Prima Secundae
Lecture 294: The Division of Grace: Gratum Faciens and Gratis Datum

Transcript
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I mean, the guy was convinced of the brain, sort of thought. I said, okay, now, suppose you and I are in a room that has no windows, right? And there's one light there in the middle of a bulb there that's on. And as long as that light's on, we can see each other, right? Now, a blow on the light bulb interferes with my seeing you. Therefore, the light bulb is the organ of what? No, no, it's not right. So I said, then there's two ways of interfering here with sight, right? One is to attack the organ, right? Other is to attack the, what, object, huh? You take away the light, you take away, yeah, the sense object, right, for the eye. So, which is in the case of the understanding, right? Whereas Stahl will point out that the proper object of our mind is the what it is, right? A something sensed or imagined. So when you interfere with the image, right, then you interfere with the thinking, but on the side of the, what, on the side of the object, not in the, but then by separate, he's going to argue that the power itself and the act is not in the body, right? If it were, it would not be universal, right, but would be, what, singular, right? I can't, I can't imagine triangle in general, can I? See, if I imagine a triangle, I can imagine a triangle in my head, I can imagine another triangle next to it. Well, am I imagining a triangle in general? Well, I only imagine an individual triangle, right? But my reason understands something, what, universal, right, huh? And that singular imagine is just something that, reasons understand what it is of that thing, right? So that's not in the body that understands universal. You know, when my friend Shakespeare there says that reason is the ability for a large discourse, you might recall that there were three reasons why a discourse could be called large. One was that it's about the large. Another is that the beginning or the end of the discourse is large. And the third thing is that the discourse itself is large or long, right, huh? And, you know, like in Euclidean, you're long. This, who's this, this, this, this, this, this, and trying to get to the Thegram and Theorem at Provisitian 47, right, huh? But you're capable of that long discourse, huh? Now, sometimes the beginning or the end is said to be large, right? And I see people who don't even think of Shakespeare, they talk about a large induction. A large induction is a large discourse from its beginning, right? Or, you know, the, you get a thing, and take an example from science there, they, you get an equation, right? Force equals mass times acceleration, right? You can plug in all kinds of masses and all kinds of acceleration all day long. And so, the end is what? Large, right? All the things that can be what? Yeah. Yeah, see? And, you know, in philosophy, you know, principle like, like, the reason, the definition of reason you're looking before and after, right? I mean, basically you look before and after, you know? Yeah, you know, you can go on forever. But now, the first sense of being about the large, there's two senses of that, right? In one case, large could mean what? Covering a large area, so to speak, right? To go back to the continuous, right? You know, where Socrates, you know, sticks the universe like a big, you know, blanket covering all these things. But, a discourse about the universal, right? That's a large discourse, right? When I discourse, you know, and I say, you know, no odd number is even, how many numbers am I covering in a way? Infinity to them, right? So, you can have a large discourse, a discourse about the universal, right? You have a discourse about man, right? Well, how many men there are? I keep on coming to be, right? It's a large discourse. And the other sense of large would be great things, right? Large as opposed to small talk, right? Talk about small things, right? My mother said, my father liked her small talk because it helped relax him a bit. She's a good understanding woman, you know. She didn't take too seriously what she was telling him, you know, but little things that happened in the neighborhood that day or something, you know? Sometimes it's small talking, you know, small talking, you know, just to recover. And, but the other part of this time, the discourse about the universal, right? That's beautiful, right? It covers a large area, right? Infinity of things, right? So, it's because reason can discourse about the universal. That's one way that you realize that it's something immaterial. You know, the senses and even the internal senses, like the imagination, they're tied to the, what? Singular, right? If I'm going to demonstrate, for example, that the triangle has interior angles, that's something that's at the university of every triangle, right? But the triangle, I imagine, will be either isosceles or scapegoat, or equilateral. And I'm not