Prima Secundae
Lecture 247: The Mutability of Human Law and the Force of Custom

Transcript
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The second one proceeds thus. It seems that always human law, when something better occurs, should be, what, changed, huh? Well, human laws are found through human reason, just as the other arts. But in other arts, it's changed that which was before held, if something better occurs, huh? So we always find something better in medicine, right? Therefore, the same also ought to be done in, what, human laws, huh? More, from those things which are, what, past, we can provide about future things. But unless human laws were changed, when better things come along, found, many inconveniences would follow, huh? In that the ancient laws found many, what, are found to contain many urithis, wood things, right? And what about the law of the prohibition there, right? See? No one observed it, really. One thing, right? And then it just got all the gangs going, you know? They became my politician friend back home. So that's why Roosevelt appointed to the old Kennedy, right? To check over these things, because it takes a thief to catch a thief. Maybe you couldn't change that law, right? Well, it was, well, because now there was nobody observing it, but then just after a few years, they changed it. So you've got this natural prohibition, and it will only change a few years later. What does law mean to anybody? Yeah. It's absurd. Knock on the door. Come here, man. I think. Elliot Ness, who was, you know, helping support the prohibition laws and stuff and all that, and when the prohibition was ended, one of his friends said, well, Elliot, what are you going to do now that the prohibition is ended? He said, well, I'm going to go out and get a beer. The difference seems the laws ought to be changed, huh? Never something better occurs. Moreover, human laws are established about singular acts of men. But in singular things, perfect knowledge can be obtained. Except of experience, right? Which requires time, right? As is said in the Second Ethics. That's why the Senate is named from Sena, right? From being old, right? Men who have a lot of experience, huh? Therefore, it seems that through the succession of times, something better occurs to be established, huh? But against us is what is said in the Decrees, huh? Ridiculum est. That's such as abominable, right? That the traditions which we've taken down from our, what, forefathers, that we allow them to be infringed, huh? I mean, it's so absurd, you know, but I mean, but some people, you know, when they speak against it, they speak about all these years that we've taken for granted, you know, huh? We've been ignorant all these years, you know? And that's old enough, you know, to be applied to this, what's said here, right? Law and customs and moralist traditions, and Burke wrote about this. Chester Finn talked about, I guess, traditions, the democracy of the dead, so they've described it. And one reason why it has value according to these men is because it's twisted the test of time. Yeah, yeah. Unlike a lot of people who have tangled ideas. Yeah. The answer should be said, this has been said above. Human law, to that extent, is rightly changed, right? Insofar as through its changed, it provides for the common, what, usefulness, huh? But the, what, change itself of the law, right, as regards in itself, has some detriment of the conservation. And what's the reason for that? Yeah, because for the observance of the law, much important is, what, custom, constituto. Insofar as those things which come about against common custom, right, even if they are more, what, light of themselves, they seem more, what, grave. When the law is changed, the power of restricting of the law is diminished, insofar as custom is, what, taken away. And therefore, never ought one to change, what, human law, except because in some respect, right, so much is, what, one recompensed for the common salvation as one is, what, from that part. Which happens from this, that either some very great and evident utility comes about from the new thing being laid down, right, or from this, that there is the greatest necessity for the, that the law that is a custom either contains, what, some manifest nicotine, or its observation is, or its observation is, to much extent harmful, I suppose, the law of drinking, right. Once it is said by Jerry Spirito, that in new things constituted, there ought to be, what, usefulness. Yeah, that when we cede from that law, which long was seen to be, what, just or right. To the first therefore, it should be said that those things which are of art have efficacy from reason alone. And therefore, wherever some better reason occurs, it should be changed what was held before, right. So you've got a better medicine or something, right, to change it right away. But laws have their power most of all from, what, yeah, grace custom, as the philosopher says, the second book of the politics. And therefore, they should not be, what, easily changed, huh. You know, when people start changing a lot of things, you know, anything can be changed, right. They get very, like the Vatican II, you know. The Vatican II, you know, starts to be changed, you know, for the sake of change, you know. They do things the way they always do, then. They told us, when he was running for the presidency, it's time for change. I saw Jindal's announcement, as you were running, you know, I think. He's a Catholic, I guess. He became a Catholic, I guess. He is, yeah. Bobby Jindal. Oh, right, yes, he's a copper Catholic. Yeah. You mentioned one piece in the speech, to protect the unborn, you know. He's been strong before life started. Yeah, yeah. I pray