Secunda Secundae
Lecture 14: The Definition of Faith: Substance and Conviction

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on a little bit to question 4. Then we're going to have to consider about the virtue of faith. And first, about faith itself. Secondly, about those having faith. Third, about the cause of faith. And fourth, about the effects of it. About the first, yes, eight things are asked. First, what is faith? This is the habit of the virtue, right? Secondly, in what power of the soul is it as in a what? Subject. Third, whether its form is charity. How can its form be charity? That's another virtue. And fourth, whether the same in number is formed faith and unformed faith. Fifth, whether faith is a what? Virtue. Sixth, whether its one virtue. Seventh, about its order to other virtues. And eighth, and not least, comparison of its certitude to the certitude of the what? Intellectual virtues that Aristotle talks about in the sixth book of the Ethics. Now, whether this is a, article one, a suitable definition of faith. Faith is the what? Substance of things hoped for. The conviction, I could translate it, of things that do not, what? What? Peer. Things not seen, huh? Incidentally, the word substantia there, right? That's a correct translation, etymologically, of the text. The text is what? It's the same two parts of the Greek word here. Substance, right? Stapusia. That's where Aristotle uses it, right, huh? Okay? But it has a word that has sub instantia stand under. Always check this in the Bible, you know, how they translate that. So I don't want to buy that Bible or not. Okay. The first, therefore, one proceeds, it seems that it's an incompetent definition of faith, which the apostle lays down in the epistle to the Hebrews. Faith is the substantia of things hoped for. Ouch, he's trying to look at the word argumentum there, huh? It's not an argument for that. It doesn't appear. It's kind of like a contradiction in words there, right? Conviction? Yeah. Conviction, I used to say conviction, yeah. Now, this guy has obviously studied the categories, right? No quality is a substance, but faith is a, what? Quality. It's in the third highest geno, right? Substance, quantity, quality. Since it is a virtue, theological virtue. And all virtues and all habits are, what? In the species of quality. Therefore, it's not a substance. I suspect that there's somebody being deceived by the equivocation of words, right? Yeah. Mother's joy, saving us a little boy. I see some of the blind man, but he couldn't see at all. Moreover, too, of diverse virtues, diverse are the, what? Objects, huh? But res speranda, thing to be hoped for, is the art of hope, right? Yeah, not therefore to be laid in the definition of faith as its object, huh? Sounds like a good objection, doesn't it? Yeah. Moreover, faith is more perfected by charity than by hope. Therefore, more ought to be placed in the definition of faith. Res deligenda, huh? Things to be loved, than things to be hoped for. Goodness say, Paul's really, yeah, it's really. Yeah, good at it. Moreover, the same thing should not be placed in diverse genera. But substance and argumentum are diverse genera, and not one placed under the other. Therefore, unsuitably, faith is said to be both substance and, what? Argumentum. It's like saying it's both a dog and a cat or something, right? You know? See, it's both a dog and an animal, because one is placed under the other, right? The dog and cat, one is not under the other. So that's nonsense, you know. A French guy, they would have enjoyed us a lot, I think. He's supposed to take the objections, you know, and left the text out, the explanation. Yeah, you know. Moreover, through argument, truth is made known, right? For that to which the argument is induced. But that which is apparent, but that is apparent, who's what? Truth is what? Yeah. Therefore, it seems to imply an opposition that it says argumentum non-appearance, you know. Argument not making something appear. Sounds like it's crazy, right? Argument not demonstrating anything. You're hopeless, Paul. I don't know. You better go take logic courses, Dr. Burkwest. And contrary to all this, is sufficient the authority of the apostle. Well, this guy's got faith. Yeah, this is theology. That's what Thomas says in the reply here. I answer it should be said that although some say that the foregoing words of the apostle are not a definition of faith, right? Nevertheless, is someone what? Right they consider it. That's why I always say in our middle prayer there before we begin, that we will write them more correctly, yeah. So although some say that the foregoing words of the apostle are not a definition of faith, nevertheless, is someone rightly considers. Omnia. All the things of which faith is able to be defined are touched upon in the foregoing description. What does he see that I don't see? It's amazing, isn't it, what he's saying? Omnia. All things of which faith can be defined are touched upon in the foregoing description. And I thought that he was just goofing off there. My goodness. Although the words are not ordered under the grammatic form of a definition, right? Just as among philosophers, often is what? Omitted the syllogistic form of what? The syllogisms, although the principles of the syllogisms are touched upon. You're suddenly aware of what philosophers do that all the time, don't you? Now, to the evidence of this, it should be considered that since a habit or habits are known by acts, right? And acts by their objects, right? Faith, since it is a certain what? Habit. Ought to be defined to its own act. In comparison to its own, what? Yeah. Now, in a text like that, I don't translate proprium by, what? Proper, right? By its own act, right? And its own object, right? Now, the act of faith is to, what? Believe. Which, as has been said above, is an act of the understanding determined to one, one half of a contradiction, by the command, from the command of the will. Thus, therefore, the act of faith has an order both to the, what? Will. Which is the good and the end. Everything good is either an end or it's ordered