Prima Secundae
Lecture 286: Motion, Act, and God as First Mover

Transcript
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upon form right that's one way it moves right over here we're in motion is carried over and applied to understanding or to loving god and so on right huh do you see okay thomas admits you know that that hope is more like emotion than love right see yeah and that love is not eliminated by the presence of one love meaning it's increased right you know you see people down there you know waiting for the the relatives to arrive in the train or the airplane or whatever it is right and then you know yeah yeah yeah i remember when i was first uh married into a family with an italian wife you know and some other italian relatives are coming over to to become americans right coming to italy and so we were down there at the airport there right now i can see my my mother-in-law you know just i mean it's ecstatic you know it's so funny though i mean the first thing that came in was was from france right huh i never really you know sophisticated you know we all of a sudden you're this you know italian came within and this came electrifying place you know and i know being a swede you know i mean i was electrified too a bit you know being in the presence of these italians you know right so so so uh it makes more sense to say that love remains when you get to the thing you love right get to the presence of what you love then uh then hope right huh it's hoping like an emotion right huh see and uh it's kind of like a seeking right huh the same way desire right desire is more like a what emotion right i notice you know that when thomas talks about in aristotle too in the whole tradition there when they talk about uh the will right and in this and the emotions and so on the they'll speak of it as the appetitive power right what does appetite mean yeah it means desire right the desiring power right why do you name it from desire you know well desire is more like a what ocean and it's more known to us right okay even the irascible appetite right you know anger is a very what movable very much of emotion right you can you can see that right huh but it's because motion is most what known to us right but it's kind of funny just this last uh couple of days you know i was reading a couple articles where thomas is obviously going back to the what before meaning of what act right and so the objection is saying that that uh he's thinking of love of god as being kind of an emotion right towards god or something you know it's kind of falling back on the earlier what meaning right huh that's a common thing with these words that are equivocal by reason huh that you uh if you make the mistake right of mixing up these senses huh you're usually falling back on an earlier sense from a what later sense huh your mind can't move it because once he had to say he can't move the word of course modern philosophers you know are very much of the sort right they can't uh move the word right yeah but they can't move the word carry it over right now okay now when aristotle divides being right what are the two main divisions of being well he does bring out that yeah but the two main divisions of being are being according to the figures of predication substance quantity quality and so on right and then being in the sense of act and what ability right okay well now with the division of being according to the figures of predication it begins with substance right which means what standing under right and the the etymologically right standing under right and that goes back to what to place right we talked about that before right okay um i mentioned how thomas was talking about the definition of of uh faith there in saint paul right and in the latin text it says substantia right brerbs for indarum the substance of things hoped for conviction of what is not seen right and i said i wonder if he knows the etymology of the greek work i looked it up in the in the text of saint paul and it's hypostasis right which is etymologically the same as substance here right you po means under right now stasis stand under right and but thomas in the thing he says the saying is the substance of things hoped for is like we say light is the hypostasis of color he's using the word hypostasis there right now the latin form of the greek word hypostasis so he seems like he knows the greek here you know and it seems parallel but that is goes back the idea of standing under goes back to what the continuous right and into place probably more than time right and then the other main meaning is into acting ability but ability is known through act and the first act is emotional then act is carried over in one way to form another way to these perfect activities like understanding and loving and seeing and so on yeah you heard me are you just hearing me you haven't heard me yet no no now in in the diana a lot of times aristotle will use the term what undergoing right the greek word you know for suffering to undergo right and uh this is first used even in the inanimate world right so the the marble underwent the chicken away of michelangelo right but then aristotle says that the senses what they don't act upon their object they undergo right now please carefully point out that this is a different sense of undergoing right from the undergoing of what the matter right because when when clay receives a shape right it becomes the shape of that clay right when the dough receives the cookie christmas cookies you know and to get something like the shape of a tree and some you know some other shape you know um the dough receives that shape as its own shape now right now does the eye receive you know