Prima Secundae
Lecture 240: Natural Law Precepts: Unity and Multiplicity

Transcript
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The conclusion, then, to this first article is not that the natural law is the habit, but it's held by this natural habit, huh? The second one proceeds thus. It seems that the natural law does not contain many precepts, but one only. It reminds me of the, you know, Stahl talks about natural understanding, which is the way I translate this news or intellectus, right, that habit, as opposed to reason out understanding, which is science. And they say, Stahl says that there are many things you understand naturally, but the natural beginning of all of them is that something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way. So it's the natural beginning of all the axioms, huh? So maybe get some distinction like that, we'll see. For law is contained in the genus of what? Precept. As has been had above. If, therefore, there are many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are many natural laws. Say that, do we? Yeah, my natural law. My natural law. Moreover, the natural law follows upon the nature of man. But human nature is one as a whole, even though it's multiple in its parts. Either, therefore, there is one precept only of the natural law, on account of the unity of the whole, or there are many, according to the multitude of parts of human nature. And, therefore, it's necessary that even those things which are of the inclination concupiscible, pertain to the natural law. Just doing what comes natural, right, huh? You have your natural law, and I have one. As Falstaff said, I've got more flesh, and therefore, therefore. Moreover, the law is something pertaining to reason, as has been said above. But reason in man is one only. Therefore, there is only one precept of the natural law. Now, the sin contra is taking the comparison, right, to natural understanding. A charistologist calls noose, and Thomas is, I think if you remember that, he's called intellectuals, right? Okay. Called understanding, right? Because there's no discourse required there, really, to speak of. But again, it says this, because just as the precepts of the natural law in man are with regard to the operable things, or doable things, so also are the first beginnings in, what, demonstrations. What my friend Euclid, right, calls the axioms, right? Axiom, that nothing is before or after itself. But the first demonstrable beginnings are many, huh? So even Euclid is a limited enumeration of them, you know. But he says quantities equal to the same, equal to each other. If equals are subtracted from equals, results are equal, right? The whole is more than a part, and so on, right? He has about five axioms there, right? But the first indemonstrable beginnings are many. Therefore, also, the precepts of the natural law are many, right? See? So he's arguing there from a, what, proportion, right? You know, to use the technical term, synderesis is to the practical, but natural understanding is to the speculative looking, right? Looking knowledge. So the natural beginning of looking knowledge contains many, what, axioms, many statements that are known naturally to themselves, so it should be the same way in the practical, right? Even more so because of the detailed character of the practical. And also, Thomas begins his reply with the proportion, right? One time I was giving a senior seminar, you know, and I just thought I'd devote it to seeing proportions, right? So everybody had to do his paper on proportions and this or that part of philosophy, right? So one guy would take it in the dianima, you know, one guy would take it in the ethics, and one guy would take it in the logic, right, huh? And so on, right, huh? So definition is to the simple unknown as what? Demonstration is to the complex unknown, or argument is. What's the virtue of a knife, huh? Yeah, see? And sharpness is what enables a knife to do its own work well. So what's the virtue of man, huh? What's the virtue of the eye, right, huh? And so on. You see all these proportions, right? They run through here. So Aristotle says the first matter is known by a, what, proportion, huh? The first matter is to man and dog as clay is to sphere and cube, huh? Okay, proportions, right? One of the tools of dialectic is, what, a tool of likeness, right? And Aristotle says you're exercising this tool especially when you have a likeness of, what, proportions, right? Of course, he says in the book on the poetic art that the most beautiful, you know, metaphors are from, what, proportions, huh? Like is the way he's made towards the pebbled shore, so do our minutes hasten to the end, right? We fill out these proportions, huh? So, no slow, Thomas replies here. I answer, it should be said, that as has been said above, the precepts of the natural law, in this way, they have themselves to practical reason, right? As the first principles of demonstrations have themselves to looking reason, right? Let's say what? Proportion, okay? Proportion is defined as what? A likeness of ratios, huh? So, two to three is a ratio, right? Four to six is a ratio. Three to four is a ratio, right? But four to six is like two to three. Three to four is like two to