Prima Secundae
Lecture 292: Grace as Quality and Its Distinction from Virtue

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So the third, then, we'll go to the third article here. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that grace is the same thing as virtue. For Augustine says that operons gratia, operating grace, is the faith which operates through what? Love, right? As is had in the book on the spirit and the letter. But the faith which operates through love is a virtue, right? Therefore, grace is a what? Virtue, huh? Now, he explains what Augustine really means, huh? So you need Thomas to know what Aristotle's really saying and what Augustine's really saying, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That Augustine names faith that operates, right? That faith operating through love, right? He calls it grace, right? Because the act of faith operating through love is the first act in which grace, making one, what? Acceptable, is made, what? Known, huh? Okay? That explains Augustine in a way that the objection doesn't understand what Augustine is saying, right? Moreover, to whomever, to whatever belongs the definition, right? Also, the thing being defined, right? So if this figure is a three-sided plain figure, then it's a triangle, right? But the definitions given of virtue, whether by the saints or by the philosophers, fit to what? Grace, huh? For it makes its harbor good and makes his, what? Activity good, huh? That's the definition that Aristotle has, right? In the second book of the ethics, right? When he's starting to take up the virtues, right? Okay? And it is also, and this is Augustine's definition now, right? A good quality of the mind by which one lives, what? Right there. Because you picked out of grace now, we've got grace as a quality there. Okay? But not every quality is grace, huh? Therefore, grace is a virtue, right? Okay? Well, so he says, The good that is laid down in the definition of virtue is said according to its agreement to some, what? Nature already, what? Existing, right? Either essential or, what? Partaking of, right? Grace is a partaking of the divine nature. Thus, also, good is not attributed to grace in that way, right? But as to the, what? Of goodness in man, right, huh? Just like we say human virtues in accordance with human nature, right, huh? So we say that the theological virtues and the infused virtues are in, what, harmony with, what, grace, right, huh? And they, in a sense, follow upon it, right, huh? But they're not the same thing, huh? Moreover, grace is a certain, what? Quality, huh? Now he's going into the species of quality, right, huh? But it is manifest that it's not in the fourth species of quality, which is form and figure, right, huh? Standing around something. Because it does not pertain to the, what? Body grace, right? So grace is, what? Not the shape of the soul, right? The soul doesn't have a shape. Nor is it in the third species, this is the species of Airstyle's giving, because it is not a passion or a, what, undergoing quality, right? That's the third species, which is in the sensitive part of the, what, soul, right? Like to be warm, right? To be sweet. As is proven in the seventh book of the, what, physics, huh? Just doing that with my student there up in the seventh. For this grace is not in the body, but principally in the, what, mind, huh? Nor again is it in the second species of quality, which is a, what, natural power or lack of power, right? Because grace is, what, above nature and does not have itself to good and bad as the natural power. Okay? The dog? No. I mean, that's what he was barking about, huh? He was not allowed into class, right? He said it anymore. Yeah. He said the question about race, which is now being answered, and hence the tale, right? Hey, I'll be as famous as St. Francis, you know, he preached to the birds, right? And they came and... Yeah. Yeah, yeah. See, obviously, you should have been a Dominican. Yeah, yeah. Oh, let's get to the hour around here. That's right. Today, by the way, is our team, which is St. Thomas Pond. It is a very good, very good. Very good. You always said Catherine Dressel. Catherine Dressel, yeah, we had you. Therefore, he means it must be in the first species, right? Which is a habit or a disposition, right? But the habits of the mind are virtues. Because also, science itself is, in a way, a, what, virtue, right? One of the virtues of reason. Therefore, grace is the same as, what, virtue. So he seems to have gone through, you know, by kind of a process of elimination, right? That it's got to be, you know? Man, for the reason why it's not the fourth one, it's not shape, right? Figure. And it's not the sensible qualities, and so on. And it's not a, what, natural power. These only habit or disposition, right? What's the answer to that, right? Is it because, you know, Aristotle didn't know about this kind of a quality, right? Or are you going to say that Aristotle has exhausted, you know, the kinds of qualities, right? Remember, I like to teach you in college that. So they might be describing some other species, you know, quality, yeah? Okay. And that's what Thomas says, huh? To the third, it should be said that grace is led back to the first species of quality. Not because it's a habit or disposition, but because it's, what, like