Secunda Secundae
Lecture 9: Augustine's Definition of Faith and Three Aspects of Belief

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The answer should be said that cogitari can be taken in, what, three ways. No, I didn't know that. In one way, it's taken in a very common way, right? For any actual consideration that the understanding makes. As Augustine says in the 14th book about the Trinity, I now call this, what, intelligentium by which we, what, understand cogitantes, right? So he's using the word cogitari in there, you've got to look at the Latin there, right? I don't know if you've got the Latin text there, some of you, or what? The quote from Augustine here in the Latin, hank nunc dico, intelligentium, qua intelligimus cogitantes, right? Another way, cogitari, is more properly the consideration of the understanding, which is with a certain, what, investigation, you might say, huh? A little inquisition, right, huh? Before one arrives at a perfection of the understanding through the certitude of, what, vision, right? Okay? So, you know, when you come to really understand something, you say, ah, now I see it, right, huh? Okay? But you might have to think about something, right? We're using that as a substitute for cogitari a bit, right? You have to think about something maybe before you say that it must be so, right? So when I study a theorem in Euclid, right, I've got to think about it for a while before I see, oh, it must be so, yes. And then I don't say it's so because Euclid says it's so, but because I see that it's so now. Yeah. And according to this, Augustine, in the 15th book called the Trinity, says, what, that the Son of God, non cogitatio dichiaris, not said to be that, right? Okay? But he's said to be, what, the Word of God, huh? For cogitatio, huh? Our cogitatio provenience, huh, he says, to that which we know and which is then, what, are formed is true, right, huh? Okay? Yeah, yeah. But it's only after this is formed afterwards, right, huh? And, of course, the thought of God doesn't have to think things out, right? He sees right away. Yeah. The process. Yeah, yeah. He understands about having to think out, think it out. He understands like that. In understanding himself, he understands all other things, right? So the Word of God should not be called a cogitatio, thinking. He's not thinking. He's not thinking. He's not thinking. He's not thinking, that's what's on. Yeah. He's not thinking out of God, you know, something like that. And according to this, he says, cogitatio is properly called the emotion of the soul, right? To liberating, right? Not yet perfected by the full vision of what? Truth, right? Well, that's why I say it makes some sense maybe to translate cogitari here to thinking about, right? When you're thinking about something, does that mean why you've really come to understand it yet? No. No. It's something on the way, right? You're trying to understand it, right? The thinking out, when you finally think it out, then you come to a halt or a stop. See, it's kind of like a motion, right? Well, thinking about something, the reason is a kind of emotion, right? Okay. But once you succeed in thinking out, then your mind comes to what? A rest, right? And understanding comes in the word for rest, doesn't it? Stand. Yeah, stand is under-moving or moving under. It's standing under, right? Firm, right? And that reminds me of the Greek word, what, episteme, right? Which Aristotle uses for science, huh? Shizem. Understanding. I mean, episteme, I don't know how many, what's the word I just used? Episteme. Yeah. Of course. And both Plato and Aristotle point out it comes from Greek for coming to a halt or stop. So, you're thinking about something, you think about something until you, what? Resolve it. Yeah, until you understand it. And then you stop. And you come to a stop, yeah. It's kind of beautiful, right? It has a beautiful etymology, right, huh? That the Latin word gentia doesn't have, right? French, the Latin is imperfect compared to the Greek for philosophy, right? So, some people say, you know, a sign of the great mind of Thomas is, they could think so well in Latin, right? And Plato and Aristotle, they were able to think in Greek, right? And so they had a great advantage, yeah? And I told you how my two great teachers in Quebec, their native language was both, what, French, Father Boulay and Monsignor Dion, right? But they both insisted that English was better for philosophy than French. And better for poetry, too, than French. So, I'm always quoting them to the French. They kind of guys are crazy, but I mean, they respect the course. And then find the third distinction, right? Because such an emotion can be of the soul, deliberating about universal tensions, huh? Universal thoughts, which pertains to the understanding part, or about particular tensions, huh? That pertains to the sense part. And therefore, Kogitari, the second way is taken for the act of the understanding, deliberating, in a third way, for the act of the cogitative power, which is like a, kind of like a particular reason, right? If, therefore, Kogitari is taken communitaire, according to the first of these three senses. Thus, this that is said, cum ascensione Kogitari, to ascend, well, thinking about it, right? Does not say the whole argument of that which is to believe. For, in this way, also the one who considers the things which he knows or understands, things with, what, assent. But if Kogitari has