three? Yeah, yeah. But is four to three like three is to two? But six is to four as three is to two, right? I see, now, if you're kind of slow there, think of the four as being two twos, and the six is three twos, and three twos are the two twos like three is to two, right? Yeah, yeah, now I see it, yeah. Yeah, but I mean, you first see proportions in math, right? You know, and the, I call it the fifth and sixth books, you could sometimes see proportional books, right? Because he's emphasizing that, right? But, you know, you read the great physicists, and they say, what, the most useful thing to find a new hypothesis, right, is a, what, proportion. That's how wave mechanics was discovered, right? Seeing proportion, right? And Einstein says how many of these things were found by seeing a proportion, right? And developing it, right? That's a very important thing to see that, right? But you usually start by giving the idea of ratio and proportion in math or in numbers, right, huh? And then you apply it to other things, huh? So, St. Thomas begins here, right, then, the body of the article. And notice what he says. For both are certain beginnings, per se nota, right, known to themselves. You know the famous distinction of, of Wethius that Thomas quotes, huh? There are some statements that are, what, per se nota to everyone, and others, they're per se nota to sapientivus, right? Okay? Wethius and the Trinitate, yeah. Yeah. Thank you. other places here's per se nota something is said to be per se notum duplicitum in one way in itself another way towards us for in itself every proposition is said to be per se nota whose predicate is of the notion of the subject but it can happen that someone being ignorant of the definition of the subject such a person such a proposition will not be what just as this statement man is rational is known to itself according to its nature because who says man is saying something what that has reason yeah nevertheless to the one knowing ignorant of what is a man this proposition is not what per se no hence it is that just as Boethius said and this is one place where he says it in the book the hebdomaribus the days of the week but it's really margis' work and the detuinitate the first mental of all diana's lecturing on that you know some dignities now that's dignity is kind of a Latin word for what axioms yeah because an axiom is something worthy of being believed on its own grounds right dignus some dignitatis which is kind of the defining or propositions known to themselves communitaire omnibus to all right and these are those propositions whose terms are known to all as every whole is more than its part right everybody knows what a whole is and what a part is right they say can you eat your steak or your apple or something you know without experiencing whole and part I mean do you take your you eat your apple with one thing your steak you know then you might not become aware of whole and part right you know you drink your beer in one at the what do you do at the pure things or in Munich there you know the toberfest you know somebody gets up and tries to take the whole thing down without stopping you know and he succeeds in doing it everybody cheers and claps he doesn't kind of a stupid thing you know but you can't live without experiencing whole and part right you can just eat and eat and experience whole and part right so everybody knows that a whole is what a part is and everybody knows therefore that a whole is more than a part it's only a sophist like brick list I told you how I convince the students you know that sometimes a part is more than a whole but the students can't untie the sophistical argument right remember that one I told you that I see I used to say to them began with my mother and I said my mother didn't like it when I said that man is an animal she didn't like that she didn't think it was quite right for me to say that and I said to my mother well he's not just an animal he's an animal that has reason my mother never went to college she said well that's better than what she said that's better too so I say then animal is only a part of what man is and they all agree to that right and then I say but animal includes besides man dog cat horse elephant right so sometimes a part includes more than whole oh yeah yeah yeah yeah but it shows you how weak the human mind is right because what you're doing here is confusing what two senses of whole and part there's the whole that is called the integral whole or the composed whole which is put together from its parts and such a whole is always more than one of the parts that are put together to make it and then there's the universal whole which is not put together from its parts but is set of its parts right like the genesis of the species like animal dog cat and horse right so if you stick with one sense of whole and part the whole is always more than the part right but what I did here was when I said animal is a part of man I'm taking a part of the definition of man the definition is a what composed whole and one part of the definition of man is animal and the other part is yeah yeah and so the definition of man contains more than animal right the whole is more than one of the parts that compose it right but then