Law and Natural Things

Transcript
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To the fifth, one goes forward thus. It seems that the natural things that are contingent are not subject to the eternal law. For the promulgation is of the notion of law, or the definition of law, right? But promulgation is not able to come about except what? It can only be made two rational creatures to whom something is able to be denounced. Therefore, only rational creatures are subject to the eternal law, and therefore not natural contingent things. Moreover, those things which obey reason partake in some way of what? Reason, as is said in the first book of the Ethics. But the eternal law is the highest ratio, as has been said above. Since therefore natural contingent things do not partake in some way of reason, but they are wholly without reason, it seems that they are not subject to the what? To the eternal law. So are the insects, and so on? It doesn't seem reasonable to me. Moreover, the eternal law is most efficacious, but in natural contingent things there happens defects, huh? They are not therefore subject to the eternal law, right? It's a big window that my daughter has in the, you know, where they eat their meals there. They're some lunch, usually dinner. It's a big window like that, that the birds, you know, wham, you know. I hope they're not going to break the window someday. You know, there's usually at least one bird that does that when I'm there, you know? They hit these round windows up top of the church. Yeah, well, it's a big window, you know, and they tend to, you know, I mean, if it's clear, too, you know. Is there stain, do you mean, or just clear? No, they're just clear. Yeah, it's clear. Because I think they can fly in there. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It must be the barn's hollows because I'm down at the workshop down there and I think I have a big garage door open and they're always flying in and fly around and fly back out. I think they want to go in and fly around and fly out. But now, again, this is what is said in Proverbs 8, verse 29. When what? He made it around the, what, sea? It's, what, limit, huh? And placed a law, right, to the waters that they do not go beyond their, what, limits, huh? Okay. The answer should be said, that one speaks otherwise about the law of man and otherwise about the eternal law, which is the law of God. For the law of man does not extend itself to rational creatures, except to rational creatures, which are subject to, what, man, right? So when the king there tried to plan their ways, right? That didn't, uh, one of the English kings there was, you know, I don't know what the history really is, but it's a story told, right? King Canute was it or something? The reason for which is because the law is directive of acts which belong to those subject to the governance of someone. Whence no one, properly speaking, imposes law upon his, what? His own acts, right? Whence whatever things are done about the use of, what, irrational things subject to man are done by the act of the man himself moving these things, huh? So I know about those cows and chickens, you know, whether they're... For irrational creatures of this sort do not, what, act by themselves, but are led by, what, others, as has been said above. And therefore a man is not able to impose a law upon irrational creatures, huh? However much they are subject to him. What about the dog, though, you see? Or the... But to rational things subject to themselves, they can, what, impose a law insofar as to his, what, precept or command, right? There's impressed upon the mind of them a rule which is a source of, what, acting, right? But just then as a man impresses by, what, declaring that some interior beginning of acts be subject to man, so also God impresses upon the whole of nature beginnings of their, what, own action. And therefore, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to that of Psalm 148. He laid down a precept and will not be, what? Yeah. That would be gone out of frame. And in this way, all motions and actions of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Hence, another way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law insofar as they are moved by, what, divine providence. Not by understanding the divine precept as the, what, rational creatures. But when we train a dog, right? Are we posing something like God in a sense, right? Because habit is like a second nature, right? So we're like God. To the first therefore, it should be said, in this way, the impressing of a inward, active beginning as regards, what, natural things, as itself, but as the promulgation of law as regards men, right? Because through the promulgation of the law, there is impressed upon man a certain principle that's directive of human action, as has been said. So this is similar to the gizm of nature whereby certain form of action is given. The second should be said that irrational creatures do not partake of human reason, nor do they obey it. They partake nevertheless by way of obedience of divine, what, reason. For to more extends the power of the divine reason than the power of human reason. And just as the members or parts of the body of man are moved to the command of reason, but nevertheless do not partake of reason, because they do not have some, what, grasping or into reason. So also irrational creatures are moved by God, but nevertheless not on account of their being, what? Rationals, huh? Don't we move the animals a little bit, you know? Sometimes he speaks this way, kind of. Not to point it out a little bit. They're doing that, doesn't he? No, no. To the theory it should be said that the defects which happen in natural things, although they are outside the order of particular causes, they are nevertheless not outside the order of, what? Yeah. Especially the first cause, which is God, whose providence nothing is able to escape, right? Subterra fugere. To flee out from under, huh? Subterra fugere, as is said in the first. And because the eternal law is the reason the divine providence has been said, therefore the defects, even of natural things, are subject to the eternal law, huh? Stop there. Subterra fugere. Subterra fugere. Subterra fugere. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, your enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or the luminary images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Okay, so Article 6, I guess, Question 93. To 6, one goes forward thus. It seems that not all human things are subject to the eternal law. For the apostle says, listen to the Galatians, if we are led by the Spirit, we are not under the law. Many people have abused that text. Yeah. Oh, yeah. But just men, who are sons of God by adoption, are led by the Spirit of God, according to that of Romans chapter 8. Who are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of, what, God. Therefore, not all men are under the, what, eternal law. That seems like it. I was reading in chapter 16 there, Matthew there, where Peter makes a profession of faith. Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And then Christ gives him, you know, his praise there, and what he's going to be, the rock and so on. Well, of course, the church fathers there discussed the fact that some other people before in the New Testament, like Nathaniel, call him the Son of God, but he argues that that Son of God in the broad sense, that even we could be the Son of God, and it's the other sense, you know, that the Son is uniquely the divine Son, that that's why Peter is being given the promise and so on. Oh, interesting. More of the Apostle says, Epistle to the Romans, chapter 8, the prudence of the flesh is an enemy to God, huh? And therefore it's not subject to the law of God. But there are many men in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates, huh? I've been recalling my youth history all the time. No news is good news, right? Well, of course, the opposite of that is what you hear when you turn the radio on, or the newspaper, right, huh? There's all kinds of mad, crazy things going on, huh? I just arrested some guys here in Massachusetts who were going to go around chopping their heads off of policemen, you know? Really? Yeah, and in honor of the, you know, ISIS and so on. So we were asking, is ISIS now in the country? We, so, but so do people who are inspired by them on the, there's something kind of shocking about that way of killing somebody. Is it multiple as a brat? More of Augustine says in the first book on free judgment that the eternal law is that by which the bad merit misery and the good eternal life. But men already beatified or already damned are not in the state of meriting. Therefore, they don't come under the eternal law. But against all, this is what Augustine says in the 19th book about the city of God. In no way is something, what, subtracted from the laws of the highest creator and orderer, right? Sapientis est ordinaris, first I'll say. From which the peace of the universe is, what, ministered. Tranquility of order, right? Peace. Well, I answer, Thomas says, huh? Don't pay attention now to purpose, but this is what I answer. I answer that twofold is the way in which something is subject to the eternal law, as is clear from the things foresaid. In one way, insofar as he partakes, the eternal law, by way of knowledge. And another way, by way of acting and undergoing, insofar as he partakes, in the way of a mover beginning. And in this second way, the irrational creatures are subject to the divine eternal law, as has been said. But because the rational nature with this, which is common to all creatures, has something proper or private to himself, insofar as he is, what, rational. Therefore, in both ways, he is subject to the, what, eternal law. Because he has, in some way, a notion of the eternal law, as has been said above. And, again, there's a natural inclination inside of each, what, rational creature to that which is in agreement with the eternal law. It's kind of hidden, you see, today, you know. See, read what's going on there. For Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics that we are, what, inborn to having, what, virtues. And Cicero says, you know, natural mode. Now, both ways is imperfect and in some way corrupt in the bad. In whom both the, what, natural inclination to virtue is depraved, yeah, yeah, yeah, down, through a vicious, what, habit. And, likewise, and also, the natural knowledge of the good in them is darkened over through passions and the habits of, what, sin. But in the good, both ways are found more perfect because above the natural knowledge of the good, there is added above the knowledge of faith and of wisdom, I suppose. That's a gift of the Holy Spirit. And above the natural inclination to good, there is added also to them inwardly a mover of grace and, I suppose, this is infused virtue here he's talking about. Thus, therefore, the good are perfectly under the eternal law, as it were, always acting according to it. But the bad are under the eternal law imperfectly as regards their actions, insofar as imperfectly they know and imperfectly are inclined to the good. But what is lacking on the part of action is applied on the part of what passion they're undergoing, insofar as to that extent they undergo what the eternal law dictates about them, insofar as they fail to do what is in agreement with the eternal law. Once Augustine says in the book on free judgment, I estimate that those who act under the eternal law, that they just act under the eternal law, and the book on catechizing the rude, he tells