Tertia Pars
Lecture 8: The Incarnation: Union in Person, Not Nature

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which will be, what, disproven below. Secondly, because from this sort of thing, there has not come to be one thing simply, but only in some, what, qualified way. For there would remain many things in, what, act. And third, because the form of such is not nature, but more art, as a form of a house. And thus they would not be constituted one nature in Christ as these guys want, huh? In another way, there comes about something from things that are perfect, but, what, changed, right? As from the elements, there comes about a, what, mixed body, right? And thus some say that the union of the Incarnation was made by a mode of, what, complexion, right? Now, in ancient physics there, right, when earth and air and water and so on combined to make flesh, right, it didn't remain earth, air, fire, and water, right? But they were changed, right, and had a new substantial form, right? Which is the form of the mixed body, right? But this cannot be, right? First, because the divine nature is altogether, what? Unchangeable. As has been said and shown in the first part, huh? You can see the order of the Summa here, right? Even though in Peter's Confession of Faith it begins with the human nature, right, then? Incarnation. It's got to be to understand God to see why this cannot be in this manner. Whence neither can he be converted into another since he is, what, incorruptible, nor can another be converted into him since he himself is ingenible. Secondly, because that which is comixtuma, and I notice in Latin, in Thomas the Latinx, mixtio is a much stronger word than our word mixture, right? When you take a mixture, we think of the things that are still remaining actually, right? But what they call a mixture in the ancient physics is, what, really substantial change, right? Okay? Where the earth, air, fire, and water, the elements come together and don't remain earth, air, fire, and water, but a new substance is produced, right? Through these things being, what? Changed, yeah. So, in that which is comixt, none of the things mixed is the same in, what? Species. For flesh differs from each species of element. It's neither earth nor fire nor water, right? And thus Christ would neither be of the same nature with the Father, nor with his mother. He'd neither be God nor man, right? Third, because from these things, which, what, differ much, there cannot come about a, what, mixture. For the species of one would be dissolved as if one could say, a, what, drop of water, right, in the amphora wine. And according to this, since the divine nature in infinitum infinitely exceeds human nature, there would not be a mixture but to remain only, what, divine nature. Now, in the burning bush, right, what's the symbolism of that, huh? The Church Fathers say that the fire represents the divine nature, huh? And fire is often a metaphor for God's, his divine nature, by its, what, light representing God's understanding, and by its warmth, his love, and by its power to transform things, right? The power of God. And the, what, bush represents the human nature of Christ. And the fact that the fire does not consume the bush is that the divine nature does not, what, swallow up, right? You see? If you try to put them together, one would be, what? Yeah. You know, dropping a drop of wine in the ocean, right? So he has, what, three arguments, huh? And often you see Thomas doing this in the Summa, and in the disputed questions, he'll stop when he gets the arguments. You can give more, but the fourth argument tends to make you forget the first one, and then, so you've also stopped at three, right? The arguments is all over mine to take up, you know? Surprising, as they say, often three shows up, huh? I was reading about the sacrament of confession there, and Thomas is saying that this is kind of a curing of the soul, right? And he calls it, Aristotle says, you know, sometimes the body is cured just by its own internal powers, right? Sometimes it's cured with the help of some medicine or something exterior, right? And then he says, now, our soul can't be cured just by itself, and therefore you need, what, something outside as well, okay? So he says, if you're going to really cure somebody's body, you've got to remove everything that, all the harm that came from this disease, right? So you've got to cure the soul, you've got to remove all the evil that comes from sin, right? Well, how many evils come from sin? Three, yeah, yeah. First, he says, is the, what, first thing that happens to you is a disorder in your soul, right? You turn from God, you know, in some excessive way to some creature thing, right? That's the first evil that you get in your sin, right? The second is, you become, what, worthy of being punished, right? So you're in need of being punished. And third, you've been, what, weakened as far as, what, doing good and avoiding evil now, right? So you have three evils that come from sin, right? That seems to sum it up pretty well, right? And then he goes in to explain how confessional we move these three, right? So sometimes three is enough because that's all there is, right? But even if it's not all there is, it's