I turned around and took animal as universal whole which is set of man and dog cat and horse and elephant but the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts right so animal is said of more than dog number is said of more than odd number right you know quadrilateral is said of more than square and so on right so it shows you how weak our mind is though right even with something obvious like that right you can by a sophisticated argument the most common sophisticated argument is the one from what yeah yeah yeah yeah it's the most common mistake being made a person can think he doesn't know what he does know right and Aristotle in the second book of the physics there the natural hearing he argues that men can think they don't know what they do know he said that's kind of a strange situation to be in and so it goes back to the great Socrates right and everybody knows from Socrates life that men think they know sometimes what they don't know well if they can think they don't they know what they don't know can they make the reverse mistake of thinking they don't know what they do know well you think that what you know what you don't know because you can't always separate what you know and what you don't know so then you can make the mistake going either way if you couldn't distinguish between a lemon and an orange and if someone makes a mistake of thinking a lemon is an orange then can someone make the mistake yeah sometimes you get an orange a big orange that looks a little bit like a little grapefruit have you ever seen that you know so if you can make the mistake of thinking a grapefruit is an orange or an orange is a grapefruit can someone make the reverse mistake or if you can think that this man did something with something that's a great comment yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah so our style says we know people make the mistake of thinking they know what they don't know therefore they can make the reverse mistake of thinking they don't know what they do know and that's to be in a terrible situation as far as the life of the mind is concerned right in the great Hegel right Hegel thought that something can both be and not be right and it's because he couldn't solve the argument you know you can say when what is not a sphere becomes a sphere right there's a time in which it is not a sphere right but that doesn't go on forever that time is it so there's a last instant in which it is not a sphere likewise there's a later time which it is a sphere right and therefore there's the first instant that is a sphere now are those two instances the same well if they're not right then you have a time in between them right which is neither a sphere or not a sphere which is impossible right so they must be the same instant the last instant which is not a sphere and the first instant which it is a sphere and that's a moment of becoming right he says and that moment of becoming it both is and is not a sphere he says it's ridiculous to say you can't think that Hegel sounds right the beautiful article I think I mentioned it before of my teacher Deconic there which is the Volatilogique and Philosophique some of his articles there are in English you know and some are in French this one's in French but it's called the Paradox de Devenir Parle Conadiction and so he shows that difficulty right with Hegel right but Thomas uses that thing that Aristotle shows when what is not a sphere becomes a sphere right there's no last instant in which is not a sphere but only a first instant in which it is a sphere as I was telling my students I think I told you on Tuesday night when you're dying right is there a last instant in which you're alive no but it's the first instant in which you're dead right dead dead dead you're you're you're dead you're Aristotle shows why this is so, but it's the way you avoid the contradiction, right? But if you can't solve or untie the contradiction like Hegel can, and then, you know, Marx takes it over from Hegel, right? Dialectics is a study of the contradiction within things, right? So even these most obvious things, right? People can think they don't, what, know them, although they do know them, right? It's like my students could think that a whole is not always more than its part. Sometimes its part is more than a whole. I remember one time in class there, I was showing the excellence of Hegel's method, right? And I thought it was kind of a joke, really, you know? But anyway, I walked out of class, and I'm walking around there, and he says, there was something today he says, you know? Somebody has finally found a better method than Aristotle's. So I could go back and explain this to the next class. I was showing the excellence, you know, of Hegel's method, you know? But, you know, the iconic referred there to the Eucharist, right? And so we say there's a time in which it's not the body of our Lord, but it's bread. Now, if you think there's a last instant in which it is bread, then you have a problem, yeah, see? Because are the last instant in which it is bread, and the first instant in which it is the body of our Lord, the same instant? So, you know, then you've got heresy, right? And if they're not the same instant, it seems like you've got a time in