Prima Secundae
Lecture 276: Judicial Precepts: Definition, Nature, and Division

Transcript
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New question, huh? New question. Can't be any worse than that. Consequently, one ought to consider about the, what, judicial precepts now, huh? You thought you were free, huh? And first, one ought to consider about them in common. Secondly, about their, what, reasons, huh? About the first, four things are asked. First, what are the judicial precepts, huh? Second, whether they are, what, figurative, huh? It signifies something. Thirdly, about the duration of them, right? And fourth, about the distinction of them. Okay, to the first, one goes forward thus. It seems that the ratio, the reason for the judicial precepts, does not consist in this, that they are ordering us to our neighbor, right? So you see, I'm one's neighbor, huh? In the lattice proximum, huh? 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Therefore, the judicial precepts are not said to be such from the fact that they order us to our neighbor. Moreover, just as the, what, ceremonial precepts are, have themselves to God, so also the, what, judicial precepts to one's neighbor. But among the ceremonial precepts are some that pertain to oneself, as the observances of, what, food and clothing and so on. Therefore, judicial precepts are not said from this that the order man to his, what, neighbor. But against this is what is said in Ezekiel chapter 18, verse 8. You forgot about that text, didn't you? Among other good works of the just man, if you make a, what, good judgment between man and man, right? But the judicial precepts are said from judgment. And therefore, the judicial precepts seem to be said those which pertain to the ordering of men to each other. But this is not too, too obscure, do you think so? Don't strain your minds too much, I don't think. I know, too, this is not. Hence, it should be said, that it is clear from the things foresaid above, that the, what, have a force of obligating from the dictated reason, because natural reason dictates this ought to be done or to be avoided, right? And these precepts are called the, what, morals, in that they are, what, by reason, right? It's interesting, you know, I mean, Aristotle would say, you know, that adultery is always wrong, right? And there's no meaning of the extreme, right? So it's not a question of don't commit adultery too much or too little, but just the right amount. No, any of it is, it's already by definition, right? And the same thing you say about murder, right? Don't kill too many people or too little, just the right number of people, you know? Yeah, yeah. You hear about this guy that escaped, you know, and they caught him down in Mexico. Chapo, Chapo, yeah, he's been in the newspaper, you know, and so anyway, he was being interviewed by Sean Penn or whatever, the actor, you know, who's going to, yeah. But anyway, you know, he says, well, I don't kill many people, you know, just, you know, line of business once in a while, you know, kind of the idea, you know, that you don't do too much. It's not an experience. Yeah, yeah, yeah, he hits the mean, you know, I mean, it's kind of funny the way he saw things. He would make Obama look like an extremist in terms of killing people. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Obama killed a lot of things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The question for you is, how did Sean Penn get the interview, and how did he respond to that statement? Well, that's the question, you know, because they think that maybe that's given some clues as to where Chapo was, you know, even though it was a secret meeting, I mean, you know, but he's trying to get. Sean Penn was in a secret meeting with him. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because he had been, he was cozying up to Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War in the Second Gulf War, trying to prevent the war, and was sort of an apologist for Hussein. Yeah, yeah, yeah. From a liberal perspective. Yeah, right. So it's stealing and so on, right? So when Aristotle's example, you know, the universality there, we hate all these. So that's a moralia. Other precepts there are which do not have the strength of obliging from the dictate of what? Reason itself. Because considered in themselves, they do not have absolutely the reason of something being old or not old, right? But they have the strength of obligating from some institution, either divine or human, huh? And determinations of this sort are, what? Yeah, some of the moral precepts. If, therefore, one determines the moral precepts by divine institution and those things through which man is ordered to God, then such are called, what? Ceremonial precepts. In those, however, in which pertain to the ordering of men to each other, such are called, what? Judicial precepts. In two things, therefore, consists the ratio of judicial precepts. That they do pertain to the ordering of men to one another, but that they do not have the power of obliging from reason alone, but from, what? Institution, right? Clear