there's no chance, but it would. Probably not. He was incredibly effective working with bureaucracies, even bureaucracies staffed by people fight against his views. He's just a very fine administrator. I guess he actually shrunk the government down there, you know. He used to the private sector and so on. Louisiana's much better off. He took over after, when he was left the African fan, or right after, right after. So he had a lot of work to do with him as well. Yeah, very nice dress, you know. I mean, it's just bounce back down. Laws have their greatest power from what? Have their greatest power from custom, as the philosopher says. The second should be said that that argument concludes that laws should be changed, but not, nevertheless, for just any amelioration, right? But for magna utilitate, do necessitate. And similarly, it should be said to the third argument, huh? Time for another article or not? We'll stop there. Okay. Okay. Okay. Mr. Rick said, Dwayne, you can start studying the angels any time you want to, he said. I'd express some interest one time about the angels. He's a good man. So I was looking at the sentences there to the second book there, the 19th Distinction, right? Thomas touches there upon a very important question. And it's the question that Aristotle raises in the premium to the three books on the soul. And that's the question whether the human soul survives what? Death, right? And Aristotle says we would very much want to know this, right? And he hints at what the decision or the conclusion about this will be, or what it will depend upon, right? What does it depend upon as far as reason is concerned now, right? Well, if the soul survives the death of the body, right? Then you have to have some evidence, right, that the existence, the being of the soul, the human soul, that is to say, right, doesn't depend upon the what? The body, right? And how would you show such a strange conclusion, right? Well, if you look before and after, you know that being comes before doing, right? Okay? Even Descartes knew that, right? I think, therefore I am, right? Okay. Okay. So, does the soul, the human soul, does it have any doing, any activity that is not in the body? And if it does, that would be a sign, right, that its being is not entirely, as they say, immersed in the body, right? An interesting way of speaking that Avicenna uses and Thomas takes over and so on. Whether the human soul is like other material forms, right? Like material forms, completely immersed in the body, right? Well, you know, when a ship is floating in the water, part of it is, what, immersed in the water, but part of it is not in the water, right? So, is a human soul like that, or is it like a submarine? It's entirely immersed in matter, right? And, therefore, if that's true, it would have no doing, no operation, that would be, what? It would not be, what, in the body, right, huh? Okay. Now, I remember a student, you know, who I could kind of gather at the beginning of the class one time at Assumption, fully convinced that the brain is the organ of thought, right? And the brain, of course, is the body, huh? And so I thought, you know, need a long enough, but the student, and I said, a good sign of this is that, what, just as a blow in the eye interferes with seeing, right, so a blow in the brain interferes with thinking. Therefore, thinking is, what, the brain is the organ of thought, right? Or alcohol going to the brain, huh? Interference with thinking, the guy's nodding his head, you know, and so on, huh? Okay. Well, then I took this example, which I think I've given you before. I'll do it again. I said, suppose you and I were in a room with no light source, except for a little light bulb that's in the ceiling, right? And I can see you and you can see me, right, huh? Now, a blow in the light bulb is going to what? Yeah. It's going to interfere through seeing me. Therefore, the light bulb is the organ of your sight, right? Now, is the argument as strong as you really thought it was, huh? If a blow in the light bulb interferes with seeing, that shows there's a connection between seeing and the light bulb, right? But does it show in particular that it's a connection between organ and the activity of that organ, right? Now, what would you say, huh? Let's take a little simpler example. I can see Joshua now, right, huh? Now, if Joshua goes out of the room, I would no longer be able to see him, right? Does Joshua interfere with my seeing, like a blow in my eye would interfere with my seeing? Is he interfering with the organ? What's he interfering with? The object, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, Aristotle says that the images, right, are to reason, huh? Like the color in the wall is to the eye, right, huh? The color in the wall is to the eye, not as its organ, but as its object in some way. And so, the comparison there of the images to the, what, reason is like that of object. Maybe, huh? In which case, you haven't shown that the brain is the organ of thought, right, huh? But maybe you're interfering with the object in some way, huh? Okay. So, now, there are many ways you can reason to the soul, the human soul, that is to say, in particular, having an activity that is not in the, what, body, right? And I've seen Thomas talk about these, and Aristotle talk about these, and so on, huh? But what was interesting for me in this little text from the Distinction 19, I think it was, question, the first article in there, really, in the second book of the sentences, was Thomas gives three reasons, huh? And the order, then, is very interesting, huh? The first reason he gives is the one that Aristotle gives in the third book on the soul. Now, to appreciate this first reason that