between, which is neither one nor the other, and that's heretical, too, right? And the solution is that there is not a last instant in which it is, what, bread, but there is a first instance in which it is, yeah. And I think I was mentioning it last time, wasn't I? I think it was fresh in my mind, but what is worth saying could be said more than once, as Empedically said, right? He's talking about the justification of the soul, right, huh? And he says, well, first the soul is guilty of something, right? And then it's in grace, right? And can it be in grace? Can it be freed of its guilt without grace? Well, you see, if there's a last instant in which you're guilty, is that the same as the first instant in which you are in grace? Well, then you have a contradiction, right? So there must be different instances, right? Therefore, there's a time between you were guilty and before you are, what, in grace, and that time you would no longer be guilty, right? That's the time in between being guilty and being in grace, and therefore you could be freed of guilt without grace, which is horrible, right? Well, again, there's no last instant in which you are, what, guilty, in guilt, right? But there's the first one in which you are in grace, huh? Thomas says, solves what Aristotle does in the 8th book, a natural hearing, huh? You can't solve all kinds of difficulties, right? You can't solve these things, huh? They're not easy to solve, right? Okay, so Thomas begins with this beautiful proportion, right? You've got to be careful when you argue proportions, right? But we sometimes reason from them, right? And sometimes we just use them to illustrate something by likeness. So he's coming down to those distinctions, then, between the things that are known by all and by some and so on. Some propositions are peresignota soli sapientibus, right? Only to the wise. It doesn't mean the wise is saying the fullest sense, right? But who understand the, what, terms of the propositions, what they, what, signify, right? Can a perfect number be a prime number? Yeah, yeah, but see, the average guy wouldn't know, right, huh? My students didn't know what a perfect number is, right? Why is 6 called a perfect number? Well, because it's equal to the sum of everything that measures it, and measures it evenly, you can see, in the strict sense. So 6 is measured by 1, by 2, and by 3, evenly, but not by 4 or 5. And 1 plus 2 plus 3, yeah. What's the next number? Yeah, yeah. Chapter 28 of Book 1 of the Supercontri Gentiles, Thomas begins to talk about the perfection of God, right? I think that's maybe accidental, but it helped me to remember where he does that, right? But anyway, that no perfect number can be a, what, prime number, because a prime number is measured only by, what, by the 1, yeah, yeah. That obviously doesn't add up to the whole number, right, you know? So it's obvious to the wise man in, you know, like Euclid, right? Wise in, tends to be wise in the fullest sense, right? But to learn in geometry, you can see these things, right? Can an even number be prime? Two. But the other one would be measured by two, wouldn't it? This is the distinction, right? Everybody would know that a whole is more than a part, right? And I used to say, you know, if someone says, no, I don't know that, we'll give you part of your salary this week. We'll give you part of the dinner you ordered. We'll give you part of the book you want, and so on, right? Because you don't think the whole is any more than the parts. So what difference would make to you whether they give you the whole, the whole mistake or part of it, or the whole book or part of it, or the whole car or part of the car, right? The whole is no more than the part, according to your thinking. And they'll scream and yant and wave, so that they really know it, right? It's a difficult example, though. Just as to the one understanding that the angel is not a body, it is per se known that he is not circumscriptively in local, right? He's not contained in some place. Which is not manifest to the rudibus, right? You ever see the second use of the word rudibus today? Augustine's day, Katikazani's rudibus song, but those are beginners, right? Raw students, right? They're pretty. Yeah, raw material, yeah. Which is not manifest to the rudibus, right? Who cannot grasp this, right? Now, in those things which fall in the grasping of all, right, a certain order is found, right? Also, Thomas is looking for distinctions and also for ordering, just like my friend Shakespeare said. Now, that which first falls in grasping is, what, being, right? And very close to that is, what, something, right? I used to tell the students, you know, everything is something, right? So, if you know what something is, you know everything. The students say, oh, I'll go home and tell my dad that. I know everything. Yeah, but you do in some way, you know, say, kundum quid, we'd say, to use Thomas' technical terms, right? In some way, we know everything, but not simpliciter, right? But in some way, we do, right? Because everything is something. I know what something is, right? So, something and nothing are almost like being and what none being, right? So, something has more to do maybe with the nature of the thing, right? Than