Prima Secundae
Lecture 291: Grace as Quality and the Five Predicables

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do this grace for you. I don't know if we say that exactly in English, I don't think, but something like that sometimes. He did it gratis. Yeah. Third is taken for the recompension of a benefit received gratis, right? Okay. So if you pay me with you, oh, I'm not going to say thank you so much. But if you do it gratis, right, then I'm going to say thank you. Thank you. I get to the door of the church going in and I open up the person behind me and say, be my guest, I say. Well, that's gratis, right? And they say thank you. That's the third sense here, right? Gracias, we say. I guess that's from the Spanish or something, right? But it goes back to the Latin, right? Okay, that's the third sense. So the word grace is a univocal word or an equivocal word? Yeah. But now is it equivocal by chance? Or are these three senses by reason? And reason, as you know, looks before and after. So if there's an order among the senses, then it's equivocal by what? Reason. Like there's an order, you know, the eight senses of in, right? From the first to the eighth sense, right? And there is a order of the four main senses of before, right? Okay. Well, it's an order among these three, right? Because the first, in a way, is the cause of the second, the second of the third, and so on. I have to give you something gratis if you're going to thank me, right? Say, gracias. And you'll give me something. Yeah. Now, as you guard the last two, right? The second and the third sense. It is manifest that grace lays down something in the one who receives grace, right? The first is a gift given, what? Gratis, huh? It's not paying something that you owe the person, right, huh? But it's something you give, right? Gratis, huh? Secondly, the recognition of this gift, huh? You're giving thanks, right? Thank you. But as you guard the first, there's a difference to be noted about the grace of God and the grace of what? Men. At the sense of being in my good graces, right? Because the good of the creature comes from the divine will. That is from the love of God who wishes good to some, what? Creature, right, huh? Then there flows forth, right, some good into the, what? Creature. That's what we were saying before, that the love of God is a cause of the good in, what? Creature, sir. But in our case, it's the reverse, right? Right, huh? The good in creatures is a cause of our loving them, right, huh? I love the girl because she's beautiful. She's not beautiful because I love her. But you compare it with God now, right, huh? You know, beautiful soul, right, huh? That soul is beautiful because God loves it, right? For the will of man is moved from a good preexisting in, what? Things. And hence it is that the love of man does not cause entirely the goodness of the, what? Thing. But it presupposes it either in part or it might be holy, right? It's clear, therefore, that each, what? It follows each love of God, some good in the creature, right? Caused, right, huh? Sometimes. But not co-eternal to the, what? Eternal love, right? Because God doesn't change, right? He decides suddenly one day, oh, no. And according to the difference of this good, what it might be, huh? There differs the, what? There's a difference is considered in the love of God to creatures, right? One common, according as he loves all things which are, right? Because it's good to be, right? So all things that he created, he loves them, right? As is said in Wisdom 11. According as, right, the natural being, he bestows upon created things, huh? There's a word, large itore, right? Shakespeare has that, no? Large discourse, right? Another is a special love, right? According as he draws the rational creature above the condition of, what? Yeah. Above there, right? Supra. To the partaking of the divine, what? Good, huh? And according to this love, he is said to love someone, what? Simpliciter, right? Simpliciter, yeah. So God loves, I don't know, because he loves all creatures, secundum quid in some way. He loves us simply, right? I call you no longer servants, but friends, right, huh? You love your friends simply, but you love other things, right? Secundum quid, right? Thus, therefore, through this that it is said, oh, okay. Because according to this love, God loves simply the eternal good of the creature, right? Which eternal good is himself. Thus, therefore, through this, a man is said to have the grace of God is signified a certain, what? Something supernatural, right? Coming into a man from what? From God, huh? But sometimes, nevertheless, the grace of God is said to be the eternal love itself of God, right? According as it is said also to be the grace of predestination. And so far as God, in gratuitous way, and not from, what, merits, predestines someone, or chooses them, right? As was said in Ephesians chapter 1, verse 5, he predestined us to adoption of sons in the praise of, what? The glory of his grace, right? What's great gratia there in that quote? That's the grace that's in God, right, huh? Rather than the grace that he's put into us, huh? Now we're going to find out where the grace is a quality of the soul, right? Now what are the two fundamental books in logic? Do you remember what they are? Well, what's the