Aristotle gives for the soul and for reason being something immaterial is in the way he proceeds there in the third book and in the second book, huh? He takes up the senses before he takes up, what, reason, right? And among other things, you learn about the senses that sensing is an undergoing, pate, you know? That the object of the senses acts upon the, what, senses. The senses don't act upon their object, huh? So sound acts upon my ear, right? And color or something like that, or light, acts upon my eyes, right, huh? And even though grammatically speaking, it seems to be the opposite, right? That would be that last kind of fallacy in language, yeah. We have a false imagination, right? My eyes fell upon the gold, you know, huh? My eyes fell upon the something there that was on the ground, right, huh? But did your eyes fall upon it, or did it really fall upon your eyes, huh? So sensing is a kind of suffering, right, a kind of undergoing, huh? And then when Aristotle gets to take up reason, right, huh, he'll say, well, then, thinking also seems to be a kind of, what, undergoing, huh? So he's seeing the analogy of the two, right, huh? And you go from one that's more known to the one that is less known, right? But now there's a second thing that Aristotle points out when he's studying the senses. And that is that the sense has to be lacking in the object that it receives. And it wasn't lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. And it's not lacking in the object that it receives. then it's what it's going to be imputed in knowing it if my tongue was sugary right or sweet a candy bar or a all-day sucker so i couldn't really what taste different things right yeah yeah and you know sometimes your your tongue is somewhat imputed right feeling something sharp or strong right now my brother mark you know the great wine connoisseur would warn me about eating this or that before dinner tonight because that's going to interfere with my taste right and learn discussions as to whether smoking was interfering with your taste of the wine or the thing right and likewise if the ear had you know sound in there all the time right that would interfere with your hearing all sounds right and if the eye had a color right down like sunglasses built into your eyes right now you'd see everything this color right well then nearest out gets to reason he says reason seems to be open to knowing all material bodies right now well if the knowing power receiving has to be lacking in entirely in the object that it's receiving or knowing right then the reason has to be what yeah like any bodily nature right that's the first argument thomas gives in this i see he's kind of following his master there right now where you start with what is more known to us the senses right that's why you borrow words from the senses like seeing can mean understanding right or grasping you know and uh and uh you see this analogy here right of both being a kind of undergoing right although the undergoing of what the senses is not as far removed from the way in which wax undergoes something right okay but in reason is even further removed from it but because reason is open to knowing all bodies therefore it's what lacking in any bodily nature that's the first argument he gives okay now what's the second argument he gives huh the second argument is taken from the way in which reason knows these things huh and the argument thomas gives here is that reason knows these things universally why whatever is in matter is from the very fact that's in matter it's what singular right so if reason is knowing things universally and not singularly it's not knowing them in the body anybody so when i sense a man or when i imagine a man right which are bodily in a bodily thing right the singularity there right i can imagine a black man i can imagine a white man a yellow man right a brown man right a handsome man an ugly man right socrates is said to be the ugliest man in athens right but he was loved by his his students right because of his his wisdom right now sometimes i myself have have given an argument that is based upon the way the mind knows right and this would be a little bit different from the one from the universality right but the argument you've heard me give it before here i go back to my understanding of the continuous right and the continuous um as her style develops it in the logic and in the sixth book of actual hearing right the continuous has two definitions the first definition you meet in logic is that a continuous quantity is one whose parts meet at a what common boundary right so the two parts of the line meet at a what point and the two parts of the semi semicircle parts of the um circle meet at a line right and the two bodies meet at a surface so a continuous thing like a body is is one whose parts committed a common boundary the second definition is that the continuous is divisible forever right why use those two definitions and i say now isn't it strange when we study master euclid right and master euclid talks about the square right and he knows the square by what a definition the definition is something like this a equilateral and right angled quadrilateral right now here he's knowing a continuous thing the square right by a what definition right but now from my studies under the father of logic right and so on do the parts of the definition the genus and the differences do they meet at a point or a line or a surface no so the definition is a what non-continuous knowledge of a continuous thing it's a continuous thing the square received in reason in a non-continuous way that's a rather strange thing to take place right okay now thomas they say had said that the singular is received in reason what