the shape of the apple as its own shape right but in some way it undergoes and it's acted upon by the shape of the what apple right now okay i'm gonna get the shape of woman i'm gonna get all excited about this there's something being acted upon right but their eye doesn't take on the shape of a woman does it so this is a different sense of undergoing right huh you got that word in there under right and you got the word going right now so they both go back to you know to motion and to you know location or place right under right uh undergoing right so we can't escape that right huh you know so thomas you know points out as i say that all of our naming really goes back to the continuous right or what is in the continuous huh you know the word form we talked about right you know the being called an act comes from motion but uh form itself seems to name the what termination of the continuous right for a sense of form is that is is the form of the class or the form of a statue of the form of a man the form of a chair right but it's the termination of the continuous right something in the continuous so we can't can't avoid that it goes back to all these names so it's interesting to see that uh so he's putting out that we're using the word motion here in a what extended sense right we see over in bodily things that for motion is not only required the form which is a what source the beginning of that motion or action right but it was also required the emotion of the first mover right okay now he's not going to demonstrate that here in this article He's your calling that from the other part of theology, right? Now, you're going to get a little more concrete here following Aristotle, right? The first mover in the order of bodies is the heavenly body, right? We don't go into all the details of Aristotle. We're right at that, right? It's kind of interesting, huh? Aristotle thought that the sun and the moon and the stars were, what, eternal, right? And they don't, what, change or come into being or go out of being, right? And it's because for centuries now, right, we've not seen any real change in the sun, right? Now, Thomas, when he comments on this in the book on the universe, the Celo at Mundo, as they call it in Latin, but the second book in natural philosophy of Aristotle, he says, well, it might be, though, that it takes, what, more time, right, than that of many generations for these things to change, right? So he's aware of the fact that this argument of Aristotle is not necessary, right, huh? Okay? It takes a long time for these things to change, right, huh? Now, some guy said the sun was a hot stone on fire, right, huh? Well, if it's a hot stone on fire, it would eventually, what, burn out in the course of a number of generations of men, right? And just like, you know, the great fire that burnt down, what, London, right? It didn't last for that long a time, really, right? These great forest fires we have out in the west there, you know, all the newspapers are talking about them, you know, and how many miles is it under control? And 10% under control! I don't know what these things mean. I knew some guys who were, I knew this in the summer, right? They go out and fight these fires, you know, and so on. But they don't really last for a long time, right? So Aristotle knew that the sun couldn't be a hot stone on fire like Hanks Agnes is supposed to have said or something, right? Got in trouble, right, for denying the divinity of it. But I guess what happened was, you know, there were, you know, meteors that fall to the ground sometimes and what, they're still burning, right? Most of the time they're burned up before they come down in ashes or something, or they don't even notice it. But I guess in the southwest there, there's one the Indians talked about, right? And now they can actually, you know, photograph it and see the way the land was, thing, but they thought this was some big story the Indians had, huh? But Anxagris apparently was aware of this, right? So maybe that's what he thought the sun was, you know? The falling stars, they call these things, right, huh? You know? It's like a stone, right? It's burning, falling down, right? And these things have come down. But Aristotle, that can't be. That can't be. I mean, it wouldn't last that long, right? It's really hard to understand how the sun would go on. I mean, you realize, what is it? Is it supposed to be 93 million miles? Yeah, it's only. Yeah, but notice, if you look at, you know, how the kind of a sphere there of how far the sun, you know, a sphere of 92 million miles with a radius of 93 million miles, right? You know, we're receiving a very little bit of the light of the sun, right? You know? Compared to. And I noticed myself, you know, and I got to, in our place where I live, I started, you know, to expand the garden, you know, the fixable garden, you know? And in the back of my property, there's one of these stone walls that they have a lot in this part of the country. And I was going right across, you know, all the back there making things. And then the trees started to grow, right? And they were interfering with my getting the proper sunlight, you know, from my garden, you know? So, you know, all these things that grow down here, they really depend upon the light from the sun, right? That's only a fraction of how much it's, you know, just as incredible, right? Now, they say that Heisenberg's pupil there, right, right, Sakrahan, they explain why the sun doesn't burn out so fast, right? It takes so long, right? But it takes such a long time, right? You can see how Aristotle could conclude that the heavenly bodies are, what, eternal, right? Even scripture speaks of them