first books, though? The first two books. Categories. Before the categories comes the Isogogae, right? I guess the real title of Porphyry's book was the Isogogae to the Categories of Aristotle, huh? Because someone was reading the Categories of Aristotle and says, what do you mean by genus and species and difference in these sort of words? And so Porphyry wrote this book, huh? Introduction to that. But it got short into the introduction, right? Just like Newton's book became known as the Pagipia, right? And they said, you know, well, it's called the Isogogae by Antonia Messia, right? Because it's the beginning of logic, right? It's the leading into of logic, which leads you into all of these sciences, right? So this is the Isogogae, right? So that's kind of a nice use of that figure of speech, right? Now, what's his name? Porphyry says, you know, to his friend there that it's useful not only to understand the categories, right? But also for what? Division and for understanding of demonstration too, right? And definition, right? Now, the Hellenistic philosophers, the Greek philosophers, they called these two books, the Isogogae and the Categories. of aristotle sometimes the book of the five names the asagoge and the category is the book of the what ten names right i'm gonna take out a five dollar bill to make concrete this thing yeah because in the um premium to the what asagoge porphyry says you know to understand genus difference species property accident uh it's necessary to understand that i don't understand the categories but to understand definition and division and demonstration and so on and in the categories there's ten highest general right substance quantity quality relation so right that's very nice concrete right now speaking now when he asked the question here where the grace is a quality of the soul right quality is one of the what ten names right in the book of the categories next aristotle is kind of more concrete he'll say you know substance how much how towards what you know but sometimes we say more abstractly substance quantity quality relation or something like that right okay so scandalous huh that thomas is going to ask whether grace can be put in one of aristotle's categories right huh everything comes under one of these ten now it's a boethius uh you know but is god in any one of these ten right well when thomas sticks up the um simplicity of god right that's one of the things you take up is god in any genus right and you find out that god is not in any genus huh except perhaps as a cause but not as a you know also not in any genus or is in the genus of substance or quantity or quality or something right okay now when you get down to the fourth article of course then the third article i should say in the fourth article uh then you've got to think more about the book of the five names right now how does aristotle distinguish those ten names and do you remember that at all well aristotle begins by distinguishing between substance and what accidents right okay so there's one category which is substance right and the other nine accidents right but thomas when he divides up the ten he likes to divide them into what three right now aristotle points out that everything else is existing in individual substances right or a set of them right now so something is said of individual substances by reason of what they are occasionally category of substance some things are said of individual substances not as regards what they are but for reason of something in addition existing in them that's quantity and quality and relation right and then the last six right something is said of individual substances by reason of something what outside of them right okay and uh that's like we're in this room here right first century i guess i'm clothed right well my clothed my being clothed is not my substance right and it's not something existing in me like my knowledge or my my health right so that uh this man's category is the kind of disease to give a whole lecture on that public lecture okay habitus okay the two fundamental ones in that second group though are what quantity and quality how much and how right so if i just ask you know how are the grandchildren i'm looking at their quality right now they're healthy and so on right now but i say you know we get to see them after and see them every while they shot up right my how tall she is and so on or else you know let me talk about those things so it's how and how much too different to the second then one proceeds us it seems that grace is not a quality of the soul for no quality acts upon its own what subject because the action of equality is not without the action of the what subject yeah so does my knowledge teach you or do i teach you through my knowledge see yeah so the action of equality is now without the action of the subject right okay does my love love you or do i love you through my love yeah but grace acts upon the soul justifying it right the justificatio impi it says in latin huh therefore grace is not a what quality right now let's reply to that here again what does aristotle say in the book on sophistical refutations huh that the most common kind of mistake is the fallacy of equivocation right and um it's curious how we use the word make sometimes and apply it to what form and other