Prima Secundae
Lecture 304: Human Merit Before God and Divine Justice

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To the ninth, it proceeds thus. One proceeds thus. It proceeds thus. It seems that the justification of the impious is not the greatest work of God. He is more so than creation. For through the justification of the impious, someone achieves the grace of the way, of the road. But to glorification, someone achieves the grace of what? Or acquires the grace of what? Of the land, of the land, of the land, patriarchal, patria. Gratia matriarchiae, patriae vellum. There's no mother. I mean, Mary's up there. I mean, in God there's no father, but God is a father, he's not a mother. Which is something greater, right? Glorification than the grace of the way. Therefore, the glorification of the angels, or of men, is a greater work than the justification of the impious. That's a pretty good argument, huh? And the whole body of the article is necessary to be part of the first. So maybe we should read the whole body of the article now, huh? What do you think? Let's look at the second and the third, because they can be. You can't answer the first one without reading the body of the article, right? Because he gives the whole body of the article and then he says in Peritheus, to what's been said in the body, is clear the response to the first, huh? So we'll have to be in suspense until the body of the article. Maybe the second and the third one can be. More of the justification of the impious is ordered to the particular good of one man, but the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man, as is clear in the first book of the ethics. And that pagan is going again. Oh, he's talking about, yeah, about how the good of the city, right? Therefore, a greater work is the creation of heaven and earth than the justification of the impious. To the second, it should be said that the good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one if one takes both of them in the same, what? Genus, same kind of thing. But the good of grace of one is greater than the good of the nature of the whole universe, huh? That's quite something, isn't it, huh? Because grace is partaking in the divine nature, right? So it's an entirely different genus than the nature of created things, huh? We'll see. I'm going to be in the dark myself with the sliced idea. I was going to say. Moreover, it's greater to make something from nothing and where nothing cooperates with the agent than to make something from something with some cooperation of the patient, the one undergoing. Of course, we argue that it's quite a different power, right, to create, huh? Because of the distance there, right? But in the work of creation, from nothing comes about something. Whence nothing is able to cooperate with the agent. But in the justification of the impious, God makes something from something. That is, from the impious, he makes the just one. And there is there also some cooperation on the part of man because there is there the motion of free will, as has been said. Therefore, the justification of the impious is not the greatest work of God. That is not a good objection, sir. It took time to think of these things. He reads these descriptions of Thomas, you know, and he's thinking about something, you know, and it's a difficult thing, and then he falls down on the ground praying to God, you know. That's what I get something on. I get some truth to this, right? To the third, therefore, it should be said that that argument proceeds on the part of the, what? Way of acting. According to which creation is the greatest, what? Work of God. So, in some sense, it is the greatest, but not in the sense of what is being made, maybe. We'll see what he says. Against this is what is said in Psalm 144. His verse sees, right? Upon all of his works. And in the collect it is said, huh? And mine says, Dominic 6, post-Pentecoste. So, I don't know. But that's what, that's, what's the authority. God, who, what? And Augustine says, expounding that of John, chapter 14, verse 12, greater than these he will do, because it is a greater work to make the just from the impious than to create heaven and earth, huh? So, or is that Augustine showing up, huh? Not Aristotle this time, but Augustine. Yeah, yeah. You had to go to Augustine this time. It's like saying, even Aristotle saw this. The old pagan, right? What's there, aren't you guys, huh? You can't see it, huh? But here, you need to leave Augustine, huh? So it begins with a distinction. I answer, it should be said, that some work can be called great in two ways. In one way, on the part of the way of what? Doing it, right? And thus, maximum, huh? Is the work of creation. In which, from nothing, he makes what? Yeah, yeah. And nothing, from nothing means not from something. I was looking at Thomas there in the Summa there, and he's, I mean, the Summa Gagiantila, he's talking about the fact that God didn't create the universe always, right, huh? It has a beginning in time. And he goes through all these objections, right, huh? And the part of God and the part of the things created and so on, and the way in which they're created. And then he has three chapters responding to each of them, you know? There's seven arguments for the first, seven for the second, four for the third, and then he answers the seven, he answers the seven, he answers the four, right? Oh, boy. He's not done now, see? No, no, no, he's that. But then there are some people who thought that they could prove by reason that, what? It's from nothing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And one of the arguments is that the universe is making something from nothing. So before there was something, there