understanding that, right, I'm understanding triangle even more universally than the species of the genus, triangle. But there are other ways of showing this, too, you know, I mean, the fact that you can know some immaterial things, right? You know that God is immaterial, how can I know that by, you know, a bodily power, right? Like that, yeah, yeah. And that immaterial, that was immaterial? Well, yeah, I mean, our knowledge of our soul and the immateriality of our soul is the gateway to knowing about the angels and God, right? I mean, there's the eighth book now of the physics there with this student that comes on Tuesday night, you know, and we're going to be coming up, there's going to be a material thing that's coming up here now. This is kind of the, it's kind of seen at the end of what, of natural, what, philosophy, right, huh? Once you get to the immaterial, and talk about immaterial things as such goes to wisdom, right, you know, but that's why it's called metaphysics, right? First great editor of Shakespeare's works there, you know, for the civilized world, right? He called it the metaphysics, Aristotle didn't use that term, but metataphysica comes after it, I'm not sure. In regard to the orthotilionistic understanding of the soul, is there any strong modern reputation of it, or attempt to refute that understanding, or is that teaching just ignored? No, there's, there's, maybe ignored in some cases, misunderstood in other cases, you know? The, the, the, a lot of, you read the, the English purists, you know, they don't really understand the distinction between the reason, and the imagination, and so on. Yeah. I imagine that's so. Yeah, because the English, you see that, that's, you know, like a custom in, you know, Newman, you know, grammar or sense, I haven't, you know, often you speak that way when you're thinking about something. Yeah. Yeah. Or feeling something. Yeah. Yeah. The English are very concrete that way, you know? Famous contrasts between the, the French that are talking about the, the abstract there, you know, and, like any more, because for another reason you're not preparing for it yet, you know? But in Thomas, we'll show you, like I was saying before there, in the text of the De Potentia, right, huh? All our words go back to the continuous, right? And he starts to talk about life, right? When the growth of the plant and the walking around of the dog is running under the cat, and so on, is not the highest example of life, even in this world, right, huh? But to know, even sensing is an example of life, right, or a sign of life, and understanding is a much fuller knowledge of life, right? What life can be, since it's an analogy of a much fuller life, than just moving around and the growth. And, but he starts there, you know? Yeah, he starts at that, right? And then later on, we carry it over, right? The word motion to, you know, operations times, use the term operations. We do something that is not emotion, right? You know, the teacher could serve his stories, quote, Thomas, the man sitting makes wisdom, you know? But I think the actual translation is, the man sitting becomes wise, right? The man running around, you know, he doesn't quiet down enough, right? You know, the Greek word for science is episteme, right? It comes in the Greek word meaning, come into a halt or a stop. I take the example, you know, Archimedes, was it, I guess, in the bathtub, taking a bath, and then finally he was relaxed enough that he thought of something. He thought, didn't he? You got a foundation for now, you know, getting fully dressed and so on. But he's stopped thinking that, right? He's just all excited, right, because of what he's thought. But he was relaxing. So this is beautiful looking before and after Thomas. Whence it remains that grace, just as it is before virtue, so it has a subject before the powers of the soul. Do you see the proportion there, right? The grace is before the supernatural virtues, right? Just as the soul is before the power. So it must be in the, what, essence of the soul. And just as through the intellectual power, the understanding power, man partakes of the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and according to the power of the will of divine love, right, through the virtue of charity, so also through the nature of the, what, soul. According to certain likeness, the divine nature, the way certain regeneration or recreation, what precision, you know, in these guys. Sometimes he kind of stopped, you know, and he's explaining the Aristotle's examples and explaining the order of the examples and how well they're chosen and so on. He says, if I was reading a modern Thomist, I wouldn't bother to see some reason for their examples that they chose or the order of the examples. I mean, it's kind of unrandom, you know, but these guys, yeah, yeah. Dyrhea of the mouth, as they used to call it. Yeah. Okay, so we should take a little break there now before we... Okay, first let's go, recall back to