things right so um this is wooden this thing here i guess and this is wooden right huh but this is a table and this is a chair right well is it wood that makes it to be a chair or a table no you may even have a plastic we got plastic you know lawn chairs and so on right so what makes this to be a chair yeah yeah see but now is that the cause in the sense of the maker see it's interesting we speak that way right now okay yeah yeah one thing that annoys me about grandchildren is you know if they buy you know cereal right there if they select the cereal they get that sugary cereal you know and i don't like that you know that sugary and then when they leave the house and there's some cereal left over so you gotta eat that awful stuff so what makes the the cereal cereal that the grandchildren pick out um disgustingly sweet yeah yeah so thomas is pointing out here this is equivocation right grace according as it is a quality huh he said to act in the soul not by way of a what efficient cause but by way of a formal cause just as white this is said to make something what white and justice just right okay what makes you to be a just man justice yeah but that's the form right is that a you know what yes now maker in the sense of the third kind of cause right it's really the second kind of cause right okay um i know exactly the reason why we extend the word maker like that huh it's interesting how when um thomas when thomas is talking about uh the three words that aristotle has beginning cause element right and as you can see in the metaphysics there he takes up beginning cause and element beginning is more general than cause and cause is more general than element right element is really something in the line of material cause right one of the kinds of cause so cause is more general than that right but beginning is even more general than a cause so every beginning in a way every cause is a beginning but not every beginning is a what cause so the example you always give is that the point is the beginning of a line but it's not really the cause of a line right okay so the point is that the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is the point is But sometimes when he's commenting on Aristotle there in the beginning of the physics there in Aristotle, he uses the word beginning, cause, and elements, right? Thomas will explain what I just explained, you know. But then sometimes he'll say, you know, you could appropriate beginning to the, what, efficient cause, right? The mover, the maker. And element to the material cause, right? And then use cause for the form or the, what, end, yeah, because you have a certain priority there, right? Okay? Because the form makes it to be what it is, right? And the end is the cause of all the other causes, you know. So those are the causes, you know, see? Okay? And, but he, no, so he attributes the beginning to the, what, the mover or maker, right? So it might be because of that in part, right? That the word mover, or maker, rather, is what? Applied to the other causes, because they're all beginning, right? And that the maker in the third sense of cause, right, is most obviously a beginner, right? Okay. We're going to have dinner. Yeah. Who's going to make it, right? You're thinking of, yeah. We'll make something. Yeah. We've got to make dinner. Yeah, yeah. We're going to get dinner on her sometime. We're going to make time to make this. That's good. We have to have time for that. Yeah. So, that's the first objection, then, right, huh? You know, so Thomas, you know, even reading the sentences, you know, and he'll often, you know, stick an argument that's based upon, you know, equivocation, right? But it's a way of calling your mind to attend to words, and, yeah. Now, second objection, more substantial here now, huh? Moreover, substance is more noble than what? Quality, right? But grace is more noble than the nature of the soul. It's elevating the soul, right? Kind of partaking in the divine nature, right? For we are able to do many things through grace, for which nature is not sufficient, as has been said above. Therefore, grace is not a quality, huh? Yeah. You've got to put that in the first, before all the rest, right? Put it in the first category, substance, right? Okay? That makes sense to this dumb girl over here, okay? Thomas is going to give us a little explanation here. To the second it should be said that every substance is either the, what, nature of the thing, of which it is the substance, right? Or it is a part of the nature, right? In the way in which we say that matter and form are, what, substance, huh? So sometimes it divides substance into, what, matter and form and then the, what, composite, right, huh? Okay? You see how closely there the word substance and nature are, right? Because nature, you know, in the second book of the physics in Aristotle takes it up. You'll find out that nature is both matter and, what, form, right, huh? Okay? Was it natural for me to walk up the steps there to church in the morning? Yeah. But by reason of my matter or by reason of my form? Yeah. Now if I step out the window on the seventh floor and I go down, that's due to my, it would be natural for me to go down, wouldn't you say? Yeah. That's because of the matter, right? So sometimes nature, which is the beginning cause of