that, huh? It's kind of a disposition of the soul, right, huh? It's not over the same as, what, as virtue, huh? But it's a certain, what, habitudo, right? Certain way of having yourself, which is presupposed, right, to the infused virtues, right? In a way like a, what, like a property of it, right, huh? See, something falling from it, right? Just as a beginning and a root of them, right? Okay. So that's what he's doing, right? He's saying it's not the same thing as the first species, but has a certain, what, likeness to that, right? Just like I was talking about it with the equivocal words there, right? You know, I said the fifth meaning that Aristotle gives there in the metaphysics is what causes before the effect, right? But that doesn't seem to be to be fifth in what place, right? And so I put it alongside the, what, the second sense, right? That doesn't mean it's the same sense as that, right, huh? As a certain, what, likeness to that, right? Okay. The second sense, if you remember, is something can be without another, but the other cannot be without it. That's a little bit like cause and effect, isn't it? Because the effect can't be without the cause, right, huh? Okay. It's not the same sense, because you can't have a causal effect, but you can have something, you know, that can be without something else, without that other thing, right? But if something can be without another thing, but not vice versa, there seems to be a kind of dependence, right? Of one upon the other, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. I was going to make a joke about that one. When you're teaching in high school or college, the girl walks by outside. You guys are distracted, right? You guys are so cut off on the female thing that the dog walks by. He's digging in the flower bed, that's why. I don't want to do that. Got to chase him up. When my cousin Donald was first teaching around the Chicago area there, the place had been used during the war, I guess they had an airport there, kind of, to take off. And so there were still airplanes that were taking off right now. So he's lecturing, you know, and everybody's taking off. Everybody's looking out the window, you know. I came and I sat in those classes, you know. I could notice where the kids are being distracted by the airplanes taking off, you know. Things in motion. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Things in motion sort of catch the eye. That's one professor in college, you know. He was a, he was a professor, you know, but he would often, you know, boom, you know, something like that. And everybody would jump like that, you know. To wake them up, you know, they'd do that. 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Okay, that's what the master says now, that's a pretty good one there, that convinces me, gratia prevenita, it comes before charity, oh, he means it's better than charity, he means it's before and cause, right, I answer, it should be said that some lay down that they are the same, grace and virtue in their very, what, essence or nature, but that they differ only according to reason, that grace is said, that grace is said according as it makes a man gracious in God's eyes, right, pleasing to God, right, or according as it is given gratis, right, but virtue according as it perfects one to doing well. And the, just stare of all people, right, seems to have thought this in the second book of the sentences, huh, okay, but if someone rightly considers, huh, the notion of the definition, the ratio of virtue, this cannot stand, that's when Thomas takes that phrase, so he'll say, this is nothing, sometimes this cannot stand, you know, that's another phrase we use. Somebody didn't say it's frivolous, but those are very common ones. Because as the philosopher says in the seventh book of the physics, huh, virtue is a dispossession of the perfect, right? I say perfect, what is disposed according to its nature. From which it is clear that the virtue of each thing is said in order to some pre-existing, what, nature. When a thing is thus disposed according as is fitting or in agreement with his, what, nature. For it is manifest that the acquired virtues, huh, through human, what, acts, about which we have spoken above, are dispositions by which a man, or man, is suitably disposed in order to that nature by which he is a man, according to the reason, right, and so on. Now the infused virtues dispose man in a higher way, and to a, what, higher end, huh? Whence also is necessary that they be in order to some higher, what, nature. And this is in order to a, to the divine nature, partaken, right? That's how he uses Aristotle there, right, to argue from one to the other, right, huh? The human virtue must be in accordance with what? The nature of man, right, huh? Well then the theological virtues must be in accordance with higher nature of man, right? And this is the, the higher nature is not the fundamental nature of man, but the nature of God partaken of in man, huh, okay? And this is in order to the divine nature partaken, according as it is said, huh? Hey, it is from Peter, huh? I knew it was from Peter, okay? He gave us maxima, huh, greatest and precious, huh, things promised to us, that we might be made, what, yeah, consortes, I guess, is the idea of partaking there, of the divine