taken the second move, thus, in this, it's understood the whole ratio of this act, which is to believe. For, of the acts pertaining to the understanding, some have a firm assent without such a thinking out. Like, don't you firmly assent to the statement that the whole is more than one of its parts, okay? Don't you firmly assent to nothing is before or after itself, right? Okay, you don't have to think about it, think about it, okay? So, of the acts pertaining to the understanding, some have a firm assent without such a thinking out. Just as one considers the things that he already knows or understands, right? Okay? For such a consideration is already, what, formed, yeah. But some acts of the understanding have a certain, what, thinking out, right? Without a firm assent. And this is when you're really kind of, what, guessing, right? Here, Thomas, distinguishing the guess that you study in rhetoric and you study in dialectic, right? Whether one declines in either part of a, what, contradiction, right? As happens to someone who's, what, doubting, right? Or one inclines to one part, right? But is held by some light sign. As happens to one suspecting, right? Or to one part they adhere, but nevertheless with fear of the other part, right? He's talking about one part of the contradiction, right? To be or not to be, that is the question. it's a question because you can't both be and not be right which is well i suspect it's this that's kind of the weak weaker case right okay but sometimes i think it's this you know you know we gotta assure that it's not the other right or they adhere to one part nevertheless with fear of the other which happens to one opining right so sometimes times call those both a guess right but opinion is a more firm guess than a suspicion right so i suspect something i'm guessing when i thinking something so but don't know it i'm guessing too it's more firm right yeah i have more stronger reason right but this act which is to believe has a firm what adhesion pleading to yeah to one part of a contradiction right there are three persons in god or there are not three persons in god we firmly adhere to there being three persons in god right now in having a firm adhesion sticking to right now what do you call the word adhesive something that sticks to it right so in firmly sticking to one part right now it comes together the believer with the one what knowing and the one understanding huh the one understanding there means what natural understanding right okay so it's a whole more than one of its part or it's a whole not one of its parts i firmly adhere to a whole is more than one of its parts right and without having to reason it right but at the theory angles of the triangle to right angles i firmly adhere to that because i followed the demonstration right in my master there euclid nevertheless his knowledge is not perfect through a manifest what vision right okay in which he has something in common with the one doubting right whether he be suspecting or opining right and thus it is private to what the believer that he has ascent meaning a firm adhesion and well thinking about it right and to this is distinguished huh no see he's talking about distinction thomas right this act which is to believe from all acts of the understanding which are about the true or the what false yeah so what do you think of augustine's definition yeah yeah yeah it's to agree right or to adhere right to ascend firmly to one side of a contradiction while thinking about it now to me um was it uh who was it say handsome would define theology as what yeah now why should faith be seeking understanding well because it's firmly assenting to something it doesn't what see yeah and therefore it naturally what thinking about it right okay so if i'm a believer i believe there are three persons in god but i don't fully understand why there should be three persons in god right or what it is means exactly to be three persons in god but i firmly believe it right well doesn't that naturally give rise then to what yeah theology right you know feed is querings intellectum right yeah if you didn't firmly assent to it you wouldn't be thinking about why is this so and what the first guy is a guy was first told let's say you know that god had became man right that's kind of an unusual thing right but if he came to believe in it firmly by some miracles whatever it was that kind of disposed him to believe it right why did god become what man right that's part of theology right to consider why did god become man so it makes sense tied it up with fides quavered intellectum right that he's defined right the great augustine is defined rightly the act of faith right because you can see from that why theology should have arisen right and also arise in part from the fact that some people attacked what we believe right and so uh i think as augustine said when the church father said that you know heresy is necessary that theology might develop because it's when somebody denied one of these fundamental things that a church father or some uh man of that caliber saw the necessity of what defending and she had to you know think more deeply about it you know to defend that article the faith against this attack some attack in the church that we could destroy the church that was that thomas aquinas i mean there's other church fathers obviously know before thomas who were defending this or that you can say that theology in a sense develops piecemeal that one