as being eternal, right? Although it could be, you know, interpreted as, you know, very long-lasting, right? Eternal ills, as they say, right? Which, you know, are not eternal. Now, the other mistake that Aristotle made was he thought that illumination is all at once, right? And that's because it takes a long time, not just to be first, right? It takes so little time, right, for the light from the bulb, let's say, to reach the walls, right? In fact, you can't, it seems to be all at once, right? So, that was just the reverse problem, right? It takes so long for the sun to change. It doesn't seem to be diminished at all inside, right? Me and my daughter, they're putting logs in the fire all the time because the other log is... Burned out. Burned out, yeah, yeah. But there doesn't seem to be anything like that, right? With the sun, it just keeps them going on forever. So it's so long, it's so, what, slow to change, right? That's why illumination seems to be all at once, right? So fast, right? Now, I read descriptions, you know, of how they were able to measure how fast it goes, but I still don't understand how they did it. Yeah. So you might say, here's two mistakes of Aristotle, right? That light is, what, all at once, illumination is all at once, and the sun is eternal, but you have to have very good measurements, right? Question these things, huh? Aristotle knew that the earth was round, right? They didn't know that the earth was turning on its axis, but I don't know why you'd think that the earth would do that, right? Because if you take, you know, a rock and drop it, it goes at a straight line towards the center of the earth, right? If you take some earth and mold it into a ball, it doesn't start to spin, it goes in a straight line, falls in a straight line towards the center of the earth. So it seemed to be even clearer that the bodies on this earth, right, the inanimate bodies, go in a straight line, either up or down. By these ones up in the heavens, they go in this, yeah, yeah. That's all behind eventually arriving at this position that the heavenly bodies are influencing emotions down here, right? But there's some evidence of that even for us, you know, in the terms of the tide, I guess, they think that the moon is responsible for that, I guess. Yeah, yeah. So if you take your ordinary experience, your common experience, it would make more sense to think of the sun and the moon and the stars as being eternal, unchangeable, right? And there's substance, right? That they only have change of place, right? But they don't have change of quality or the only change of what? Substance, right? And that the earth is what? Not revolving, but that the, what? Heavenly bodies are going around us, right? Okay. And then you get to the idea, you know, that what? A circular motion is more able to be eternal than a straight line motion, right? See? And so you're getting to the idea of, you're starting to approach what he's going to say, right, huh? For we see in bodies that motion is now required the form, which is the beginning of motion or action, but is also required the motion of the first mover. Now, the first mover in the order of bodies is the heavenly body, huh? It certainly can be seen in the change of the seasons and so on, right? Whence the more, what? Fire has a perfect heat, it does nevertheless does not alter other things except by motion of the, what? Heavenly body, right? For it is manifest, but not to us, that all bodily motions, right, are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to a first bodily mover, right? Right now. Thank you. Thank you. Thus also all motions, both bodily as well as spiritual, now you're using the word motion in what? Equivocal sense, right? But equivocal by reason, right? Are reduced in the first mover without qualification. The first mover simply that is what? God, huh? Okay. And therefore, no matter how perfect some bodily nature or spiritual nature is, right? It is not able to proceed to its own act unless it be moved by God, right? So Thomas, in the second book of the Summa Conventilis, he talks about creation, right? And how only God could bring into existence something without having any, what, matter, right? That he'd be the source of matter as well as of, what, form, right, huh? And then in the third book, he talks about how God is, who's all these things, right? That were created by him, right? But that's where, you have to see the reasons for that, right? Okay. In that part of theology. Which motion is according to the, what? Or is by reason of his, what, providence, not by the necessity of nature as is the motion of the heavenly, what, bodily, right? For not only from God is every motion as from a first mover, but also from him is all, what, formal perfection, perfection of form, I guess, huh? As from a first, what? Aristotle, I say, in the ninth book of wisdom, huh? The ninth book of wisdom, he argues, first, what he does is to take up, what, ability and act, right? Actually, there's three parts. It's divided in three parts. And Thomas divides the ninth book. And in the first part, Aristotle talks about, what, ability, but especially his ability is found in things that move, right? Ability in comparison to motion in a strict sense. And then in the second part of the ninth book, he has a completely universal consideration of act, right? And then you discover other senses of ability, right? Because ability is known to act. And then what does he do in the third part, right? Where he's distinguished now ability and act very thoroughly in the first two parts. Now he talks about the order of act and ability, right? And he argues how act is before ability and what? Knowledge, right? And