it that way, catechizondis frutibus, yeah, you always got a dick out of that, huh? He says that God, according to what? Mercy on the souls of those, what? Deserting him, right, huh? By, what? Suitable laws, he knows how to, what? Adorn the lower parts of his, what? Creature, huh? Just a strange quote there, huh? Okay, now what about this word here from St. Paul now? We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. We're going to defend that. First, therefore, it should be said that that word of the apostle can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is understood to be, under the law, the one who, what? Not willing so, right? Is subject to the obligation of the law, as it were to a certain, what? Weight, huh? Once the gloss says that under the law is the one who fears the, what? Who, by the fear of punishment, threatens, and not by the law of justice, he abstains from a, yeah. And in this way, spiritual men are not under the weight of the law, right? Because through charity, which the Holy Spirit pours into their hearts, they voluntarily fulfill that which is of the law, right? Another way that can be also understood, insofar as the works of man that are done by the Holy Spirit are more said to be the works of the Holy Spirit than of the man himself. In which case, since the Holy Spirit is not under the law, just as neither the Son, as has been said above, it follows that these works, insofar as they are that of the Holy Spirit, are not under the, what? And to this attests what the Apostle says in the second epistle of the Corinthians, chapter 3, that where there is the Spirit of God, of the Lord, there is liberty, huh? So you freely obey the law, right? Don't seem to be under the law, right? Yeah, yeah. Fear. Old school teachers used to say that there was a category of two different ways of evaluating a student, and the last category was me prodding. Now to the second objection, it should be said that the prudence of the flesh is not able to be subject to the law of God on the side of, what? Action. Because it inclines us to actions that are contrary to the law of God. But they are subject nevertheless to the law of God on the part of undergoing them, because they merit to undergo punishment according to the law of divine justice. Nevertheless, never in no man is prudence of the flesh so dominant that it corrupts entirely, right, the whole good of nature. And therefore there remains in a man an inclination to doing those things which are of the eternal law. For it has been had above that sin does not take away the whole good of what? Nature, huh? Diminishes so much. Jeremiah, why does the way of the wicked prosper, why does the just suffer so much, why does the wicked prosper? And he says, well, there's nobody so bad that they never did anything good. So God, no damnation and misery, he rewards them for whatever good they did, he rewards them in this life. Because that's the only time they're going to have to throw any rewards. Whereas God loves the just so much, and nobody's so just they never did anything bad. So he wants to speed up their punishment in this life so they don't have to spend so much time in purgatory in the next life. So, it's one way to understand it. But it is, yeah, nobody's so bad that they never did anything good. To the third it should be said, huh? It's the same through which one is what preserved in the end, right? And through which one is moved to the end, huh? Just as the heavy body, by its weight, rests in the place below, huh? By which gravity or weight it moved also to the place itself, huh? And thus it should be said that just as according to the eternal law, some merit beatitude or misery, so by the same law they are preserved in either beatitude or misery, huh? And according to this, both the blessed and the damned are subject to the, what? Eternal law, huh? Christ calls Peter, I was pitching that text there earlier, and he says, blessed are you, right? Flesh and bone, blood did not reveal this to you, but my Father was in heaven, huh? There at the Christ, the Son of the living God. How does, in the Hebrews, how did the epistle, how did they define faith? I was going to use, I think the last word started to mention, but I was going to say, Yeah, you could translate that as conviction maybe, you know? But the first part is the substance of things hoped for, right? So the things hoped for is beatitude, right? And the substance means, what? Substance is the sense of foundation, right? So you already have a certain foundation in beatitude, you might say, huh? Substance is the word. Yeah, yeah, epistasis. Substance is the name, yeah. Yeah, which is the, you know, the Greek word that corresponds, etymologically, to substanti, right? To stand under, right? Right. Now we've got to the natural law right now. I noticed that the order here is just the opposite of Aristotle, who in the rhetoric, he speaks of the human law first, and then he goes to the natural law right now. These people are more aware of the human law. I didn't see any natural law signs as I drove up here, but I saw some 45, you know. A policeman pulled out behind me and said, gee whiz, I think I'm okay here, it's 45. Anybody turned off, he said, he's following me, you know. He's threatening you all. Yeah, because he knows I'm a... Yeah. What's interesting is, I think pretty much the Constitution were influenced by Aristotle to a certain degree. They had assumed that the only way this type of political system could work was with a virtuous citizenry. And now we're in this modern experiment where virtue has been thrown by the wayside, and it's more of a hedonistic kind of thing, a society without virtue. But the problem is, the laws then have to change. You have the person who's afraid of the punishment, if he commits some sort of