where we are now. Go back to the premier here at the beginning of question 109. We divide the consideration of what, grace into three parts, right? And then he divides the, what, first part into three. And we're about to start the third part of the first part. Okay, just look at the necessity of grace here in the question 109. Consequently, we're not to consider about the exterior beginning of human acts, to it God, insofar as we are aided by his grace to acting well, right? And first, we're not to consider about the grace of God. Secondly, about his cause, right? And third, about his effects, right? That's very easy to understand that distinction, right? I remember when I was teaching the course on love, right? And Thomas did something like that. The passion, talked about love itself, and then talked about the causes of love, and then the effects of love, right? Okay, now the first of those three, about grace itself, he divides again into three, right? This guy's taken up with three and two, this Thomas guy. For first, we will consider about the necessity of grace, and that was in question 109, right? All those articles. And then the one we just finished. Secondly, about grace itself, as regards its, what? Essence or nature. We just finished that. And now we're getting the third part, which will be its, what? Division. Now, this guy coming in, we'll ask him, right? Is the consideration of grace here in the Prima Secundae divided into two or three parts? Okay. What are those three parts? No, no, no. It's grace itself, the causes of grace, and the effects of grace, right? So he looks at grace itself, and then he's going to look before grace at its causes, and then after grace and its effects, right? Good example is looking before and after, right? Now, the first of those parts, grace itself, right? He divides into two or three parts. Yeah. And the first part is the necessity of grace, which we've read already. And the second part is the, what? Nature of grace, right? Okay. Which we just finished now, right? These four articles. Now we get the third one, the division of what? Grace, huh? Okay. There's no part on the demonstration of grace, right? Thomas sometimes describes the philosophical method as defining, dividing, and demonstrating. That's what Euclid does, right? Defining, dividing, demonstrating. And Porphyry, in the premium that he has to the Isogogi, right, says, it's useful not only for the categories, my friend, but for definition, for division, and for demonstration, to know what genus is, and what species is, and what difference is, and what properties, and what accent is. So now we're down to division of grace. So now I can get. What a too simple understanding of grace. So let's look at question 111 now, the division of grace. This is the third part of the first part, right? For the consideration of grace. Got that? The third part of the first part. We're in the prima secunde, but that's a different thing. This is the first part of the second part of the summa. There's only two parts of the second part. But the whole summa is divided into three parts, right? So we're in the first part of the second part. Okay. Then we'll have to consider about the division of grace and about this thing, five things are asked. First, whether it is suitably divided, grace, by the grace gratis datum and the grace gratum facientum, right? The grace, you might say, freely given, right? The grace gratuitously given, if you want to stick closer to the word gratis, right? And the grace making us, what, acceptable, right? Now, as an old guy acquainted with these things, I suspect that this naming here should be understood in what kind of naming we've talked about before. Because isn't all grace gratis datum? So how can you distinguish grace, you know, given gratuitously from grace? Doesn't seem like sense, right? See? But don't we sometimes distinguish between man and the animals? But isn't man and animal too? So how can you distinguish between man and the animals? It doesn't make any sense, does it? It's like distinguishing between numbers and even numbers. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So you have animals, right? Who have the ability to sense, right? And so on, huh? Okay. But then man is something in addition to being able to sense. And that is reason, right? So he gets his own name, right? Man. And we sometimes keep the name animal for the... Yeah, yeah, yeah. There's many examples of that. We've talked about that. We've named him before. This is very common, huh? Very common, huh? See, there's all kinds of places, huh? Okay. So I suspect that grace gratum facientum is going to be superior, right? Okay. Now sometimes you have another way this takes place, and that is when the common meaning, right, is found fully in one, right, and imperfectly in the other, then the one that is fully found in keeps the common name, and we give another name to the, what, deficient one. So sometimes we say that reason is a kind of understanding, and the angels have understanding, right? But then sometimes we keep the understanding for the name of the angel's power, and we give man a new name, which is reason, right? Because he has an overshadowed, you know, understanding, huh? Doesn't understand too well, right? And he has a hard time understanding. He's got to reason things out, think them out, right, huh? You see? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I see what that division is, right? But you can see a little bit about the naming of it, right? Okay. Then, secondly, about the division of grace, gratum facientis, that's the second of those two that he first, right? Through operantum, operating and doing, and co-operantum. What the heck is that? That's a distinction of the second sense of, the second kind of grace in that previous. Now, apparently, he's got another division of the same thing. About the division of the same by going before grace and following grace. Now, what the heck is that, huh? Where does he come up with these things, huh? They're all in the tradition, right? Back in the reading. Now, those, apparently, the second and the third are divisions of the second of those two that were mentioned in the first question. Second, in the order of the words. Now, the fourth one is about the division of grace, gratis datis, which I guess is a famous one that's given by my friend St. Paul, right? Okay. I'm from St. Paul, Minnesota, you know. Yeah, that's right with my name. Yeah. You read about the original name of St. Paul? It was Pig's Eye. And, of course, we're the capital of the state of Minnesota now. And I said, if they had kept the name Pig's Eye and not given the name St. Paul, it never would have become the capital of Minnesota, right? Oh. Yeah, it shows you the importance of names, right? You know? Yeah. Now, what's the fifth article? What's the comparison of those two kinds of grace? Which is better, right? Which is, maybe a comparison of them in terms of the fourth sense of before and after, right? Which is better, huh? Maybe I would confirm what I kind of suspected from the way they're named, right, huh? Well, it's another example of that first way of naming there is the word disposition and habit that's kind of relevant to us here. Sometimes Aristotle will distinguish between disposition and habit and then he'll speak of habit sometimes as a stable disposition, right? Or a disposition not easily lost, right? So what does habit have that the other dispositions don't have? Well, that's stability, right? So it gets a new name, habit, and the ones that are easily removable keep the name disposition, right? So my mood today might be my disposition, right? Because it's easily removed, right? You know, they do have these cut to hours, you know. Disposition, I mean, they call it the attitude, judgment or something, you know? But a mood, I think a mood is a disposition, right? You start the day and be in a good mood or a bad mood and it can disappear in the day when these things happen. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, so let's look at the first one here now. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that grace is not suitably divided by grace making us, what? Acceptable, you want to put it that way? The good graces of God and grace given gratuitously. For grace is a certain gift of God, right? As is clear from the things said above. But man, therefore, is not pleasing to God because something is what? But rather reverse, huh? Therefore, something is given, what? To someone, gratitude by God. Because he is what? Yeah. Therefore, nothing is the grace, gratum faciens, huh? It's coming out of objection here, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that grace is not said that grace is not said to make one gratum, huh, acceptable, effectively. That means as a efficient cause, huh? But formalitary, right? And we met this before, haven't we, huh? You see? You see? You see, what makes, this is wooden, and this is a table, right? Okay. Well, why is this a table, and why is this a chair, right? You see? I might ask that question in a different way and say, what makes this to be a table, and this is a chair? What would you say? You see, you see, you see, you see, two different senses, right? If you said, you'd probably say, well, in the context here, you'd say, it's a shape that makes one a table and the other a chair, right? But you might say, like, this wise guy over here is a carpenter, right? And that's good. That's a good thing you brought in, though, right? Because you see the two different senses of what? Yeah. And one is formally, is form, and... the other is really the third kind of cause, right? Really the second kind of cause, right? So he says, grace is not said to make one gratum, effectively, right, as an efficient effect, but formalitair, right, as a form, right? To it, that through this a man is what? Justified, reordered, right? And he is worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to