enough for our mind, in most cases, you know, to see it. So he gives three reasons why this second way of union cannot be, what, taking place, huh? Between the divine nature and the human nature. This is the second union where the two natures are changed in order to form one nature, right? You can't change God, right? That's his fundamental reason, huh? And secondly, if you, what, change the two of them to form one nature, neither one of the original natures remains, huh? So you'd be neither God nor man, right? And the third one is you can't combine natures where there's no, what, balance, right? Where one infinitely exceeds the other, right? One would be swallowed up in the other. Third way, there comes to be something from some things not being changed, but being, what, imperfect, huh? as from the soul and the body comes to be a man, right? Likewise, from diverse members, right? Now, this cannot be said of the mystic incarnation. Here he goes again, three more arguments, right? First, because both nature is perfect in its own, what, definition, right? The divine and the, what, human, okay? Secondly, because the divine and human nature are now able to constitute something by way of, what, quantitative parts as our organs, right? Our members constitute the body because the divine nature is incorporeal, right? Nor can they come together in the manner of the soul and the body of form and matter, right? Because the divine nature is not able to be the form of anything, especially of a bodily thing. That was shown back in the treatise on the substance of God, right? It would also follow that the species resulting would be communicable to many, and thus there would be many Christ's son. That's kind of a footnote, though, to the second argument. Third, because Christ would be neither, what, of human nature nor of divine. Because any difference added varies a species as unity in numbers, as is said, in the eighth book of metaphysics. It's beautiful what Aristotle does in the eighth book of metaphysics, the book of wisdom, where he says that the natures of things are like what? Numbers. And you add or subtract one from a number and you don't have the same number anymore. And you can see that, you know, in Shakespeare's exultation there, right? What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast no more. So, you might say if you have a body, and you add life and you have a what? You have a plant. And if a body and life and you add sense then you've got a what? An animal. A beast. A mental body and life and sense you add reason and you've got man, right? Subtract music you've got an animal. Subtract sense you've got a what? A plant. Subtract life you've got just an animal body, a stone or something, right? So nature of things like numbers. You add a subtract something you have a different what? Nature. So Hairstyle is seeing a little bit of truth and Plato is saying that the natures of things are numbers, right? Well, no, no, not really. But he sees what? He's what we call a good what? Student, right? A good student is like the earth, humble, right? He hears what the master says, listens to it carefully, right? He has some discretion and judgment, right? But then some fruitfulness, right? So he takes what's good and what Plato says. They're not numbers, but they're like numbers, right? In this way. That's why you can use the word more or less like Shakespeare does, right? Now I'm trying to explain what Shakespeare says. What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast no more? And I take it with numbers, right? What is a three if it be what? Half of four? Two no more, right? Is there a necessary connection between being two and being half of four? Like there is between being three and half of six, right? So what is the three if it be half of four? Two no more, right? See? There's a necessary connection between the beast and what the chief good of a beast is. And between a man and what the chief good of a man is. So if the chief good of a man is nothing more than to sleep and feed like that of the beast, then man is more than a beast. See? That's really like numbers, isn't it? There's some precision there. So there's no way this union can be made in what? Nature, right? Now some people have taken the words as Saint John there and the word was made flesh and they would understand it as meaning what? Yeah. Yeah. The union was in the nature. But that don't make no sense. When you think about it now. Now we've got to get Cyril off the hook here. The first therefore it should be said that that authority of Cyril is expounded in the fifth what? Synod, right? Yeah. Yeah. If someone, right? The one incarnate nature of the divine word, right? Same. Does not take this as the father's what? Tat. Because from the divine nature and the human, right? Union. Made according to what? Subsistentia, right? And that would refer to what? The union and the persons, right? But from such words, one nature or substance, right? Of the divinity and the flesh of Christ attempts to deduce, right? Such a one is accursed. Anathema said, okay? Therefore, the sense is not that in the incarnation from the two natures should be one nature constituted, right? But because the one nature of God united the