it's being. Now, that which first comes in the apprehension of reason is being, huh? Is have a sentence, huh? The understanding of which is included in all things whatever that someone apprehends, right? You'll say the same thing about something, because it comes right after. Everything you understand, it's something, right? Even nothing. And therefore, the first intermonstable beginning is sometimes said to be that you cannot at the same time, right, affirm and what? Deny, huh? Can't both be enough. which is founded upon the notion of being and what? Unbeing, right? And upon this beginning, all the others are what? Founded, huh? This is said by who? Yeah, said in the fourth book of metaphysics, huh? Aristotle, right? Just as being is what is first that falls in the grasping simply, so good is the first that falls in the apprehension of what? Practical reason, huh? Which is ordered to what? Do it. Yeah. For every agent acts for the sake of an end which has a notion of something what? Good. Good. And therefore the first beginning and practical reason is what is founded upon the notion of good, which is that the good is what all want. Now who said that? Yeah. But he didn't speak as if that was original with him, right, huh? If no one else knew it before him, right? So in the very beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, he's going to talk about the good, right? He has an induction, right, showing that we always act for the sake of something good, right? Therefore, he says it's been well said, not necessarily originally by him, right, that the good is what all want. This, therefore, is the first precept of the law, that the good should be done and pursued, right, huh? And the bad to be, what, avoided, huh? And upon this are founded all the precepts of the natural, what, law, huh? That all things that should be done or avoided pertain to the precepts of the, what, natural law. Which, practical reason, huh? Naturally grasped the, what, human goods, huh? Because the good has a notion of an end, the bad has the notion of the, what, contrary of that. Hence it is that all the things to which man has a natural inclination, reason naturally apprehends as good, and consequently as to be pursued in one's doings, right? And the contraries of them as bad and to be avoided, huh? According, therefore, to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law. He's going to start to give us something of that. There is first an inclination in man to the good, according to his nature in which he comes together with all, what, substances, insofar as each substance desires the preservation of its being according to its own, what, nature. And according to this inclination, it pertains to the natural law, those things to which the life of man is conserved and the contrary imputed, right? So what are they working on nowadays, huh? Assisted suicide, right? We oppose that, huh? The realms that's unnatural, opposed to this first one he mentions here, right? This first inclination that is natural. Yeah, yeah. Secondly, there is in man inclination to some things more, what, special and not as universal, according to the nature in which he comes together with the other animals. And according to this, it's said to be of the natural law, the things that nature teaches all the, what, animals, as a conjunction of man and the male and the female, right? And the education of the, what, children of the free. Well, that's something else that's being violated today, right? Yeah. Third, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of reason, which is property among the bodies, huh? Just as man has a natural inclination to this, that he know the truth about God, and to this, that he live in, what, society, huh? And according to this, those things pertain to the natural law, that regard, what, to which, that we take into account this inclination, huh? That man should, what? Yeah, yeah. What is this guy, Carson there, the medical man there, might run on the public ticket, or run for the nomination, but he said, it was him, somebody recently just at the graduation said, you know, make a commitment that could have spent at least a half hour doing something new every day. That man avoid ignorance, right, huh? That he does not offend others with whom he ought to speak or live. And other things have retained to life together in society, right, huh? So, apply now to the objections, right? He's going to carry out that proportion, right? Just like there's one axiom that is kind of the natural beginning of all the rest, right? So, the first, therefore, it should be said that all those precepts of the natural law, insofar as you refer to one first precept, huh, have the notion of one, what, natural law, right? They're all bound together, right? They're one in order, right, to the first one, huh? That's true both about the natural understanding and the looking reason and the natural law and the practical reason, huh? There'd be many things that are naturally known, but they're all one, yeah. As Aristotle said at the end, I think there's a 12th book there, after he shows that God rules the universe, and he quotes Homer, right? The rule of many is not good, let there be one. But order depends upon something one, right, huh, you