motion and arrest, right, sometimes you attribute it more to the form, sometimes to the, what, matter, right, huh? Is it natural for a man to have large discourse looking before and after? Yeah. That's because he's matter. It's more earth than fire and air. No. It's the form, right, huh? Okay. But that he goes down when he steps out the 10th floor, yeah, out of the airplane, yeah. That's matter, yeah. It's grace. Yeah. Why, the helium would go up because of its matter, huh? Mm-hmm. And because grace is above the nature of man, right, huh? Oh, excuse me. Then nature is also used in the sense of what a thing is, right, huh? Which is like one use here of substance, right? So the distinction of the senses of substance and of nature are very similar, right? And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be that it is substance or a, what, substantial form. You would think of it as being matter. But it is a, what, accidental form of the soul, right? It's not the very substance of the soul, right? Now, that which is substantially in God, right, accidentally comes to be in the soul, right? Now, accidentally doesn't mean, now, by luck or by chance, right, huh? It means accident is distinguished from, what, substance, right? Where accident is defined as something that exists not in itself, but in another, as in a subject, right, huh? And you'll come back to this when he talks about what the subject of the soul is in the fourth article, huh? Okay. That which is substantially in God is accidentally in the soul partaking of the divine, what, goodness. This is clear about, what, knowledge, huh? Okay. Now, sometimes you might say that God, that grace is a partaking of the divine nature, right, huh? But when you partake of something, are you that thing substantially? You know, when you talk in ethics now, we talk about this a lot, and we say, can anger be reasonable? Yeah. But is it substantially reason? Or is it partaking of reason, right? So reason is not the substance of what? Yeah. It's partaking of it, right, huh? Well, likewise, if our soul partakes of the divine nature, right, is that going to be its substance? It's going to be something in the light way of accident, right, huh? Okay. It's something impressed upon the anger in this other example, right? For reason, huh? Something of reason has been, what, impressed upon that, right, huh? According to this, therefore, because the soul, right, imperfectly, right, partakes, huh? And notice that, huh? It's like, if you have the Latin text there, imperfecte participat, right, huh? Going back to what Aristotle says in the third book, I guess it is, of the thing, that whole and perfect mean almost the same thing, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. Imperfecte participat, huh? Takes a part of it, right, huh? Since the soul imperfectly partakes of the divine goodness, huh? The partaking of the divine goodness, which is grace, huh? That's a very thing. Is it St. Peter in his epistle that says that? I guess it's the text that they most point to, huh? Okay. Then this partaking of the divine goodness, which is grace, is had in a, what, more imperfect way in the soul, huh? Than that in which the soul subsists in itself, huh? Is, however, more noble than the nature of the soul, insofar as it is a, what, an expression? That's it, it's an expression. Or a participation of the divine goodness, huh? But not, however, as it guards the way of God's being. I am, who am, right, huh? I am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am, who am God said to Moses, I will show you every good. And Thomas says, it is to myself. That is myself. That's kind of a stepping stone, right, to understanding what grace is, right? It's not the substance of the soul, right? It's going to be an accident, right? But is it quantity or quality or relation? It's going to be quality, we'll see eventually. Let's go to the third objection. Moreover, no quality remains after it ceases to be in the, what, subject, huh? But grace remains, huh? For it would not be corrupted, because thus it would be, what, turned into nothing, right? Just as it was created for nothing. Whence it is said to be a new creature. In the epistle to Galatians, therefore grace is not a, what, quality, huh? When you're kind of thinking of grace there as being kind of a substance, right, huh? And therefore another creature, right? To the third it should be said that just as Boethius says, as Aristotle said before, Boethius, of course, huh? The being of an accident is to be in another, right? And that's it, huh? Strictly speaking, nothing is in itself, right, huh? Whence every accident is not said to be a being, right? Which is perhaps the most equivocal word, there is being. As it were, having itself being, right, huh? But because by it, something is, huh? So just like, does knowledge know, or what? Yeah. Whence it is more said to be of being, right, than being, right? Something of it. And because it belongs to that which, what, yeah, that which belongs to come to be or to be corrupted, of which there is what being, right? Therefore, properly speaking, no accident either comes to be, nor is it, what, corrupted, right, huh? But it is said to come to be or to be corrupted, according as the subject begins or ceases to be, in act, according to