nature, right, huh? Okay, so that's the Pope himself, huh, first one, yeah. And according to the receiving of this nature, we are said to be regenerated as sons of what? God, huh? It's interesting, huh? When St. John talks about seeing God as he is, he first talks about we are the sons of God. We are said to be the sons of God, and we are the sons of God, right, huh? And then he says, we know when he appears, we shall be like him, but we shall see him as he is, right, huh? That's something in the line of what? Nature, right? Rather than the line of, what, a habit, right? Thus, therefore, just as the natural light of reason is something apart from the virtues, what? Acquired, which are said in order to this, what? Natural light. So also, the light of grace, which is a partaking of the divine nature, is something apart from the infused virtues, which are derived from that, what, light, huh? And are ordered to that, what? Light, huh? Whence the apostle says in the epistle to the Ephesians, you were at once darkness, huh? For some time. But now you are light in the Lord. Walk, therefore, as sons of the light, huh? For just then as the acquired virtues on the natural virtues perfect man for walking in a way that's in agreement with the light of what? Grace. What could be more clear to Thomas, huh? Dr. Clarissima. It's kind of funny how the Jesuits are calling their teacher the Seraphic, you know. Thomas, he's a young doctor, he's a Seraphic. He's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor, he's a young doctor In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Grazius. God, our Enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Angels of God, lighten our minds, or to know our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand what you've written. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Let's look at the body of the Article 3 again, just because it's such an important article, right? He says, I answered that it should be said that some lay down to be the same thing, right? Grace and virtue, in their very essence or nature, but that they differ only according to reason, right? Or the ratio. That it is called grace, according as it makes man pleasing to God, let's say. Or according as it is given gratis, freely. It's called virtue of her, according as it perfects us to acting well. And this seems to be what the, what? The Magister is a sense of thought, yeah. In the second book of the sentences, right? But if someone rightly, you know, we've got to consider rightly that, so we pray when we look for Thomas or the angel. But if someone rightly considers, the notion of virtue, this cannot stand. That's Thomas a hoax. That's a phrase all the time. This cannot stand. Because as the philosopher says in the seventh book of the physics, virtue is a certain disposition of the perfect. I call perfect what is disposed according to its, what? Nature. That's what Aristotle sees, right? Now, I noticed when Thomas in the Summa, when he's defending, or taking up, rather, the genus, you know, that virtue belongs to and so on, right? And he recalls the text of Aristotle there in the book on the categories. And the first species of quality that Aristotle gives is habit or disposition. The second species is natural ability or inability. And then you have the sensible qualities. And then you have the shape and so on. Well, it's always struck as kind of strange at first sight that he puts habit or disposition, Aristotle before, power, right? Because he's not closer to the nature, right? And Thomas says, well, he puts habit or disposition first because by the habit, we are disposed well or badly with regard to our, what? Nature. So in that sense, it's closer, right? In some sense, than even, what? The power, I see. Because by the power, you can use that well or badly and it can be disposed in a way that's even contrary to your nature. So the virtue is being disposed in a way that's in agreement with your nature, right? And the vice is disposition that is contrary to your, what? Nature. Well, here you see something like that, huh? I call perfect that which is disposed according to its, what? Nature. Nature, yeah. Now, of course, in God, huh? The virtue of God, there are certain virtues of God, right? They are the same as his nature, right? So he doesn't have to worry about not being, yeah, yeah. But we, they're not the same thing, right? And so we can be disposed by our habits, right? Either in accordance with our nature or, what? Opposed to our nature. Okay. From which it is clear that virtue, the virtue of each thing, or each thing, yeah, is said in order to some nature pre-existing, right? When each thing is thus disposed according as is congruence, right? With its nature, huh? So we sometimes speak of, you know, the vice is being something in human, right? Okay. Now, it is manifest that, he's gonna, I take a little break here, right? Because he's gonna develop this point now. It is manifest, however, that the acquired virtues, the natural virtue, I mean, the human virtues, as we call them, the virtues acquired to human acts about which we have spoken above, are dispositions by which a man is soonably disposed in order to the nature by which he is a man, right? Now, the infused virtues dispose man in a higher way and to a, what? Higher end. Whence also