Secunda Secundae
Lecture 5: Faith and Knowledge: Can Faith Be Known?

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Okay, let's go on to the next article now, article 5. To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that those things which are of faith are able to be what? Yeah. Ashita means what? No reasoned out, right? Do something else. Now those things which are what? Not, yeah. No, in a sense, seem to be ignorant, right? No, because ignorancia, ignorance, is opposed to knowledge, right? But those things which are of faith are not what? Unknown. For such ignorance of such things retains to infidelity. According to the words of St. Paul, I guess, about himself there, when Timothy, right, he's excusing himself, right? He was forgiven because he was ignorant, right? And he did these things, you know, he used to attack the church, right? You know, before, get knocked off his horse. It's got the expression in daily life, not get knocked off your horse. See, he says, ignorance, right? I did this in my incredulity, right? Therefore, those things which are of faith are able to be what? Paul tells us to have a reason for the faith that is in us. St. Peter, St. Peter, yeah. St. Peter, yeah. St. Peter, yeah. St. Peter, yeah. St. Peter, yeah, St. Peter. What? He's thinking of a reason for the hope, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. But then there's a free supposal that you're giving a reason for the faith. Yeah, yeah. So why do you believe? So you're asking, you're looking for a reason, aren't you, right? If I'm an atheist or a free thinker or whatever, you know, and I ask you, you know, we're having an ecumenical session here. Why do you believe, right? You're being asked to give it to anybody. So you should have a reason for what you believe? Right. Yeah. Well, then it can be known, right? If there can be a reason for it, right? There's a reason for the Pythagorean Theorem, right? Reason. In other theorems, it's even easier than that, right? All of those things which are demonstrably proven are what? Known, right? That's a reason not knowledge. Because demonstration is, in logic, right, a syllogism making us to what? What is the cause? But some things which are contained in faith are demonstrably proven by philosophers as God to be, right? And God to be one, right? Things of this sort, huh? Therefore, those things which are of faith are able to be what? Known, huh? I mean, Aristotle proved that God exists, right? And he proved that God is what's simple, pure act, many things. For more opinion differs more from knowledge than faith. As we said before, opinion, there is what? Fear of the opposite, right? Fear of the opposite, right? So, opinion is a kind of, what, a conjecture, not a better guess, right? So, sometimes you divide guess into opinion and suspicion, right? Opinion is a stronger guess than suspicion, right? But in either case, are you what? Yeah, there's some fear that the opposite might be so, right? I guess I'll go. I guess you're right. But opinion and knowledge can be, in some way, about the same thing, huh? So, one man guesses what the other man knows, right? As is said even in the first book of the Posteralytics, right? Therefore, it seems that, what, because faith is even stronger, I mean, closer to knowledge, right? To a scientia. The Greek word for scientia is, what, episteme, right, huh? Which is what Plato and Aristotle says, has in it the idea of coming to a halt or a stop. So, when the mind is reasoning, huh, and it shows that it really is so, then it comes to a halt or a stop. Right. Yeah. In fact, when he jumped out of the, what, the meditation jumped out of the bathtub, right, and went right around, you know? You know, Eureka found it, right? So, he stopped thinking it, right? He's got excitement, huh? Against, this is what Gregory says, huh? He's a pretty great authority, huh? Gregory the Great, I guess. That operentia do not have, what? Faith, but, what? Knowledge, right, huh? Therefore, those things about which is faith do not have, what? Do you know there are three persons in God, or do you just believe that? You don't know it, do you? I'm an atheist here. There's no belief, right? So, he says, I answer, it should be said, that every scientia is had through some beginnings, huh, that are known to themselves, right? Now, he said that known to themselves does not mean known to itself in the sense that you prove a statement by itself, proved by, what, other statements, right? Okay. And if it's said to be known to itself in an affirmative way, rather than, you know, a way of signifying, what, something negative, right, not to another, or you could say, well, it's known to its, what, parts, right, huh? Something like that, huh? Okay. So, the beginning of the Euclid's elements, right, you have the axioms and the postulates, right, which are known to themselves, huh? And per consequence and consequently, what, then they are seen, right, huh? And therefore, it's necessary that whatever things are, what, shita, right, that are known demonstrably, in some way, are seen, right, huh? But it's not possible that the same thing by the same one be both... believed and what? Seen, as has been said above, right? Whence also is impossible that by the same one, the same thing is what? Yeah, it's seen, right? But now it is possible that that which is seen or what? Known for another. You've got to be careful about translating shittim known because it doesn't really give you the full idea of shittim, right? Shittim is something known from other things that are certain, right? Known to be certain. Now it can happen he says that that which is seen or known necessarily by one person can be believed by what? Another, right? For those things which we believe about the Trinity, we hope that we ourselves will