enough, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the judicial exercise, right, or exercised by the office of some, what? Princes, huh? Who have the power of, what? Judging, huh? To the prince pertains not only to order those things which come into, what? Not about litigation, but also about the voluntary contracts which come about among men or between men, and about all things pertaining to the community of the people, the rule. Once the judicial precepts not only are those things which pertain to, what? The fights, the judges? It is. But also, whatever pertain to the ordering of men to one another, which are under the ordering of the prince, is it where the supreme, what? Judge, huh? What kind of government he's got, I don't know. Now, to the second, now, is the objection taken from the moral precepts, right? He's already made that distinction, right? The body of the article. To the second, it should be said that that argument proceeds about those precepts, ordering one to one's neighbor, which have the strength of obliging us from only the, what? Dictated reason. Kind of natural reason, right? To the third, it should be said that even in those things which order to God, some are, what? Moralia. Moralia, because reason itself. Moralia, because reason itself. The form by faith dictates them, right? Has God to be loved and to be what? I used to always say that thing, you know, you've got a commandment to love God, you know, of all other things and so on. You say, well, now, isn't that kind of a strange notion of love? I say, you know, that I command you to love me, you know? It raises a kind of question to think about it, right? How lovable is he? You know? Yeah, yeah. They say, if I love you, people should love me, you know? I command you to love me. So you say, well, that's not the way to get men's love and maybe you shouldn't be commending that, you know? As long as I always fall back upon the fact that the definition of law, right, is for the common good, right? Okay. So to love God is loving the common good, right? One way I would... It's one way to answer the other is to say that we're just that stupid and we need to be told. Yeah. That's what I liked about that prayer of Richard Chester, right? Yeah. Yeah. We got it on there. Thank you. Yeah. These men haven't heard it, so let's see. He says, Thanks be to you, our Lord Jesus Christ, for all the benefits which you have given us, for all the pains and insults which you have borne for us. Most merciful Redeemer, friend and brother, may we know you more clearly, love you more dearly, and follow you more nearly, day by day. Amen. That's good. It's from the musical Godspell. Well, then it's actually the prayer of St. Richard. It's actually the prayer of St. Richard. Is it based on a song, I thought? I don't know, but it's his prayer. It's Richard of Chichester from the mid-13th century. I think the songwriter made it by the crib that was my answer. But that's what he says, and he spoke English in some fashion. Unless that's a translation from Latin, it's something he did very well. I don't know what he wrote. Let's quote it, yeah. I don't know. Seems a very good prayer, yeah. Okay, we're in the third, applied the third objection here, right? Yeah. Some things are ceremonial, which should not have the strength of obliging, except from the divine institution, right? To God pertains not only that sacrifices be offered to God, but that some things that pertain to what? Those offering and worshiping God, huh? Now men are ordered to God as to an end, huh? And therefore to the worship of God it pertains, and consequently to the ceremonial precepts, that man have a certain, what? Suitability, respect to the divine worship. But man is not ordered to his neighbor as to an end, so that he must be, what? Right, disposed in himself nor to his neighbor. For this is the comparison of servants to their masters, right? Who are, who, what they are, are something of their lords, right? According to the philosopher in the first book of politics. And therefore there are not some judicial precepts ordering man in himself, but all such are moral precepts, huh? But reason, which is the beginning of moral things, has itself in man with respect to those things which pertain to himself, just as the prince or the judge in the city. It should be known, however, that because the order of man to his neighbor more is subject to reason than the order of man to, what? God. More and more precepts are found by which man is ordered to his neighbor than through which he is ordered to, what? God. An account of this also is necessary for there to be many, what, in the law than judicial things, huh? To be more ceremonials than judicials. Okay, now we go on to the second question. Okay, now we go on to the second question. Would the judicial precepts figure something, huh? I was kind of curious, that idea of figure, how it came to mean sign, right? I ran across the text and I was reading the sentences, you know, where Thomas talks about it, right? And he says, figure has two meanings. The first meaning is the limit of what? Quantity, right? And