article is clarified after another right according to the particular um heretics that are challenging that particular radical right jerome says you know the whole world the whole church grown to find itself area right it was a terrible scourge yeah yeah again another thing i like to say about gustin's definition of to believe right you know is to believe these uh things like the uh things like the trinity and the incarnation and so on right um is this against the nature of reason well it would be against the nature of reason and a kind of tyranny if reason didn't think about what it believes right you know so that's something else i i see kind of the definition by the great augustine right it shows the harmony of the nature of reason right which wants to understand right what it accepts right and so that if you sent it without thinking about it right you'd seem to be going against the nature of what reason right right that makes sense too right so both the nature of reason is respected there and the origin of what theology uh it's very profound what the custom says right huh those are thompson's up by saying there right and to this is distinguish this act which is to believe from omnibus occupus of all the acts of the understanding which are about the true or the false right okay so any question about that first article so this um idea so it's not against reason because it's the fact that he mentions is it's it's it's like in that way like doubting and none of those are against him you see in the case of of um see geometry take the example of that right now you think about something before you what before you're able to demonstrate that it's so right yeah okay i know myself sometimes i don't have euclid around and so on you kind of think about it and maybe take a few examples you know when you say it seems to be so you know and you you know and you start looking for the reason why it must be so right so um but geometry is a scent after you what think about it right so thinking about it comes first when you finally think it out the reasons why it must be so right then you what have a scent without any more thinking about it right in the case of faith right you never quite what know right that there are a few persons in god right you believe that a few persons in god right but nevertheless you firmly assent to it right but you wouldn't do it in a purely human matter right and you are what assenting while thinking about it right i'm not thinking about it anymore when i ascend to the theorem in euclid i say now i say yeah yeah yeah yeah i don't i'm not believing anymore my teacher right you know at one time in life i believe the thing in theory i don't believe it anymore i know that it's so you know it's the euclid you know yours the first book you know to the last year one proposition 47 and it's converse 48 is the vagabond theorem right so once i got through the proof i used to when i give an exam to the kids you know it's going to be you know 40 minute 50 minute exam and also they're going to be there i gotta keep my new spirit you know so you know until i really knew it you know huh so so i'd say now i think i know it right so but you think about it before right and then you you sent after you yeah but that's not the case of faith right you ascend while still thinking about it right because you don't fully have evidence in your reason right it must be so right you see that so he's distinguishing it right you see reasons to give a sense even if you don't see the truth yeah yeah yeah yeah in the case of guessing right then then there's a thinking about it but it's not sufficient to give you a firm a sense right so if you compare this with the other acts of reasoning and see if this is separating it from all the other acts of reason right because then some of them give a sense some of them are about the truth false others are not about the false yeah you have to admire this great mind of augustine right because the custom didn't have aristotle as much as thomas had to help him you know huh now what the heck is the second article about we gotta look at the new implied objections yeah oh okay oh i almost got away with it okay and the first objection is saying from a damascene right that's an uninquisitus right the first effort should be said that faith does not have a what inquisition of natural reason demonstrating that which is believed right it has nevertheless an inquisition investigation certain one of those things by which a man is what induced right um to believing right huh no so he said in duchiter he didn't say forced to believe right huh but in duchiter right now because they are said by god right and confirmed by what miracles right so this leads us into believing right but it doesn't force us to believe right when it's not forced by the truth itself since one might be in a geopolitical demonstration huh i was forced by truth itself right you know to say that distinction comes in for order i was forced by what the axiom of before and after nothing is before or after itself once that became obvious to me i said which then there must be some distinction before you see order right and that's where i still gives the the first post predicament is distinction of opposites and the second one is before and after the distinction of order right third one is the distinction of hama together neither before nor after yeah you got a fourth and a fifth one too you know the fourth one is about what distinction of