what? See them someday. According to that of the first epistle to the Corinthians chapter 13. We see now through a what? We're in an enigma, in a kind of dark way, right? But then we will see what? Face to face. Which vision the angels already, what? Have. Whence what we believe they see, right? Okay, so someone can see something that someone else believes, right? And likewise, it can happen even that what is seen or known by one man, even in the state of the, what? Of the way, the road, huh? Be by someone else, what? Believed, huh? Who does not know this demonstrably, right? Yeah. That can be known by natural reason, too, see? See, Thomas and the Summa Congenitilis is very explicitly divided, right? Into two parts, right? And the first three books are about those things can be known both by faith and by, what? Natural reason, right? And then the fourth book is about those things can be known only by faith, right? Not by natural reason. In summary, it can happen that that which is seen or known by one man, even in the state of the road, right? Of the via, this life, can be known, can be, what? Believed by another who does not know this thing demonstrably, right? But that, however, which is commonly proposed to all men, right? As believing, right? As to be believed, should be believed, is commonly not, what? Known, right? Like the Trinity and things that sort. And these are, what? Simplicitaires, simply subject to faith, right? By getting back the old distinction of simply and somewhat. So do you know that God exists or do you believe that God exists? I'd like to say I know it. But I know I believe it, too. If I don't know it really well, I... Yeah, even the great Charles Deconic, I remember him saying one time in the chorus, he says, I think I can prove that God exists, he says, but I would not be so presumptuous as to say so. Sometimes, you know, they give the proofs, you know, from the summa and so, you know, to kids in high school even, you know, or something, you know, to show them that they can be, you know, can be reason given for these things, you know, but I don't know how much they understand the proofs, but for most people, they would, yeah, it would be belief, right? But that would be somewhat a matter of belief, right? Because not all men would have to believe it because some would know, right? If we could have a chance to convert Aristotle, right? He would come already knowing that God exists and some other things about God, right? And so we would not have to be led to believe those things, right? Because he knows them already, right? In a strict sense, he knows them. But the Trinity is something that is a matter of faith simply, right? We met that distinction before, that distinction, we were not here when we talked about it, but the distinction between what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. A simple example to give of that distinction is, you know, the black man is somewhat white because his teeth are white, you know, and they always talk about the way the black man's teeth, you know, kind of stand out, right? Because it's black skin and so on. And I am somewhat black, right? Because it's in my eyes, you know, it's black, you know, and my hair used to be kind of more black, you know. It's kind of white now, but, so, but simply speaking, I'm white. We've talked about that before. He seems to be using that distinction here, right? So the Trinity and things of that sort and the transubstantiation and so on, this is a matter of faith simply, right? For everybody, right? Even for Thomas Aquinas and so on, right? But existence of God can be proven by natural reason, right? That's actually a matter of faith, right? It can be known by natural natural reason, right? But most men maybe will not be up to it, huh? You see? So it can be a matter of belief for what? Won't be a matter of belief for most, you know? But that's somewhat, right? So he says, that which is, at the end of the body article, that which is commonly proposed to all men of believing is communitar, huh? Non cito, right, huh? Okay? And these are things which simplicitar, huh? Are under what? Faith, huh? And therefore, faith and sciencia are not about the same thing, right, huh? So if you argue that they are the same thing because Aristotle knew this, right? That God exists and so on, right? Then you're making the fallacy of what? Simply and somewhat. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, I was reading there with, what's his name, Joshua last night there, you know, the third book there, in the soul, and Thomas has a little thing added there in the text there where he's showing that Avera was his mistake, you know, about the possible understanding, right? And it turns out that it's the fallacy of simply, not, no, it's the fallacy of Paris and the Barachidans, right? Which is, sees even the wise, as Aristotle Avera was as wise, but deceived even him, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the infidels, right, huh, have ignorance of those things which are of faith, right? Because they do not see or know. Again, the word know doesn't give the exact meaning of sheath there in Latin, right? It's a reasoned out knowledge, right? They don't see these things or reason them out in themselves, nor do they know them to be believable, right? That's a different thing, right? They don't know that either. But in this way, the faithful have knowledge of these things, right? Not as a word demonstratively, by demonstration, right? From statements known to themselves, right? But insofar as through the light of faith, they are seen to be, what, believable. Or they should be believed, right? Okay? So there's a way in which you kind of see as a result of faith, right? You see that something should be believed, right? You don't see the truth of