that, what, accident. And according to this, grace is said to be created, right, huh? From the fact that men, according to it, are created, huh? That is to say, are constituted in a new, what, being, huh? This is very profound. From nothing, right, huh? That is not from their merits. That's beautiful to explain what's it that they're created, right, huh? Not from your merits that you have grace, huh? According to that, in the epistle to Ephesians, huh? Created in Christ Jesus, in good works, huh? Yeah, oh, he's a marvelous Thomas guy. Okay. But against these objections is, upon that of Psalm 103, huh? That your face might be, what, exhilarated? Cheered up. Cheered up in oil, right? Says the glass, that grace is the, what? But it's the light, huh? The light, so to speak, of the brilliance of the soul. Yeah. But the nitor of the soul, right, huh? How do they translate nitor, in terms of the, yeah, yeah. It has the idea of the, from the sense of sight, too, isn't it, I guess? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's interesting, huh, the beauty of the soul, therefore. But the nitor, the brightness of the soul, is a certain quality, huh? Just as the beauty of the, what, body, huh? Well, you know how Dionysius always speaks of light as being in the, what, notion of beauty, right, huh? Give me some clarity, right, huh? So Mozart's the most beautiful music. Some clarity in Mozart's music, huh? Kind of amazing thing. Therefore, grace is a certain quality, huh? Thomas says now in the body of the article, I answer it should be said, as has been said, in the one who is said to have the grace of God, right, huh? There is signified that there is a certain effect, right, of the gratuitous, right, huh? Will of God, right? Now it's been said above that in two ways, from the gratuitous will of God, is man, what, aided, right, huh? In one way, insofar as the soul of man is moved by God, right, huh? To knowing something, or willing something, or doing something, huh? And in this way, the gratuitous effect in man is not equality, which is like a form, right, but the motion of the soul, right, huh? For the act of the mover in the moved is motion, as is said in the third book of physics, right? It's interesting, huh, that I was just thinking about, you know, how Aristotle says in the ninth book of wisdom that act means, first of all, what, motion, right, huh? And then later on, it's carried over and applied to what form, right, huh? And when you talk about those two causes, the mover and the maker, right, huh? They're both a cause of act and another, right? But the mover is a cause of the act called motion, and the maker is a cause of the act called, what, form, right? So the carpenter is a cause of the chair in the sense of a maker, right, huh? He made the chair. It's a beautiful set there at Assumption there on the private dining rooms there, you know, with these beautiful wooden chairs, really. And it was told maybe by one of the priests that years ago, I guess this guy couldn't afford, you know, any money to send his kids to Assumption's like that, so. But he was, he made it beautiful, and they had these, all these, I don't know how many years, you know, they're going to last forever, you know, they're going to last till the end of the time, I guess. And really striking, you know, but he really, you know, gave this wood a form, and it's solid, I mean, you know, these things are, you know. I had to ask to go down and look at them. Yeah, yeah, yeah, but they're very impressive, you know. You say, where did they ever get this, you know, I haven't seen anything like this in the apartment store. No, no. Just as motion is more known than, what, form, right, huh? And you can see that in words like action and activity and so on. You're thinking more of motion than a form, right? It's kind of strange to talk about shape as being an activity or an action, right? Words that are derived from the word act, right, huh? So the first meaning of act is motion, right? And it's funny, huh? You know, not only do people watch sports all the time, but, you know, some of the modern philosophers are, you know, where they deal with everything's in motion, right? Like Hegel and Marx after him, you know. All reality is kind of in motion, right? Even Heroclitis had that kind of idea, you know. All things flow, nothing remains, you know. All things are in motion, right? But at least they're hitting upon what's most known, right? I don't know anybody who says all things are at rest, you know, and nothing is in motion. I mean, a few people would, you know, a few people would deny motion because it's so hard to understand, right? Heroclitis says, you know, it's a strange thing, you know. emotion he says but not impossible to be the thing that has the least being you might say right now yeah yeah yeah when I go to count money on there on Monday night now we do it on the night at 630 and always you know if it's doing the football season always talk about the game you know and put it about so-and-so about this it's kind of a common topic we bring up you know and so on like everybody's watch that right you know something at rest you know I guess I don't want somebody to rest somebody's sleeping okay so sometimes God is a mover right now okay I think I was mentioning how you know my favorite book though