how it, what, is before it as a cause, right? And so on, right? And then he says that although in the thing that goes from ability to act, it's in ability before it's in act. It goes from ability to act by reason of something already in act. So my water in the morning there is, what, cold before it's hot. It's able to be hot before it's actually hot. But it goes from the ability to be hot to being actually hot because of the stove, huh? Okay. It's only then that you add the leaves, right? I think I'm wrong. No. So this is the reason why Aristotle will conclude eventually in the 12th book that the first being, the first cause, right, then, will be pure act, right? And that's the basis for saying why God is what? It's altogether simple, right? Why God is unchanging, right? God is pure act. There's no ability to be, what, actualized in God, right? Okay. And because act, you also argue in the 9th book that act is more perfect than ability, right? The ability is for the sake of act. So if God is pure act, then he's completely, what, perfect, right? So pure act is the middle term for showing all these things about the divine, what, substance, right? And even for showing that God's understanding and loving are the same as the substance, because otherwise his substance would be an ability for an act that is not its substance, right? So it's really kind of beautiful, right? And that part is very well established now, but we have to first meet, what, ability and act, right? In natural philosophy, right? But even the 9th book of wisdom, as I say, in the first part, he treats the ability for motion, right? And he distinguishes, you know, actual ability and rational abilities and so on. But it's, you know, not a completely universal consideration of ability. And then it's only the second part that he gives a universal consideration of act, and then you see other senses of, what, ability, right? Like the ability to understand, or the ability to love, and so on. And then it's completely universal consideration, huh? Then you're ready to really understand the order of these, right? Aristotle is a guy who always wants to stay as close as he can to the senses, right? In his reasoning act, understanding it, right? So he just kind of wants to see more concretely, right? What's the order of movers and moved, right? And the heavenly bodies, obviously, seem to be something between God and the things down here, right? And it's only seen in the tides of the ocean, right? But also in the change of seasons and how the sun comes out. So act is simply speaking before ability. So let's go back to the text here. It's manifest over that just as all bodily motions are reduced in the motion to have the body as in a first bodily mover, so all motions, both corporal as spiritual, are reduced in the first, what, mover, or simpliciter, the qualification, which is God, right? Okay, and that's understood motion there to include now in the first meaning of motion, right? But even understanding and loving and so on. And therefore, no matter how much, how perfect is a bodily or spiritual nature, it cannot, what, proceed to its own act unless it be moved by, what, God, huh? Without, you can do nothing, as our Lord says, right? Kind of struck me, I'm going through the St. John's Gospel there at the Katina Horia, you know, and how much theology is being taught there, you know. It's kind of amazing to see that, huh? More so than even the other Gospels, right? And even about his divinity, right? Yeah. The Father and I are one, right, huh? I was reading Thomas this morning there. He's talking about the order of charity, you know, and he's talked about it earlier. But now he's talking about how is it affected by heaven, right, huh? And some people think that you love the beatitude of the saints more than you own beatitude, and he says, no. Well, you love God above all other things, right? Even yourself, right? But you love your own beatitude more than the beatitude of the saints, right? And this is something natural. Race doesn't go against nature. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Which motion is according to the reason of his providence, right? Not according to the necessity of nature, as is the motion of the heavenly body, right, huh? I think was it Avicenna, I think, had the idea that creatures proceed from God not by will, but kind of by kind of a natural necessity, right? You have this tendency in some thinkers. You have this tendency in some ways. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Not only from God is every motion as from a first mover, but also every formal perfection, right? As from a first act, right? And that's perfection of a form, right? Thus, therefore, the action of the understanding and also of any created being, right, depends upon God as regards two things. In one way, insofar as it has from him the form through which or by which it, what, acts. But in another way, insofar as it is moved by him to acting, right? So the natural light of my reason, which is like a form by which I understand, is something I got from God, right? But also my, what, proceeding to understand, right, depends upon him, right? Two different dependencies we have upon, what, God, right? Well, it can be by nature, yeah, yeah. It's going to go on to make that distinction. For each form, indi terribus, put into, right, created things by God, has an efficacy, right, causality, with respect to some determined act, right, in which it can go according to its own, what, proper nature, right? Right, but beyond which it is not able to go except through some form added above that. Just as water is not able to califacere, unless it be califacta, by