to an end. And it's also got a reference to the object of the understanding, right? Which is the truth. And because faith, since it is a theological virtue, said and said above, has the very same thing for its object and for its, what? End. It is necessary that the object of faith and the end, proportionally, right, correspond to each other, right? And it's been said above that the first, what? Truth. Truth is the object of faith, according to it, it is not seen, right? And those things by which an account of it inherits to faith, to the object. And this is necessary, according to this, that the first truth have itself to the act of faith, by way of what? And the end, according to the ratio of a thing not seen, which pertains to the ratio of a thing hoped for, according to that of the apostle to the Romans, chapter 8, verse 25. What we do not see, we hope for. For to see truth is to, what? Have it. That's pretty good. That's exactly right there. But one does not hope for something that he already, what? Has. But hope is about this that is not had, as has been said above, right? And would you say that also about love? Does it have to be not had what you love? Love. Love your friend or your father or your mother or your wife or whatever, right? Yeah. But you know something that you have and don't have, right? And love both. But you can't hope for something that you already have. Hope to be rich when you're already rich. I hope Dr. Burles will be here today. Thus, therefore, the... Now, how many Tudor usually has a sense of kind of like it's a relation, right, huh? Thus, therefore, the relation of the act of faith to an end, which is the object of the will, is signified in this when it is said, faith is the, what? Substance of things, what? Hope for, right? For a substance, which has the idea of standing under, right, huh? So the foundation of a house, right, huh? It's like he's saying that this is like the foundation of a house, huh? And substance has got that etymological sense, right? For the substance is the custom to be called the first, what, beginning of something. And most of all, when the whole thing following is contained in the virtue in the first, what, beginning, huh? As if we say, as if we say, for example, that the first indemonstrable beginnings are the, what, of a science. Because they come first and they underlie everything else, right, huh? And I see the Greek word usia there that Aristotle uses for substance. It doesn't have that etymological sense, right, from what the substantial Latin does. And the other word that you have in Greek, right, in this text is not usia, but the one that made it the same thing, yeah. Now they're called the substance of science because the first that is in us, huh, of a science are these kind of, what, beginnings, right? And in these, in virtue or in power, is contained in the whole, what, science, huh? What? Yeah, yeah. Aristotle in the fifth book of Wisdom there, where he's taking up the words that are equivocal by reason that are used, especially in wisdom, but to some extent everywhere, right? And the first word, of course, is beginning. And he starts off with the idea of the sense of beginning, like the edge of the table is the beginning of the table, right? But then he has a sense of whether the beginning of something is, what, its first fundamental part, right? And that's what the foundation of the house is. So let's give us an example there of the second kind of beginning, where it's actually a part, right? You wouldn't say the edge of the table is really a part of the table, but although it's in the table. But you could say the foundation of the house, right? And they take examples from the boat, too, you know, where the... The prowl or something. Yeah, yeah. And so, right, we can speak of the beginnings of science, right? The definitions and axioms and properties that can be known without having to reason them out, right? And everything else is built upon that, right? Especially after... St. Justin, I don't know if he was from the Aristotle Convention, the house of faith, the foundation, the whole house, the chair, the roof. Yeah, yeah. And then he said, and then how he built the house, and he tools, and that's the second. That's the four parts of the category. Because it's a very, very useful image. Yeah. So, go back over to the beginning of the second paragraph here. Thus, therefore, the habitude of the act of faith to the end, which is the object of the will, is signified in what is said, huh? That faith is the substance of things hoped for. For substance is accustomed to be called what is the first, what? Beginning of something, right? And most of all, when the whole thing following is contained in the power of the first beginning, right? And that's very clear in the example of the axioms, right, huh? The statements that are known, what? Through themselves by all men. And then, as Boethius says, the statements that are per se nota to the wise, right? Right, okay? So, if you know, if you don't know any geometry, you still know that a whole is more than what? Part. But the man who knows some geometry knows that no odd number is even. Because he knows an odd number is an even number is, right? So, it's obvious to the man who has a little bit of wisdom there in geometry, right? And everything else is based upon those, what? Statements, huh? So, you have to trace your way back to those statements. And see how things that come after are in the power of those statements. Take a simple example of how it gets typical in the wrong direction. A very easy theory. When straight lines intersect, right, the opposite angles are, what, equal these two, or these two are equal, right? Now, how do you know that? How do you know that? Well, before you get to this theorem, right, you get the definition of, what, right angles and acute angles, not two angles, right? Now, when a straight line meets a straight line and makes, what, equal angles, we call those, what, right angles. What, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what And then a, what, a tooth angle is more than a right angle and a cute