universally right and from that he can reason that the what reason is not a what body right because what's received in the body is always for that very fact singular right now purposes are reasoning and what's received in the body is always what in the continuous right so if it's received in reason in the form of a definition it's received in an uncontinuous way now is the reason for that what you're receiving no what you're receiving in this case is something what continuous right now what about the other definition of the of the continuous that which is divisible forever right now now if you know the categories and so on right you know that these things are not divisible what forever right you get down to a highest genus yeah therefore it's when you get down to being or something right you can't you know define that by something more universal anything you'd use to define something would have to be something right and it doesn't get you anywhere right so a definition definitions just like demonstrations right they're not divisible what forever right okay so from both definitions continuous you can say that reason knows it's a continuous in a non-continuous way what explains that not what you're knowing because that is continuous right therefore it must be the nature of the mind right now whatever is received is received according to the way of the what receiver right and if i had a piece of dough here i could probably mold into some shape you know how about the water here right well i could mold the water the water it's got some shape here doesn't it no you know if i poured this out right it wouldn't what retain that shape right so the shape is received in water and in clay according to the nature of the shape no according to the nature of the what receiver right now so if continuous things like squares are received in reason in an uncontinuous way that must be the very nature of the reason right and therefore it's not a body right okay that's a different army than thomas's one right thomas's argues from the fact that what's received in the reason is what no longer singular but universal and this is what the great waifu said said right you know i've often heard that quoted a thing is singular he says consents and universal when what understood right and a woman is seen it's a singular right she's understood it's something if she can be it's something universal right some consolation for that right Thomas says in Morality that you're not seduced by women in general, but by this woman. But notice, does it make sense that the argument that Thomas gives second, right, or the one that I put in that second way of proceeding from the way we know something, right, that that should come after the first one that was taken from Aristotle there? Then in the deima? Well, I didn't know that, but it's kind of built up from what's known to the senses, right, that knowing power has to be lacking in the object that it receives, right, and then you see the reason it receives or we see all the natures of these things, right, that kind of leads you on to the idea that it receives things universally too, right, maybe a little more subtle about things, huh, can argue from the analogy to the senses, right, that reasons they mature over here. Now, what's the third argument, huh, Thomas gives, do you think? I've never seen them give these three in that order, you know. I've seen them, you know, separately and so on, huh? Well, he gets the third one from, what, Avicenna. Very good, yeah. Avicenna has some marvelous things, right? He has some marvelous, Aristotle, but marvelous things, right? Now, Avicenna says, huh, that no knowing power that is a body can know itself. The ear can know sound, but the ear cannot know the ear. The eye can know color, but the eye cannot really know what an eye is, huh? Now, Avicenna gives a reason for that, huh? That a knowing power that is a body, huh, that is an organ of the body, the bigger body, that organ or that body comes before it, and it's, what, object, huh? Because this knowing power is not knowing it in separation from the body, but in the body, through the body, right? So a knowing power that is a body and organ, huh, that body or organ that it's in is before its, what, object. But can it be before itself? Therefore, it can't know itself. Now, you gentlemen, huh, have studied under the great Shakespeare, right? And Shakespeare has given us the best definition of reason, which is Joshua, do you know? What's Shakespeare's definition of reason? That's part of it, yeah. But what's the part you left out in the middle there? Yeah, yeah. So reason knows what reason is, right? A knowing power that is a body, right, an organ, can't know itself as all of a sudden is shown, right, down by adduction, but for the reason, right? Therefore, if reason knows itself, if reason knows that it is, the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, because my reason at least knows that, right? And your reason after, your long meditation, and Shakespeare knows this too, then reason is not a what? Body, huh? Magnificent thing, right, huh? Of course, notice, when you say reason is the ability for a large discourse, you're touching upon something involved in the first argument, right? In the universality of reason, right? And when you say large discourse, part of that meaning of large is what? You're knowing things universally, right? And finally, the definition itself is in the third argument, right? So it's magnificent the way Thomas is, ordered those three, right? So sometimes, you know, although I've seen these arguments separately, you know, in different places in Thomas, right? I don't remember him exactly laying those three down that order there, right? I think