flesh, right? And he's what? Person, right? So Thomas quotes the explanation itself of the synod, right? Okay. That's an old digut, right? Thomas will often say, you know, such a way of speaking should not be extended, right? But piously expounded, right? Okay. But essentially, the synod is saying you shouldn't understand it in the way that the objection is understanding it, right? That's good enough for me. I'm a teachable fellow. The second one is from the Athanasian Creed, huh? The second, it should be said, that from the soul and the body in each of us is constituted a twofold nature, twofold unity, rather, of nature and of person. Of nature, according as the soul is united to the body, perfecting it formally as its form. So that from the two there comes about one nature as from act and ability, or matter and form. And as far as this is concerned, the likeness between the two should not be, what? Observed, right? Because the divine nature cannot be the form of a body as was proven in the first part. That's a question on simplicity of God. But the unity of the person is constituted from them insofar as it is one someone subsisting in the flesh and the soul. And as far as this is to be noted, a likeness, huh? For the one Christ subsists in divine nature and the, what? Human. Well, incidentally, in the Summa Conte Gentilis, he gives a little bit of explanation of the same thing, right? Because in the Athanasian Creed, it says that the union of the human and divine nature in Christ is most like the union of what? The soul and the body. He makes a comparison, right? There's no, nothing in the created world, let's say, that is as much like the union of the human and divine nature in God as that of the soul and the body, right? But Thomas says, what does Athanasius need, right? Okay? And he says, well, this is the way you've got to understand it. As Aristotle explains in the three books on the soul, the soul and the body are joined as what? Form and matter, huh? But also as what? Agent and what? Tool. Tool. Tool. Tool. Okay? Now, notice, Aristotle defines a soul as the first act of a natural body. Composed, right? The parts of the body are, as it were, tools of the, what? Soul, right? Okay? So you have this two-fold comparison of the soul and the body, huh? And so Aristotle's argument against the position of the Pythagorean is that any soul can go into any body, okay? He argues not only from matter and form being relative to each other, but he also argues from the fact that not just any art can use a tool of any art, huh? So my wife possesses the art of the tailor, right? Okay. And she might use a needle and thread and a few other tools. My brother-in-law possesses the art of carpentry, right? He uses a hammer and saw, right? Well, can my wife use the tools of the carpenter? No. And he can't use the tools of the, what? Tailor, right? Okay. So, in what way is the union of the divine nature and the human nature and Christ like the union of soul and body? Well, not like form and matter, right? And that was heretical, right? The Arians and people like that said that the divine nature was in Christ in place of its human soul. So as if like as were the, you know, matter and form, right? Well, that's heretical, right? But the human nature, right, of Christ is like a tool of his, what? Divinity, right? Okay. And then Thomas goes on further and explains that there's two kinds of tools, huh? And one is a tool that is not joined to you, huh? Like a hammer or a saw or something like that, right? But another is a tool like my hand or my teeth or something, right? Which is a tool, what? Joined to me, right? Okay. And what kind of a tool is a priest? A joined or separate tool? If Christ uses you, a priest, to sanctify somebody, if it makes a sacrament or something, right? Offer sacrifice and so on. Are you like the hammer or you're like the hand? Joined by nature. I think we're joined by nature. He is similar in nature. Yeah. But he's using you like you use a, what? Hammer. Okay. See? But the divine nature and the human nature of Christ is like my hand. So it's joined to God, right? In the same person. And therefore it's like a joined tool, right? It's like Thomas says the tongue is a tool of my reason. And not because the reason is the form of my tongue, right? The reason is immaterial power. But I use my tongue to express my thoughts and so on, right? So it's a tool joined to me, right? Okay. So that's the explanation he gives, right? Of the affirmation created here in the Summa and Gentiles, my favorite body, by the way. That's a beautiful explanation, right? And the tool has something from the, what? Excellence of the chief agent, right? So the human nature of Christ, you know, has an efficacy that the human nature that's not joined to him in the same person would not have. Here's a little different explanation, right? The one in the, yeah, interesting, yeah. It goes back to the St. Christoph's understanding, too, of the soul, right? And to the bulk of the body, the body is to the soul, not only as the matter, but also as its, what? Tool, right? Here he gives a little different explanation of it, huh? It's okay. It's taking as much so. To the third, it should be said, and this is, again, what? Going back