transgression, so he'll follow the law without fear. And that's what we're more getting into, because the virtue is no longer instilled in people, so that out of love and virtue, they will follow the law cheerfully. And it's a time of great transition, it seems, for that year. Well, Thomas says very concisely that virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery, right? Well, you see people going down this road of vice, right? You know they're heading towards misery, right? Super. It's all about the misery. Okay, then we'll have to consider about the natural law. And about this, four things are asked. I mean, six things are asked. First, what is the natural law? Secondly, what are the precepts of the natural law? Third, whether all acts of virtues are under the what? That natural law. Fourth, whether the natural law is one among all peoples. And the fifth, whether it's changeable, right? And sixth, whether it can be deleted from the mind of men. Well, it seems to be in the 20th century. Yeah. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the natural law is a, what? Habit, right? Okay, because as the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics, there are three things in the soul. The power, the habit, and the passion. But the natural law is not one of the, what, powers of the soul, nor one of the, what, passions. As, as is clear, if you go inductively by numerating one by one. Therefore, the natural law is a habit, huh? There you get a division into three, and two are eliminated, so let's get a third one, huh? Moreover, Basil says that conscience, or cinderesis, huh? Cinderesis is often used for the, what, um, natural knowledge in the practical order, right? And prudence, right? So do unto others as you have been doing to you, right? Like, this is kind of naturally, what, known, huh? How would you like to see someone did that to you? You know, that's what we see in the kids, and that's the thing. And they really have no answer to that, right? Because they wouldn't like it if someone did it to them. So, Basil says that conscience, or cinderesis, is the law of our understanding, which cannot be understood except as regards the, what, natural law. But cinderesis is a habit, as has been had in the first book. Therefore, the natural law is a, what, habit of it. Moreover, the natural law always remains in man, as will be clear below. But not always the reason of man, to which law pertains, thinks about the, what, natural law. Therefore, the natural law is not an act, but a habit. Against this is what Augustine says in the book on the good of the kind of life, huh? That the habit is that by which something is done when, what, yeah. But the natural law is not of this sort, huh? For it is found in the little ones and in the damned, huh? Who are not able to act through it or by it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit, huh? Let's see what the master says. I answer, it should be said, that something can be called or said to be a, what, habit in two ways, huh? In one way, properly, and essentially. And in this way, the natural law is not a habit, huh? For it has been said above that the natural law is something constituted, what, by reason, huh? Just as also a proposition is a certain, what, work of reason. So in the looking reason, right, huh? The second act there is, what, to form a statement, right, huh? Affirmative or negative, huh? Thomas has picked up this bad habit of calling the statement a, what, proposition, right? But proposition is really, what, like a premise, right? Because it's placed before or for something, right? But a statement, a proposition in that sense is also a statement, right? So it's got to be called, you know, take a kind of synonym of the statement, huh? I prefer calling the statement. Now, it is not the same that someone acts and that by which someone acts, huh? For someone through the habit of grammar makes a, what, suitable speech, huh? Horatio. Now, since therefore habit is that by which someone acts, it cannot be, what, be possible that the, some law is a habit properly and, what, essentially, huh? Another way that can be called a habit, that which is, what, held by habit, just as, what, faith is, what, that which is held by faith, right? That's kind of ambiguity there, right? What is our faith, right? Is it a habit or is it the things we, what, believe, right? I mean, they always have this kind of profession of faith there on Easter or something like that or some important day like that and this is our faith. This is the, you know, the words, you know, huh? And in this way, because the precepts of natural law sometimes are considered in act by reason, right, huh? And sometimes they are, what, in it only habitually, huh? In this way, it can be said that the natural law is a, what, habit, huh? He makes a comparison now, right? Just as the indemonstrable principles or principia, beginnings, in speculative matters, huh? Looking matters, as Berkowitz says, are not the very habit of principles, right, huh? But they are the principle. But they are the principle. But they are the principle. of which there is a what? Habit, huh? Now what about this text to Maristala, right? Where it seemed to be only those three, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher intends there to investigate the genus of what? Virtue. And since it is manifest that virtue is a certain beginning or source of act, those only things he lays down which are beginnings of human acts. Right? Text, Thomas, understand what Aristotle is saying, right? To it, the powers, the habits, and the what? Passions. Now apart from these things, these three things, there are some other things in the soul. As certain acts, right? As to will is in the what? One willing. And things known are in the one what? Knowing. And natural properties