is necessary that it'd be in order to some higher, what, nature. Otherwise, you'd be disposing it in a way that's not suitable to the nature of the thing, right? So the nature of man has to be raised by grace, right? In order that the theological virtues and so on and the infused virtues can be in accord with that. And this is in order to the, what, divine nature partaken of, huh? According as it is said in the second epistle of Peter. Now, he's the, what, first pope, I guess. Maxima et preciosa. He gave to us, right? Most of all. And precious promises, right? That through these, we might be made, what, partakers, consortes of the divine, what, nature. And according to this, taking of this nature, we are said to be regenerated in the sons of God, right? Well, that's interesting, right? Because a son is something that ties with nature, right? But we're not the sons of God by nature. The son of God, the word of God is the son of God by nature, right? He shares the same nature, but we're not sons of God by nature, are we? So, our nature has to be raised up, right, to take of that, yeah. So then he argues from this proportion. Just, therefore, as the natural light of reason is something apart from the acquired virtues, which are said in order to this actual light. So, also, the light of grace, the sons of light, which is a partaking of the divine nature, is something apart from the infused, what? Virtues, which are derived, huh, from that light, huh, and are ordered to that, what? Light, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Whence, also, the apostle says, huh, in the Epistle of Ephesians, you were once, what? Darkness, huh? But now, however, lighten the Lord and walk as, what? Sons of the light, huh? Therefore, just as the acquired virtues, which Aristotle wrote in the second, in the Nicomagnetics and so on, men, a perfect man to walking, he had that quote there, right? The sons of light walk. To walk in a way that's fitting to the natural light of what? Reason. So, also, the infused virtues perfect man for walking in a way in agreement with the light of what? Grace. So, that was such a good text that we had to read it over again, right? Yeah. Makes you respect nature, huh? I see a nice proportion in Thomas there. He's talking about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? And he's talking about the difference between the gifts and the, what? Virtues, right? And so, he's talking about at one point there about the, maybe the greatest of the gifts of the Holy Spirit which is called wisdom, right? And the theological virtue of what? Faith, right? He gives an interesting proportion or likeness of ratios, right? He says that the gift of the Holy Spirit called the wisdom is to faith, right? The theological virtue. Like first philosophy, right? Wisdom in that sense. His to natural understanding. Kind of interesting, huh? You see that proportion, huh? He gives a similar, I guess, in fact, the gift of the Holy Spirit. And then he says natural or moral virtue is supposed to be on the power. He's subject to obedience and obedience to prompt to obey reason. So then the gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose not only of the moral virtue, but even of understanding the virtue of the reason of the Holy Spirit. Yeah, rather than reason, it's God himself as a measure. The measure of what you're disposed of, according to. That's what that's very often done. Yeah, yeah. Interesting things about the Holy Spirit. I don't know how much we knew about them when we were confirmed, you know. Yeah, yeah. I just said that, you know, you know. And do they still do that? No, that's different for me. They should have, but they did. Okay, so let's go on to Article 4 now. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in some one of the, what, powers, huh? Now, as we've kind of seen it a little bit in the previous article, that it's in the soul, right? But, you know, it's the care of Thomas to, to, to, uh, be nothing un-chewed, uh-chewed-ah-chewed-ah-chewed-ah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah-chewedah. He didn't talk about the art department so much, but he was talking to the people in the arts and so on, you know, and, uh, he had a whole bunch of the books up there, popped with them, you know, on the one side of his desk, you know, huh? And then, uh, he'd, he'd make his points, you know, you know, the faucet that would just let it fall on the side of the desk. You see, he'd put the book on top where it was, "'Voisi la Verite!' You know, here is the truth, he says. They're looking at all the books that they love, and they figure it out. Constipation, the opposite problem of constipation, where you're just food, which don't get any food value from, and just go straight out to the other side. And it seems like all this wisdom goes in, but just never, like, Okay, for Augustine says, huh? In the hypogonostic, what is that? Oh, that's about the gnostics? That grace is compared to the will, or to free judgment, as the, what? Rider to the horse, right? That's kind of a, you know, platonic proportion, and it's not bad, you know? I used to kind of, okay, that sometimes, you know, how if you lose control of the horse, you know? You're being dragged by the horse, you know? That's why you're reasoned, and you're, humanity's being dragged by your emotions, right? You know, kind of a, but the will, or librum arbitrium, right? Free judgment is a certain, what? Potency, as has been said in the primo, right? First book, summa. It's like the, like the, what? The sisal, right? The rider is on the horse, right? Yeah, yeah. Seated on the horse. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it goes again there, huh? The rider on the horse is above, right? The horse, but he's not really in the horse, right? You know? And then you carry it over, you know, and say, well, that the, you know, grace is, you know, in the will apparently, Augustine seems to be saying, right? But Thomas will explain Augustine to be free of him from defending the confusion there of the magister, right? So Thomas to me should be called the magister, you know? By Antoinette Messiah, right? Just like if everyone was called the commentator, even Thomas to be phrased him as the commentator, because it was so common in those days, right? But I mean, Thomas to be the guy who was able to understand Aristotle fully, I mean. So if grace, so if the will is a power, as it has been said, then grace is in the power of the soul as in a subject, huh? Let's see how Thomas applies to that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as from the, what, nature or essence of the soul flows its, what, powers, which are the beginnings or sources of its doings, right? Its operations. So also, right, this nice proportion now, from grace itself, right, flow the virtues, right, into the powers of the soul, by which the powers are, what, moved to their, what, acts, huh? But there's no proportion there, right, huh? Just as the, what, the powers of the soul are to the soul, a bit like a property to the species, right, huh? It falls upon it, right? Well, then, the infused virtues, right, and so on of the supernatural virtues flow from the, what, grace, which has been added, right? So it's proportion, right? Okay? Just as, you know, the powers of the soul naturally follow upon the, what, the essence of the soul, the nature of the soul, and more powers in us than in the dog, and more powers in the dog than in the, what, than in the tree, right? Okay? So likewise, the supernatural virtues, right, follow from the elevation, right, by grace of the, what, soul, and from them flow the heavens. So it's a beautiful proportion, right, huh? I'm a great, you know, respecter of proportion, right? Where Aristotle begins with, he talks about metaphor, right? He says the best metaphors are by, what, proportions, right? You see that in Shakespeare it's these beautiful proportions, huh? Though art thy mother's glass, and she indeed calls back the lovely April of her prime. That's based on proportion, right, huh? Yeah. I call one of my grandchildren little Maria, you know, because her mother, she was like her mother, boy. You see, in what you call the simile, huh, you have a proportion, right? But it's more explicit, huh? Like as the waves make towards the pebble and shore, so do our men's hasten to their end. That's a very intelligible metaphor, too, though, huh? And I certainly refer to that when I'm talking about connection between time and motion, right? But in metaphor, it's more. condensed, right? Brevity is the soul of wit. See, Homer is especially praised for his what? Similes, right? Shakespeare for his metaphors, so Shakespeare has good similes too. Yeah, yeah. But in philosophy, you have closer, right? Proportions, right? And Aristotle talks about the fourth tool of dialectic, right? The tool of likeness, huh? And that's part of it, huh? The ability to see, what? Proportions, right? That one is to the other as the other is to that, right? Thomas does do a beautiful thing when he's talking about the virtues. Now, the virtues are all, what? Equal, in some way, right? He's saying, well, the objection is, well, faith is not as good as charity, so how can you, you know? But Thomas says they're equal proportionally. What does that mean? You know, he takes it as a beautiful example of it? The hand, yeah, yeah. See? And as your hand grows, this finger is going to be, you know, you know? They grow equally, but proportionally to what their goal is, right? You know, the opposable thumb's got to be ready to hold your glass and so on. But it's a beautiful understanding of proportion, huh? Yeah, yeah. So you can't be, you know, up here in your prayer life, but your patience is way down here. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But in the words equivocal by reason, right, some of the most important ones are the ones that are based upon seeing a, what, proportion, right, huh? So we're in this room and our heart is in our body, right, huh? We're not exactly the same thing, right, but it's in proportion, right? And if they cut out your heart, it will be in your bodies in a place, right? And not as a part of it anymore. They pull out one of your teeth, right? And one guy there in the county house that takes a thing and half his tooth, you know? It's kind of funny. He comes into the shackles sometimes, he just comes into it, half his teeth missing, you know? He's kind of a joke, you know? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. He took out his glasses and said, I have to go over here for a couple of days, but he says that I have a tree stump, but I'm going to be watching you to make sure you build this building. And he came back two days later and the building wasn't built, but they had put a cloth over his eye. Is that what the African said there? Yeah, it was. It's a true story. It's a true story. So they weren't quite sure, but they wanted to cover the base. They didn't want to do the work. Okay, so you see the proportion here, right, huh? It's just as from the nature of the soul, right, huh? Their flow is what? Powers, right, huh? That's what I was going to call in the teaching there of the, what? I used to go get, right, huh? The distinction between species and property, right? And property and accident, right? Because the accidents and the properties belong to the species, right, or the individual, but one has no connection really with the nature, right? The other does. It falls on it. Well, then grace is like, in proportions, like what? Nature, right? It's like a second nature, right? So also from grace there flows, our virtues, in the powers of the soul, through which the powers are moved to their, what? Acts, huh? And according to this, grace is compared to the will as the mover to the, what? Moved, huh? Which is a comparison of the rider to the horse, huh? He's moving the horse, right? If he's in control, that's to say. My mother always tells me a thing, you know, the horse getting away with the carriage, you know, and how do you, you have to almost go towards a tree to stop the horses, you know, and so on. But then you've lost control, right, huh? So it's compared as a sasaurus, huh? Rider? Rider? Rider. Yeah, because of the idea to sit there, you know. Not, however, as a, what? Accident to its, what? Subject, huh? Okay. Defense there of Augustine, right? So Aristotle, you know, when he talks about the fourth tool of dialectic, he says, you know, the consideration, you know, of the, of likeness, right? Because you've got to consider in what way it's like and what way it's not unlike, right? Because error takes place when you, what? Think that things are more alike than they are, or that they're alike in a way that is, what? That they're not really alike, right? See, why he can speak, you know, the third tool is finding the difference. Well, a difference is a difference. You don't have to worry too much about, you know, there's more or less. But likeness, you've got to be very careful, because likeness is the cause of, what? Deception, too, huh? It's very important, likeness, huh? Now, we used to read one of the great physicists there, and, and of course, they say that PR2M, right, on this, things in the history of science, you know, as well as being, you know, a working physicist, right, you know, and he says that most of the discoveries here are based on, what, seeing a proportion. Of course, Einstein, reflecting on, on wave, I mean, wave mechanics, right, talks about how it's based upon seeing a proportion, right? You know, and Einstein, you see, with, with light, when he introduced the photon theory there, right? Light quant, as he called it that time, I guess, but, but, what was known to be, what, a wave, in some sense, right, turns out also to be a particle, right? Well, then maybe the particles that we thought were just particles are also waves, right? And they developed this proportion, right? Louis Dubois, and so on, and I predicted what the waves would be, and sure enough, you know, but most of these theories are, most of these new discoveries are made by seeing a, what, proportion, right, okay? Thomas was giving us that first objection there, right, proportion, but in the third article there was a proportion there, right? That, that the, the nature of man is to be, what, human virtues as, what, yeah, or maybe turn the proportion around, because we're going from that, that grace is to the fuse virtues a little bit like, yeah, yeah, yeah. But there's going to be two things in proportion. One is that the virtues are, in the one case, in harmony with the, what, nature of man, other cases are in harmony with grace, right? But then also the idea that they're flowing in some sense, they're coming from them in some ways. Let's look at the second objection here, huh? Morver, he's calling this Augustine again. Who is this Augustine? He's calling all the time. Must be Augustine the Hippo, I guess, huh? Yeah. Anything good come out of Hippo, you know? He said about grace getting good come out of Nazareth, right? From grace begin the merits of man, huh? You can't merit anything without grace, huh? You can't merit anything supernatural, you can't merit. But merit consists in an act which proceeds from some power. You've got to do something to merit something, I guess, huh? Therefore, it seems that grace is a perfection of some power of the soul, right? Well, this can be solved in some way like the first one, right? And therefore, Thomas says. And through this also is clear the solution to the second one, right? For grace is a beginning of the meritorious, what, the doing, meritorious doing. Mediante, huh? Virtus. By means of the virtues, right? Just as the essence of the soul is the beginning, right? Of the operations of life, mediante bos potensis, right, huh? Okay. So do I think because I'm a man or because I have reason? Do you think because you're a man or because you have reason?