Secunda Secundae
Lecture 11: Faith and Natural Reason: Necessity and Explicitness

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Now, we get up to article, what, four at least? Four, yeah. Yeah, so we'll start there. Yeah, I've got a little lesser one here. It's enough to raise it to sit in. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that those things which are able to be proven by natural reason is not necessary to what? Leave them, huh? For in the works of God, nothing superfluous is found. Much less so than in the, what, even in the works of nature. So how many arms does nature give you? Yeah. I mean, you carry the groceries in, you know, like this, and you need another arm to get the door open, right? And you need three, but you don't really need three. You need three arms. But everybody has had to wish at one time, you know. Therefore, that which can be done through one, it's superfluous, right, to add something else, right? Therefore, those things which are able to be known by natural reason, they'd be superfluous to take them by faith. Moreover, those things that it's necessary to believe are the things about which there is faith. But there is not knowledge, huh? And faith, or belief, about the same thing. Since, therefore, scientia is about all those things which can be known by natural reason, it seems it's not necessary to believe those things which can be proven by natural reason. Moreover, all things that are knowable by natural reason, huh? seem to be of one kind, huh? If, therefore, some of them are proposed to men for believing, for like reason, then all of them would be necessary to believe, huh? But this is false. Therefore, those things which are able to be known through natural reason, yes, you know, it's not necessary to believe them. Well, this dummy here, I don't see any problem with those arguments. Do you? No. I've got the brains of an eggworm. But against this, because it is necessary to believe, right, that God is one and what? Without a body. Which are proven by natural reason by the, what? Philosophers, right? What part of the natural reason there did you beat those things, huh? About God. And that he's incorporeal, right? And that he's one. Yeah. But, you know, you could say when you think about God, I think you could say there's five parts of thinking about God. And the first part of thinking about God is where the God exists, right? And, you know, Thomas has five arguments and both sumas, you know, for that. And, but there are actually more arguments than just five. In fact, they don't have exactly the same ones in the two. And then what's the second part of thinking about God? No, that's part of it, yeah. But the second part, Thomas says, is about the substance of God. And one of the things that is said is that God is what's simple, right? So, actually, there's five again, right? The simplicity of God and the, what, perfection of God, those two. And then the, what, unity of God and the, what, the infinity of God, infinity of God. and then the God being unchanging, motionless, right? Now, the order in the two sumas of those five, and especially as regards God being unchanging and so on, it's a little different, right? Because the proofs are a little different of the existence of God, right? And you build upon those, huh? Okay? So, it's in that second part of the substance of God, right? That you would have, what, unum at incorporeum, right? In incorporeum being part of the, the simplicity of God. He's not put together like a body is put together, right? Okay? It's kind of an amazing thing there, you know, when Thomas takes it up, because, especially when you go to the Summa Theologiae, he has a question on the simplicity of God, and there's like eight articles, right, in there. But the first six articles are just proving that this particular kind of composition is not found on God, and then this one, and this one, and there's six articles of that sort. And then the seventh article is showing that in no way can he be composed, in no way can he put together, right? And I see the Summa kind of gentile, which is written for the, you know, you know, these divishly intelligent, you know, Dominican theologians, right? You know, he begins right away by showing there could be nothing of that sort, right? But when he gets to that seventh article, he says, what? He's going to show it by induction as well as by syllogism. and he induces from those six articles before, right? You say, oh my goodness, Thomas must think that there's only six ways of being put together, that every way of being put together is one of these six. And as you study those six, you realize that the first three ones that he eliminates individually, right, in the first six articles, is a kind of composition of what we're putting together that's found only in material substances. And the last three are found in both and in material one, right? So you keep thinking about that and you say, I'm, you know, starting to be convinced, right, that there's only six ways of being put together. And the first way of being put together is to have a body and to have your parts put together, right, huh? So somehow my liver and my teeth, they're kind of attached to, you know, but the way the continuous parts are, right? And then the second, but that's not found in the angels, right? They don't have a body either. And then the second way is what? Well, I'm put together from a body and a soul. That's a different way of being put together. And, you know, sometimes you get a kind of a agnostic, you know, scientist or, you know, a guy who's dissecting bodies all the time and, you know, I dissect a body, I get a liver and I get a heart and I get a, you know, teeth and I get bones and so on. But you never see, you know, a soul laying there on the table. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I'd be even more surprised than he would be if a soul lay on the table, right? You know? That's really a different kind of thing, right? You know, if you want to take a homeless example of something a little bit like soul and body, right? But it's more proportionally safe. You know, if you took apart this chair, you'd get, you know, some legs and some, you know, seat and so on. Would you get the shape of the chair? No, that's lost, right? It's not going to show up like one of the parts of the thing, yeah? And then Thomas says, this is a third kind of composition and he's very concrete there with me. He says, that whereby Socrates is Socrates and that whereby Socrates is a man. They're not the same. If Socrates was by the same thing a man and Socrates, Socrates would be the only man around and that's the way the, what, angels are. so Michael, That whereby Michael is this kind of angel, right? And that whereby he's Michael I'm the same. But that whereby I'm a man and whereby I'm Dwayne I'm not the same, right? So that's a third kind. But those three kinds of composition are being put together, right? So on it. material substances, right? And then he has three that are found in material substances and in the angels, right? And one is the composition of the substance and the, what, being, existence of the thing, okay? So even in the angels, the substance of the angel and the, what, the existence of the angel, and that's the same thing, okay? And then there's composition in the angels' life and us of what it is and its, what, powers, right? So the understanding or the, what, will of an angel is not the same thing as a substance. And then, strange as it may seem, huh, there's a composition of genius and difference in the angels as well as in us, right, huh? But then when he gets to the seventh article, he has this inductive argument, right, huh? He's not, in any one of these six ways, God put together. And therefore, he's all together simple. And then he gives the universal reasons, the logistic reasons, right? You know, magnificent, magnificent text, huh? Then he goes on to show that God is universally perfect, right, from what he's showing. Simplicity, huh? Magnificent, magnificent text. Now, what does Thomas answer? Well, he got a big print there, right? I got one of those things on my computer that does a big print like that, too, you know? I answer, it should be said, that it is necessary for man to take, right, or to receive, by way of faith, not only those things which are above reason, but also those things which are able to be, what, known. And this, this is an account of three reasons. First, that more quickly, man would, what, arrive at a knowledge of the divine truth. For the knowledge, the reasoned out knowledge, as I call Shintzia, to which it pertains to prove that God, what, to be, and others of these things about God, is proposed last, huh, for men to be learned, huh? Presupposing many other reasoned out knowledge, right? And this is not except after much time of life that man arrives at a knowledge of what. Yeah. Okay, well, that makes sense to me, right, huh? Wouldn't want to wander around the thing, I wonder if God exists, you know? Yeah, yeah. Well, I've got to study logic first, and then I've got to study geometry, and then I've got to study philosophy of nature, and oh my gosh. And thus, not except after a long time of life, would man arrive at the knowledge of God. So, good to believe God about God, then, right, huh? Even though it seems that you can arrive at, by your natural reason, as an old man, right, huh? The scripture says there, man has another science, adds another pain. Second, that the knowledge of God might be more common, right, huh? For many, in the study of reasoned out knowledge, are not able to, what, progress, right? Even on account of the, what? Dullness. Dullness, huh? Yeah. Of their genius powers. Or an account of other occupations and necessities of temporal life, huh? Even account of the, what? Torpor, huh? Laziness, yeah. Of learning, right, huh? These are like the reasons, yeah. Thomas gives for faiths, other places. And therefore, they would, what? Fraudently, yeah, from the knowledge of God, unless it were proposed divinely, right, through, by way of faith. And third, an account of certitude, right? The other student is up there and believing God, right, huh? How could you be more certain? For human reason, in divine things is multum deficiens, huh? Of which a sign is that the philosopher is, right, huh? Pursuing human things, right? By natural investigation, huh? In multis era verunt, huh? They said contrary things one to another, right? Therefore, that there might be undoubtful, I mean, not to be doubted, but, and certain knowledge among men about God. It is necessary that divine things be treated by way of faith, as it were, a deodicta, right? Okay? Who can neither deceive nor be deceived, huh? So to the first, it should be said, then, that the investigation of natural reason does not suffice for the human race, for the knowledge of divine things, which can be shown by reason, huh? And therefore, it is not superfluous that such things be believed, huh? Got this family that comes, they go to daily mass there, they, she comes