was nothing, and therefore there was a beginning, right? Thomas points out that really, you say from nothing, it's a way of saying not from something. It's not as if nothing is something from which it was made, right? And so by imagining that way, you have a kind of false imagination, right? So if something was made from nothing, then it was nothing before it was something, right? Okay? Yeah. Just like if you make a table from a tree, well, the tree was before the table, right? And therefore the table wasn't always, right? So if you made something from nothing, then it was nothing before it was something, therefore it had a beginning, right? It's a duration. And Thomas said, well, no, it doesn't mean that's right. So you can watch out, ex de hilo, right? You find in other ways of speaking, you know, you find this one they were talking about, that on Tuesday night, my student there, in the eighth book of the physics show, you know, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, and when Aristotle was arguing to the existence, of the unmoved mover right and he he argues that either you come to something that moves itself right or you come to something that's altogether unmoved right and he first takes up the probable thing that it's from something that moves itself right at the beginning and then he's going to argue that even if there is something moves itself it's going to depend on something that doesn't move at all right that's a further step right but why does he he do that right but he's in between things well thomas says goes back to plato right and plato's the guy that said the through another depends upon the through what itself so before the through another is the through itself right so your coffee huh is it sweet through itself no so if your coffee is sweet so he must have used sugar or something that is sweet through itself right okay so um if something is moved by another it's moved through it to another right or by another and therefore there was something before it is through itself right so plato kind of you know emphasize that right huh and we often make use of that huh and um that the through itself is before the through another right you gotta be kind of careful of that right and i see it kind of a lot of times in logic when we talk and we say that um some statements are known through other statements and those statements that are known through other statements are conclusions right now is every statement known through another statement no because then you'd have a what infinite regress and you have to prove an infinity of things prove anything yeah yeah so so nothing would be known right to know a you had to know b and before you could know b i had no c and so on forever you never could even begin because anything you say you know to begin with you say you'll prove that first you know and then okay so it's a hopeless thing so you must come to some statements if we know anything that are known what to themselves right i gotta be careful what does that mean though see are you proving a thing through itself that's a logical fallacy isn't it so a statement that's known through itself is a statement that is known but not through another statement what thomas says about nothing you're the same sort of thing right okay okay but it's interesting the way we use that way of speaking though even though it can be misleading to some people right it can mislead some people you know you know it's funny some scientist not thinking get something from nothing right and we don't even we even believe in creation don't think you get something from nothing what warren says i kind of my friend warren that they're really kind of irrational you know even the early greeks had it so you can't get something from nothing right yeah yeah yeah yeah there's no free lunch you know but this is even greater you know than a free lunch yeah yeah in the interview with bernie you know they say well i gotta pay for all this i don't know that's what he says he admitted you know so it'll be easier to beat the delivery you know but i saw ben at you know he's been secretary of education member under uh yeah and he was on uh ewtn you know and uh he convinced that she's going to be indicted but i don't think anybody else thinks it's going to happen you know yeah yeah or the michelle is successful yeah we're somewhere in the body right we yeah that's on the part of the way of agenda the way of acting another way that can be said to be the opus magnum right on account of the magnitude of that which comes about right and according to this greater work is a justification of the what impious because it what terminates at the good of partaking yeah which the creation of heaven and earth turns at the good of mutable what nature right and therefore augustine when he says that greater is it from the impious to make the just than to create heaven and earth he adds for heaven and earth pass away but the salvation and the justification of the predestined remains but it should be known that something great is said in two ways thank goodness now this is in one way according to the absolute quantity right and in this way the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace justifying the what impious and according to this the glorification of the just is a greater work than the justification of the what impious another way something is great by its quantity of what proportion just as a mountain is small and a grain is what large yeah you have a grain or something yeah yeah okay yeah so we speak of a 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I use that expression. To get us out of hell, right? I'd be struggling around here trying to figure it out without seeing any distinctions, right? So