know? In the Pacific War there, you know, there was a kind of a divided command there between MacArthur and the Navy there, you know, and it led to some problems, right, which MacArthur was concerned about, you know? We do an army, you know, you have to have one. One, yeah, it's in command, back to the one. In this question concerning obedience, it's a good question about even hell of perfection, St. Bonaventure, the last question is whether everyone should be obedient to the Supreme Bonaventure. And the Bidder saying that in Vatican I, when it's defined in papal primacy, the bishop, they're all discussing that question. That was a pamphlet born around Rome. To the second, it should be said that all the, what, inclinations, or whatever parts of human nature there are, as the concubus upon the irascible, according as they are ruled by reason pertain to the natural law, right? And I reduce to one first what precept has been said, which is the one that you should do good and avoid evil, right? And according to this, there are many precepts of the natural law in themselves, which nevertheless come together in one root. Sometimes he calls it a beginning, sometimes a root, huh? To the third, it should be said that reason, although in itself it is one, nevertheless it orders all those things which pertain to men, huh? And according to this, under the law of reason I contain all those things which are able to be ruled by what? Reason, huh? A little break here. A little break here. A little break here. A little break here. A little break here. A little break here. A little break here. natural law, right? To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that not all acts of the virtues are of the law of nature. Because this has been said above, it's of the notion of law that it be ordered to the common good. But some acts of virtues are ordered to the private good of someone. This is especially so in the acts of temperance, right? So your dinner is for you, right? Yes, not for the common good, right? You can't share everybody at your meal. Therefore, not all acts of the virtues are subject to the natural law. Moreover, all sins are opposed to some virtuous acts. If therefore all acts of the virtues are of the law of nature, it seems ex consequente, consequently, that all sins are against what? Nature. Which nevertheless, especially, is said of some sins that they're against nature, right? Well, quite at that today. Like Donald's talk about what they're talking about. Moreover, in those things which are according to nature, all come together. But in the acts of virtue, not all come together. For something is virtuous to one that is, what? Ficious to another, right? Therefore, not all acts of virtues are of the law of nature, right? To the amount of alcohol that might be good for one person and not for another person, right? But against this is what Damascene says, huh? In the third book, huh? The orthodox faith, it says, huh? Third book. It's a famous work, huh? And therefore, virtuous acts are subject to the, what? Law of nature, huh? Now, you've got to be careful about that, right, huh? Because there's a natural inclination towards them, right, huh? And they're ordered to the natural good of man. But nevertheless, the habit is, what? Not acquired, not by nature, right? It's acquired by repeated acts. The answer should be said that about the virtuous acts, we can speak in two ways, huh? In one way, in the last article, you begin with a proportion. Here, it begins with a distinction, huh? We had a distinction there, too. But insofar as they are, what? Virtuous, right? In general, I guess. In other way, insofar as such acts are considered in their own, what? Species. If, therefore, we speak of the acts of the virtues insofar as they are virtuous, thus all acts that are virtuous pertain to the law of nature, huh? For has been said above that to the law of nature pertain means everything to which man is inclined by or according to his own nature, huh? But each thing is naturally inclined to the operation that is suitable to it according to its, what? Form. Just as fire to eating. When, since the reasonable soul is the proper form of man, or man's own form, the natural inclination is in each man to this that he acts in accordance with, what? Reason. People would say, you know, I don't know if that's so, you know. I said, well, which is going to get somebody mad at you, you think, more? To say you're wicked or to say you're stupid? The kids might actually rejoice in being wicked, right? But they don't want to be, what? Stupid. And, uh, I took the example, you know, that I read a few years ago in the paper there. Someone downtown there tried to rob a bank or a savings bank or where it was. And, uh, he came in and he was, he handed the paper, you know, put the money in the bag, you know. And, uh, and the woman played dumb, right? She said, Oh, I haven't seen this kind of withdrawal notice. I'll have to check on this. And she walks. And so she played dumb, right? And he didn't know what to do. So, of course, you know, it's like it's rabid. He runs out and he gets caught, you know. Well, um, he shouldn't even get the money, right? Well, what is he, he, he, he, he, he's