what is said in the epistles of the Colossians. He made us worthy, right, on the part of the, what? Yeah, in light. So that's just taking off the example of what, you know, in times a lot of times he will clear up different words, right, by an objection, right? So it's a way of formally making you see a certain distinction or see the importance of this distinction. Now the second one is the objection that I was given. Whatever things are not given from, what? Preceding merits are given, what? Gratis. But even the good of nature is given to man without any preceding merit, huh? Because nature is presupposed to merit, huh? Therefore nature itself is given gratis by God, huh? But nature is divided against grace. Oh, here we go. Yeah. And so to be therefore is, it's said to be gratis datum. It's just laid down as a, what, difference of grace. Because it's found outside the genus of grace, right? Christellus is in the categories, right? The different genre have got different kinds of, what, differences, right? So, right, animals by, what, two-legged and four-legged, right, huh? But would you divide numbers by two-legged and four-legged? No, they have a different kind of differences, right, huh? Okay. Or would you divide habits by two-legged habits and four-legged? See? Okay, so this is argument, huh? Even nature is, what, gratis, right? So how is this a difference? This is more universal. This is serious, these difficulties here. The second, therefore, it should be said that grace, according as it is given, what, gratis, excludes the notion of, what, death, huh? But there can be understood a two-fold death, huh? Okay, this guy sees distinctions, huh? What you have to do to see before and after, and so on. One, proceeding from merit, right, huh? Which is referred to the person himself, right? Of whom it is to act or to do meritorious deeds, right? According to that of Romans 4. And who, what, acts, right, huh? Reward is, what, according to devil, according to kind of ode to him. Not secundum, but gratis, huh? Another is what is due from the condition of nature. If, for example, we say that it's ode to man that he have reason, and other things which pertain to, what? Human nature. In neither way should a debt, on account of this, be said that God is what? Yeah. Yeah. But rather, insofar as a creature ought to be subject to God, so that in him, right, the divine ordering might be fulfilled, which is that such a nature has such conditions or such, what, properties, right? And that doing such things, such things will, what, follow. Natural gifts lack the first debt, right? But not do they lack the, what, second debt. But the supernatural gifts, huh, lack both debts. And therefore, speciality is more. And they indicate for themselves the name of, what, grace. So that's the other kind of, what, yeah, where one has more fully, right, the common meaning, right, huh? And so it keeps the name, right? And the other one that has it less so gets a other name, right? Back to the other one. The third objection now. Every division ought to be by opposites. But even the grace that is gratum faciens, huh, that making us pleasing to God, to which we justified is given to us gratis, huh? That was my objection, right? Thomas has placed that third here, right? According to that of Romans chapter 3, verse 24. Or justified gratuitously, right? Through his grace, right? And therefore, grace ought not to be, what, divided against, what, grace gratum faciens against grace gratis totum, right? Remember that in the logic there, you know, where Aristotle's talking about definition and, what, property, right? And he speaks of definition, sometimes it's a property, and sometimes he divides definition against property. Well, what do definition and property have in common, huh? Well, in the strict sense, they're convertible with the thing defined that has a property, right? Definition brings out the nature of the thing, so it's a more perfect thing, right? So it gets a new name, right? Definition, and the other properties, right, keep the name property, right? That's the kind of naming that you have, right? Just like, you know, the dispositions, some dispositions are easily lost, and some are firmly kept, as we said, or have some stability. That's kind of a noteworthy thing, so we'll give a new name to that, call it habit, and we'll keep the name disposition for those, right? That's taking place here, right? Okay? The disposition of the wind and the sock. Yeah, yeah. It seems to me that, therefore, you might say, you know, in one way, a habit is a disposition, in another way, it's not. Well, how can you affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing? The word disposition must be, what? Equivocal. There's equivocal by reason here, right? There's a reason why this happened, right? How many fingers? Hmm? Four fingers and a thumb. See? Now, why did this finger get a new name? Yeah. Opposed. It's very important when I grab my