in, they have, what, ten children, I think, you know, but some of them are in, you know, school away now, but there's eight of them, you know, and they, they all need to heal down. And, uh, I was kind of watching the other day there, because there were, uh, four older children and four younger ones, right? Or five, I guess, yeah, five, yeah. And each older child had a young one next to him, right, in the same pew, you know, so they couldn't, you know, each other, yeah. And then the left, one left over she had, you know, she was holding her arms all the time. There's one little boy, you know, he was up to communion time, he's not yet, you know, to receive communion, you know, but he comes back from the, he goes over to the cross there and he kisses the cross and goes back to the pew, right? And then after, after mass, he gets out of the pew and gets over, he kisses again, goes up, you know, kneels in front of the tabernacle, comes back, kisses again. So, he's really, he's really, really got that up. But marvelous, I mean, I'm sure that they, they believe, right, huh? Yeah. You know? I remember when, when I was in graduate school, you know, one time we were in this course where DeConnick was, was teaching, you know, something about the processes of God, right? And he says, uh, I think I can prove that God exists, he said, but I would not, I would not be so presumptuous as to say so. You know? And sometimes you get in the high school, so I tell you, they give the proofs, you know, and they think they understand them and they don't really, you know? And, uh, it's, uh, but he said, uh, I believe more that God exists than what my mother told me, than for his study of Thomas, nobody. He gave us kind of a fatherly talk one time, you know, and, uh, he, he was, uh, I mean, he did, you know? Very good, yeah? Barberous man. I told you about it, his, uh, session there with, with Pius XII? Yeah. Yeah. I told you about that, didn't I? Yeah. Yeah. He had, uh, private sessions with a number of theologians, you know, and he had with Deconic, and, uh, Deconic, you know, went back to what Thomas points out very clearly, that strictly speaking, Peter's not in heaven, because Peter is something composed of a body and soul, and his soul is there, but Peter's not there, I can see, you know? Well, if the body of Mary is up to assume to the heaven, then Mary would not be there. Oh, that's scary. He's very impressed, he's very impressed with this, you know, 5th to 12th, they say, you know. Yeah. The iconocles are always trying to get, I'm seeing Diane, you know, to write something for the Laval, Théologique and Philosophique, you know. So he wrote, you know, The Grace of Mary is at the Hypothetic Union, or, yeah, yeah. I go in there, I wrote my thesis under Diane, you know, and I go in there and have a little outline of what I've got to do with my thesis, you know. And he was, you know, correcting the order, and so on, you know. Sapiensis or Nari. He says, yeah, it's not good the way it is now. He says, well, I don't have any evidence, he says. Well, once I had the order, I could do the whole thing on my own, because he was going over to Vatican II, you know, and. And you guys are great, great guys. Yeah. Now to the second argument. The second, it should be said that about the same thing, there cannot be knowledge, reasoned out knowledge, and belief in the same person, right? Up with Indem. Okay. But that which is by one man known can be by another, what? Believed. Believed, yeah. And that's the two of all of us in quite a few years, yeah. You used to know it, but now I just believe it again. Even I who had Aquinas as my first teacher, you know. You know that, didn't you? Yeah, yeah. Sister St. Joseph there, she was in kindergarten, right? Her name was Sister Aquinas, you know. So I tell people, my first teacher was Aquinas, you know. But I wasn't quite ready for the Aquinas. Yeah, well, you're speaking of the fourth, the first. Yeah, yeah. To the third, it should be said that if all things knowable can be in the notion of science, right, it is not however suitable that they be, what, ordered to be attitude, huh? And therefore it's not equally that all propose to what be believed, huh? Well, we got to that article, huh? Okay, well, this, again, so this relates to the three things that Thomas said about that. So the first one would be to crater a deum, right? That would match the number one. Well, see, to crater a deum is kind of the object, I think, the material object, right? And deo, D-E-O, would be, you know, you're relying upon God, right? Okay. So the first one. Deo is the first one. Deo, right? Yeah, deo, I guess, yeah. Yeah. And then deum, you know. Deum. Yeah. And then in deum. And that means that you will, right? Well, that's part of it, right? Here I'm kind of being a little bit playful there. Okay. But it's good to believe God because he can either deceive or be deceived, right? Maybe that's good to believe me, you know. Yeah. That I can deceive and be deceived. But nothing better about to believe about, right? About God, right? And so that's one reason why I say it's good to do, right? I can also say that the good is the object of will, right? And the will moves reason to believe, right? And so you bring in the fact that the will is moving, the reason kind of evidence, you know, that it's good. And now it's comparing it to, you know, what Aristotle says, you know, that all knowledge is such as good, but some knowledge is better because it's more of what? It's about a better thing or because it's