mad, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And, uh, I guess another time in my hometown of Minnesota there, St. Paul, the, um, came on to rob the, the White Castle, right, huh? So he said, uh, to the, it's kind of late at night, he comes in and there's a little girl behind the counter at the last, there's nobody else in there. He said, put the money in the bag, right, huh? Okay. And, of course, he's, he's, he's got his, uh, what, gun in his pocket, apparently, you see. And so she's, you know, she puts him in the bag. Once she's passed the bag to him, he takes his hand out, she realizes he doesn't have a gun, right? And so, um, he doesn't get a good grasp on it and she's got a better hold on it and she pulls it away, right? By the time he, he runs out, right? Well, if he had left his hand in his pocket there pretending to have a gun, right, and I'd take it with his left hand, but instead he's about thinking, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he reaches with the hand that's pretending to have the gun in it. It's just stupid, you know, but he can, he can, he can, he can kick himself, right? So he'd kick himself not because he, he was, uh, doing something wrong, stealing, but because of the stupidity with which he, he did it. So I take examples like that to show that kind of you, you identify more with your reason, you know, than, you're more apt to get in a fight by calling somebody stupid, you know? Even, even a criminal doesn't normally call it stupid, right? But he wouldn't mind, you know, being called wicked, you know? Okay. When since the rational soul is the proper form of man, the natural inclination each man is to this, that he act in accordance with reason, right? And this is to act in accordance with what? Virtue, right? When according to this, all the acts of the virtues are of what? The natural law for, um, the one's own reason dictates to each one naturally that he act what? Virtuously, huh? But if we speak of the virtuous acts in themselves, as they are considered in their own what? Proper species, huh? Thus not all acts of the virtues are of the what? Law of what? Nature, huh? For many things are what come to be according to virtue, to which nature is not at first, what? Inclined. But through the, what? Investigation of reason, men, what? Find them, huh? Yeah. As were useful to living, what? Well, yeah. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that temperance is about the natural, what? Desires for food and, what? Drink and for, what? You know, productive, reproductive aspects, which are ordered to the, what? Common good of nature, right? Just as the other legal things are ordered to the common moral good, huh? Now, to the second one, which is the idea that, what? Some things are especially said to be against nature, right? Okay. To second should be said that the nature of man can be said to be either that which is proper to man. And according to this, all sins insofar as they are against reason are also against, what? Nature. As is clear through Damascene in the second book, right? Or that which is common to man and the other, what? Animals, huh? And according to this, certain spiritual sins are said to be against, what? Nature. Just as against the, what? Mixture of the male and the female, which is natural to all the animals, right? Yeah. Is the, uh, contributus musculorum, right? Which is what they want, I guess the Supreme Court, can I call that or something? I think whether this is, could it be natural or not or something? I don't know. I don't know if it's going to happen. My guess is they might take it back. Yeah. We'll see. We'll see what they do. Who knows what they can do. which is specially said to be a vice against, what, nature, right? It's our common nature, right? Just like if you see the more common, if you step out the window, right, you naturally go down. See, that's according to your nature as something heavier than air, right? Not your nature even as an animal, right? It's even more general, right? So you have to see how the words are used. Now the third objection, let's look back at the third objection. Actually, that's a different type of one here. In the acts of the virtues, not all come together, right? Something is virtuous to one that is to another vicious and so on, right? To the third, it should be said that that argument proceeds about the acts considered in particular, right, according to themselves. For thus, according to the diverse conditions of men, it happens that some acts are to some virtuous, as it were, what, proportioned and suitable to them, which are not so, what, which are not vicious to others, which are inevitably as vicious to others, to which they are not, what, proportioned, huh? So that's what we've gone into. Are we going to stop now? Are we going to go ahead and figure out a decor? Or what? Do you want to interfere with your desire to eat or something? No, we have cubits of blood, I think. I mean, look, you guys have got a natural inclination to eat or something. Do you have a natural inclination to learn, too, huh? Yes, supernatural. Yes. Yeah. Not being supernatural, that's above the natural now, see? You're going to be in trouble with that word. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Thank you.