kinds of motion but their motions are what tied up always being opposites so there's something to do with that in opposites right then the last one is senses of the half the first three you can see very clearly how they're tied together right now the second one he says well you're just confusing two different senses of cogitari right okay because in one case you're putting together universals to see something universal another case you're putting together singulars right to see something singular they said that people like uh the pony you know when they're down the battlefield there they used to have a second sense of what to do right huh mccarthy used to get out there sometimes and they'd warn him you know that there's you know it's too dangerous to be out here uh and he says well i can't fight if i can't see him he says now third one what about this the will here right huh he says that the understanding of the one believing is determined to one not by what reason but by what the will right and therefore ascent here is taken for the act of the understanding right but according as it is determined by the will to to one of the two sides of the opposites yeah okay now we go to art too, right? Whether suitably is distinguishing the act of faith by this which is to what? Believe, now, creator ideo, how will you translate that? To believe by God may be the closest thing, right? It's more data though. What? Data as the object of creator. I think that's the thing that sometimes creator can take data, sometimes it uses, and then sometimes it's in construction. Yeah, it's more like to believe by God is the reason why you believe, right? Because the primary object there is the first truth. And then to believe God, that's more of what the object is concerned, it seems. And to believe in God, well, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? This is referring to what kind of the moving towards God is the end of your thinking, huh? It's kind of interesting that you should have those three, right? It's a little hard to express it properly in English, huh? We don't say in English that I believe, when I say I believe God, we probably use that for creator ideo, right? I believe God, right? I believe in God, well, you probably use it in a different sense again, huh? But it's kind of like the material object, right? Like creator ideo is kind of the formal object is that distinction, right? Okay. But how would you express it in English to say I believe by God, or, you know? We'll see what Thomas goes on to say here. We're taking apart your act, huh? Of believing, yeah, yeah. But faith is one habit, it says, right? Okay. One habit, there is one act. But faith is one habit, since there's one virtue. Therefore, unsuitably, are laid down many acts of it, right? To see is the one act of the eye, right? To hear the ear, right? Over that which is common to every act of faith, every act of faith, ought not to be laid down, has a particular act of faith. But creator ideo, right? Is found commonly in any act of faith, right? Because faith rests upon the first truth, right? That's what it means, that first, yeah, yeah. Therefore, it seems that unsuitably is it distinguished from some other acts of faith, right? However, that which belongs even to those who do not believe, cannot be laid down as an act of faith. But to believe God also belongs to some without faith. Now, of course, in English, it would be confusing here. We'd say, I believe in God, you know? But, you know, people would say that, right? Number four, right? Moreover, to be moved to the end pertains to the, what? Will. Because the good is, and the end are the same thing, right? Whose object is the good in the end, as Aristotle points out in the 14 books of wisdom. But to believe is not an act of the will, but of the understanding. Therefore, one ought not to lay down as a difference. As one difference of what it is to believe in God that implies emotion in the end. That's an act of the will. And this we're talking about, faith is in the reason, right? But again, this troublemaker is Augustine again, right? But again, this is that Augustine lays down this distinction. Now, lays down is what? Sign of what? Firmness, right? I am going to lay down the law now, right? The idea of firmness. And in the soldiers, and you know, speech in which some statements, lay down, right? The same word that you use when you talk about giving a law, right? You lay down the law, what the kids say. Lay down the, you know, we're reading Washington Irving's Life of George Washington, right? And he's laying down the law, you know, because the army is pretty, it's organized at that time, you know. And anybody who's, you know, not being brave will be shot. Lay down the law, you know. You obey your officers and, you know, and, you know. You know about the Marines there, right? They get the captain, everybody just goes with his gun to make sure you go forward, right? He's supposed to be a dead hero than a dead coward, right? Yeah, yeah. And Colin had been a Green Corps officer, you know. He said, why'd you become a Marine? He says, well, if you've got to go in, he said, you might go in the best, he says. That was rather true. So that's the body article. The answer should be said that the act of any potency or, what, ability, right, or habit can be taken, right, according to the order of that ability or habit to its, what, object, right? But the object of faith can be considered trappuccite, right? No, she doesn't go beyond three, yeah? Not yet. She made a negative, like, pretty well. Okay? For to believe pertains to the understanding insofar as it is moved by the will to assenting, as has been said. Therefore, the object of faith can be taken either on the side of the, what, understanding itself, or on the side of the will moving in the understanding. If, on the side of the, what, understanding, thus, in the object of faith, two things are able to be considered, right? As has been said above, one of which is the material object of faith, and thus is laid down the act of faith as quae dere deum. Now, you've got to realize that to believe God could have the other sense sometimes, too, right? But this is what you're, you're believing something about God, you might say, right? Okay? To avoid the equivocation, right? See? By to believe God could mean the formology, too, you know, but, yeah, the Latin, you know, okay? Because as has been said above, nothing is proposed to be believed by us except according as it pertains to, what, God in some way, right? It's like we say that Iran in theology, you know, that what's the subject of theology? Well, it's God, right? Okay? And other things only insofar as they relate to God in some way, as their beginning or their end, right? Preaches relate to God as their beginning, right? And then, of course, are in. Very much relates to God. Another is the formalis ratio, right? The object, which is the middle under which one ascends to such a thing believable, right? And this is laid down as the act of faith, quae dere deo, right? To give the Latin there, right? How the heck does those English editions translate that? They probably give up, you know, huh? What? They believe in a God as the first... Yeah. Yeah, yeah, that's one way to try to get around to that. To believe God, because he said so. So you have to be careful there about the equivocation there between the two languages, right? Because to believe God in English would mean crater ideo in Latin, right? In the way he's understanding it here. I say you've got to be careful that to believe, in English to say, to believe God, God is the reason why you believe, right? The formal reason, right? But crater ideo, right, means to believe things that pertain to God, right? And this first one you said is the ideo, crater ideo. Yeah, let's see, when you translate, if you just take the words, you know, and translate crater ideo, you translate to believe God, and then that would have a different sentence than it has in the Latin, right? Yeah. You know? Yeah, there's something like that also with the word prayers, and I like that, you know, and some of the other languages. To pray God, does it say something? In some languages, it's okay. Yeah, what does that mean? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, yeah, yeah. I'm begging you, it's like you say, you know, Shakespeare says prithi, isn't that a form of, I pray you, I pray you, I'm asking you, I'm debating you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a different meaning than it would mean in English, right? It's kind of funny in English to say, I pray God. But science and deity speech, we speak to them, you know, I pray you would, you know, something like that. You would do, yes. If man could think without words, it would be nice, but he can't, he can't. I used to always ask them, the students, can you think without words, huh? And I said, well, don't we sometimes think without words? And I said, yeah, probably. But do you know what you think if you can't express it in words? What kind of thinking is that when you don't know what you're thinking? You've got to be able to put into words what you think to really know what you think. People are stumbling around, they can't quite say what they think. I mean, it's another step, you know, to know whether what you think is true or false, right? But if you don't even know what you're thinking, how can you investigate whether it's true or false? So, the material object and the formal object is the way he distinguishes cre d'ere deum, which is the material object, and cre d'ere deum is the formal object, right? If one considers in a third way the object of faith, according as the understanding is moved by the will, then one lays down the act of faith, cre d'ere in deum, for the first truth is referred to the will according and as the ratio of a, what? In, because that's the object of the will, right? The good in itself. Now, to the first objection, it can be said that to these three are not designated diverse acts of faith, like the objecture is saying, but one in the same act having a diverse relation to the object of faith, right? And to this is also clear the response to the, what? Second, right? We're just saying cre d'ere deum is what's common to all, right? Yeah, we're not denying that, right? Yeah, we're not distinguishing particular acts, right? But three aspects, you might say, of the same act, huh? Now, what about those faithless people? To the third, it should be said that to believe cre d'ere deum, right? Which is, to be understood in our English way of speaking, right? Does not belong to the faithless under that ratio by which it is laid down to be an act of faith, right? For they do not believe God to be under these conditions which faith determines. And therefore, neither do they truly, what? Believe God. Believe God, because as the philosopher says in the ninth book of wisdom, in simple things, huh? A defect of knowledge is only in not attaining them entirely. The thing is truly simple, right? You can't know parts and be correct about it, incorrect about another part, right? You get the whole way out. It's a very interesting thing in Aristotle. It's out in the ninth book of wisdom. Just look at the ninth book of wisdom again in the twelfth book, you know. I remember seeing him pick that up. Aristotle, you know, is contrasting, you know, the knowledge of God with the knowledge of what? The truth about creatures, right, huh? Where you have a composition, right? Well, God is not really composed, right? It's entirely simple. So you get the whole simple thing or you completely miss the point. I say it's a hard thing to understand fully, you know. That's the way he's solving that, huh? Now, the fourth objection was saying, hey, this is an act of reason. I'm only bringing in the will for it. It's an act of reason, what? Moved by the will. To the fourth, it should be said that it has been said above. The will moves the understanding and the other powers of the soul to the end, right? And according to this, it's laid down that the act of faith is to what? Yeah. You're in some way tending towards God, right? Yeah. So that's interesting now that we see what the, I know they come. When we look at the creed, the creed, Jesus used in Deum. So what would be, what would be the reason that the creed would use? Yeah. And in what sense is it you're saying, I believe in God, right? Is it taking the sense of, I believe in God here? Same as in the Latin? Is it the Latin text says in Deum, right? Uh-huh. You know? It seems you have to take it in that sense, right? Uh-huh. So your believing is in some way, what? Tending towards God as the end, right? Yeah. And that makes sense, doesn't it? If the act of reason is being commanded by the will, right? Uh-huh. Well, the will can't do something without its own object, right? So that the, what? Act of believing, right? Is in some way tending towards, what? God in himself. Yeah. Because it's commanded, the act of belief, right? Mm-hmm. By the, what? Will. Will. Kind of a subtle thing, but isn't that the truth? So the main thing, what did you say, the main thing with the creed is it's to build up our will? It's to force our will for the act of faith? Well, you're talking about the, what moves the act of reason, right? Yeah. What moves reason to ascend, it is the will, right? Yeah. So you've got to put that into an account of the, what? Act of belief, right? Yeah. You know? I mean, that act is not there without the will moving the reason, right? Yeah. Yeah. So you're not really expressing fully the act of, what? Of faith without bringing in the relation. it has to God, to the act of the will, right? It's moving it, huh? Makes sense. But the other two senses, right? Which in Latin they go, what? Greater Deo, right, huh? Which is like the material object he says, greater Deo, right, huh? Kind of the formal object. That's more, what? On the side of the reason, right, huh? Because what is it thinking about, right? And why is it thinking this way about it, right? Right. Okay. Or what is it, enlightening it to do this, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But you have to bring in the act of the will, right? It's voluntary, right? So Augustine will say that now, and Thomas will often quote Augustine there, you know, he doesn't will, yeah. So I mean, you're really, leaving out an essential understanding of the act of belief if you don't bring in the order that it has from the, what, the will, right? Yeah, yeah. That takes into account the object of the will in some way, which is the end, right? The will. Amazing thing, huh? Yeah, right. So a lot here to chew on, as they say. Think about it. Well, I'm sending you to it, I'm going to think about it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Kind of an amazing thing, huh? Mm-hmm. I respect for this act of belief, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Was I reading the latest book by Weigel, you heard about that? Mm-hmm. It's kind of a personal book, you know, there about his relationship with John Paul II, so. Oh, yeah. It's kind of, I just, it seems, I haven't seen the book itself, I've seen a few accounts of it, you know, and so on, and, and, you know, how they were trying to destroy the faith there in Poland, you know, and so on, huh? Oh. And I guess when he, he went back there, you know, to Poland, I said, you know, that was really tough with the communists that way, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah. We want God. Yeah. We want God. You're actually, you know, you're saying that, yeah. What do we do? What do we do? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. He was nervous, he actually wet his pants. Yeah, he was nervous. I don't know. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. He did before he died, I'm pretty sure. I don't, I didn't hear that. I, I think I heard that. He died just a few years ago. It's a short time ago, yeah. And I thought I heard that he came back to the faith, but I tried to look it up. No, he was definitely, he was Jewish. Oh. Well, okay, so he came back. Well, because he, at least one of his parents were Jewish. He was not, um. I don't know. I thought I saw that one before he died. Mm-hmm. Well, there's a triumph of John Paul II. Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II? Do you remember the triumph of John Paul II?