there's one way in which creation is the greatest work of God, right? That's what the Bible begins with, right? And you get to the Gospels and you're talking about justification, right? And then you get to the apocalypse and you... Yeah, yeah. But if you work each of them in its own way is the greatest work of God, huh? So should you admire God more for creating the world? Or should you admire God more for justifying you? Or should you admire God more for glorifying the saints? Yeah, but for different reasons, right? When you're reading the Gospel of John, you say, my God, I didn't realize there's this much in there. I mean, I've read it before more than once, but I say, my gosh, there's so much in there. That's way more difficult than the other Gospels, it seems to me, too. You know, there's three persons that they describe in the Gospels that Christ raised from the dead. And one of them, of course, is what? Lazarus, right? And that's found only in John, huh? That one, huh? And then, what are the other two? One is the widow of name? The son of the widow. Yeah. Is it the little girl that's found in all the other Synoptic Gospels? But the widow of name, I think, is found only in Luke, yeah. Let's think about those. Because Augustine kind of takes that as the three kinds of what? The spiritual sense there of the sinner who's just newly... Yeah, and that's the little girl, and then the one who is... Dead. Dead, yeah. And then the one who's confirmed. Stinking. Yeah, yes. Stinking. Yeah, yeah. Got a beautiful thing. Nice example of three here, right? We had four things there in the justification, right? But two of them are on the part of what? The motion of free will, right? The motion of free will, right? The motion of free will, right? The motion of free will, right? The motion of free will, right? The motion of free will, right? You get to the 10th article now. To the 10th one goes forward thus. It seems that the justification of the impious is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than ones that are not miraculous. But the justification of the impious is greater work than the other miraculous works. As is clear through Augustine and the authority induced. That was authority back in the previous one here, right? What is that work of Augustine that appeared in? John, track 72 there. That's how it is. He's coming, John. That's a folk, yeah. You can see the great decision. And therefore the justification of the impious is a opus miraculosum. Is it outside the, what, order of things that someone should be, what, justified in this way because it's a more normal way of being justified? You know? This may not be. Moreover, let's look at the reply to the first objection. To the first, it should be said, therefore, that some miraculous works, although they are, what, less than the justification of the impious as regards the good that comes about. They are nevertheless outside of the custom, customary order of such effects. And therefore, they have more of the notion of miracle, right? Something that is, yeah. But this is the normal way of being justified, right? You know? Just right by God's grace. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, the emotion of the will, second objection. Moreover, the emotion of the will is thus in the soul as the natural inclination is in natural things. But when God does something in natural things against the inclination of nature, it's a miraculous, what, work. As when he enlightens the blind man or when he raises up the, what, the dead one, huh? But the will of the impious tends in something bad. Hence, therefore, God, by justifying man, moves him in the contrary direction, in the good. It seems that justification of the impious is miraculous. He says, to the second should be said that not whenever a natural thing is moved against its inclination is a miraculous, what, work. Otherwise, it would be miraculous that water heats or that a stone is thrown up for its own. But when it is done outside the order of its own cause, which is apt to, what, do this. But to justify the impious, no other cause is able except God, huh? Just as neither is water able to, what, eat except the fire. And therefore, the justification of the impious is by God, and in this respect, not miraculous, huh? Well, it's a customary way of doing it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Right, right, right. He's not even afraid of somebody else's, you know, way of, you know. Except the moderns, right? No, you know. Moreover, just as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. But it's miraculous when someone subito, right? John Paul II has made that subito. So, without the, what, without study, he acquires wisdom from God. Therefore, it's miraculous if someone impious is justified by God. Well, to the third, it should be said that wisdom and knowledge, man is naturally apt to acquire by God through his own, what, genius and study, right? Genie must be able to discover something himself, right? And there, when, apart from this way, a man is made wise or knowing, it is, what, miraculous, right? But the grace justifying, man is not naturally apt to acquire it through his own operation, but by God, what, operating, huh? Once it's not, what, similar, right? Okay. So miracle is something outside the ordinary, what, way of doing things, right? But this is not, you know, there's not some ordinary way of becoming justified other than what we've read about in this question, right? This is the ordinary way of being justified, yeah. The only way, I guess. Yeah. But against this, miraculous works are above the natural power, right? But the justification of the impious is not above the natural power. For Augustine says in the