how do you get from there at the sign, right? Well, Thomas says that it goes to the idea of statues, right? And how the figure of a man is taken as being a sign of the man, right? A figure more than anything else, right? So when Lafayette came back to the United States and his good friend George Washington had died, right? There's all these, what, statues of Washington, right? But he got down and saw the statue and, what, Virginia there, right, in the state house down there, he says, ah, that's the man, right? That's Washington, right? A lot of these ones are not so good, right, huh? But the statue maybe would have, what, a likeness of the man only because of what? His what? His figure. His shape, right? Wouldn't have his color, necessarily. They gave us some marble. His shape. And that's kind of generalized then, right? You know? Just as the shape of the statue is a sign in some way of, what, Washington, right, huh? So now we generalize it and say that the sign of anything, right, is a figure, right, huh? Kind of stretched a little bit, right? But that seems to be as far as he goes to explain it in his text, in his sentences. Forgotten text, it was going to be on and say. I'm imitating my master, you know, but if I see a little text, you know, sometimes you find them in the oddest places, right? But they indicate other things. So to the second, one precedes us. It seems that the judicial precepts do not figure something. Well, he's going to probably take the opposite side, right, being contrary, right? For this seems to be proper to the ceremonial precepts, that they are, what, instituted in the figure of some other thing. We saw that before, right? Ceremonial precepts, right? So the lamb is a figure of what? You know, hold the lamb of God, right? It's a figure of that, right? If, therefore, also the judicial precepts figure something, there will be no difference between the judicial and the ceremonial precepts. I mean, that figure the same thing, so I mean, it's a little bit. Moreover, just as to that people of the Jews are given some judicial precepts, so also to other peoples of the, what, Gentiles. But the judicial precepts of other peoples do not figure something, right? But the order of what to come about, right? Therefore, it seems that neither should the judicial precepts of the old law figure something, right? Moreover, those things which pertain to the divine worship, it is necessary to, what, treat of them by certain, what, figures. Why? Because those things which are of God are above our, what, reason, right? That's more closer to the idea of figurative when we speak of what? Yeah, figure, you know. In Scripture, yeah. Yeah, I mean, when Thomas gives us the reason for metaphors, right, in Scripture, right, because you're something above our mind, right? With metaphors and poetry, or something below our mind, right? But something outside of our mind, right? But those things which are of our neighbors do not exceed our reason. Therefore, through judicial things, which order us to neighbors, why not not to, what, figure something, right? But against this is Exodus chapter 21, which I'm sure you're all familiar with. I should ask you guys, what book of the Bible have you recently been reading? So, in Exodus 21, judicial precepts, allegorically and morality are expounded, right? Well, I answer, that is Thomas, not me. I answer, that should be said, that in two ways it happens that some precept is fair to. That's interesting. One way, primo et per se, right? Because it was, what, chief instituted to figuring something. And in this way, the ceremonial precepts are, what? Figurative. For this they were instituted, that they might figure something pertaining to the worship of God and to the mystery of, what? Christ. So, primo et per se, eh? Some precepts are figurative, non primo and per se, that's up front, but ex consequente. See what that means exactly. And in this way, the judicial precepts of the old law are figurative, eh? For they were not instituted to figuring something, right? But to ordering the status of that people according to justice and, what, equity. But ex consequente, they figured something. Insofar as the whole status of that people were disposed through these precepts, eh? was figurative. According to that of St. Paul, the first epistle of the Corinthians, omnia in figurum contingiae bantilis, everything happened to them was in a figure, right? I always think of that passage of Thomas there when I think of how we're always going astray, right? The Jews, you know, going astray, right? I know you don't have the reading that we had this morning there in the Mass, but it's from the book of Samuel, right, eh? And the Jews were, what, they lost to the Philistines, right? Well, then they'd gone off and they got the figure, the, what, the Ark of the Covenant, right? They went to battle again, they lost again, and the Ark of the Covenant got taken over by the Philistines. I don't know what's going to happen in the next reading. Sounds pretty bad, right, eh? But they're always getting in trouble, you know, the Jews, right, eh? Well, we're