of the soul are what? In it has immortality and others of this sort. So what is the natural law? Is it something known in the nowhere? Yeah, so it's not so much the habit, is it, right? It's more clear in the reply to the second objection, right? That's kind of an unusual word that could not be any speech. To the second, it should be said that senderesis is said to be the law of our understanding insofar as it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, right? Which are the first, what? Beginnings of human deeds, huh? Just as Aristotle will speak, I call it natural understanding, right? Aristotle sometimes calls it just nous, right? Or Thomas will call it intellectus, right? But this is a habit of those things that are known, what? Naturally, right? You naturally know something cannot both be and not be, right? Although the sophists can make you kind of wonder, right? When I was a little boy, I remember wondering, what would it be like if there was nothing, absolutely nothing? Well, of course, as a little boy, right, I didn't realize, you know, if there was absolutely nothing, there'd be nothing to imagine. What would it be like? You're trying to, in a sense, picture what it would be like if there was absolutely nothing, right? And so apart from the fact there'd be nobody there to imagine anything and no imagination to imagine things, can you really imagine nothing? Now, you start to ask, what is nothing, right, huh? Is nothing something, or what would you say? The average person would say that nothing is the opposite of something, right? And therefore, nothing is not something, is it? And then you say, well, can you talk about nothing? Can you? Hey, philosophy, like, no. Now, I'll teach you a caseric, I just tell you that, I think, before, I used to joke about that, huh? Philosophy is the only course where you can get paid for talking about nothing. But you can actually make, what, two statements about nothing, can't you? You can say, nothing is nothing. Boethius says, nothing is more true than a thing is said to be itself. A dog is a dog, right? A rose is a rose. What can be more true, right? So it's true that nothing is nothing, right? And it's true that nothing is the opposite of something, right? So then nothing must be something, huh? Yeah. Now, I know there's ambiguity there in English, you know, if we say, I ask somebody, what did he say? And the person said he said nothing, okay? Now, grammatically, there's some ambiguity in that, huh? Yeah. Because could he say nothing? Is that a way, possibly misleading, of saying he did not say something? Or we say he said nothing, right? That's kind of, you know, you can kind of play around that a little bit and take it the wrong way, right? But can reason talk about nothing, right? Then is it talking about nothing? Does that mean simply that it's not talking about anything? Like we're interpreting that's, you know, to say nothing. Or is he really talking about nothing and saying something true about nothing? So, that's the last sense of is when you say nothing is nothing, right, huh? But it's true. True, right? And therefore, you seem to be talking in some way about something, right? And you say, well, then nothing is something, right? And then you seem to have a, what? Contradiction, right, huh? Okay. Well, when Thomas discusses Aristotle to the beginning of the fourth book of the metaphysics, and Aristotle is showing there the subject of what wisdom is being, right? And he gives a plethora of meanings, right? And Thomas comes into our rescue, right? And he says, basically, there's four meanings of being that Aristotle has here, right? And the first meaning of being is substance, like a man or a dog, right? The second meaning of being is accident, like the shape of a man, the shape of a dog. Or the health of a man or the health of a dog, huh? It's not a being in the same way that a man is or a dog. But it's being in some way, right? Okay. And, or we're sitting, you know? That's an example of accident, right? Okay. And we are in this room, right? Something accidental there, right? Okay. It can go on to distinguish, maybe among the accidents, some are more real than others, right? And what's the third meaning of being, huh? Well, is there such a thing in this world, does it exist in this world, such a thing as coming to be? And that's a way of being? Coming to be? Yeah. Well, it's kind of funny though, right? Yeah. See? It's a diminution there, right? Coming to be is a way of being? Well, in a very imperfect way though, right? Because you're not quite a ride to being yet, right? You know? And is there such a thing as ceasing to be? Such a thing as dying, let's say, right? Is that not to be? Not quite yet, you know? See? And then the fourth sense is what? Where things like nothing and ignorance, right? And negations said to be, right? So that fourth sense that nothing is something, right? Yes, I was profoundly wondering what would it be like if there was nothing, right? There was a book by Grandpa John. I guess he's a psychiatrist I don't know what he does we had a book interesting stories of these people he met in mental home mental institutes one was 20 years or something and the doctor was asking do you remember what you were doing before you I was trying to think about nothing I said well how did you do that and I just said nothing, nothing, nothing that next year she was in Capstaj for 24 years wow, don't do that there's some sense of is someone is blind someone is ignorant even nothing is nothing to use the word is there's some sense of being strange we can't even think about not being without except the term be yeah look at the article in the sentences there where Thomas asks whether God knows bad things Mala and the argument is against it that God does not know Mala it's kind of interesting