more certain, right? And this is both of those excellences, right? You realize that, you know, the perfection of this act of form of faith, right? And he's in number three there, right? Preasing God. But it's kind of interesting, you know, when you talk about faith, we haven't studied yet the virtue of faith yet, have we? We have the object of faith and then the act of faith and then the pro-life of faith. But once you acquire the virtue, right, of faith, right, then it's in accordance with any virtue, almost any habit, right? You have a certain inclination following upon the presence of that habit in you, right? I want you to remind me now, there's a little boy there, in St. Paul, Minnesota, that's my hometown. We'd go over to Minneapolis sometimes and swim in the lakes. Minneapolis is called the music, city of the lakes, right? And we'd play sometimes in many hot halls, you know, and so on. So we were over there playing, me and my brothers, right? And my mother and father brought us up, you know, respect and be just and so on. And here we'd find a billfold, money in it, right? Well, it never occurred in my mind, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. To pocket my money. I mean, it didn't take, I mean, it couldn't be a ball. I mean, I had no temptation, no, it's just, it's not a ball. I'm like, let's go down to the concession down there, you know, and say, did somebody, you know, report a loss to a full? No, no, no, no, we, of course, we didn't take that or take the money, you know, they're cursed. And then we went home and we were looking at the newspaper all the time and somebody was advertising it for a loss in the off halls, whatever it was. And so we called him on the phone, right? Remember the day he comes over here, he wasn't too wealthy, you know, the old broken-down car, you know, he's there. And so we made sure that he was the guy, you know, that belonged to me, you know, the thing. And he wanted to, you know, give us an award. I don't know, my parents are going to be allowed. Yeah, yeah. You know, all that sort of stuff. So you realize that you have something of the virtue of justice, right? Yeah. And you're inclined to do what is right, it's really exciting to do something, you know? Just think of my friend George Washington, right? He's really impressive that way, you know? And integrity and so on. It's like that when you have the virtue of what? Yeah, it's a real habit, right? And the virtue, the habit of the virtuous, and you're inclined to believe, right? You're moved to do that, right? But, you know, I remember when I said, yeah, I'm always synthesizing how Aristotle would have to give maybe the abstract reason, you know? He'll give a, what, a sign of the truth of what he's saying, right? And he's very careful with that. It's kind of like going back to your senses before your analogy ends, right? So what is, what is like that in faith? So it respects our nature as an animal, right? It has senses, and goes back to the senses, right? What is that? Well, it's the miracles, right? It's all miracles. Yeah, yeah. So there's two ways that we are inclined to believe, right? One is by the habit itself of faith, right? The virtue itself of faith, which, like every virtue, right? Inclines you to act there in accord with the inclination given you by the habit. And then also miracles and things of that sort, right? They are, they are, what, a way they're apportioned to us, you know, who started all our knowledge with the senses, right? And so it's another sign you should believe, right? Okay? Apparently he didn't like that. He did like that rose from the dead, right? Raised from the dead, right? He tried to kill him, too, you know? It was a very striking piece. A lot of times, too, you know, even in philosophy, you know, when you have an abstract argument, you kind of understand it, you know? You go out and you find a striking example, but you know, oh, you know, that's what people were talking about in class there all day long, like that, like that, what you say, you know? You know? And it's something like that, right? You're inclined to believe these things by the virtue of faith itself, and then, what, you go out and hear about some miracle or something like that. Thank you. And I was just speaking with somebody last week who was coming to faith in the saints. And so I kind of spontaneously started to propose examples from the saints who did really extraordinary things. I use the example of Padre Pio, who I kind of try to be respectful, but I call him kind of like a freak of God. Because certain things have happened with him in his life and that he didn't, it doesn't seem to fit. There doesn't seem to be any real reason. Why was he up in the clouds directing the bomber, the Allied bombers, to avoid, why did God, what did he, except that it's a very striking test point. And as this lady said to me when I was pointing out, there's something more to be seen here. Not just that he's an extraordinary man doing weird things, but there's something more to this religion and what he is assigned of. And the example of the shroud or whatever, those are things that oftentimes with people, who are coming to faith that were really striking, there's something more to this religion. So there's two different things I'm distinguishing here, right? One is that sensible sign, you know, raising the glasses or, you know, the water and the wine, the first miracle, I guess. But the other thing is the, what, if you receive the habit, right, it's an infused habit, right, it's not