fire, right? Thus, therefore, the human understanding has some form, act in the sense of form, to wit, the understandable light, huh, which of itself is sufficient to understanding some understandable things, right, to which we can, what, arrive at, we're able to arrive at, in the knowledge of them, through sensible things, right, okay? So I have some light in me whereby I can understand things starting with my, what, senses, right? Right, following the road from my senses into my reason, right, huh? But higher understandable things, right, like the Trinity, right, the human understanding is not able to know unless it be perfected by a stronger, what, light, as by the light of faith or the light of prophecy, right? Yeah. They're different lights, you see, which is called the light of grace, huh, insofar as it is something added above nature, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said that for the knowledge of anything true, and they're saying anything true, right, man needs divine aid so that his intellect, what, is moved by God to its, what, act, huh? But not, it does not need, however, for knowing truth in all things that aid, what, there'd be a new enlightenment added above the natural light, right? But only in some things which exceed our natural, what, knowledge, right? And then kind of a little footnote here. Nevertheless, sometimes God miraculously, right, instructs through his grace some people about those things which are able to be known by natural reason, right? Just as sometimes he miraculously does some things which nature is able to do. Now, where is that, where is that, oh, yeah, the priest is telling us the parish priest. He's at a meeting last night. We had the pro-life committee there. And he comes to it. And I guess, I think it was in Mexico, yeah, when the Pope was there. He, the boy couldn't walk, you know? He hugged him, you know? Next morning, the boy was walking. Yeah, not walk since. He did that with a kid in Philadelphia, too. Had some disease. Yeah. And the Pope kissed the baby and he took it to the doctor and there was no more tool in it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So you gotta be careful, this Pope. I mean, yeah. That's kind of striking, you know? Striking seconds, yeah. I remember that time, you know, the Pius, biography of Pius X, right? It was canonized, as you know. And I guess there was a little boy who was crippled, you know. And he was brought by his parents, you know, to the meeting. And the Pope picked him up and held him in his arms and he'd go out talking, you know, like that. And then the little boy sat down and sat around like... Some kind of broke their daughter and had something to do with her legs. Yeah. So they took, without his knowledge, they took his socks and they sent him to put these on. Yeah. And she was cured. So they went back and they gave the letter to the Pope and he says, imagine that. She put on my socks. I wear them every day. My legs are killing me. Oh my God. I mean, another thing they talk about was these two nuns, I guess, who were near retirement, so to speak, you know. And it was kind of a special favor, they got an appointment with the Pope, right? But they were, you know, kind of crippled old ladies, you know. And the taxi tag driver was going to the meeting and he was waiting outside for them, right? They wasn't even him off, you know. And he didn't want to take them into the taxi because he didn't think they were the same people that they went in, you know. It was kind of an amazing thing, you know. Pius X, yeah. In my little biography, I'm just kind of a picture of his body laid out there even after he died, you know. And I never say it was so good-looking a body. I mean, just the figure of that man, you know, amazing thing. I bring it to here, I bring it to here, if I think of it, you know. I don't forget who the author is, but the little one. I was kind of interested in Pius X, you know. Paul, Francis had a great devotion to Pius X. You didn't know that. Francis did? Francis. He had his feast day last August. He said the Pope showed up unexpectedly in the Basilica of St. Peter's at the tomb of Pius X. There were some pilgrims there who were having mass with some priests. Pope Francis showed up for the mass. And he attended the mass sitting on the benches outside the altar. And they said, I have a big devotion. He said, I already celebrated mass, but I wanted to come down. I have a big devotion. It was a wonderful short volume on just recondiscences of Pope St. Pius X. Wonderful, wonderful book. We have a pair. Great time. Okay, well, that's the first article. That's pretty good, huh? Need a break? Or do I have to do that? Sure. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Article 2 here. The second one goes for it thus. It seems that man is able to do, to will, and to do good without grace. For that is in the power of man, of which he is the Lord. But man is the Lord, the master of his own acts. And most of all of that which is to will, as has been said above. Therefore man is able to will and to do good by himself without the aid of what? Grace. So we're in the first objection here, right? Man has gotten power to will and do things. To the first, therefore, it should be said that man is the Lord of his own acts, and of willing and not willing, on account of the deliberation of what? Reason, huh? Which can be moved to one part or to the other, right? But that he deliberate or does not deliberate, if he is the Lord of this, it is necessary that he, what, do this? That this be through some preceding deliberation, huh? Now I can argue, you know, the argument for instance of God, right? That you can't have an endless