book of the Petition of the Saints, that to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, pertains to the nature of men, right, huh? But to have grace, right, is of the, what? Faithful. Therefore, the justification of the impious is not, what? Maracous. Sounds kind of strange what he does that. It's curious, huh? But the justification of the impious is not above the natural power, huh? Yeah, it means what? When so far, it's not above its natural power to cooperate with God? Is that what you're saying? That must be what you're saying. Yeah, yeah. So to be able to have faith, to be able to have charity, it's of the nature of men, right? It's not a natural thing, but it's of the nature of man to be able to have these things. Will Thomas answers in the body article. Hence, it should be said that in miraculous works, three things are accustomed to be found, huh? Which one is on the part of the power of the agent, right? Because they're able to come about only by the, what? Divine power. And therefore, they are some Tichitara Mira, right? As we're having a hidden cause, as is said in the first, huh? Wonder is raised when you hit another cause or something, right? But if you go over this thing and it fell to the ground, would you wonder why it fell to the ground? If I didn't go over it and it goes up, you say, why did it go up? What? The magician would do. It's up there. And according to this, both the justification of the impious and as well as the creation of the world and generally speaking, every work that by God alone is able to come about can be said to be, what? Yeah. That's only one thing that's involved. Secondly, in some miraculous works is found that the form brought in, induced, is above the natural power of such a matter. just as in the... Just as in the... raising of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body, right? And as far as this is concerned, the justification of the impious is not what? Miraculous. Because naturally the soul is capable of grace. That's probably what it said in this encounter. In that, for this, that he is made to the image of God, he is capable of God by grace, as Augustine says. That's interesting, huh? Because we're made to the image of God, they were capable of grace through God. So the other animals are not made to the image and likeness of God. They're not capable of what? Grace. And by they become, partake of the divine nature. So the first thing, it is miraculous. Second one, it is not, right? Third, there is found in miraculous works, something apart from the accustomed order of cause and effect. Just as when someone sick acquires perfect health, subito, apart from the accustomed cause of curse of nature, course of nature, of healing, rather, which comes from nature or what? Art. It's supposed to be the mother-in-law there, right? Peter, right? Jesus. As far as this is concerned, the justification of the impious sometimes is miraculous and sometimes not. For it is the accustomed and common course of justification that God moving inwardly the soul, that man be converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, and afterwards he arrives at a perfect one. Because charity begun, merits to be, what? Increased. And increased, it merits to be perfected, as Augustine says. But sometimes God vehemently moves the soul that at once it has a, what? Certain perfection of justice? Just as was in the conversion of Paul, there being, what, exteriorly a miraculous prostration, right? And therefore the conversion of Paul, as it were miraculous, is commemorated in the church, Cile Brita. Great celebration. Yeah. Yeah. That's not usual, right? It's celebrated, right? So it's more, not a miracle, than it is a miracle. He said, he was just an atheist, he didn't like it in his presence, and then one day, for some reason, I guess he was with some Catholic dome and went into the church, and I just want to stop there and think, because, okay, they went outside and waited, and they went inside, and I guess they were in a benediction or something, and he was just hit, and it's true. Yeah. It's true. It's a miracle. So he's celebrated. Maybe not quite like St. Paul, but it's similar. Wasn't Stalin in the seminary for a while, I don't know if the reason of his being there was, whether he was just to get a free education, or why he was there, but he's a young man, isn't he? I don't know. In the case, it was a tale of two altar boys. Yeah. Do you remember this? Where one altar boy, I think, drops the wine in the water, at the altar when he's sitting there, and the priest just lambasts and chastises him, humiliates him, and then there was another altar boy, who did the same thing around the same time in another country, and the priest was very gentle and understanding. And it turned out, one of them ended up being Stalin, and then the other one was maybe the Archbishop Sheen, or something like that. I don't know who the other one was, but it was supposed to be true. I think I heard him on the other one. Stalin was the one that was mistreated, I mean, by the priest? The one that, yeah, he was lambasted. That's an excuse. And it shows also, what's the saying? I think St. Faustina, if we knew how responsible we were for each other's eternal salvation, we'd be paralyzed with terror. And how gently we need to treat each other, and charitably, in their old ways, but how often we fall. I think it was in St. Faustina. The old sign that makes it harder. That's what God told St. Gaffer's dinner, all your virtues and all your vices come to your neighbor. Now, in terms of what happens to your neighbor, what happened to you? I could hear a break right now before the next question here, huh? Effect now of grace, right? If you go back