angle is less, but this is a fundamental thing, right? Well, there's a straight line meeting this straight line. It may not be making equal angles, right? But does it make any difference where this other line comes in? Won't this angle and this one here be equal to this one and this one? They occupy the same area, right? Yeah. Okay. So, if a straight line is a straight line, it's going to make either two right angles or angles equal to two right angles, right? This is a straight line meeting a straight line, so these two are going to be either two right angles or equal to two right angles. And these two will be the same thing for the same reason. Now, from equals, equals are what? R is subtracting. The results are what? Equals. So they're going to have to be equal, right? We've gone back to things that were more known, right? Quantities. What? Equals. Equals equals are subtracting. The animals, right? Go back to these things that are kind of obviously a thought. And so in the power of these premises is this conclusion here, right? Yeah. So, substance here is kind of signifying that ethologically, right? It stands under everything else and therefore everything else is built on it, yeah. Okay. So we say especially when, what, this is not only the first beginning of a thing, but most of all when the whole thing following is contained in the power of the first beginning, right? As if we say that the first beginnings, indemonstable ones, are the substance of science, right? Because the foundation of the whole science, yeah. Because the first that in us is known of science are these kind of, what, beginnings, huh? Yeah. So they call those principles, what, hearsay, what? Known, huh? Known to themselves, right? Once you understand them. If you know what a whole is and what a part is, right? It's obvious that the whole is more than one of its, what, hearts, huh? Makes sense, huh? Okay. Now, in this way, therefore, faith is said to be the substance of things hoped for. Why? Because it's the first beginning of the things hoped for in us through the ascent of, what, faith, which in its power contains all the things hoped for, right? Now, in this, we hope to be, what? Made blessed. That we will see by a clear vision the truth which we adhere to by what? Faith. As it's clear through those things above which have been said about happiness. Happiness, yeah. Okay. Now, the habitude or relation of the act of faith to the object of the understanding, according as it's the object of faith, is designated in this that is said. It's the, what? Conviction, right? Of things that are not, what? Seer. So, you've got reference to, what? The object of the understanding here, right? The thing you're trying to see. And you're kind of getting a starting point in seeing that, right? Because you believe what you're going to see face to face later on, right? Okay. But when you say it's the substance of things hoped for, you're kind of referring to it's been the object of what? Of the will, right? And the word argumentum here is taken for what? Of argument, right? Okay. Because through an argument, the understanding is induced to adhering to something, what? True. Whence that firm adherence of the understanding to the truth of faith, that does not appear yet, is called here argumentum, right? Whence another letter has convictio, as I kind of imitate that, right? Okay. Okay. Because through the authority, the divine authority, the intellect of the one believing is what? Convinced, right? To assenting to those things which he does not see. Beautiful, he said. If someone therefore wants to put in the form of a definition these words, right, he could say that faith is a habitus of the mind, right, by which is begun eternal life in us. Making the intellect assent to things that are not, what? Here. Now through this, faith is distinguished from all other things which pertain to the understanding, right? Because through this that is said argumentum, it's distinguished faith from what? Opinion, suspicion, doubt. So opinion is stronger than suspicion, but it's still not certain, right? And so dialectic is about what? Opinion, right? Arguing for probable opinions. And suspicion goes into what? The argument that you have in rhetoric, huh? And doubt, of course, is... That's the news. The secret news is all about suspicions. Yeah. And doubt, yeah. Doubt, right? Yeah. Thomas sometimes says that opinion and suspicion are both what? Guesses, right? But opinion, you've got a little more basis for your what? Yeah. I mean, for your thinking and soul, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So it's usually the word argumentum there, right? That they're what? Yeah. One distinguishes then faith from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, to which there is not a first adherence of intellect that's firm to something. But to this that is said that it's the what? Things not appearing. Argumentum, since it separates it from what? Opinion, and what? Suspicion, and doubt, obviously. But non operentium distinguishes it from what? I understand. Yeah. Where things are either obvious or proven through what is obvious, right? Okay. Through this that is called the substance of things hoped for, one distinguishes the virtue of faith from faith commonly taken, right? Which is not ordered to the attitude that's hoped for, right? Now all other, he says, all other definitions, whatever they are that are given to faith, are unfoldings of, right, of this which the apostle lays down. I don't know. Things hoped for, he says, distinguishes the virtue of faith from, what did you say, from faith commonly taken? Like I believe it's going to rain tomorrow. Oh. Yeah. It's a kind of opinion. I believe it's going to rain tomorrow. Yeah, but it's not ordered to. It's not something I'm hoping for. Yeah, they say Thomas will speak of opinion and suspicion as what guesses, right? And it's a little more basis for your guess in the case of opinion and suspicion, but they're both in the genus, you might say, of guess, right? So argumentum is going to eliminate those things from being the same thing. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. And then it's a conviction of what is not seen, separates it from depth in the border. You see that now. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Or like one senior old, you say, voyez-vous! You see this! It could be also the human fate of distinguishing it in the sense of you believe that the guy at the pharmacy is a pharmacist. You don't know that. You believe that you're not holding. You're taking only for some medication. That would be human. The witness is human. Augustine says, he's talking about different ways that they have these things. Faith is a virtue by which are believed things that are not seen. That's already included in what St. Paul says, right? But sometimes it's good to say it in a little bit different way, right? And what Damascene says, right? That faith is a what? Yeah, not an investigated consent, right? Okay. And that some others say, right? And this is one of my Hugo's now, Hugo of St. Victor, huh? Who's the other famous guy at St. Victor? Richard. Yeah, yeah. So I was very struck by the fact. Your brother? Yeah, yeah. His name is Richard, and my name is Hugo, you know. It's in the stars, you know. In the stars, we'd be philosophers. Did you ever go visit? No, I didn't see that. And what others say that faith is the certitude, right? I say Hugo of St. Victor, right? Quaidam, so, De Absentibus, right, huh? Okay. Conviction that was not seen, right? It's got that in there, huh? And Dionysius says, the seventh chapter of the Divine Names, that faith is a what? Manans, remaining, right? Foundation. Foundation, fundamentum, right? Which is kind of the same thing as what? Substantia, right? Of things believed. Bring them together in faith, and in them, truth. That's the same as saints, the substance of things, what? Hope for, right? Now, apply to the objections. The first one is based upon the what? Whose common fallacy in thinking? Fallacy of equivocation, right? To the first thereof, it should be said that substance is not taken here, according as it is the genus, what? Most general. Most general. Divide against the other genera. But according as, in each genus there is found a certain, what? Likeness of substance. Insofar as what is first in some genus, and containing in itself the others in virtue or power, is said to be substance of them. Now, the second objection, huh? Yeah, you can't do that. Yeah, you can't get away with that. To the second it should be said that since faith pertains to the understanding, according as it is what? The will. Necessarily to be ordered, just as to an end, to the object of those virtues that are what? Is perfect. Among who? Which ones is what? Hope, right? And therefore a definition of faith is laid down the object of what? Hope. It also has the idea that that object is what? Not had, huh? But that's not true about love, right? Because there's, you can love God without having this, but you're going to have love if you get the big division, right? So, since faith pertains to the understanding according as it is commanded by the will, So, it is necessary that it be ordered, as to an end, to the object of those virtues by which the will is perfected. Among which is hope, right? Because it will become clear when you talk about hope, right? And therefore the definition of faith is laid down the object of hope. But why the object of hope rather than love, right? Because love can be with, as it's all about. That's what he says in the reply to the third objection, right? The objection is the one that's saying why he should have done, you know. It's more perfected by charity than it is by the other, right? To the third should be... Excuse my voice. To the third it should... That's pretty bad. To the third it should be said that love can be a thing seen and not seen. And a thing is present and what? Absence. Absence, yeah. And therefore, res diligenda, a thing to be loved, right? Is not properly adapted to faith as a thing hoped for, right? Because faith is a things not seen, you don't have them. So it shares with hope of those, you know, the object more of the will, right? That it's not had, you know. Since spes, hope, is always the things absent and not seen. When he sees that call. Yeah, yeah. What about the fourth objection? The same thing ought not to be placed in diverse genres. It's hopeless, you know. But substance and argument are diverse genres. Yeah. With one not being placed under the other. Therefore, unsuitably, faith is called the substance and argument. To the fourth it should be said that substance and argument, according as they are placed in the definition of faith, do not imply diverse genre of faith, nor, what? Diverse acts. Diverse, what? Diverse, what? Relations of one act to diverse, what? Objects. And so it's the object of reason, right? Because it's true. And it's also the object of things hoped for. That's the object in some way of the will, right? Okay? And more when it's not possessing what it is. It's order to, therefore, it's more defined by hope than by what? Charity, right? Well, the charity would be more the form of it than hope, huh? The fifth objection. Moreover, by argument, excuse me, truth is manifested of that to which the argument is induced. But that which is said to be, what? Whose truth is manifest. Therefore, it seems to imply an opposition in this. He calls it argumentum and nona parentium, huh? It's like saying it's a demonstration of what is not seen. To the fifth, it should be said that argumentum, which is taken from proper principles of thing, makes the thing to be apparent, right? But argumentum that is taken from the authority of God does not make the thing in itself to be apparent. And such an argument or such a conviction, right, is placed in the definition of faith, huh? Now, you know, I think the Greek word that he uses there is the one that Aristotle uses for refutation, right? Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of an unusual thing that he does there, right? But when you refute it right, it doesn't mean you see the truth, but it's a strength, you know, huh? It's your refutation of that.