it in itself, huh? Okay? Now, what about these reasons that are given by the faithful, right? To the second it should be said that the reasons which are induced by the saints to proving those things which are faith, you might say, what? Simply, right? Like the Trinity and so on. Are not, what? Democitive. But they're certain, what? Persuasions, right? As we're to manifest that it's not impossible what is proposed in faith, huh? Or sometimes they proceed from the beginnings of faith, right? That is from the authorities of what? Or the authors of sacred scripture, right? As Dionysius said in the second chapter of the divine names. For from these beginnings it proves, what? Something among the faithful. Just as from principles naturally known it proves something, what? Yeah. Whence theology is a science as in the beginning of the work it has been said, right? You've got to be careful there, right? It could be subordinated to the faith of those who see the articles of faith in themselves now in heaven, right? Aristotle talks about that kind of science, huh? Science that he's subordinated to the science, right? For its principles. And that's what the kind of science that theology is. So he sometimes reasoned from one article of faith to something else. It's a matter of faith, right? So there's a kind of sciencia there, right? There's not reasoning from things naturally known known to themselves. Now the third one is making very explicit the distinction between simply and somewhat, right? To the third it should be said that those things which are able to be proven demonstratively, right? Like the existence of God, right? Demonstration, quia they call it, that something is so, for the effect. Are able to be numbered among things to be believed, right? By those who don't know the demonstration, right? Not because these things are, that faith is about these things simply, right? Among all, but because they are pre-supposed to those things which are of faith, right? It is necessary, at least by faith, to presuppose them by those who do not have the demonstration of them, right? Now we're down to the fourth objection. I don't know what the fourth objection was a bit. Opinion and science can be in some way about the same thing, right? But faith is even closer to science, so it can't be about the same thing, right? To the fourth it should be said that as a philosopher says there, by diverse men about the same thing, there can be had, what? An opinion, just as now there can be knowledge, reasoned out knowledge, and faith, right? But by one and the same, there's able to be had faith, and what? About the same thing, secundum quid, right? Yeah, in the subject, huh? Not according to the same thing, right? For about one and the same thing, a person is able to know something and have an opinion about something else, right? So the doctor knows some things are wrong with you and other things, he guesses are wrong with you. It's not the same thing that he knows and guesses are, right? But about the same thing, according to the same way, there cannot be at the same time in one man knowledge, neither with opinion nor with what? Faith, right? For other and other reasons. For science with opinion to be together, can not simply be about the same thing. Because of the notion of science is that that which is known is estimated to be impossible to have itself otherwise, right? Yeah. But by reason of the opinion, that which someone estimates so, he guesses could possibly be otherwise, right? I guess that's so. I think that's so. I think they're coming. You know, but I'm not sure. But that which is held by faith on account of the suit of faith is estimated to be impossible to have itself otherwise. But for the same reason, but by that reason, it cannot be the same thing known and believed because the thing known is seen and the thing believed is not seen as has been said, right? I'm going to stop now, I guess. We're going to go on a little bit of it. Okay. Now the next group of articles is more about the articles themselves, right? So Article 6, with the things to be believed. To 6 one proceeds thus, it seems the things to be believed should not be distinguished by definite articles. For about all those things which are found in the sacred scripture are contained, faith should be had, right? But they cannot reduce to any certain number and count to their multitude. Therefore, it's superfluous to distinguish articles of faith. There's just too many things here to believe. Moreover, material distinction, since it can come about infinitely, right? Should be, what? Observed, I mean, omitted by art, right? But the formal ratio, the object, believable, is one and indivisible. As it has been said, namely the first truth, right? And thus, according to the formal ratio, believable things should not be, cannot be distinguished. Therefore, there ought to be omitted, the material distinction of things to be believed, huh? Two articles. However, as has been said by some, there's a whole bunch of people down here. Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Richard, they say, Victoria. An article is an indivisible truth about God, right? Forcing us to believe it. But to believe is voluntary. Because as Augustine says, no one believes unless he will. Therefore, it seems unscubly to distinguish things believable through articles. Again, this is what Isidore says. An article is a perception of a divine truth tending towards what? In God. But the perception of divine truth belongs to us according to a certain what? Distinction. Which in God are one, but in our intellect are what? Multiplied. Therefore, the believable things ought to be distinguished by articles. The answer should be said that the name of article seems to be derived from what? Greek. Greek, huh? For an arthrona, in Greek, which in Latin is called an articulus, signifies a certain what? Agreement, you might say, right? Of distinct parts, right? And thus, the parts of the body are adapted to each other, right? And they're called what? Yeah. Where is the word article word? Is it in politics here or in the constitution? Article of the constitution legally. Yeah. Either the newspaper. Yeah. An article about this is an article. Are they adapted to each other? I don't know. Physically. Are we? Visually, they're. Yeah. And likewise, in grammar, huh? Of the Greeks, they're said to be articles, right? Certain parts of the oration adapted to other, what? Saying? And expressing their genus, number, or case, right? And similar in rhetoric articles, they said certain adaptions of the parts, right? These things go out here. They're called articles, right? That Thomas has. Aren't they all connected? Yeah. Aren't these articles all connected in some way? Yeah. So Thomas's summa is divided into questions, and questions into articles, right? They said in the adaptation of these articles, one to another, right? These are all about the object of, what? Faith, right? And other ones would be about the, there'd be another question about the acts of faith. And another one about the habit of faith, right? So the articles in each question will be co-op-tate, adapted to each other, right? Connected, right? A terrible quote there from Tullius, right? From Cicero, that's the name for Cicero, right? Articulus dicitur cum singula verba. They're distinguished by intervallis, right? They're distinguished, huh? Whence also the things that are believable by Christian faith are said to be, what? Distinguished particles, insofar as they divide into certain parts, having some, what? Fitting to each other, right? Now, the object of faith is something not seen about divine things, as has been said above. And therefore, where there occurs something for a special reason not seen, then there's a special, what? Article. Where many things are, what? The same reason, unknown. There, the article should not be, what? Distinguished. For just as, what? There is some difficulty had to seeing that God should, what? Suffer, right? And another, that he, what? Rises from the dead, huh? And therefore, we distinguish the article of resurrection from the article of, what? Passion, right? But that he should be, what? He should suffer, die, and be buried. Well, that kind of goes together, right? They have one and the same difficulty, right? And then one being accepted is not difficult to accept the others, right? And kind of this, they all pertain to one article. So, you're going to distinguish the articles by, what? The difficulties of believing, right? It's not seen above. Yeah. And there's some difficulty of believing that man can arise and the dead, right? And there's some difficulty about believing that God could die in some way, right? And it's a different difficulty, right? And therefore, there's a different article, right? So, where there's a special difficulty in believing, right? There's an article that has to be distinguished, right? You kind of get that, Thomas. We're kind of slow-burners. We're kind of getting there, aren't we? I'd like to. I would like to. It doesn't make sense, you know, that he suffered, died, and was buried, you know? That's kind of what? Yeah. And it could be one of those three things. It could be the rest, right? If he suffered, he could die, and, you know, if he died, he could be buried. Yeah, let's go. If God could die, then he could be buried. Yeah. I'm just meeting Washington Irving today, you know. I'd like to meet him there. His visit to Walter Scott's home, you know? Oh. And he gave me all the examples of his sense of humor, right? Yeah. Well, I guess somebody that they knew had died, right? And the wife didn't really know that he had died, right? And so she said to her husband, Walter Scott, did so-and-so die? Well, he said, if he didn't, they treated him very badly because they buried him. He gave us a little anxious, you know? He was kind of a charming man. He said to her husband, Walter Scott, did so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so-and-so. He says he's completely happy, you know, to get that, you know, because he took him in, you know, and so on. He says the only time I was sad was when I had to leave, you know. Great guy. Well, it may not be always easy to tell, but you can kind of see what that example that he gives there. Now, to the first one, that there's a multitude of things in what? Scripture, right, and they're all to be believed, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that some things are believable about which is faith, as such, right? Why some are believable about which there is not faith as such, but in order to what? Other, yeah. Just as in other sciences, some things are proposed as per se intended, right, huh? And some to the manifestation of what? Other things, huh? Because, therefore, because faith is chiefly about those things which we hope to see in the fatherland, right? According to that, there's another part of the definition of faith. Faith is the substance of things, what? Yeah. It's kind of a, what? A foundation in the things you're going to, what? That you hope to see, right, huh? And it's kind of a foundation laid there, right, huh? Because you believe these things that you will later see, right? So, all these things that are contained in Scripture, then, are not about things that you hope to see, right? And, therefore, those per se pertain to faith, which directly order us to, what? Eternal life. As if there are three persons, right? Well, of course, if this one of these persons didn't become man, you know, we'd have, it's very much important to our getting to heaven, right? So, we've got to be told about these things, right? To have the omnipotence of God, right? The mystery of the incarnation of Christ, now that he served. Those things who directly order us to eternal life. And, according to these, are distinguished articles of faith. Some things are proposed, though, in sacred Scripture, to be believed, not because they are principally intended, right? But, to the manifestation of the things, or the foregoing things. As that Abraham had two sons. That the touch of the bones was raised from the dead, right? And, other things of this sort. Which are narrated in sacred Scripture, in order to the manifestation of the divine majesty, or the incarnation of Christ. And, according to such things, why not not to distinguish the articles, right? And, other things of this sort, which are narrated in sacred Scripture, in order to the manifestation of, what? Divine majesty, right? Or, the incarnation of Christ, right? So, in those two things, right? According to such things, none say to distinguish the articles, huh? To the second, it should be said that the formal ratio of the object of faith can be taken in two ways. In one way, on the part of the very thing believed, huh? And, thus, the formal ratio of all things believed is one. Namely, the divine, the first truth. And, on the part of this article, and on this part, the articles are not distinguished, right? Another way can be taken, the formal ratio of the things you believed, on our part. And, thus, the formal ratio of the believable, is that it is, what? Not seen. Not seen. And, from this part, the articles of faith are distinguished, huh? By the things that are not seen, yeah? To the third, it should be said that that definition is given of article more according to a certain, what? A name. Insofar as it has a Latin derivation. Then, according to its true meaning, derived from, what? Greek, huh? Thomas often points out that the etymology of a word is not its meaning. You can't simply argue from one to the other, right? So, if your name is Johnson, right, huh? You're not necessarily the son of John. You know, once is not a great, you know, I'm not really a, you know, Berkwester's name from, what? But, mountain branch, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's not the meaning of the word, is it? Am I a mountain branch? It can never be said that, although, right, for believing, huh, no one is, what, forced by the necessity of force, right? Since to believe is voluntary, he's nevertheless, what, restricted, you might say, by the necessity of the end. Because, for the one approaching God, it is necessary to believe. That's what the apostle says, right, in St. Paul. And without faith, it's impossible to, what? Please God. That's a strong thing, huh? Remember, I used to take that example of the word equivocal by reason. It's necessary to understand the word necessary. Because if you maintain it's not necessary to understand the word necessary, you have to understand what. Necessary means, wouldn't you, to show why it's not necessary? Yeah. But, is the word necessary univocal? Is two necessarily half of four? It's necessary to eat in this life, isn't it? Is that the same sense of necessary as when I say two is necessarily half of four? Because two will always be half of four, right? Do you always eat in this life? No. If you're going to live, then you must eat. Sometime. Somewhere. A few times a day. You're not a few times a day, but you've got to eat something, right? Somewhere, right? Is it necessary to study logic? Yeah, yeah. So, if you want to be a philosopher, you've got to know some logic, right? So, in order to eat Shin-in, right? Okay. Is it necessary to go to confession? Well, that's how we're all sinners, right? Well, that's how we're going to go to confession every day or something. I heard John Paul's second day, didn't he? Yeah. I was told him that. Interesting, right? But notice, huh? I'm going to go to confession every day. I'm going to go to confession every day. I'm going to go to confession every day. I'm going to go to confession every day. I'm going to go to confession every day. I'm going to go to confession every day. It's not necessary to receive the sacraments like it is necessary for two to be half of four. Because people can go to life without receiving the sacraments, right? But if you want to achieve this in, then you must do it. Yeah, yeah. It's necessary for me to have a car to get home tonight. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you want to get there before supper. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And comfortably home, more or less, right? You know, so I mean, there are different senses of necessary, right? So it's necessary to understand, yeah, even to see that it's necessary to understand necessary. But it is necessary to understand necessary, like it's necessary that two to be half of four. Because two must be half of four, and everybody understands the word necessary, do they? Must you understand the word necessary? No. Yeah. If you want to understand demonstration, for example, then you must understand the word necessary, right? In other words, to achieve a particular end, right? That's one sense of necessary, right? Sometimes something cannot, some end cannot be achieved at all without this, what, means, right? If you want to live, you've got to eat, right? I keep you guys away from your eating now, right? Some people go on a starving thing, to kill themselves, right? Came up in this, talking about the suicide there, you know, they'll stop, you know, take away their food. It's the word necessary. And it's very, I would say, you know, that if you don't understand the words equivocal by reason, you're going to make a lot of mistakes, you're going to be confused most of the time. Universal, yeah. Universal, yeah.