here to the premium there, chapter what? Beginning of 113, I guess. We divide the consideration of grace into three parts, right? Consideration of grace in itself, right? And then the causes of grace, right? And then the, what? Effects of grace, the division into three, if I might be so bold as to. Okay, if you go back to the premium at the beginning of 113, which is the premium to the third part, it says, then we're not to consider about the effects of grace. And first of the justification of the impious, which is the effect of gratia operantis, right? Operating grace. Second of merit, which is an effect of grace cooperantis, cooperating grace. So we just finished the part of the justification of the impious, right? And now the effect merit, merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace. So he recalls that at the beginning of the first, at the question 114. Then we're not to consider about merit, which is an effect of gratia cooperantis, on cooperating grace. And about this, ten things are asked. First, whether a man is able to merit something from God. Secondly, whether someone without grace is able to merit eternal life. Third, whether someone by grace is able to merit eternal life worthily, right? Ex condigno, right? Now, remember that passage I was pointing out there in the epistle of, what, who was it? The last one there. Jude, was it? And didn't he say, the one who was talking about faith, hope, and charity, wasn't it? Yeah. Building up your soul by faith, hope, and charity. And then he speaks of what? Yeah, but before he uses the word eternal life, he speaks, and then Christ with his Elias is mercy, right? I said, why does he say that? Is that because of the fact that it's still mercy and not justice? It's justice, but it's still an element of mercy. Well, this may be able to cast some light upon that thing, huh? Whether ex condigno, right, huh? Because that would suddenly be, you know, justice, right? Give me my due, you know? What Shakespeare say about the dead? Home are gone and tamed their wages. Your merits, I guess, huh? Fourth, whether grace is a beginning of meriting by means of charity principality, huh? Well, I think that's probably so, yeah. Now, a little more standing back now. Whether man is able to merit the first grace. He isn't an EWTN sometimes. He's always interviewing some, some person who's come back to the faith or discovered the faith or something like that. What, did they merit the first grace, you know, that led them this way, huh? Sex with their man is able to merit it for another, right? Well, did, what's the mother there of Augustine? Monica, yeah. Did she merit the version of her son by her prayers, you know, the prayers, the tears and prayers? How could they feel to do something, right? Yeah. Good to have a mother like that, huh? Seven, whether someone can merit for himself preparation after a lapse. I hope so. Whether someone can merit the growth of grace or what? Charity, huh? Now, whether someone is able to merit final perseverance. That's the ultimate grace, final perseverance. I don't know why it's just stuck in at the end where their temporal goods fall under merit, huh? I've got a little piece of filet mignon there, which I didn't buy it, but nothing like that. It's still to come expensive, you know. How are you going to, can I merit temporal goods? Can I merit filet mignon, you know? I don't deserve a filet mignon, huh? Only the French should think of that title, filet mignon, right? Favorite, I guess mignon means favorite or something, you know, something like that, yeah. Okay, to the first end one proceeds thus. It seems that man is not able to merit something from God, right, huh? For no one would seem to merit reward from this that he renders to another what he owes him. But through all the goods which we do, right, we are not able sufficiently to recompense God what we owe him, right? But that always we, what, ought to owe, what? Yeah, semper amplius debiamus, huh? As even the philosopher says in the Eighth Book of the Ethics. My goodness! That way refers to Lectio 14 there. So that's pretty good for the whole Aristotle, huh? And then this is why I'm sure they were going to use this one here. When Luke 17, 10, it says, When all the things that are commanded we have done, we shall say we are useless servants. What we ought to do, we have done, that's all. What's in, you know, that play of Shakespeare's, As You Like It, you know, the old servant there, you know, out of service and fidelity it is, you know, not a reward, you know. You know, he's, you know, he's, the antique world, what's good in the antique world is seeing them, right? That's a great play, right? You know, it's really our appreciation of nature, huh? Beautiful things in there. Beautiful play. You know, as you like it? Yeah, it's a very good play. Be reading it. That's a great play there. Therefore, a man is not able to merit something from God. Let's see how he answers that. First, therefore, it should be said that man, insofar as by his own will, does that which he ought, he merits. Otherwise, the act of justice by which someone renders, what, what he owes would not be, what, meritorious. Is it meritorious that I pay my debts? Yeah. But because it's voluntary, right? So, you know, I pay my income taxes, which they force me to. They'll stop my bank account. Yeah, they talk. The IRS, you know, is the greatest collection agency in the world, right? I always hear on the radio there, and I turn on coming up here, you know, they're advertising, you know, this group, if you're, you've had to pay your taxes last year, we'll help you, you know, get straight with the thing, and all these organizations to help you. Maybe people worked at the IRS