the Summa Kadri Gentile is the second book is more about God as a maker right and the third book is more about God as a what mover right in the second book you're talking about God is like we say in the Creed beginning God made heaven and earth right no he formed these things right but then he's going to what not leave them you know he's going to move them towards their end and towards himself ultimately right another way man is aided from the gratuitous will of God the graceful move God what do you say in the good way of saying that in English the gratuitous that's it according at according as some habitual gift by God is poured into the what soul soul huh well he says the gratuitous from the gratuitous will of God right man for the gratuitous will of God um according to which or by which right and habituality yeah but a habit now is some kind of a what form as opposed to emotion right and is that word in funditu or poured in is that taken from the continuous yeah and this is because it is not what suitable right that God should be less provident right or provide less right for those whom he loves to the extent of what ever having a supernatural good right then those that he loves only for having their what natural good huh now to natural creatures huh he thus provides that not only does he move them to their what actual acts but also he goes upon them forms right and certain what powers right which are the what beginnings of acts right they're using the words principia there right yeah but applied to the to the maker of the world and thus the motions by which what moved by God right they become what naturally creatures and easy that's because they have the habits right the forms and the what powers right right now okay otherwise it would be simply what maybe like almost like force in a sense right now it wouldn't be according and it they often quote this other thing here oh it's going to be quoted I know he's going to quote that no I just thought about it because I've seen him quoting other places you know and that God disposes all things suaviter right and he disposes all things sweet thing you might say right now because what he moves them to they're naturally inclined to right because of the nature and the powers that he's given them right so that according to themselves they're inclined to these motions right going back there since they didn't finish okay and thus the emotions by which they're moved by God become to the creatures unnatural right in accordance with their nature right and easy right because they have this inclination according to that of wisdom eight he disposes all things but sweetly nice guy yeah nice guy yeah yeah yes but he's not a body see how you can't transcend the the continuous right he's somebody much more therefore those whom he moves to achieving somewhat yeah yeah does he pour in some forms right with supernatural qualities right by which sweetly and promptly right they are moved right by him for achieving an eternal good and thus the gift of grace is a certain what quality right okay no one would think it's a quantity would they say and any relation is not a quality right would make the action but notice you could say that um uh you need some kind of a form to do this promptly and sweetly right with pleasure delight uh if it's something above our nature right you need something even more right if you have this nature enjoying things that are in accordance with it so you sweetly and the cat moves out very quickly you know with the paw yeah a friend of mine friend of mine he had rescued a cat from someplace on a tree or something and he brought in the house there he knew i had to like to play with the cat he came up so we were playing with the belt there let me tell you that and uh the cat just you know playing like that as a little cat and finally put down a belt that was kind of striated built you know and the cat you know and uh i thought that he was uh the snake is a natural enemy of the cat you know the cat was you know and you you kind of you couldn't even hold him there you know what the other person was moving that particular covered belt the other ones he was playing all the time you know and then he's he moved you know he's just a little kitten you know he wasn't uh probably the older cat would not be deceived by that kind of a belt you know but it's kind of striking to see that you know the instinct right huh yeah but amazing i watch these these squirrels you know when they they run around the tree and there's one running around the other after it i don't know if they're playing or whether one's mad at the other and chasing them you know but you see that you know i mean i said it many times you know and they're so adept you know i mean the way they wrap trees and uh jump from things yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah well that's that's that's a you know use the word quantity right now but then the grace itself is not a quantity right but again you know qualities could have more or less right now but you know they'll have discussions too of what that means you know huh to be more or less but it's uh not like it is itself a quantity right now okay anymore they say you know when the children are what is is the body of my grandchild um a quantity well no it's a substance right but it