it's kind of significant that he does that, right? It's a beautiful text, huh? So I'm doing a little caseric with you, you know? And I was impressed with that, you know? And the next time Warren calls me, I'll see him when he thinks of that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's right, I come down, you know? I can see him coming down the hall there, and I remember that, seeing him stopping me in the, I'm in front of my, my little tin place there, and Dwayne, he'd say, you know? So he's like a child, almost, you know? You know? But you know how I was reading in the, just today was in Mark, you know, about how you've got to become like a little child, right? You know, surf the little child to come to me, Grace says first, but then he goes on to say that you should be like a little child going into the kingdom of heaven, right? Well, something like that for what? Philosophy, right, huh? If you don't have that wonder, huh? That kind of enthusiasm, right, huh? You have the third movement there, right? Mozart quintet, huh? You know? You don't have that particular thing, you know? I always give this example, you know, when I think it was a course on place, you know, on the fourth book of natural hearing. He kind of was teaching that course, and I remember I was staying in the hall there before class, you know, and he kind of came down to the hall, he stopped in front of me, looked up at me, and he's got a short mat, and he looked up at me, and he says, isn't this wonderful out of the way he says, you know? He could see he felt more wonder than anybody in the whole class, right? And here he'd been teaching, you know, the fourth book of natural hearing and other books of natural hearing from the 1930s, you know, and I'm up here in, you know, 60, 63, sometime in there, right? And he's got more wonder, you know, like a little what? Child, you know? Does he talk about in another part the non-continuous knowledge of continuous things? I don't remember even saying that explicitly, maybe he does someplace, but that's the one that always struck me because I, you know, I had these two definitions. on the continuous and I saw you could argue from them, you know? Same way of demonstrations. A demonstration is not divisible forever, right? It's not, you know, middle term and then middle term between those and middle between those and so on. It'd make an infinite task, right? You know? It'd be xeno to prove that you'd have to get the moving. Yeah. You'd say A is B because A is X and X is B, but how do you know A is X because A is G and G is X and so on, right? Yeah. And you know how when you're defining it, one way of defining it is to start with the genus, right? And sometimes even more emochiness, but then gradually you divide to get to the thing, you know, you want to define. If you had to go through infinite steps, you'd never get down to the species you want to define, right? So, yeah, yeah, in the computer we might not be able to go through infinity of things, huh? Okay. So I hope you appreciate that or appreciate Thomas there at least, huh? Is he 19 or the second book of sentences? Yeah, I think it was the first article in there, yeah, from the right thing. There's all kinds of things in there. I thought you might see a damn in the course, you know, a forgotten text, you know, of the sentences. Of course, you didn't see what the text is, you know. And we'd go on for a long time, because I forgot a text I was about to bring up, you know. There's a text that indicated how logic is closer to natural philosophy than to grammar, right? Yeah. In some ways, right? Even though, you know, in the trivium, right, in the quadrivium, right, the trivium has got grammar and logic and rhetoric, yeah. So you might think that geometry is closer to logic, you know, and those two are closer. and logic and natural philosophy, right? There's a way in which the forgotten text. So we're at question 97, article 3, where the custom is able to obtain the force of what? Of law. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that custom is not able to obtain the force of law nor to what? But we're on, move away a law, right? For human law is derived from the law of nature and from the divine law, right? You heard about the woman down there that was refusing to issue these marriage licenses to homosexual or lesbian things? But what law are you doing this? She says, by the law of God. She's refusing it. What? Yeah, yeah. She had kind of a rough marriage life, you know, many things, but I guess she, her mother, a dying mother, I think it was, she said, the lawyer said, he says, you've got to get straight with God, you know, and you've got to, so she's, a kind of conversion, right? And she's rejoicing in her and her being thrown in jail for six days and so on. But the custom of men cannot change the law of nature, right? Nor the divine law. She could have quoted this text, too. Customs of men, huh? Therefore, also, neither is it able to change, what? Human law, right? So there's some difference between human law and the law of nature and the divine law that makes it possible in regard to the human law for it to change it, but not the others. I'm sure Thomas will lighten us upon this, but you've got to confuse the issue first here, right? Yeah. Moreover, from many evils there cannot come about, what? One good, huh? But the one who begins first to act against the law does badly, right? Therefore, many similar acts being multiplied, huh? It doesn't become something good. But the law is some, what? Good, huh? Since it is a rule of human acts, huh? Now, what's his name there? Martin Luther King, right? The idea was you know, sit down at the counter and do this and sit that down. Eventually, you've