at one time and know the rope's a little bit out of it. They can save you, you know, some money, you know. Don't delay. Don't get to delay. And then it talks about all the things that they could do to close your account or seize it and find a lock on your, your, your, uh, yeah, or your wages, you know. Sorry, your wages went to the IRS today. I'm going to go to you. You get paid. Friday or something. Where's my check? Where's my weekly check? It's the IRS. That's where it is. That's why the church, the bishops are opposed to the gambling casinos because the poor people, you know. They get in the hole. It's all completely, it's very complicated. It gives you just enough to hope that you might get more and then take some money. That's it. Two students back at school, one was a super math genius, so he could do all the counting, figure out all the odds perfectly, and so he wasn't very popular, I think, in the casinos. Another one was a guy of Irish descent who had the proverbial luck and charisma of the Irish. And he didn't know what he was doing, but he always won. He was welcome. He always had a room available free, because apparently people, you know, gambled more when he was there. So I think it might be interesting that sort of comparison between the two. Okay, so the second objection now. However, from this that someone, what? Makes himself better, right? Or he progresses himself. He does not seem to merit before himself, or before the one to whom, what? Another thing profits, right? But man, by operating well, profits himself, I guess, huh? Or another man, not over God. For he said in Job 30, verse 7, if you act justly, what from your hand does he take, right? And therefore man is not able to merit anything from God. So people, they can pray like this, you know, like they're giving God something, right? Another man like Rochelle should say, whenever we give a guy, it's like popcorn. Yeah. I used to compare it, you know, to the parent that gives the kid a little, what? Yeah, yeah, give him a, what's the word for it? Lounge. Lounge, yeah, yeah, yeah. And then the kid, out of that lounge, he goes and buys a rose or something for his mother, right? For Mother's Day or whatever it is, you know? Well, he just, you know, and they still appreciate it, right? Even though you know that you gave him the money which you bought the rose, right? But that he went out and bought the rose, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. We're kind of like that though, I mean, huh? Yeah. The second should be said, huh? God does not seek from our goods anything, what? Useful, right? But glory, huh? My goodness. That is, the making known of his, what? Goodness, huh? Which also from his works he, what? Seeks, huh? Now from this that we, what? Worship him. Nothing adheres to him, right? Or gives itself to him. But to us, right? So God doesn't get anything from us by our praising him. But we get something for ourselves by praising him. Right? And therefore we merit something from God, not as if from our works something accrues to him, right, huh? But insofar as an account of his, what? Glory. We do something, huh? For the manifestation of his goodness he calls that glory there, right? Yeah. What's Christ in his prayer there talk about the glory that he had before the foundation of the world, right? That's not something he got from us, I don't think. He's praying something about that with him. He wants that to be made known, right? Or something. Right? To us. The third objection. For whoever before someone merits something, constitute him a debtor of himself, right? Amen. For his owed that someone be paid with the worth of marriage. Yeah. But God is a debtor of no one. When it is said in Romans 11, who before gave to him and must be, what, returned to him, right? Therefore no one from God is able to merit anything, right? What did I say? To the theory it should be said that because our action does not have the ratio, right, of merit, except from the presupposition of the divine ordering, it does not follow that God is made simplicity dare our debtor, but a debtor to himself, right? Insofar as in his owed that his ordering be fulfilled. Now put that in your pipe and smoking, huh? Somehow. He's more a debtor of himself in the sense of saying, huh? Yeah. That his ordering should be fulfilled, right? Because he ordered this to glory, right, huh? But again, this is what is said in Jeremiah 31. There is reward to your work, but a reward is said for merit, it's rendered for merit, huh? Therefore it seems that God can merit something from God. The answer should be said that merit and what? Reward is that? Verses? Referred to the same thing, huh? For that is said to be reward that is compensated, right? Recompense to someone for the, what? As a return, I guess, retribution, work, and labor. As it were a certain, what? Price. Price of it, huh? Oh, my God. Maintain the wages. As the expert says, huh? Whence justice to render a just price for the thing received from another is an act of justice. So also to recompense the reward, right? To pay back, I guess, huh? The reward of a work or labor is an act of what? Justice, huh? Now, justice is a certain equality, as is clear through the, what? Philosopher, right? That means equality is justice, huh? Democratic thought. See, all these crazy things are being introduced because the minorities that practice these vices must be treated equally, right? That's justice, right? And therefore, simplicitare. There is justice among those of whom there is simplicitare equality. But of those of which there is not simplicitari qualitas, there is not simplicitari justitia. I don't know if the word simply carries the full sense of simplicitari in