acquired by your own act. And then you get a certain, what, inclination to what, what is in harmony with that habit, right, huh? So there's a different reason for believing than a miracle, right? Yeah, Father Boulet used to, boom, then it was. I would tell you about Father Boulet, you know, he was a kind of interesting man, right, huh? And, but he spoke a very rapid French, right, and I'd get a few lacunae in my notes, you know, and so on. And so my first oral exam from Father Boulet, yeah, and I remember studying the night before and saying, I missed something there, you know, it's French, you talk, get awful Quebec French sometimes, too, you know. And so I remember I had two or three lacunae in my notes, but part of it, I really had the course down my mind, you know. So the first question he asked, boom, because then one of those things, and then second question, boom. So it was at least to me, maybe those three things I just, you know, blank, right, I didn't even, you know. And so he sits back in his seat, you know, and he says, Mr. Burkwist, he says. What do you know? Well, apart from those, you know, two or three lacunae, just little things, I really had the course down. And so, of course, I was, my, my, my, my, so what do you know? So I went down, I started out, bang, bang, bang, you know, perfect order, you know. He was kind of amazed, you know, and he said, I'm going to give you the highest possible mark. I'd want to give you more, but you could only, you know. You know, yeah, this is the highest number I can give him, right. So I got taught us, jealous, smiles, you know. Well, then, then second time I was going to take an oral exam with him, right? And he was, they had reversed the alphabetic order, right? So Burkwist, usually I would go in, almost the first student, and I was the last student going in, right. And so I come in, and I sit down, you know, waiting for my oral exam to begin. He's getting up, you know. He went sober, and he's pretty fast, you know, cool, no, no, it was like that. And I didn't think for him to start the exam, you know. He said, oh, at one exam, he said, call me on the phone, and he walks out. I said, what the heck am I supposed to do, what the heck am I supposed to do, you know. Does he expect me to call him on the phone, take a oral exam? And so I went to somebody, you know, who knew him. He says, you know, he thinks you really know the stuff. He's going to give you, you know, top grade, you know, and so on. Which he, of course, did, you know. This is kind of a, I didn't know what to do, you know. I mean, does he expect me to call him on the phone? So he's kind of, he's kind of a, you know, character, yeah, yeah. And, yeah, I'll tell you other stories about him, but I suppose I'll get back to this serious stuff here. He stopped off at the wall, you know, because you'd heard about Monsignor Dion, right? And I guess he went to some other university, some other guy had some big reputation. And Monsignor was so careful, and so, this is the guy I'm going to study under, you know. So they became very good friends. So they became very good friends. Okay, now, whether man is held to believing something explicitly, right? To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that man is not held to believing something explicitly, right? For no one is held to that which is not in his power. But to believe something explicitly is not in the power of man. As it said in Romans 10, right? That's what none likes, right? He works in St. Paul. In what way, right, can they believe, right? Who have not heard, right? Because faith is exalted to, right? How can they hear without someone preaching? And how can, what, they preach unless they be sent, right? Therefore, to believe something explicitly, man, is not held. It's possible. Moreover, just as by faith we are ordered to God, so also by charity. But to observe the precepts of charity, a man is not, what, held. But it suffices that he has only a preparation of his soul, right, huh? So what does Christ say at the last judgment there, right, huh? I was hungry and you, yeah, see. But you've got to do something to help this person who's, what, hungry, right, huh? And like also in that precept of the Lord, huh? If someone strikes you in one cheek there, I guess, offer him the other one, right, and so on. And in other things like that, as the great Augustine expounds in his book on the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, which is mainly in, what, the Matthew, right? That's more complete. It's in Matthew and Luke, I guess, where the Our Father is found only. But in Luke it's kind of shorter, you know. Therefore, man is not held explicitly to believing something, but it suffices that he has a soul prepared to believe in those things which are proposed by God. Well, it sounds reasonable, huh? Moreover, the good of faith consists in a certain obedience, huh? According to that of Romans 1.5, to obeying faith in all, what, nations. But the virtue of obedience is not required that man, what, observe some determined precepts, but that he has a soul that is prompt to obeying. You know, obeying. According to that of Psalm 118. For I to assume I am prepared, right? I am not disturbed that I am a guard who keeps the commandments, huh? Therefore, it seems enough, right, for faith that man has a prompt soul to believe in those things which are divinely proposed, huh, to him. Without this, that he explicitly believes something, huh? But against this is what is said in the epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 