always getting in trouble, too, you know? I mean, you go down and read the church councils, you know, and you know, always the thing needed to be corrected, you know, even in the priesthood, right? Which is the name that was taken from Philistines to corrupt their own land and the name of it. It's interesting, yeah. So they're not instituted to figuring something right, but to ordering the status of that people according to justice and equity. But ex consequente, they figured something, insofar as the whole status of that people were disposed through these precepts was, what, figurative, according to that of the first epistle to the Corinthians. Omnia, all things in what figure happened to them, eh? To the first objection, therefore, it should be said that the ceremonial precepts in a different way are figurative than the judicial, right? The one, primo and per se, right? And the other ex consequente, eh? So is the nation of the Israelites, is that kind of a figure of the church, let's say? A figure of the church? The Israelites themselves? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The Jews was chosen for the Jews. by God, that from them Christ would be born, right? And therefore it's necessary that the whole status of that people would be what? Both prophetic and figurative as Augustine says in his book against Faust. An account of this also, those judicial things were treated to that people are more what? Figurative and judicial things treated for other people. Just as the wars and the deeds of that people are expounded, what? Mystically, which means in a spiritual sense, right? Not over the wars or just the Assyrians and Romans, although what? Much more clear according to men. That's interesting. That's very interesting. I always like what it says in the, think about it with the spiritual warfare, that's what it says in the Book of Judges, that God got some of the enemies of Israel so that they would learn to fight. To the third, it should be said that the order to the neighbor that people considered by itself was what? Open to reason, you might say? But according as it refers to the worship of God, it was above reason. And from this side, it was what? Figurative. Time for one more article here, I guess. Whether the judicial precepts of the old law have a perpetual what? Obligatory character, right? To third, one proceeds thus. It seems that the judicial precepts of the old law have a perpetual obligation. For the judicial precepts pertain to the virtue of justice. For judgment is said to be the carrying out of justice. But justice is perpetual and immortal. As it's said in the Book of Wisdom, chapter 1, verse 15. Therefore the obligation of the judicial precepts is perpetual. Moreover, the divine institution is more stable than human institutions. Ernest Dahl talks about the best form of government. He calls it the government according to a prayer. Oh, really? Yeah. As if you know that the circumstances that make such a government able to be instituted would require one to, what? More to pray than to expect them to come in the ordinary. But the judicial precepts of human laws have a perpetual, what? Obligation. Therefore, much more of the judicial precepts of the divine law. Moreover, the apostle says, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the, what, disapproval or reprovation of the, what, foregoing or preceding mandate came about on account of, here, what, weakness and, here, what, its uselessness, which was true about the ceremonial precept because it could not make something perfect according to, what, conscience-serving only in food and drinks and various, what, baptisms and justices of the flesh, as the apostle says. But the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious for that to which they were ordered, to, what, constituting justice and equity among men. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the old law are not, what, disapprovia, but still have efficacy. But against this is what the apostle says to the Hebrews chapter 7, that the priesthood being, what, translated is necessary that the carrying over the law come about. But the priesthood is translated from Aaron to Christ. Therefore, also the whole law is translated to carry over. Their judicial precepts do not still have their obligation. Now, what is Thomas going to say to this, huh? I'm sure he'll have something. See my footnotes here that the sentence is in the fourth book, which I'm not up to yet here. I'm going through editing the text. I'm up to the 20th distinction of the, starting the 20th distinction of the third book. Of course, there's about 40 distinctions in a book, so. I'm just about the halfway mark, you know, but if I'm going to get 20 down, I'll, you know, then I've gone halfway, you know, and I get 20 more to go. I think I'm going to be seduced into going back and reading the first book again, because that's really about the Trinity and so on. It's a saving thing to read. But you're working toward that. Yeah. Remind me to that. The answer should be said that the judicial precepts do not have perpetual obligation, but