glass, right? Indispensable. Yeah. Yeah. So, that's a good example, though, right? It's right in your face, right? You see what I mean? So, there's a reason why we do that, right? There's a reason why this, why these keep the name finger, and this one gets a new name, which is thumb, right? Right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. But now the word finger becomes, you know, equivocal, right? One sense, the thumb is a finger, and in the other sense, it's not, right? Yeah. It runs through, you know, our speech, you know? You can see that, huh? It's a boy or a man, but it says he gave him a different name, right? He's not a man, he's just a boy. He's an honor. Easy. He's good. So, you shouldn't divide something against this to make any sense, to divide number against odd number. To the third, therefore, it should be said that grace gratum faciens adds something above the notion of grace, given gratuitously, which also pertains to the notion of grace. Because it makes man, what? It's a little easier to see in the Latin. And therefore, grace gratis data, which doesn't do this, right, retains to itself the common name, right? Just as in pluribus aldi is contingent. I can give you an example. I've done that already, right? And thus, are opposed to two parts of the division, which are gratum faciens, non faciens gratum, right? So there you can see the opposition when he states it that way, right? But the one non faciens gratum just keeps the common name of both of them, okay? So that's beautiful, right? And that way of naming things makes you think both of what they have in common and what one has that fits it apart from the other, right? Because of its super excellence or because of its, in other cases, you know, it's for its defect, no? Okay. Okay. Now, against all this is the great authority of the apostles, or maybe St. Paul, you know? And I think, you know, who's the, what did the Pope say about Augustine? You know, the Church has made, you know, the doctrine of Augustine on grace, its own doctrine, right? You know, the teaching of Augustine on grace is the teaching of the Church on grace, right? But St. Paul is very much in, in, what, the thinking of Augustine, right, about grace, huh? Because it's very explicit compared even to the Gospels in some way, right? Okay. And so it's interesting that the, that the texts here, right, and the said contra, which are authoritative arguments, right, huh? They don't take a text from the Gospels, but from the, what, yeah. I mentioned how when Thomas divides the Bible, right, he divides it on the basis of, what, power, I mean, not power, but law and grace, right? And it's because the words of the great St. John, they're right, for the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came to Jesus Christ. So he divides, the Old Testament sometimes into two, huh? The law of the king and the law of the father, right, huh? But it's about the law, right? And then the new he divides in the basis of grace, right? Now he divides the New Testament into, what, three parts, right, huh? The origin of grace, which is Christ, and this is in the four Gospels, right? Then the nature of grace, right, huh? Which is in the epistles of St. Paul. He pulls them out, right? And then the effect of grace, right? Which in one word is the church, right? And then you have the, uh, actually the apostles, which is about the origin of the church, the canonical epistles, which is a, the growth of the church, and then the apocalypse, the final state of the church, right? So in that division, you can see the importance of the, what, epistles of St. Paul for grace, and now for the text, he goes not to the Gospels, even though the greatest books of the, of the New Testament, even, is the Vatican teaches, but you go to Augustine, right? I mean, to St. Paul, to the epistles of St. Paul, right? And one is from the Ephesians, and the other is from the Romans, right? So all things fit together when you have the truth and you divide, you know, some understanding as Thomas does, huh? But against this is that the apostle, and he's the apostle by, what, Antonia, he and Peter. What is it, John, Paul, the Sackney stories called them, the princess of the apostles, right? Okay. But against this is what the, the apostle, tributes both to grace, huh? Both gratum facere, right? Hedese gratus datum, right? To make one, yeah, and to, and to be given gratuitously. He says, as regards the first in the epistle to the Ephesians, he gratificavit, huh? He made us acceptable in his beloved, what, son, right? As regards the second, it's said in Romans 11, 6, huh? If it is grace, it is not from our works, huh? Otherwise, grace is not, grace is not gratuitous, huh? Okay. There could be so many other things about grace in there. Okay. It can therefore, we can distinguish grace because it has one of these things only, or what? Utrumque, right? And that's going to be grace in the foolish sense. Okay, let's look now at the body of the article here. The answer