and one argument goes like this it says knowing takes place in just two ways either either you are the cause of what you know and you know it because you're the cause of it or the thing itself acts upon you and is the cause of your knowing it like with us a lot right well it says but God doesn't know by things acting upon him okay well then if you knew the bad it would have to be the cause of it but God is not the cause of bad things therefore God doesn't know bad things right okay yeah it's an interesting argument isn't it and then he gives another argument saying that knowledge takes place by way of what likeness okay there's got to be a likeness you know of the thing known in the nowhere just like when you imagine something right you have a likeness to this thing well there's no likeness of God to the bad because God is entirely good right perfectly good so you can't possibly know what the bad see and it goes on to other arguments but in the embodied article he mentions Averroes had said that God doesn't know the bad right now hearing all this bad news as I was mentioning earlier today I would say well because that's partly the way Averroes understands the happiness of God right he doesn't know anything bad yeah yeah they couldn't know anything bad right now it's reminding I'm saying in some way these things go back to what Empedocles right because Empedocles has a famous fragment of Empedocles he says that by earth we know earth and by water we know water and by air we know air and by fire we know fire and by love we know love and by hate we know hate it's because we have these in us right so in a sense the thing we know is what in the knower right if your mind can't grasp something can it know it now if you grasp something if I grasp this thing it's in my hand right so the mind has to grasp the thing to know it so you've got to have the thing you know in your mind right well then Empedocles said that God though is incorruptible right therefore there's no hate in God because hate is what separates things huh so love unites things but hate separates them right but since God unlike other things is incorruptible right can't be divided up there's no hate in God right therefore God doesn't know hate because he doesn't have any hate in him Aristotle in the third book on the soul the second book he criticizes in case you're saying that right and again the metaphysics you know that we would know something like hate which is a source of badness and so on we know something God doesn't know right well this is like this other position that Thomas was talking about you know Neuveros and so on right well how do you reconcile you know the truth you know God will know everything we know and more and to say that these objections say he can't know the bad huh how do we resolve that huh evil is a negation it's madness yeah he's saying that God you see by knowing himself knows everything good that he has made right and by knowing the good that he has made he knows the opposite of that what good right so he knows his work at first huh the good right and through the good he knows what the bad right huh which is the absence or lack of it right but if God knew only himself he wouldn't know the badness in things huh he might know badness in some general way because it's opposed to his goodness right but he wouldn't know the sickness of man or the ignorance of man because he'd have to know to know the knowledge of man to know the ignorance that is opposed to it right he'd have to know the health of man to know the sickness that is opposed to that right so Thomas says by knowing himself he knows the good in things and by knowing the good in things he knows the evil what opposed to them right huh so it's not the first thing he knows right but the second thing he knows right but it's not as Aristotle or as Shakespeare would say a discourse in God right he doesn't like we know the premises and then one day we magically put them together and we know the conclusion right but God always in knowing himself knows the good in things and in knowing the good in things he always knows the evil opposed to them right but we have to go right further and it seems very much to apply to today right you know they talk about homosexual unions you want to call it a marriage people don't know what a marriage is therefore they don't know that this thing is not a marriage right you know I used to always say who knows better the ignorance of the students the student or the professor well if the professor knows what the student doesn't know then the professor knows the ignorance of the student more than the student knows his own what ignorance huh in fact is it really possible to know your own ignorance if you don't know what you don't know how can you be what how can you know your own ignorance huh you know it's kind of in a roundabout way you might know your ignorance but there's no direct way to know it huh was it Noah didn't know his ignorance of alcohol or wine huh yeah didn't know what the power of the juice huh it's interesting how the difficulty of Empedicus comes back and the medieval thinkers like Averroes and so on so we to the reply to the second objection there right to the third should be said that that argument concludes that the natural law is habitually held right huh and it's not the same thing right huh if I grasp the thing my hand is not what is grasped right but to that which was objected in the contrary it should be said that that which is habitually within us sometimes someone is not able to use on account of somewhat impediment just as a man cannot use the habit of science on account of his sleep and similarly the boy is not able to use the habit of the understanding of beginnings or also the natural law which is habitually within him on account of the defect of what age