Thomas' text, right? But a certain mode of justice can be that is said to be, what? The just, right? Or that of the, what? Lord, huh? As in the same book the philosopher says. An account of this, in those things in which there is the simply just, there is also the simply the ratio of merit or reward. In those things in which there is secundum quid justitum and not simplicitari. In these there is also not simply the ratio of merit but secundum quid. Insofar as there is say there the ratio of what? Justice. Justice. As if a son were to merit something from his, what? Father. Father, huh? And servant from his Lord, huh? So as a son, did you merit something from your father? Give you a quarter if you vacuum the room there or something. Is that justice? Is that justice? He gives you the quarter? He said, kundum quid, he said. Some bitchy there. Yeah. Well, if all he gave it was the quarter, but he gave life and the house and clothes and food and school and everything else. Jesus said that the son is always in debt to his father, right? So how can you merit something from your father if you're always in debt? You haven't paid him back yet. Right? You paid your father back? And yet, as far as the father-son relationship, there might be a way of putting your father in your debt in a certain way. And so there are these concurrent debts, these concurrent reciprocal obligations. And they would wash out in the end in favor of the father if you united them together. But I don't know if this would maintain a distinction between the various... We have these noble scenes in Shakespeare's history plays, right, where the son comes and rescues his father, you know, from being killed by the enemy, right? And then in a sense the father has received his life, right, or in a sense from the son, right? So that's something, right? That's kind of an unusual circumstance, right? When you take care of your parents when they're old or something, right? Mm-hmm. Of course, of course. And so I said my sister was kind of in that situation. I said, well, you've got to remember she changed her diapers and she said, Ben, I've done that. She did it back to my father. I get it, too. I think we could say that the parents change their children's diapers so that children will change their parents' diapers or something like that. Yeah. He's lost in the translation. Yeah. Well, what about a child being instrumental in the conversion of the eternal salvation of their father? Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Now it is manifest that between God and man there is the maxima in equalitas. For they are distant, yeah. Yeah. Infinity to them, yeah. And the whole which is the good of man is from God, right? Whence is not possible, huh? For there to be justice of man towards God according to absolute equality, huh? So you can't give back to your to God or even to your father to equal what you received, right? In most cases, anyway. And God always can't give back. But according to a certain proportion insofar as each acts according to his own what? Mode, huh? Now the mode and measure of human virtue is to man from what? God, huh? And therefore the merit of man before God cannot be except according to the presupposition of the divine ordering, right? To it that if man what? Carries out or attains from God through his operation is the worst reward that God what? Fixed, yeah, gave him the power of acting right towards that, huh? Just also as natural things achieve this through their own motions and operations that to which God has what? Ordered them, right, huh? But there would be a difference because the rational creature moves himself to acting through free will. Once his action has the ratio of merit that is not in other what? Creatures. So, what is Thomas answering to the question? Can man merit something from God? Not simply, right? But secundum quid, right, huh? Okay, now you've got that kind of distinction, right? It's used a lot, huh? You say, well, did I come to be when I walked in this room today? Not some pitchy tear, right? But I came to be in some way. I came to be in this room, right? And when I sat down, did I come to be? Not simply. I came to be what? Sitting, right? Okay. So this is the division of being according to what? The figures of predication, right? Substance, quantity, and so on, right? When I came to be, I know, I'm five foot eight, five foot ten, I don't know. Did I come to be? Or was I already before I came to be? My present height? That's the category of quantity, right? So the nine general accidents, right, are being what? Secundum quid, right? And my substantial being is being what? Simply, right? Why cease to be when I leave this room? I hope not. I will cease to be in some sense, right? I'll cease to be in your company, I'll cease to be in this room, right? I'll cease to be sitting at least until I sit down in the car, train, car. Now, the same thing is true about act and ability, isn't it? Am I in my house now? I'm able to be there. Is that to be there? It's to be there in ability. So the student, you know, is able to learn, right? Does he know these things? Yeah, yeah. There's one silly, well, I should say silly, one, he's just saying it's not what you know but you know where to find it. How to do a Google search out of there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And there's some truth to what he's saying, but I mean, is that really, you know, to know simply? It's what you know that you know, right? It's not what you know where to find. What are the arguments used against memorization? Yeah, yeah. It's funny, you know, when I read the modern philosophers, they never distinguish, you know, between simply and subcundum quid, you know, that is simple distinctions.