they are evacuated through the advent or coming of, what? Christ. But in a different way than the ceremonial. Now, this is interesting. A difference that Thomas sees, huh? For the ceremonial are so evacuated that not only are they dead, but they are mortiferous, causing death, right? To those observing them after Christ, especially after the gospel's been divulged. But the judicial precepts are dead because they do not have the force of obliging, but they nevertheless are not dead, causing them. Because if some prince orders in his kingdom these judicial things to be observed, he does not sin. Unless perhaps in this way he observes them or commands them to be observed, as it were having the strength of obligating from the institution of the old law. Then such an intention of observing would be deathly. Deadly, yeah. Deadly, that's good. Yeah, that's a good translation. No, take your translation, Father. But the difference, but the reason of this difference can be taken from the things foresaid or foresent. For it is said that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primo et per se, right? As were instituted chiefly to figuring the mystery of Christ as something in the future. And therefore the observation of them prejudices, right, the truth of what? Faith. According to which we confess or by which we confess these mysteries to now already be completed. But the judicial precepts are not instituted to figuring, but to disposing the status of that people who are ordered to what? Christ. And therefore that status of that people being changed, Christ already having come or coming, the judicial precepts lose their obligatory character, right? For the law was a, what, pedagogue, leading us to Christ, as is said in Galatians chapter 3. But because these judicial precepts are not ordered to figuring, but to bringing something about, then their observation does not absolutely prejudice the truth of faith. But the intention of the one observing them from the obligation of the law would be prejudicial to the truth of faith. whence through this is had that the status of that people, what, would still dear? And that Christ has not yet had come, right? To the first effort should be said that justice is, to be sure, perpetual, to be observed. But the determination of those things which are just, according to the institution, human or divine, is necessary that they be varied according to the diverse status of men, right? So should women be given the vote or not? What do you say? Not everybody. That's my determination. The women are really elected Obama, right? I don't think the men didn't vote for Obama in their plurality. That reason alone. And married women, you know, vote better than unmarried women, right? Because they have, you know, the guidance of their husbands a bit, you know? The husbands have some influence over them, you know? Yeah, yeah. A philosopher of Windshuttle or something like that has written an essay in New Criterion some years ago asking, well, what are the actual fruits of women's suffrage? And I mentioned before, the fruits are few and you could say bitter. And for saying that, he probably is living in some witness protection program somewhere. But it's, yeah, it was a very interesting essay, a very courageous one, I think, for him and his publisher. The second should be said, the judicial precepts instituted by men have a, what? Meaning that status of the regime, right? But if the city or the nation, or if the city or the nation, the tribe, comes to another regimen, is necessary for the laws to be, what? Changed. For there's not the same laws that is suitable in a democracy, which is the power of the people, and in oligarchy, which is the power of the wealthy, right? As is clear through the philosopher in his politics. And therefore, also, the status of that people being changed is necessary for the... judicial precepts, to be changed. To third, it should be said that those precepts, judicial precepts, dispose the people to justice and to equity according as they belong to that status, right? But after Christ, the status of that people must be changed, right? As that in Christ there would no longer be the discretion of what Gentile Jews, which were before. In account of this, it's necessary that the tissue precepts be changed. Do we have time for one more? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that the judicial precepts do not have any certain, what, division. Who could think that? The judicial precepts order men to one another, but those things which must be ordered among men coming into their use do not fall under any certain distinction, since they are infinita. Therefore, the judicial precepts cannot have any certain distinction. No science, no art about the infinite, right? No, unfeeling. Moreover, the judicial precepts are determinations of moral things. But moral precepts do not seem to have any distinction, except according as they are reduced to the precepts of the deck law. Therefore, the judicial precepts do not have any certain distinction. Moreover, the ceremonial precepts, which, because they have some