series, right, of movers, right? Well, here you have kind of another kind of argument for God, right? And since this cannot go forward forever, right, it is necessary finally to arrive at this, that the free judgment of man is moved by some exterior beginning, which is above the human mind, huh? To wit, from God, huh? And notice what he says here. There's also the philosopher, meaning what? Christoph, proves in the chapter on good, what? Fortune, huh? Okay? This is the chapter in the, what, Eudemian Ethics, huh? You know? Most of the time we get quotes from the, what, Nicomachian Ethics, right, huh? Now, who is Nicomachus? Nicomachus. Oh, Nicomachian Ethics from Nicomachus, right? Who is he? Nicomachus. That's you. Well, I guess Aristotle's father was named Nicomachus, right? And he also had his son named Nicomachus, huh? So is it the ethics he learned from his father, or the ethics he was trying to, what, communicate to his son, huh? You could say maybe either one or maybe a bit of both, right, huh? Now, who is Eudemian Ethics? Well, Eudemus, I guess, was a student of Aristotle, right, huh? That's kind of a profound thing that Aristotle's saying, right? I kind of call this, you know, the ethical argument of God, right, huh? And that he can't be the start, you might say, of his own, what, deliberation, right, huh? But he's moved by God. He talks about that in a chapter that he did, Eudemian Ethics. You've got to realize Aristotle was the kind of, hey, Aristotle's somebody. I mean, he really is. And this is a beautiful example, you know. You wouldn't expect a pagan like that to realize this dependence upon God, right, even for our internal things. I mean, Monty Fossett, I think it has my own thoughts, you know. I don't need anybody to move me. Whence the mind of man, of even a healthy man, right, huh, does not thus have the dominion of his own acts, but that he needs to be moved by, what? God, huh? And much more, right, the free judgment, free will of a, what? Man who's infirm after, what, sin, where he's impeded from the good by the corruption of, what, nature, huh? So you need God, right, huh, to think about doing something good, right? How's that in your power to think about something good? Understanding, right? Let's look at the second objection here. Moreover, each thing is more able to do that which is for it according to nature than in that which is outside of nature, right? But sin is against, what, nature, as Damascene says in the second book, huh? So Aristotle says there in the ninth book of the ethics that when a man does wrong, right, huh, he changes himself, he's no longer himself. It's kind of a striking thing, huh? You see that? As Damascene says, huh? Pecatum is contunditurum. But the work of virtue is for man according to nature, as has been said above. Since therefore man seems to be able through himself to, what, sin, which is against nature, right? Then much more through himself can he, what, will and do good, huh? That's a nice argument, huh? Well, Thomas says, to the second it should be said that to sin is nothing other than to fall short of the good that belongs to someone according to his nature. That's a beautiful thing, right? Shows the importance of what? Nature. Now, each created thing, huh? Just as it does not have being except from another, so considered in itself, it's nothing. That's what I have for myself, nothing. So that it needs to be conserved or preserved in the good of its own nature, in a good suitable of its own nature, from another, right? Otherwise it falls into nothing, right? Now, Augustine says sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing, right? But he can, through himself, huh? Because he's from himself nothing, right? He can, what, fall short from the good. Just as through himself or left to himself without God, he would come into, what, an unbeing, right, huh? God withdraw his, what? Unless he be divinely preserved, right? That's an interesting explanation, right? If a man is more able to do what is against his nature, then what? What is in accordance with his nature, huh? This is an argument from the idea that it's easier to do this than to do that. He can do the thing that is more difficult, therefore he can do the thing that's easier, right? A man can do more what is in accordance with his nature than what is not in accordance with his nature, right? But what can man do more from himself? What is he from himself? He's nothing. He's an unbeing, right, huh? And therefore he can do that which is, what, lacking in being, right, huh? More easily than that which is, what, the quorum of his nature, huh? I'm more able to be a nobody than a somebody. Because I'm a nobody from myself, right? I'm a somebody like Aristotle because I've been given a good mind by someone other than myself. Would it be a pagan partial explanation or a partial understanding of original sin, do you think? Well, when Thomas talks about, you know, why a creature can fail, you know, and why the divine, you know, will can't do evil, you know, huh? And it's because, you know, that goes back ultimately to the fact that from ourselves we are nothing, huh? And therefore we have built in kind of a negative aspect. Weakness. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm more able from myself to do nothing than something. You see that in the guys that sit around TV all day. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Aristotle says that the ethics of the life, most men prefer a life suitable to beasts, you know? It's rather strong, strong words, you know? How can he say that? How can he be so nasty, right? He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person. He's not a friendly person.