got to change the law, huh? But law is a certain good since it is the rule of human acts. Therefore, through custom, one is not able to remove the law so that the custom itself obtains the force of law. Moreover, to what? Put forth the law retains to public persons, right, huh? Those who are in the government and so on. To whom it pertains to rule the, what? Community. Whence private persons are not able to make a law, right? So the cop wouldn't take it. That I had made the law was at speed limit but it was different here than the city had put down, huh? In this car. But custom is what? In strength, right? Through the acts of private, what? Prisoners. Therefore, custom is not able to obtain the force of law through which laws you moved, huh? Okay, now we cut off the rest of the article and say, you think about this now for a day or so, right? Now against this is what a guy called Augustine says, right? Where he is. In the epistle to, what? Kasulan, right? Yes. He says, the custom of the people of God, right? And the institute of, what? Should be held for, what? Law, right? And thus, the, what? Of the divine laws and those who have been in contempt, the, what? Customs, these actual customs, right? Should be coerced, right? Okay. I was thinking that old saying there, lexarandi, lex credendi, right? It has some, some of the likeness to this, right? Because credendi is a pretty important thing, right? But the lexarandi is something that you, what? Custom, right? If the whole church prays Holy Mary, Mother of God, well then, I believe that she is the Mother of God, right? You know? Well, let's see what the Master says here. See if you can tie this on the Houdini of theology here. I answer it should be said that every law is, what? Makes progress or is proficient, right? From the reason and the will of the legislator. The divine law and the natural law from the reasonable, what? Will of God, huh? Mohammedans believe that? I don't know. The reasonable will of God. The human law from the, what? Will of man ruled by, what? By reason, yeah. Now just as the reason and the will of man are made known by, what? A word in things to be done, so also they are made known by, what? Deed, yeah. For this, each one would seem to be choosing as good that he fulfills by his deeds and by his work. How does man it is manifest, however, huh? That by human word is possible for what? To be changed and also be explained, right, huh? Insofar as it makes known the interior motion and conception of human, what? Reason. Whence also through acts greatly, what? Multiply. Which make a custom, right? A law can be changed and, what? Expound, yeah. Does Augustine say that you have to go to the lives of the saints to see the meaning of some of these things? And also for something to be caused, right, that will obtain the, what? Power of law. Insofar as the exterior acts multiplied, the inward motion of the will and the conception of reason are most, what? Efficaciously declared, right? Whence when something many times comes about, it seems to, what? Deliberate reason, judgment of reason, huh? And according to this, custom both has, what? The power of law and can abolish the law, right? And also be interpreted the law, right? Yeah. I thought you weren't a candle lawyer. Not very well. Not very well. Okay, let's see now how Houdini won't tie these things, right? The first, therefore, it should be said that natural law and the divine go forth from the divine will. This has been said, huh? That's why they're not able to be changed, right? Whence is not possible to be changed through custom proceeding from the will of man. But they're only able to be changed through divine authority, right? That's why they're not going to be changed to the divine authority, right? going to be changed That's why they're not That's why they're not going to be changed And therefore it is that no custom is able to obtain strength, right, against the divine law or against the, what, natural law. As Isidore says in the book on, what, synonyms, I guess, use, huh, or custom, is way to authority, right? And a bad, what, use or bad custom, law and reason, in this case, what? Come, yeah. I said, we don't have to worry about this because it's obvious in the Constitution that the state has no other way to establish sacraments or change them or corrupt them. We don't have to worry about it. Of course, they'll persecute us anyway, but that doesn't change the sacrament. Yeah, yeah. Between that law and the even worse one about abortion, you know, I mean, the Supreme Court has done a lot of harm to us, to our whole country. We believe that one thing on earth is a matter. Also, there's a change now in the language describing religious freedom, where we have freedom of worship, but not freedom to exercise our religion. There's a world of difference between the two. Freedom of worship is, well, you're freedom of church on Sundays, and keep it to yourself. But freedom to exercise religion means you lift your faith, which means you break it to the public square. But Anthony Kennedy and other Supreme Court justices are truncating that right bit by bit using freedom of religion, freedom of worship. It's a very insidious and utter thing. Okay, to the second it should be said, this has been said above, huh? Human laws, in some cases, right, are deficient, right, huh? Once it is possible sometimes to act apart from the law, in the case in which the law itself, what? It fills. Nevertheless, the act is, what? It will not be bad, huh? Have you ever been in a stop sign, you know, where it never turns green? Of course, I was in one that was in Boston, I think it was in Boston, yeah. It was never changing, you know, huh? What do you do in this case? It's clear. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. My father had this thing, this is a place you have to promote yourself, he'd say. That's the expression. That's right. There was a fellow who went to Rome, and there was a big, big, big intercession. It was a holiday, so there was nobody in the street. Nobody. Yeah, yeah. And English driver, and he stopped dutifully at the red light. And the Italian guy says, he looks around, he says, well, you stopped for us, it's just the red light. Go, there's nobody here. Go. Go. Well, when you get this law, though, you could turn, you know, like, right after stopping, you know, at a stop sign, you know? Mostly because people were doing it customarily, right? It made some sense, you know? And it didn't spend, you know, progress, I mean, things are not stalled as much as they were, so I didn't finally make it law, I mean, a written law, I mean. And when such cases are multiplied, right, on account of some change of men, right, then it's manifested by custom that the law is, what, no longer useful, right? Just as it would be manifested, the law is contrary to the word, what, promulgated, right? But if already remains the reason, the same, on account of which the first law was useful, not custom the law, but law, custom, should, what, conquer, right, huh? Except perhaps on account of this only, that the law is seen to be, what, useless, right, huh? Because it is not possible according to the custom of the, what, yeah, which was one of the conditions of, what, law. It was difficult to remove the custom of the, what, multitude, huh? Now what about the third objection here, right? Let's go back to the third objection to see, that's a little different one. Individuals are not supposed to do this, okay, private persons, that is to say. To the third, it should be said that the multitude in which custom is introduced can be of two conditions. If it is a, what, free multitude, right, huh, which is able to make for itself law, more is the consent of the whole multitude to observing something than the, what, which the custom manifests, than the authority of the, what, prince, who does not have the power of, what, yeah, except in so far as he carries the person of the multitude, huh? It's apparent in the majority of the Americans are opposed to that, according to that, maybe too, but according to the thing with Iran, you know, huh? Yeah, yeah. Better push it to anyway, you know. But it never changed. Yeah. When so, though, individual persons are not able to, what? Nikla, nevertheless, the whole people is able to make any law, huh? Taxation's a representation. If, however, the multitude does not have the free power of, what, or of removing the law laid down by a higher power, right, then, nevertheless, that custom and such a multitude prevailing obtains the force of law insofar as through, what, it is tolerated, right, right, to whom it pertains to, what, imposed the multitude of law. And from this, it seems, what evidently you prove, what custom, what induces, huh? I remember one time I was sitting in an interview with a political science guy, right, who was applying for a job at the college, and so on. I remember a distinction he was making between the law and the policy, right, huh? And so he was trying to explain his distinction to the students, right? He thought the students would know that there's a law as to what the speed limit is out there on the highway, right? Maybe the speed limit out there is 60. The law says 60 degrees or whatever it is. Now, the cops, if you're going 65, maybe the cops would not, what, go after you. If you're going 70, they would. So the question is, what is the law and what is the policy, right? Well, I'm just saying, well, policy is the right word there, but that was a distinction he was trying to make, right, huh? And they might say, you know, you're okay if you don't go for 65, you know? And the word passes around, right, huh? Well, that kind of has now the force of law, right, huh? You're free to drive up until 65, but don't go beyond there, right? The machine, you know, clicks, shows more than five miles, so. Incidentally here, just... a little aside here about custom right because here he's talking about custom in the practical order right custom and what law right okay what's what's the role of custom there in in the in looking knowledge and knowledge well i always think of two fundamental texts one in aristotle and one in thomas right and in thomas the one i always think of is in both summas before he tries to prove that god exists right he raises the question is the existence of god obvious right or say no to him right and he's got to answer no to that question before he's going to ask the question whether it's possible to demonstrate that god is right and then finally to demonstrate that god is right and um some people think that the existence of god is what obvious her parents say no to him and thomas has to explain this is not obvious but why do they think this is so right then and there he talks about the force of what custom right my brother mark used to be annoyed by these statements and books like today we know the earth turns on its axis right that the sun doesn't go around the earth right even though we speak of when the sun rose today and when it sits today right we don't all know that in fact very few of us know that you know and but if you're accustomed to something right huh it seems that that everybody knows that right where were you in the brains are passed out right so thomas says you know if you're accustomed to hear god spoken of and have him called upon and so on right now in the time you're youthful right and so on uh then it seems kind of obvious that god exists right and uh so custom can make something that is not obvious seem but obvious right and custom therefore can make something even what false seem to be what true right such as a great force of custom right aristotle in the in the uh second book of wisdom there he talks about the influence of custom upon the way we think right and uh if you're accustomed to think in a certain way because of the sciences you've taught or because of your your your peculiar mental uh makeup yeah then you are what going to try to proceed that way everywhere right and aristotle says well you shouldn't proceed in the same way everywhere right one of my cousins says to me duane do you really like that red wine i said yeah but i can't suspect you know that he's drinking red wine like he drinks beer and if you did that i would not enjoy it all i'd be you know spitting it out and so on right you've got to take a little bit of red wine and sniff it you know i just the grandchildren i teach them how to do this and uh only that way can i enjoy it right you see i can't drink it like i drink you know glass of water already been out sweating or something like that you try to be going that way and you just you know even white wine would not drink that way so you've got to be educated how to drink wine right yeah you don't drink wine in the same way that you drink soda pop or the same way you drink water right or even orange juice right and so the same thing is true about what knowing right so if you've got very good eyes should you try to use your eyes to know music you've got excellent eyes but you're you're kind of deaf you know i guess this time went on uh samuel johnson got more to appreciate music right now he spoke of it as acquirement of a sense right and boswell you know he was a great admirer as you know johnson wrote the famous uh life of johnson and saved his his speech and so on but he would he would pass up a opportunity with johnson to go here handle you know a concerto or something huh or vice versa if you've got very good ears but your eyes are kind of bad you know you should go to the art museum and put your ear up against the painting right that's an exaggerated example right it's just that the ear is not really a tool for knowing what yeah for knowing paintings right and the eye is not really the main tool for knowing music right huh and some people you know that like uh you know nice beautiful looking dish right now you know but that's not really the what pleasure proper to right you know aristotle is a very interesting thing in the book on the poetic hearts there where he's talking about tragedy right and he talks about those who want the tragedy to have a happy ending have you read the history of you know even shakespeare's plays right there are attempts you know in the 17th century right 18th century there to uh change you know the unhappy ending of king lear with so-and-so marrying so-and-so you know disdemona marrying somebody i mean not disdemona but uh credelia bearing somebody you know and uh it is you know travesties trying to find to restore the true shakespeare you know but the point the point that he makes right is that what one should not seek every pleasure from tragedy right but the pleasure that's appropriate to what tragedy right and uh the pleasure that's appropriate to tragedy and the pleasure is appropriate to comedy is not the same right and i remember you know fielding there when he started writing joseph anders i think one of those novels right he has a little preface where he says to the reader he's writing a new kind of fiction here you might say right and the reader you know they don't really be disappointed by expecting a pleasure other than the one he's maybe accustomed to and some people can't um because of their custom and the limits of their customs they can't really what adapt to this right a friend of mine taught high school english right and uh trying to teach macbeth these high little kids right now and uh funny told them you know the detective story is something i forget but you could say he's given up you know trying to teach macbeth in the way that macbeth should be what appreciated right but people are you know what a detective story is or crime stories or something like that but that's not what macbeth is really you know and they can't what adjust to that right i remember the first time i got adjusted to the um to homer right now my brother mark had a you know lousy little paperback edition you know that i couldn't get started on really you know but i knew i had to do something with the homer so finally when i was first teaching assumption there i had a colleague who had some belonged to some literary society and they had a beautiful big edition of homer you know so i wouldn't get that i said so i haven't you know i paid him in order to his society you know so i'm going to read a book and i did like 24 books in in homer right and so the first night i read a book you know second night another book finally i can't put it down you know and all of a sudden i've what yeah yeah yeah you know how sometimes it can happen in real life that that that you don't like particular food and yet you can get what accustomed to it and to enjoy it right now but if someone insisted upon you know putting vanilla ice cream on uh filet mignon i'd say you're you know you're not sticking the pleasure property to a filet mignon right now regardless of whether the ice cream or filet mignon tastes better right it's not the same pleasure to eat a steak and eat an ice cream cone right it's not the same thing right so um you have to multiply these things right huh i used to tell a little joke there but it's a true story um in class there at this point i used to have a um advice column for