should be said, as the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans, huh? The things which are from God are ordered, right? Quia deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Yeah. So as Aristotle says, God must be a friend of the philosophers, huh? Because he's using their reason all the time. But reason looks before and after, right? And their likeness is the cause of love, right? Quia deo sunt, ordinata sunt, right? So he must be a friend of those who look before and after, huh? So he must be a friend of Thomas who we saw looking before. He must be a friend of Shakespeare. I think so, yeah. You're going to the site of Shakespeare's grave there in the church, huh? There in his hometown. In this, however, does the order of things consist? That some things through other things are led back to, what? God, huh? As Dionysius says in the book on the celestial hierarchy, Oh, but the great commented on that, Thomas commented on the divine names, huh? Okay, but they both know, they both work, so. Since therefore grace is ordered to this, that man might be led back to, what? God, huh? That's interesting. He didn't say that man might be led to God, but led back to God, huh? Because he had left him kind of. Since therefore grace is ordered to this, that man be led back to God in a certain order in which this is, what? Done, huh? That some are led back to God through others. According to this, therefore, there is a twofold grace. This is interesting. One through which a man himself is joined to God, and this is called grace, gratum faccienza. The other by which one man cooperates with another in order that he might be, what? Led back to God. And the gift of this sort is called grace gratis delta because it's above the, what, faculty of nature and above the mere of the person. It's conceded to a man. But because it is not given for this that the man himself be justified by it, but rather that he cooperate for the, what, creation of another. And therefore, it is not called gratum faccienza. It doesn't do that. And about this kind of grace, the apostle speaks. I guess, when the division of this is given, they come back, I guess, in the next article, the next, I mean, the fourth article. To each one is given the manifestation of the spirit out of utility taught them, right? Of others, right? It seems to me and I was talking to my student on Tuesday night there about the division of two and three, you know, and I was saying, you know, you can't understand the division of the seven sacraments, I mean, by one division, you see. But I would distinguish, what, five and two, right? It seems to me that matrimony and holy orders, right, are not primarily ordered to the good of the person being ordained, right? Or the person being married, right? It's not us. It's not us. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, it's about children, right? I told you, it was a, my... My sister-in-law, Dolores, my brother Richard's wife, you know, she talked about when they moved to St. Paul someplace, but she went over to kind of register them in the parish, right, and so she was fairly newly married then, but they already had, you know, children, and so the priest, of course, he asked them, you know, have any children, and she said, oh, yeah, and I said, well, now you know what it's all about. She just laughed, you know, and so, or it says about the priest, you know, that he's taken from men, you know, to offer sacrifice, right, to the name of the people and so on, so it seems to me that those two sacraments are ordered to the utility, right, you might say, to the good of the church or the good of the children, right, huh, and the children, are really the kind of the common good of the mother and father, right, huh, so, and the father, we call him a father, right, you know, okay, in discussion, whether you should call him a pastor, you know, father or, or one senior, we never call him a senior, you know, a father, we always call him one senior, you know, you know, okay, so, well, if I'm in public with that people, I'd call him one senior, but if I'm with them privately, I'd call him father. That's the one guy said, man, the counting house, yeah. So, but the other five sacraments seem to me ordered to the good of the person receiving the sacrament, right, then you just distinguish the three and the two there, right, huh, you know, because the two are the removing evil. Thomas does the first three, you know, the baptism and confirmation and Eucharist, it goes back to the vegetative soul to illustrate, you know, because of the likeness there, right, because there's birth and there's a growth, which is like confirmation, and then, you know, yeah, the three powers of the vegetative soul, right, so these things are given according to the likeness of these things, huh, you need those three things. That's a marvelous body of the article, they're telling us, I got time for the article or not, okay, so, about to go on to next time then, huh.