11, verse 6. To the one approaching God, it is necessary to believe that he is, and that he's the man who rewards, right, those seeking him. Let's see what the master says now. I answer it should be said that the precepts of the law, which man, what, is held to, are given about the acts of the virtues, which are the way of arriving at, what, isolation. But the acts of the virtues, as has been said above, is taken according to the relation of the habit to the object. But in the object of any virtue, two things can be considered. That which is properly and per se the object of the virtue, which is necessary in every act of virtue. And again, that which piracidans, or in a subsequent way, is what? Has itself to the preparatio of the object. Just as to the object of fortitude properly and per se pertains, to sustain the, what? Death. And what? Yeah, on account of the common good, right? Was it Washington there? Those first guys that were put in the army, they didn't have much discipline, right? How am I going to win an R.I. war with these? It wasn't why he did. Yeah. He led them. They were really stirred by that. Yeah. This old man who was not. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah, Washington did that sometimes, too. Okay. But that a man be armed, right? Or that with a, what? Yeah. Strikes in a just war, or something of this sort he does, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but, what? Pratchidans. So the determination of a virtuous act to the private and parousal objects of the virtue is under the necessity of the precept, just as the act of virtue itself. But the determination of a virtuous act to those things which accidentally, or secondarily, it may be a little different thing, has itself to the private and parousal object of the virtue. It does not, what, come out of the necessity of the precept, except sometimes for this place and this time. It should be said, therefore, that the object of faith, per se, is that by which man is made, what? Blessed. Blessed, huh? As has been said above. But the Pratchidans, or secondarily, has itself to the object of faith, all things which in Scripture divinely treated are contained, right? Just as Abraham had two sons, that David was a son of, yeah, and others of this sort. But as regards to the first things to be believed, which are the articles of faith, a man is held explicitly to, what, believe. So we see the creed on Sunday, don't we? Just as we are held to have, what, faith. But as regards to the other things to be believed, man is not, what, held to explicitly, what, believe. But only implicitly, or in preparation of the soul, insofar as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in divine Scripture, right? But then only things of this sort must he explicitly believe when, what, it stands to reason, right? That this is contained in the teaching of faith. The fullness of faith, right, to the Pratchidans, or so? Could be, could be. To the first, therefore, it should be said that if in the power of man it would be said that, what, thus to many things a man is held which he cannot, what, without grace that repairs him, right? As, like, loving God and his neighbor. And similarly, to believing the articles of faith. But nevertheless, man is able to do this with the aid of, what, grace. That's probably the new Pope, right? Which aid is given to some, what, divinely, yeah? To whoever it's given. Mercifully, right? To whom it's not given, from justice not given, in punishment of a foregoing, what, sin, right? At least the original sin, as Augustine says in the book. Yeah. To the second, it should be said that man is... held to determinately loving those things lovable which are properly in pairs say objects of charity to wit God and once what neighbor but the objection proceeds about those precepts of charity which are falling upon in that way pertain to the object of faith to the third it should be said that the virtue of obedience properly consists in the what the will not in reason and therefore for the act of obedience it suffices that the promptness of the will is subject to the one commanding right which is the proper and pairs say object of obedience but this precept or that one or consequent there has itself to the private pairs say object of obedience is it all that explicitly? no it's six articles you read to this whether all are equally held to having an explicit faith to the sixth one proceeds us it seems that equally all are held to having explicit faith because for those things which are the necessity of salvation all are held this is clear about the precepts of charity but the making explicit of things to be believed is of the necessity of salvation therefore all are equally held to believing what moreover no one is held about those things to believe explicitly those things he's not held to believing but sometimes the simple ones right are examined about the little articles of faith therefore all are held explicitly to believe all moreover if the the little ones are not held to have explicit faith but only implicit faith is this is that they have implicit faith in the faith of those who are greater but this seems to be dangerous because it's possible that the greater ones can err right therefore it seems that the lesser ones ought to have a explicit faith and thus therefore all equally are held to believing explicitly yeah when you write your letter to but against this is what is said job one that the what in the asses i guess yeah because they seem what the lesser ones who