has quantity right then you know it can be more or less right it can be taller than he was shorter than he was i mean i'm the age of shrinking now i'm probably shrinking you know going down downhill yeah yeah okay so it's not a number right or a length or a width there because the soul itself is not a what a body right huh so how could the soul itself have a what length or width or depth right except metaphorically speaking right now so now you get another category this right now distinction between substance and quality and so on now we're going to get into the book of the five names so if you have something like let's say you have a triangle right and if you say a triangle that it's a rectilineal plane figure right that's an example of the genus of triangle right the more remote would be a plane figure right now even more general would be a figure right now each of a figure plane figure rectilineal plane figure right now that's kind of approximate genus right now genus is a name what said of many things significantly right signifying in common what they are right then you have to add differences right to distinguish one from the other right so the genus is being said of what they call species right and the differences separate one species from another under the same genus right or the species is the difference is what the species has in addition to the genus right so that's three of the names uh genus difference and species right but then the other two names are property and what accident right and property and accident is something outside the nature of the thing what it is because the genus signifies what it is in general right the species in particular right and the difference signifies how it is what it is well the property and the accident signifies something outside what it is right but the difference between property and accident is that the property follows in some way upon the nature right and the accident has no connection with the nature so if I say the triangle is a rectilineal plane figure I'm just giving its genus right they say it's three-sided you know I'm giving it's a difference right if it's a triangle that's the species itself but now if I say the triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles that's a what yeah that's why porphyry says it's good for knowing what demonstration is huh because in a demonstration like that's the preposition 3d2 is in book one of euclid you're going to prove that every triangle has its interior angles right equal to two right angles but if the triangle is green let's say right that's not part of what it is to be a triangle to be green is it and is it connected with the nature triangle doesn't follow upon the nature right now okay so this is important to see that distinction right now I say what is what is the soul to the powers of the soul it's like which which predicable as they call these five in Latin it's like which predicable to what predicable see I say what is what is the triangle to uh rectilineal plane figure you say it's the species is to genus right what is it to three-sided well there's a difference right um what is it to uh uh interior angles to right angles well it's a property right species to a property what is it to green was a species to it's an accident right what is the soul to the powers of the soul yeah species to property right now and the more noble the soul the more powers it has right huh so the plants right huh just have the vegetative powers right powers of nutrition and growth and reproduction right now but then the animal soul has what sensation and the emotions right that dog is out there barking so what's he barking at me he said oh what's he barking at me i saw the monks the monks you know sent him over i think you know to greet me or to bite me but i was you know dog is is known for his anger right and his you know his aggressiveness and so on and uh so what is the soul to its powers what says the species is to its what properties right i get to man man's got the full soul right huh so sometimes aristotle speaks of the soul the plant or the animal or the beast that is to say as being what part of the soul right huh only man's got the full powers right but aristotle in the three books on the soul there he takes up the vegetative powers first and then the sense powers and finally the intellectual powers right huh so this would be important now i mean his grace and and the virtues or grace and faith hope and charity right how are they related right huh we're more like the species as to the property we'll see right so just as you know from from receiving this soul from god i had certain what powers that fall upon that naturally right like properties of my soul so when i receive grace right there follows from the grace which we'll find out it's in the soul itself right uh certain properties in the what powers right in the higher powers that is to say right like faith and in reason and hope and what charity and the what the will huh we're getting a little ahead of ourselves here right but just talk with importance here you know logician here you know talk about the book of the five names and the book of the ten names huh they both figure in here so philosophy has some use there in theology huh okay so take a little breaker now before we begin article three you