to what Damascene says, apparently, from Gregory. To the third, it should be said that, as Damascene says, the divine nature is said to be incarnate because it's united to the flesh, what? Personally. Personally. Not that it be converted into the nature of what? Flesh. See, someone can take the words, though, and the word was made flesh, and say, hey, that's what it seems to be saying, right, huh? But, you know, it seems so, too, and yet when you study the history of these things a bit, like even in the Summa College of Gentiles, you see all these heresies and all these misreading of Scripture, right? You can see how good Vatican II is, right? And it said that sacred Scripture, sacred tradition, and the magistrate of the Church, no one can stand without the other two, right? How you really need them, right? How, you know, it can easily misunderstand the sacred Scripture, without the sacred tradition, the councils and so on, and without the magisterium explaining sometimes what the words mean, huh? But vice versa, they at the same time support the others. I always use an old military thing there, you know, where we'd mark with the M1 rifles, huh? And then you're a Christian kind of bivouac, kind of, you know. And you need how many guys to put your rifles down, right? You need three, because they have these little hook hooks, right? And two of them, you can hook them together with these four, right? You need a third one, you know? And that's the way these three things are. You need all three of them, huh? And no one can stand without the other two, with those three rifles, right? In the same way the divine sacred Scripture in the church, in the magisterium, one cannot stand without the others. You see that a lot in the coming home program there in EWTN, you know, where a lot of these Protestant ministers that came over to the Catholic Church, they were praying to say, you know, Scripture, sola scriptura. And the question was, well, where'd you get these books, you know? Well, you've got to bring in the tradition of the church, right? And they kind of convinced them, right? But they're kind of coming to see gradually, right? The truth of that statement of Vatican II. That's a beautiful example, I think, that three is enough, right? Two is not enough there, right? No two of those can stand by itself. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Likewise, flesh is said to be deified, as he himself says, not by being converted into the divine nature, but by its union to the word, right? With their properties being, what? Saved, right? So it might be understood, caro deificata, because it was made the, what? Flesh of the divine word, not because it was made, what? God, huh? So would you say that Thomas' words were wise, huh? His wisdom was turned into a vocal sound? Or is it because these words are being used as a tool, right, by someone who's very wise, huh? So I find the words of Thomas wise, I find the words of Shakespeare wise, right? I don't know where Shakespeare's wisdom comes from, but I find he says some very wise things, right? But his words are wise, because they're the words of a wise man. So we might say that God's actions are, what? Even his human actions are divine, huh? Because they are the, what? Actions of the divine person, huh? Even though they're human nature. So, we'll take a little break, and in your exam, we'll be asked for the three reasons. The three reasons. The three reasons. It's good, you know, when you, if you have a hard time sleeping at night, when you lay down in bed, you know, the pressure's off the body, you know, and you can think about these things and say, now, what are those three reasons, huh? I don't assume a kind of gentile is here to give, you know, even more reasons sometimes. And when I come back, and after a while, after I'd read it, I'd say, now, before I look at the text again, I'm going to see if I can remember all those reasons. And usually I can remember some of them, but not all of them, you know, and then I'd kind of come back and say, oh, that's the reason I missed, you know, and you kind of, it's like the coin, the lost sheep or something, you know, I mean, you've got nine out of ten reasons. What the hell is that ten reason, you know? And you take more delight in the tenth reason, because that's the ones you could remember, right? You know? And so I want to teach you awake at night, too, you know, and find that God can't go down the hall and get the book and see what the tenth reason was, you know. It's good to do that, you know, in some ways, and then, you know, you don't have to, you know, then maybe a week later you've forgotten it, but I mean, as you keep on reading and reading these things, the reasons, you know, start to do more and more, right? They stick with you more and more. That's right. So now we've got the falsehood eliminated, right? Now we can go to, I assume, the truth here, right? It seems that the second one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the incarnate word was not made in the person. First, because the person of God is not other from his nature. We've learned that, right? In the Trinity, he would think of this objection. If, therefore, the union was not made in the nature, it would follow that it is not made in the, what? Person. I didn't get around that. Moreover, human nature is not of less dignity in Christ than in us. But personality, being a person, pertains to dignity, right? As is had in the first book. Therefore, since human nature in us has its own personality, right? It's own personhood, if you want to say. Much more would it have its own personhood in Christ. And Tom's going to answer that by saying it's drawn to a higher personhood than human personhood. So Christ, apparently, was not a human person. But it was... You didn't even let the pick then. You read this again. Moreover, as Boethius says in the book on the two natures, that a person is an individual substance of a rational, what? Nature. This is the definition of person that Thomas defended in the Prima Parra. But the word of God assumed an individual human nature for universal nature, right? Does not, what? Subsist by itself, huh? But only in the, what? Naked contemplation is considered, huh? Naked means, what? Without images, right? Without the senses. As Damascene says. Therefore, human nature has its own, what? Personality. Yeah. Yeah. Therefore, it does not seem that the union was made in person. Why does Thomas always attack the truth in this way? To make you stop and think, I guess. But against this is what is read in the Chalcedon, the Synod of Chalcedon. Not in two persons divided or partitioned, right? But one and the same, on a begotten Son, our Lord, we confess Jesus Christ. Therefore, the union of the word was made in what? In person, right? Now, Thomas will say, I could begin to see on the respondent, he says in the Summa Cargiatiles, we have to see what it means to be united in person, what it means to be united in nature, right? But he's talked more about the first in the first article, and here he's going to talk about the second. It should be said that person signifies something other than what? Nature. For nature signifies the essence of the species, what it is, right? Which the definition, what? Signifies, huh? It's a paranoid quote from Aristotle. Definition of speech signifying what a thing is. And if to those things which pertain to the notion of the species, nothing other was joined, or could be found, right? To be joined, there would be no necessity of distinguishing the nature from the, what? Underlying. From the, not the underlying nature, but from the, what underlies nature. Oh. Which is the individual subsisting in that, what? In nature, huh? Because each individual subsisting in that nature would be altogether the same with that, what? Nature. But there happens in some things, subsisting things, to be found something that does not pertain to the, what? Notion of the species. Namely, the accidents and the individuating, what? Principles. Just as most of all appears in we things, huh? In those things which are composed of matter and form. And therefore, in such things also, secundum rem, right? In the things themselves, differs nature and the suppositum. Not, as it were, altogether, right? Separated. But because in the suppositum, in the underlying, is included both the nature of the species and there are added above this some other things that are besides or in addition to the notion of species. Whence the underlying signifies as the whole having the nature just as a formal part, which is perfective of it. So am I, Dwayne Berkowitz, am I human nature? If I was human nature, I'd be the only man, right? As you can see, I have human nature, right? As a formal part of me, right? But I have things that are in addition to human nature, right? I have some knowledge of odd numbers and even numbers and so on, right? And I have health and I have color and I'm sitting and so on, okay? An account of this, in composed things, in things composed from matter and form, nature is not said of the underlying. So Dwayne Berkowitz is not human nature. He's a man. But man means what has human nature. It doesn't say that I am human nature. For we do not say that this man is his own, what? Human nature, huh? His own humanity. If, however, there is something in which altogether there is nothing other apart from, what? The notion of its species or nature, as in God. There, they are not other. Secundum rem, right? That's the phrase he uses in things, in reality. The underlying and the, what? Nature, huh? But only according to the thought of which we understand that. Because the nature is said according as is a certain essence. But the same is called the underlying according as it is, what? Subsisting. And what is said of the underlying should be understood of the person in a rational creature or intellectual creature. Because a person is nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature, according to Boethius. So Thomas says, as far as the word self is concerned, hypostasis, which corresponds, I'm laughing to suppose it to him, right? You can speak of this in regard to any individual substance, right? Why person is an individual substance of a rational nature, right? So everything that is in some person, whether it pertains to the nature of it or not, is united to it in the person, right? So in my person is I am, what? Both a man and I am, what? A geometer, right? And somewhat healthy. If therefore human nature is not joined to the word of God and christened, in no way is it what? Yeah. And thus holy is taken away the faith of the Incarnation. which is to undermine the whole of the Christian faith. He says in another place, the whole Christian faith depends on two things, divinity and humanity. Yeah. Because, therefore, the Word has a human nature united to itself, but not, what, as pertaining to its divine nature, it follows that the union is made in the person of the Word not in the, what, nature. Thomas seems to be saying that it's either joined, what, to the nature or to the person, and it can't be joined to the nature as we saw in the previous article, therefore it must be joined to the person or else it's not joined at all. And that's obviously contrary to the faith, right? The relationship between person and nature, he seems to indicate it's like a whole to a part. In us, in us creatures, yeah. Right. And especially creatures composed of matter and form, right? So that is? So human nature isn't the whole of me, so to speak. But your person includes your nature. Yeah, yeah. In other words, Dwayne Berkowitz has human nature, right? But he also has things besides human nature, that I'm a geometer, that I'm white, huh? Okay, that I'm healthy if I am. And so on. Okay. So many things have you said of me, right? Right. So the person with the whole, or anyone includes everything. When you, when you, not only the nature of that, you include all the others. Things that pertain to nature. Yeah. And you see, human nature and geometry don't come together and form one thing, right? So it's because this, it's because I am a man, and I am a geometer. You can say you've got a, what, human geometry or something, right? Because they both belong to the same, right? And so, but like that in the incarnation, right? That God is man, and man is God. Not because the human and divine nature are joined, but, well, they are joined in a way. But not to each other, right? They don't come together. One doesn't become the other. They don't become part of one great nature or something like that. But because they both belong to the same, what, person, right? The same person subsists in these two natures. Now we'll see how Thomas answers the objections because he might say, well, we saw in our study of the Trinity, right? Okay, and in the comparative study of the Trinity, remember that there's no difference between the Word of God and the divine nature, right? There's no difference between the Father and the divine nature. No difference between the Holy Spirit and the divine nature, right? Okay? Secundum rem, they are the same, okay? And secundum rationum, there's a difference there, right? Okay? Why does there real difference, secundum rem, between the Father and the Son? And between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son, right? Now, I see how Thomas does this, but you know when we say, I was reading today an article there in the sentences there, where he's saying, is the will of God the cause of things, right? And one of the objections is saying, well, isn't the divine knowledge the cause of things, right? And Thomas said, or is the divine power, you know, the objections say that. And Thomas will say, well, God's power is infinite, right? So he wouldn't produce anything in particular unless he will to produce this rather than that, right? And the same way that Aristotle argues, you know, in the ninth book of Wisdom, that knowledge can't alone produce something because it's the same knowledge of opposites. So my medical knowledge enables me maybe to make you healthy or sick. But I can't do both. And so I've got to choose. Make a good choice. And my knowledge of logic enables me to teach you and to deceive you. And I can do both. And I knew when I gave an exam in logic, right? I knew how to make something seem like a good argument that had a fallacy in it. And I knew they would deceive most of them. A good number of them, right? But so, whether I teach or deceive, right, depends upon my will. The same way a man is a master of rhetoric, you know, he can persuade or dissuade, right? You know, he can go in and show the guy's guilty or show he's not guilty, right? And so, there's a little moral problem there, is one way to say. I know my client is guilty, you know, if I go in there and, you know, they try to, you know, kind of say that they, they try to, the American lawyers try to say, you know, well, we've got to get the guy, you know, hearing, you know, anyway, you know. But I mean, if you know the guy is guilty and you go in and show that he's, persuade the jury that he's not guilty, you know, you know, is that, is that moral, right? So you might say that God's will determines to what is the power should be applied and to what is knowledge should be used, right? So that in a sense the main cause there is the divine what? Will, right? Okay. Now someone comes back and says, yeah, but God is altogether simple. So the divine knowledge and the divine will or the divine mind and the divine will are the same thing, right? But yet, they differ, what? It's a connemorazione, right? And it's insofar as God's will that he ultimately, what? Is said to act or to cause something, right? And not insofar as he's, what? Knowledge, right? So, you know, you're talking about predestination there, for example, you know. You see, God chose us to be, right? He chose us to be beatified and eventually. But that's the divine will, right? He says, this is a free choice in God's part, right? So maybe Thomas is going to say something like that. He'll say, well, there's no difference between the divine person and the divine nature, right? But still not the same, but they still differ, including them, what? Rationum, right? And therefore, there's a difference between saints being united to the nature as nature and being united to this as a, what? As a person, right? Okay? Just as it's not the same thing to say this comes from the divine will and it comes from the divine knowledge, right? Even though that they are the same, what? Thing, right? Yeah. But I'm chosen to be insofar as he has will. Okay? Or insofar as he is will. Okay? Let's see how Thomas answers that first objection because that's an interesting one. there from our point. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although in God there is not other secundum realm, right? In the thing, the nature and the person, right? They differ nevertheless according to the way of what? Signifying, huh? Because the person signifies by way of something, what? Subsisting. And because human nature is thus united to the word, that the word subsists in it, right? Not, however, is something added to it to the reason of its what? The definition of its nature. Or is its nature changed into something, right? Therefore, the union is made in the person and not in the, what? Nature. I say, going back to something, probably say it is, does God know bad things? Yeah, does God know bad things? but this villainous knowledge are the same right there. But the bad is the object of God insofar. far as he's mind, right? Not insofar as he is what? Will, right? The bad is an object of God insofar as he is mind, right? But not insofar as he's will, right? Because the bad is known by God, but not will. You have to see that distinction, right? We don't really understand God, right? But we understand that he's both mind and will, and that these are not different as he couldn't remember, right? But neither one of them fully expresses God, right? What we understand by the one, we say that the bad is an object. It is known. But insofar as it's will, it's not what? Will, right? So that's the way he's solving it, he says there in the first argument there. Sunday's Aristotle, or Thomas goes all the way back to Aristotle in the book of Natural Hearing, right? Where Aristotle is saying, acting upon undergoing are the same motion. So by pushing this is its motion, right? And it's being pushed as its motion, right? So motion and what? I mean, pushing and being pushed is the same thing. Secundum Rem, but not secundum, what? Rationum, right? Because insofar as this motion is from me into the cup, it's called pushing. Insofar as it's in the cup from me, it's called being pushed, right? I kick you, right? By kicking you and you're being kicked are the same thing. But I'm kicking you and you're being kicked. The difference is cundum rationa, right? It's kicking insofar as it's from me into you. And it's being kicked insofar as it's in you from me. The second one is talking about the importance of human, what? Personality, right? Okay. And it seems that you're denying Christ, right? Something that your human nature, my human nature has, right? To the second it should be said, that personality necessarily to that extent pertains to dignity of something and its perfection. Insofar as it, what? Pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing that it exists, what? Per se, right? By itself. Which is understood in the name of person, right? But it is more dignity, more worth to something that exists in something, what? More dignified than itself, than it exists, what? Per se. And therefore, from this fact, human nature is more, what? More dignity in Christ than in us. Because in us, as it were, per se, existing, it has its own, what? Personality. And Christ already exists in the higher person, in the person of the word. Just as to be completive of the species pertains to dignity of form. But nevertheless, sensitive is more noble in man, on account of the conjunction, right? To a more noble form that is completive of it. Than in the brood animal, in which there is the, what? It is the completing form, right? So in other words, to be a sensing soul is what completes the nature of a brood. In us, we're completed not by a sensing soul, but by an understanding soul. But we have more dignity even in our sensing than the, what? Yeah. So we appreciate the beauty of Mozart's music, which I can never get the cat in the house to appreciate, right? Go out to the kitchen there and take a little bit of sandwich meat out of the ice box or something like that and the cat be right there next to you, you know? But you play, you know, what's that opera or stuff for the, you know, and the cat? Just do it, right? Or, you know, you see it in Aristotle talks about recollection there, you know, and how it's kind of a syllogism, right? But in the imagination, the memory, right? Recalling this through that, you know? What are we doing yesterday at 10 o'clock? You know, you can kind of reach your way back to it, right? And then, of course, you know, all this, you know, poetic imagination. So when you see how the sense powers have a certain ability in man, right? That they don't have any of the animals, right? And even, you know, old cuisine, you know, and wine and so on. There's a certain dignity, you know, in our food and the taste of our food that the animals don't have, right? I can't figure out the cat sees and the mouse myself. You know, it's like my steak, you know, like the mouse, you know? They don't appreciate the white sauce or something, you know? Okay. Now, the third objection was taken from the definition, right? Of person. Thomas begins by saying to the third it should be said that the word of God did not assume human nature in the universal, but in the atomo, in the individual, right? Just, that's the word individual for undivided. As Damascene says, otherwise it would belong to each man to be the word of God, huh? That belongs as it belongs to Christ, huh? It should be known, however, that not every individual in the genus is substance, right? Even in a rational nature has the notion of a person, but only that which exists, what? Per se, yeah. Not however that which exists in something more perfect. Whence the hand of Socrates, although it is a suited individual, right? Is not nevertheless a person, right? Because it doesn't exist by itself, but in something more perfect, namely in its, what? Whole. And this also is able to be signified in this that the person is said to be a substantia individua. That's the definition of what is. For a hand is not a complete substance, but a part of the, what? Substance. So although human nature is a certain, what? Individual in the genus of substance, because nevertheless it doesn't exist by itself, but in something more perfect to within the person of God, consequently it is, it does not have its own, what? Personality. And therefore there was made a union in the person. Now, come back to my limping comparison, right? Okay. Beginning point A, right? Okay. Now, if I draw this line over here, it has its own endpoint, right? So now you've got two persons there, right? Okay. But now suppose instead of drawing this like that, I draw to that end point, right? Well then A is beginning of both this line and that line, and it's the same point as beginning of both, right? So what's going to take place in the incarnation is that human nature is going to be drawn from the Blessed Virgin, right? To the same, what? Person that is the second person of the Blessed Trinity, right? Okay. Now, if that human nature was not drawn, right? To that point, right? But, by itself, it would have its own, what, personality, right? I guess it has a, you know, kind of disliked this, but you can see the point, huh? In the case of the Incarnation, human nature is drawn to subsist in the same, what, person, that is the second person of us, Trinity, right? Okay? In you and I, our nature is not drawn to subsist in that person, but it has now its own, but, personhood, right? Okay? But there are, in this case, this example here, it's one of the same points as the beginning of this line and the beginning of that line, right? But it's not drawn to that point, but drawn by itself, right? Then you have two points, right? Okay? So, here, you have one and the same persons subsisting in two, what, natures, yeah? It's like this point here is the beginning, if you want to say, or the end of two lines, right? It's one and the same point that is the beginning of both of those lines, right? In this case here, you have two points, right? It's something you've said to that, on the comparison, right? It just brings out something, right? So, we speak of this one person, the Word of God, subsisting in, what, two natures, right? And someone like this, you say, this one point here is the beginning, one and the same point, is the beginning of two different lines, right? Of course, the two lines are not, what, you know? That's why it's a lot, a lot of different is your vertical thing here, huh? Make it even more interesting in a sense, huh? You know how in a circle there you can go down to, right, huh? Okay? So, you can have a curved line and a, what? A straight line, right? And this point here, like the down to a circle, is the same point as the beginning of a curved line and a, what? A straight line, right? But, can a straight line and a curved line ever correspond? Yeah, but then that's a point, it's not a line. So, a curved line and a straight line will always be, what? Distinct, right? And this is a little bit like the divine nature and the human nature, right? They cannot ever coincide. But one and the same point can be the beginning of a curved line and a straight line, right? And this is something like incarnation here. Or one and the same person, right? Very much an atomo, but the point is indivisible, right? Is, in fact, in both of these lines. This is one and the same person subsists in two natures that remain entirely, what? Distinct, huh? The fire and the bush, right? Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm. 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