certain distinction, their distinction in the law is what? It is brought out in the law, right? When some are called sacrifices and some observances, right? But there is no distinction hinted upon in the law of the judicial precepts. Therefore, it seems they do not have any certain, what, distinction. Ah, what is this? Look at the beautiful text here in the said contra. I, my goodness! Who would have thought of that? It said contra, ubi est ordo, o portet quatsit distinctio. Oh, boy, do I like that text. They go together. Oh, boy. It's kind of like ubi caritas est. Yeah. There's no delight that casts upon the definition of reason by the great Shakespeare. But the ratio of order most of all pertains to the judicial precepts through which that people was ordered. Therefore, most of all, they ought to have a certain distinction. Boy. Boy. Wow. Well, I like that. I think it should be said that since law is a certain, what, art of instituting human life or of ordering it, right, just as in any art there is a certain distinction of the rules of the art, so it is necessary in any law for there to be a certain distinction of the, what, precepts. Otherwise, there would be a, what, confusion taking away, huh? Useful of the law. And therefore, it should be said that the judicial precepts of the old law, through which men are ordered to one another, have a, what, distinction according to the distinction of the ordering of, what, human things, huh? Now, there's a four-fold order found in any people. I didn't know that. They asked that they're going to have the Republican candidates they're going to be. Tonight, you know, at 9 o'clock, you know, they'll be. Yeah, yeah. They're talking there, and the rumor was that Bush and, what's his name from New Jersey there? Christy. Yeah, that they're going to gang up and, no, no, no, no, Rubio tonight. Rubio. Yeah. You're going to, I don't know. I'm talking about these rumors going around. So a four-fold order is able to be found in any people. So I'm going to ask them what that four-fold order is tonight. I get my chance to ask a question. One of the, what, princes of the people to the, what, subjects, huh? Another of the subjects to each other. The third of those things which are the people to the extraneous ones, huh? And fourth to the domestics, huh? And those are three. The father to the son. The wife to the husband. And the Lord to the servant, huh? You find that in some of the St. Paul's epistles, you know, the three-fold distinction there, right? And according to these four orders are distinguished, can be distinguished, the judicial precepts of the old law. For they're given certain precepts about the institution of princes, right? And their, what? Yeah. You get the word principality, huh? And about the reverence to be, what? Shunem. And this is one part of the judicial precepts, huh? Hail to the chief. The president comes in. But they're given also certain precepts pertaining to, what? Citizens with respect to each other. As regarding buying and, what? Selling, huh? I was reading in the sentences about, you know, like the Christ should be called the Redemptor, you know? And this is appropriate, you know, to buy us back, you know, with that way of speaking. Because that's the first meaning of redemption, I guess. And judgments and punishments, right? And this is the second part of judicial precepts. They're given certain precepts pertaining to extraneous, as about war against, what? Enemies. And about the receiving of foreigners and, what? Strangers with violence. And this is the third part of judicial precepts. So that's what, what's his name going on, huh? Getting so much popular attention, huh? What's his name? Trump, yeah. Yeah. And this is the third part of judicial precepts. And then there are some given precepts pertaining to domestic conversation about servants and wives and sons, right? And this is the fourth part of judicial precepts. Okay. That's good confirmation. To the first, therefore, it should be said that those things which pertain to the ordering of men to one another are, to be sure, in number infinite, right, huh? But nevertheless, they can be reduced to some certain things according to the difference of the ordination that is of humans, huh? This has been said in the body of the article, I guess. To the second, it should be said that the precepts of Decalogue are first in the genus of, what? Moralia, huh? This has been said above. And therefore, conveniently or suitably, other precepts that are moral are distinguished by them, right, huh? But the judicial precepts in the ceremonials have another reason of obligation. Not from reason, natural reason, what? But from institution alone. And therefore, there is another reason of their distinction. To the third, it should be said that from those things which are ordered through the judicial precepts in the law, one, what? Hints at the, the law hints at the distinction of the judicial, what? Recepts. So there is text in there that pertain to that. Okay, shall we stop there? I'll be an 80-year-old man when I see you again, but I'll enjoy your steak and, you know.