are the lesser ones who are signified by the asses they have to believe in the things to be believed to the greater ones who are signified by the boves as gregory expounds and that's an interesting metaphor right that you have in the songs huh right that the boves huh are the higher and the other ones are lower he has a quote here from joe one yeah but the assinae are said to what parche bond where yuxta the integrated ones right because the minor ones who are signified by the asses ought to be what in things to be believed to adhere to the greater ones yeah were signified by the boves as gregorius expounds in the second book of immoralia now he's a big big authority he's very great i answered it should be said that the unfolding of things to be believed comes about through divine revelation for the things what are to be believed exceed natural reason but the revelation divine revelation in a certain what order to the higher ones thomas is always quoting that quaea deo sunt or in nata sunt just as to men to the angels and to the lower angels through the higher ones as is clear to dionysius and the celestial hierarchy thomas if his mind is really below dionysius right he doesn't talk the way about aristotle he's kind of equal to aristotle yeah thomas is one of the few people that could be fully understand aristotle right you know i was trying to try and understand the distinction there the senses of before and after and uh aristotle gives in order four senses of it right and then it's like he's forgotten the sense right there seems to be another one you know and now i say what does that where does that belong in the distinction and the order of the senses see is that supposed to be fifth in order see i said um when aristotle was distinguishing the senses of a word um equivocal by reason does he put all the senses that he gives in a what one straight line or is there a a straight line of the central senses and then there are other senses that could be laid alongside or under these chief senses right well what's a dummy that can be supposed to do right well one of the most magnificent examples of thomas's understanding aristotle is in his commentary on what uh in the the physics physics right yeah yeah natural hearing yeah and uh the um aristotle has distinguished eight senses of the word in or to be in right but in the text we have we don't have his ordering of those senses right so thomas now says we're going to order those eight senses right in the way aristotle teaches us in the fifth book of wisdom and so he does so magnificently right the first sense of to be in is what yeah to be in this room here right now what's the second sense of to be in part in the whole yeah and then uh what's the third sense what's the third sense oh he says genus in the what yeah see well the genus and differences too for that matter are in the species as a part of the definition is in the whole definition right but it's a little more hidden in that sense then you know pages yeah it's a part of the book right now okay it's up in the mind right okay and then when he gets to the fourth sentence what is that they say what's that just the reverse he said the genus is in the species the third sense and now he turns around says the species is in the genus what the hell is that guy doing you know well thomas says well there's two kinds of whole right there's a composed hole which is put together from its parts and the second the third sense are dealing with that kind of a hole and then there's the what the universal whole right and that's even more hidden from us right okay that's the fourth sense right then what does he say form and matter well you see that's like species in the genus because it's a species actually in the genus it was actually in there when i said dog is an animal then cat would be in dog right but cat is only an animal in ability right okay and then the one my favorite one huh he goes to the active sense of ability i've got you in my power okay okay and then finally he comes to the sense of what okay treasure is there where heart shall be right now okay so he's taken the eight senses aristotle is there and he's ordered them you know from the first to the last right and then he says aristotle seems to have left out the sense of give you the nerve of that guy right he says uh in time and thomas says well we lay this alongside in place right because they're both an external extrinsic what measure right now so he's not trying to stick in that sense of in what time in the order of the first to the eighth senses of in that aristotle gives right so he said now i figured out something i believe that uh not every sense of a word equivocal by reason right should be put in one simple linear order, right? But you get the central senses, I call them, right? And then there's some other senses that have some special likeness to one of these senses, and you can put that alongside or below that, right? So then I became armed, you know, to try to figure out the thing in the categories, right? And it seemed to me that the sense in which the cause is before the effect, is not fifth in order, but it seems to be like the second sense, before in what being, right? And just as what, as effect depends upon the cause, so what is after in being depends upon what is before in being, right? They got that from Thomas, you know, that that's the way to proceed, right? Start to find examples, you know? It's absolutely amazing the way Aristotle understands these things, right? And Thomas is the only guy who could... Make the thing out and appreciate fully Aristotle, yeah. So everybody else has to go around making mistakes, fallacy and equivocation, right? You're condemned to that, to doing that, huh? Modern philosophers are always committing that fallacy. Mistake for mixing up the senses of a word, right? But more of a word equivocal by reason than one equivocal by chance because there's a connection among meanings, equivocal by reason, huh? But as my teacher De Connick said, you know, every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason. Kind of amazing to see that, you know, huh? You're getting to realize that, huh? You can't even give the axioms without using words equivocal by reason. A whole is more than part, right? And you can't even understand that without the, what, realizing that the word whole and part are equivocal by reason, huh? And I used to take my students and I'd say, now, talk about the importance of this, right? And then I'd say, I'd tell a little story, you know, get them, you know, kind of relax like it, you know? And I tell the true story, though, right? When I said that man is an animal, my mother, what, said, Dwayne, that doesn't sound good to me. I said, well, he's not just an animal, right? He's an animal that has reason. My mother said, well, that's better, Dwayne. My mother never went to college like that, you know, but it didn't seem right to her for me to call man an animal, right? But if I said an animal was reasonable, that was better, Dwayne. Okay? So I said, to be an animal is only a, what, part of what man is, right? Okay? So all the students agree to that, right? I said, but animal includes, besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? So sometimes what is only a part contains more than the whole, right? You say, oh my goodness, maybe, well, what's happening here, right? You're mixing up two different senses of whole and part. The first sense of whole is the composed whole is put together from its parts, right? The second sense of whole is the universal whole, which is not put together from its parts, which they call the subject parts, but it's said of them, right? And so you've got to be careful, right? A composed whole is always composed of more than one of its parts. And a universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts. But you mixed up those two different senses, and then I got them, you know, doubting the axioms, right? You say, my God, you know, if you can make a mistake about the whole is more than a part, you can start to doubt that that's true, you know? Yeah, I mean, that's really, you know? And that's something very fundamental, right? I mean, Euclid, you know, is as an axiom, right? I mean, statement known to itself by all. Yet my students there who don't understand fully the name, the critical organism, purpose is to show now that the park could sometimes contain more than the whole, see? But if you're considering the animal as a composing part of the definition of man, right? Then the definition of man contains more than, as my mother pointed out, animal, if it all contains reason, right? But if it's a composed whole, right, it's composed more than one, right? That's really kind of striking, you know, that we're so dependent upon words of biblical by reason. Terrible. So Aristotle and Thomas seem to understand such words. The sophist has some appreciation of this. Okay. So we're down to the implied objections, aren't we? We're talking about... We're in the middle, we just... Yes, let's start hard. Yeah, yeah. So also, the higher men, right, to whom it pertains to instruct others, right, are held to have a more, what, fuller knowledge of things to believe and to more explicitly, what, believe, huh? So Monsignor Diana, the grace of Mary is of the hypostatic order, right? Well, you know, like the commoner... In Sunday views, yeah. He has to have the explicit analogy of the grace of Mary, right, huh? You know? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the making explicit of the things to be believed is not equally, as regards all people, of the necessity of salvation. Because, what, the greater, the more educated and so on, are what held to have more explicit knowledge of these things, huh? Because these are those who have the office, right, of instructing others. That's what's common sense, huh? Now, the second, it should be said that the simple are not, what, to be examined about the subtleties of faith, right? Except when there's this, what, heresy going around, right? So it has had a suspicion, right? That they have been, right, depraved by heretics, right, huh? Who, in those things, right, that pertain to the subtlety of faith, they're accustomed to lead them astray, right? Make them depraved. It's a little hard way of speaking of them. But if they're not found to be pertinacitair, huh? Pertinacitair, huh? Sturbinate. Adhering to perverse doctrine. If they fail in such things some simplicity, it should not be imputed to them, right? How's this argument, huh? And God made Adam, right? Wasn't he lonely? He couldn't get, you know, companionship with the dog or the cat or the lion or something, right? So then he made what? Yeah, he, yeah. And she was close to him in nature, right? What about the angels, right? Every angel is a different kind of angel, right? So aren't the angels very, what? Yeah, yeah. It's kind of hard to see this creature that belongs to another genus or another species. You know, how can you say, yeah? You know, how can you say, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah