Tertia Pars
Lecture 13: Distinction of Reason and Real Distinction in Theology

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Thomas has said, it would be false to say that the Father and the Son are less one in the divine nature, right? When the, what, two natures are in the one person of the Son, right? Doesn't make any sense, huh? Again, it goes back to the fact that the Father and the Son, compared to the divine nature, there's no real distinction. There's merely a distinction of what? Of reason between the Father and the divine nature, right? You saw that in that comparative study, remember? Because God is all good and simple. So, but there's a real distinction between the Father and the Son. But between the Father and the divine nature, there's only a distinction of reason. That's what you've got to be careful, you know, with the syllogism, right? In the second figure, we use the second figure syllogism a lot in theology. In all the second figures, you have negative conclusions, huh? And the way you get a negative conclusion is by affirming something of one thing that you deny of the other, right? And remember the objection to saying that there's no distinction, real distinction, between the Father and the divine nature, the Son and the divine nature. Because something can be said of the divine nature that cannot be said of the Son, or vice versa. For example, you can say that the Son is generated, right? The divine nature is not generated. Therefore, the divine nature and the Son are not the same thing, right? Okay. Now, of course, Thomas says, well, if what is affirmed of one thing is denied of another, right? There must be a distinction between them, right? But it may be either a real distinction, that they're two different things, or it may be that they are distinct in what? Reason, yeah. That's a very subtle thing, right? I got thinking, you know, being kind of crafty fellow here. I was going back to the things I know in philosophy, but carrying back this distinction that Thomas makes there, right? And let me give you an example, right? This is good here. When you talk about the most universal things, and one of the most universal things is being, right? Because being is said of anything that is. Can you be something that isn't a being? There are the kind of dictionary terms, right? Okay. But then you find out later on that good is also said of all, right? You say, well, how can that be? Because aren't there good things and bad things? Okay. So how can good be said of everything, right? See? But when you study these things more deeply, you find out that the bad is, first of all, a what? It's a privation. Yeah. It's a privation, or to use the English word, lack, right? And what is a privation or a lack? Well, it's the non-being of something you're able to have and should have, right? So, Augustine, you know, kind of exaggerates that and says, sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing. Okay? But it's not really nothing, but it's the non-being of something and a subject able to have. See, once you start to understand what the bad really is, then you realize how being and good are really, what? Convertible, right? Now, when you study being, one of the two main divisions of being are division of being, according to the figure of predication, substance, quantity, quality, munition, and so on. And then being into act and, what? Ability. And ability is, of course, for the sake of acting. So act is better than ability, right? But ability is good because it's an ability for acting. And so you begin to see how being as such is good. Act, most of all, but ability because it's relation to acting. While the lack of predation is something bad. Now, once you have this truth that being as such is good, now I'm going to syllogize that they're not the same, right? Okay? Because I'm going to find something that is said of one that would be denied of the other. What's the opposite of bad? So good is the opposite of bad. So being is not the opposite of bad, but being is the opposite of what? Yeah. So being is not the opposite of what? Bad, right? So therefore being is not what? Good. Well, I've never seen Thomas do this, but... I'm kind of crafty here. And I'd say, well, the fact that something is affirmed of good that would be denied of being, right? Shows that there is a distinction between being and good, right? Okay? But it doesn't tell you is it a real distinction or a distinction of what? Reason. Reason, right? So when Thomas, you know, in the beginning of the day, the Veritati, the question was just Veritati, the Veritati. Thomas, following, incidentally, had a sentence. He shows you how these most universal names, although they're, what, convertible, right? Nevertheless, they're not synonyms, right? They have a different meaning, right? Okay? And the first meaning of good is the good is what I'll want, right? And when Thomas explains it, he goes back to what Aristotle points out in the Dianima, that the soul in some way is all things, because all things are in some way, what, noble, right? And desirable, and so on. And you get the idea of true and good because of that. So good and being are not the same, but have exactly the same meaning, right? Being means what is, and the good means what is what? Desirable, right? Okay? So they differ in meaning, but they're not two different what? Things, huh? And so the reason why you can affirm something of one and not of the other is because they differ in what? Meaning, the meaning is not the same, but you're not bringing out a distinction in things. Up here you find out that they mean the same thing, right? But defined differently, right? Okay? I know it takes me to be a more simple map. It sounds like it's not that simple, right? Euclid there, when he talks about numbers, he calls, by the latest to geometry, he calls, or we call, I suppose, the factors, two numbers that multiply in each other, right? Like the number, we call those, like, take number 12, let's say. 3 and 4 would be what? 5. Yeah, yeah. But you can call them the sides of 12, right? Oh, yeah. That much nicer is. Okay? Now, so we say the number whose sides are 3 and 4. Okay? Let me see the numbers, please. Let me see. Let me see. The number whose sides are 3 and 4, and the number whose sides are 2 and 6. So, is the number whose sides a 3 and 4, the number whose sides are 2 and 6? Are they two different numbers? The same thing, the same number. But is there a difference between 3 and 4 and 2 and 6? 3 and 4 are not 2 and 6. Therefore, the number whose sides are 3 and 4 is not the number whose sides are 2 and 6, right? In a way, yeah. These ones here, the sides are even. Are these two sides even? Are there numbers? No. So, they can't be the same number, right? Well, no one knows what you have here. You have like a different definition almost, right? Or a different meaning, right? 3 and 4 and 2 and 6 are not synonyms, are they? Okay? You have two different definitions of the word of the same number, right? So, something could be affirmed and denied of these two, right? This is a number whose sides are an odd and even number, and this is a number whose sides are not an odd and even number, but two even numbers. Or this is a number whose sides are two even numbers, and this is not a number whose sides are... So, something can be affirmed of one of these, if denied of the other, because there's a distinction in the definition, you might say, of these two, right? But there's no distinction of what? These two numbers are being the same number, right? But defined or known differently, right? Or it's like we said, you know, 12 inches and one foot or something, right? Same length, right? But known some, but differently, right? And sometimes if I want to call it 12 inches, I'm going to, you know, I want to cut it into the inch, inch, things, you know? But it's easy to see, right, that good and, what, being, right? Or good and true, right? You might find out that being as such is, what, knowable, right? And Aristotle points out in the ninth book of Wisdom that ability is knowable to act. Act. Ability is knowable through the act which is an ability. But act is knowable, but to itself. So, if this is the most universal division of being into act and ability, so all being is, what, knowable. Now, is being and knowable convertible? Well, we're saying every being is knowable. Is everything knowable being? You say, well, can I know nothing, like we were talking about nothing before, right? I know something about nothing. Nothing is nothing. Nothing is not something, you see? But I have to give nothing some being, make it a being of reason, right? In order to, what, make statements about it, right? So being and knowable are really convertible. Can't know much about nothing. That's because there's not much being, right? It's the only reason, right? Is it? It sounds kind of strange, you know, but you go back to the early Greeks, and they all have this idea, you can't get something from nothing, right? And they all mean something by the word nothing, when they say that, don't they? But not in the same, that's not a contradiction. You mean something by the word nothing. Well, nothing is something of reason, but not something outside of reason, right? The reason takes it as if it were something, right? Okay, so being as such is knowable. Being and knowable are convertible, right? Things are said to be convertible, when you can say every A is B and every B is A, right? That's what it means to magic. But now I'm going to syllogize that being and knowable are not the same, right? And I say, well, knowable is the opposite of what? Unknowable, right? Is being the opposite of unknowable? So it's something they said, therefore, of the knowable, that is united being, therefore they're not the same. There's some distinction. Distinction, yeah. But is there a distinction in things? Or is there a distinction of what? Reason, yeah. But we've shown before that being as such is knowable. They're not really different in reality. The same as being an knowable. But they are different in what? In thought, yeah? That's a very subtle thing, right? And it's easier to see, right? Not as easy to see as a sphere, right? The number whose sides are three and four, and the number whose sides are two and six. Those numbers are not different in reality, the numbers. But they're different in thought, right? The thought is a little bit different, right? One case is known by three and four, and the other case is known by two and six. That's really a great discovery. But Aristotle and Thomas see the more difficult things, right? He realized that being and good are the same thing. Of course, you get to God, that's because he's very important to you. God says, I am who am, right? That's what he said, you know. And Christ comes on and says, well, he alone is good, you know. Yeah, it's really the same thing you're talking about. But you have a little different thought about that, right? You know, I'm very much of a logician, you know, and I know about the second figure of the socialism. And I'm constantly, you know, when we argue that God is unchanged and so on, we're affirming something of God that we deny of the changing or vice versa, right? And I'm so used to doing that. And then all of a sudden, when you see the guy trying to do the same thing with a person and the divine nature, you say, oh my gosh. We've shown that the divine nature is not, the person is not the divine nature, right? Because this person, the son is generated and the divine nature is not generated. But, you know, think twice, huh? Maybe it's possible that something can be affirmed and denied when there's only a distinction of what? Reason, huh? See? Then you go back and say, hey, when I talked about even, you know, something less difficult, if you could say that, you're talking about God by himself, you know, before you get to the Trinity, right? That's more difficult to understand. You say, well, is the divine mind and the divine will really two things? But can something be affirmed of one that's denied of the other? Is the divine mind free, really? Does the divine mind choose, or just the divine will chooses, huh? So the divine will chooses, the divine mind does not choose, right? Therefore, the divine mind and the divine will are not the same. We showed before that they must be the same, right? How can something be affirmed to one and denied to the other if they're really the same thing? Yeah, distinction in thought, right? Why is there a distinction in thought? Well, because we start from creatures where they're really distinct things, right? And then you get a thought about a word, a thought about mind, and you realize that mind and thought must somehow already be in God, right? But in God, they're one in a way we don't really understand, right? Well, we understand that they must be one. A thing in God. So we have two thoughts about one thing. Actually, one and two thoughts, you know? That's kind of an amazing thing, though, right? To see that, right? You say, well, is it possible that our mind could have two thoughts with only one thing? Yeah. You can go back to the supper and have two thoughts about twelve. Same thing. It's easy to see, right? In fact, we have two thoughts in the same number. The number whose sides are three and four, and whose sides are two and six. You know, Euclid has a way of showing that sometimes a square number is a cube number. And it takes sixty-four, right? Sixty-four is what? Eight times eight. So it's a square number. It's also four times four times four. It's a cube number, right? Well, the number eight, let's say, is a cube number and not a square number. Number nine is a square number but not a cube number. So, but here, sixty-four is both a square number and a cube number, right? But you've got a different thought, right? It's kind of interesting to see that the same number can be both, right? But, so you have a different thought of sixty-four. I can look at sixty-four as a square number. I also look at it as a cube number. Which is it? Well, it's one and the same number. But to me, you know, you know, when we first define square number and cube number, right, we don't have the same definition, do we? And then you say, well, okay, now, what is four? Well, it's a square number. You take numbers, something like that, right? And later on, you find out that the same number could be both. What? That's kind of amazing, right? But, you know, I probably start with something simple. It's like, you know, take four, which is two times two. Two is the first number, right? So four is the first, what, square number. What's the first cube number? Two times two times two. Yeah, eight. Nine would be the second square number. What's the next cube number? Twenty-seven. Twenty-seven, yeah. Okay. And Euclid has a beautiful theorem to know that between any two square numbers, there's one mean proportional. Here's another theorem. Between any two cube numbers, there's two mean proportionals. Okay? So between, I'd say, eight and 27, you've got, say, 12. And 18. So eight is to 12. It's 12 is to 18. It's 18. It's 27. Now, the ratio of two to three. And you say, well, gee, what is it? There's a number that is both, what? Yeah. Or if you had two numbers, they were both square and cube, they'd have both one mean proportional and two mean proportionals. Amazing, right? You know, these wonderful things. So, but first you think of these things as separate, right? The separate theorem that says, you know, the separate definition of cube. Now, when Euclid begins to talk about numbers, he defines odd number and even number, right? And he defines prime number and composite number, right? And you think that an odd number will ever be an even number? So, the definition of odd and even number seems to be always in different numbers. And will a prime number ever be composite? No, it's a composite number. Well, it's a number that's measured by some other number, right? Other number. I see. One not big number, right? By the prime, it's measured only by one, right? It's not measured by any other number. So will a prime number ever be a composite number? See? Okay. But then you meet somewhere along here, you know, the definition of a square number and the definition of a cube number, right? Then you find out later on that it's possible that the same number would be both a square number and a cube number, right? See? But in the beginning, you have two definitions. I see. You see? But later on, you realize that it's possible, you know? So why four and, let's say, eight, four is just a square number. Eight is just a, what, cube number. That's the way the creatures are, right? They're just kind of a comparison, right? Why God is like the, what? He's both a square and a cube, you know what I mean? I mean, you see what I mean? And you say, well, this is, it looks like every comparison, but I mean, it's a little bit like that, right, you see? You know, we take up man, the human soul, and this is the gateway to studying God and the angels, right? But in man, the understanding and the will, each has their definition, and they're two different things you're defining here, right? And then later on, we realize that there's mind and will in God that must be, but then I mean, it's felt that they're the same thing, right? You know, kind of hard to understand, but kind of prepared for it if you studied these numbers like that, you see? Is that just another reason to say you, right? Yeah. No, but you've got to be kind of broken into these things, right? You know, the thing that struck me, you know, when Euclid ends up the first book there, you know, with the idea of the theorem, right? But then after he studies proportions in book five, and he goes back to things, then he shows that any, you know, regular rectilineal figure, like a pentagon, if you have a pentagon, right, on the hypotenuse of the right angle, right? And the pentagon's another two, so those two will be equal to the pentagon on the side opposite the right angle. And the same thing, you have a hexagon. It's a regular figure, right? It's like the square's a regular figure, you know, but the sides are all equal, right? You realize the power he's got in there, you know, you see? But when you get into dialectic and you get into philosophy, you see, these proportions that really dominate understanding things, huh? I appreciate it. I'm going to take off here, you might. I'll use your classic, my Lindsay's going to come on Thursday this week, though, so I'll get a rush. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctrine, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Amen. Now, like we were saying there, the Guardian Angel corrects you, you know, and makes you think twice, right? Well, my Guardian Angel pulled me up and said, Breakfast, you are not saying exactly the right things here to these guys, okay? One kind of relation of reason that Aristotle talks about is a strange case where one relation is real, right, on the one side, and then on the other side it's not real. But it's said because of the relation of the first one to it, huh? And the example Aristotle gives is taken from knowing, huh? Where he says the knower always has knowledge of something. And the knower is really, by his knowledge, related to the thing he knows. So knowledge is knowledge of the known, right? But then he says the known is related by relation of what? Reason, huh? Okay. Now, the reason for that is that knowledge is based upon immateriality. And sometimes they define knowing as receiving the form of another as other, while keeping the form you have. And that immaterial being is only in the knower. And it's not in the chair out there that is known. So there's nothing in the chair whereby it's really related to me. But there is something in me whereby I'm related to the chair, because I possess in this immaterial way the chair, right? Okay. Well, if I kick you, right, huh? There's a relation between, I think, we're on both sides, huh? Well, I'm the kicker of you, and you're being kicked by me, right? But we share in a certain motion, a certain activity, right? Okay. Well, now the great Avicenna and Thomas himself both refer to, this is not the same way with love and the loved as it was with knowing and the knower, right? I think I was giving an example of that, right? And the reason for that, they both go back to the sixth book of wisdom, where Aristotle says that truth and falsity are chiefly in the mind, although they're measured by the thing out there, but the good is chiefly in what? Things, right? Okay. So you've got to be careful then to say that that's a relation of reason, of the thing love, to the what? Lover, right? Because it's not two kinds of, what? Being, right, huh? But the good is really in, what? Things, like truth is furthering the mind. That's a little thing there, but you've got to, you know, a guardian angel pulls you up sometimes, huh? Just a little aside here, but going back to Trinity, huh? Ran across a very interesting text of Thomas, where he's taking up this question of whether the power to generate the Son that the Father has and the power to create, are they the same power? Okay? Now, this is a question from my question of Disputate de Potencia, right? So the power to generate the Son, right? God the Father has the power to generate the Son. Then you also have this power of God, the power to create. Now, are they the same power? What would you say? Amen. Huh? Yeah. Because the power to generate involves the power of God as it's in the Father, right? Okay? But the power to create is a common flaw, yeah. Okay? But basically, they're really the same powers as what Thomas is going to defend. But what I found very interesting was this objection and the way Thomas replies to that. Because he sees a likeness of these two to something in us. Okay? Now, the objection is saying, huh? Well, that the Father naturally gives birth to the Son. So that up here you have nature. But as far as creating, God chooses to create us, huh? So it's will and choice, huh? Down here. The objection says, well, nature and will and choice are not the same thing. And you know Aristotle, the ninth book of Wisdom, in speaking of this difference, he says that nature is determined to one. That's part of the reason why it's one sum. Quite the will is open to what? Opposite sum. So when I go in the restaurant, I sit down and eat the menu. I can choose to have chicken or not to have chicken, right? Or to have chicken or to have steak or something else, right? And why the nature is determined to one. Even Shakespeare, you know, would be famous. See in Coriolanus, huh? Nature not being able to be more than one thing, right? So these seem to be opposites, right? And so these two powers can't be the same thing, right? Well, Thomas begins his answer by saying, well, but in God, nature and will are the same thing, right? But then he goes on to a very interesting distinction and then a likeness to something else, huh? And he says, well, really, you shouldn't really say that this power to create is the will, right? But you can say the will uses the power to create, right? Okay. Well, up here, we always deny this, right? That the father didn't choose to produce the son. He naturally produces the son, right? And then Thomas says, nothing prevents the same power, right? Coming to something naturally and then being moved by the will to something. And you know what he takes as his example for this? That'd be more known to us. He takes our reason, right? Okay. Now, take two things that I think by my reason, huh? I think that a whole is more than a part. And I naturally think that, huh? Everybody naturally comes to think that a whole is more than a part. So my reason, you could say, is naturally led to think that a whole is more than a part. Now let's take something else I think. I think that God became man. Do I naturally think that? Hmm? No. Every man naturally thinks that a whole is more than a part. And if he says he doesn't think that, we'd say, well, you say that, but you really do think it. He says, no, no, I really think that, you know, the whole is not more than a part. He says, well, we'll give you a part of your cell right today. We'll give you a part of the car you bought. We'll give you a part of the meal you ordered, right? And he'll scream and rave and rant, and you'll see that he really knows that the whole is more than a part, right? So I naturally think the whole is more than a part, as every man does, right? But now why do I think that God became man? Do I think that naturally? No. But actually my reason is moved by my will. My will and the influence of grace, undoubtedly, right? So, you see, I like this, huh? And some things reason is moved to naturally, like to think that the whole is more than a part. And some things our reason does, right? Like thinking that God became man, where it's moved by the, what, will, huh? Now the other thing besides the will involved, basically, we know that those two are found in the case of, what, reason, right? So that's like this one power, right, huh? It gives rise to the sun, naturally, right? It gives rise to us creatures as moved by the divine will, choosing you to be. I didn't know why he chose you to be, or me, but he chose us to be, right? That's why he chose some parents for us. It's all the way back, right? We should thank him for choosing a universe, right? Of which, however humble a part, we could be, right? And choosing to have a church of which we could be a part, and so on. That's a very interesting comparison, right? And then there's some things that the reason comes to, by reasoning, right, for those things it actually knows. How did I come to think the Theorem, right? Originally it was by will, right? But eventually I reasoned out for things I naturally knew, right? And sometimes you reason from these things. So, what's that kind of interesting? An interesting thing that Thomas has there. It's in the second question, these good questions that he's taking up, this potencia generandi, this power to generate that the Father has. Okay, we're up to the eleventh article here, in this difficult question two. Excuse me, tenth, yeah. To the tenth, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the Incarnation was not through, what? Grace. For grace is a certain, what? Accident, as has been said in the second part. Now, incidentally, how does Thomas distinguish between grace and the three theological virtues, huh? Yeah. So, when you study soul and its powers, right? The soul is in the genus of substance, huh? It's formed in the genus of substance. And the soul, and actually does rise to, among other things, reason and what? Will, right, huh? These powers, right? But the reason and will are not the same thing as the soul, but they're natural powers of the soul. And Thomas will speak of sanctifying grace as being in the soul, right? And making the soul kind of godlike, huh? Or, like St. Peter says, kind of a partaking of the divine nature. And then, from this grace, there flows into reason, right? Faith and the will, hope, and love, or charity, right? Okay? So, just as naturally, you could say, reason and will arise in the soul, right? So, likewise, the soul, perfected by, what? Grace, right? Grace, gives rise to these virtues, theological virtues, in reason and in the, what? The will. Incidentally, another little kind of interesting thing there. Remember that symmetry about the Mass, the musical parts of the Mass that I spoke of before? And we said that the symmetry was A, B, C, B, A, right? These five parts of the Mass that are sung at least in a moment, right, huh? And you have the Kyrie, right? And the Agnus Dei, which are really prayers, huh? Asking for God's mercy, right? And then you have the Gloria and the Sanctus and Benedictus, which are more praise of God, right, huh? And then you have the Kredo, right, huh? So, I'll make you a little kind of comparison there, that in a way, there's a reflection here of the theological virtues, because the Kredo, obviously, corresponds to faith, right? And the prayers asking for God's mercy, these two here, correspond to what? Hope. And to some extent, you could put the praise with what? Love, right? And this comes out very clearly in the words of St. Augustine, right, that I quoted many times, but that Paul VI, in his address to the St. Cecilia Society on the Feast of St. Cecilia, quotes Augustine quite at length about the connection between music and love, right? But the phrases of amare and laudibus, laudare and amare, right? To love and praises, and to praise and love, right? So, I'll rest my case there, right? There's a connection between the praise and what? Love, huh? Well, then I was reading this address by Benedict XVI, and I think it's the one who was talking to the Benedictines, so it's a little more friendly, didn't it, to them? And talking about the importance of seeing these things, right? But he's noticing something here about the glory and the sanctus, that they both come from the, what? Angels, huh? Because the angels say, glory to God in the highest, and then in Isaiah's, right? Seraphim and so on, sanctus, sanctus, sanctus. And then he quotes one of the psalms, you know, I was singing the presence of the angels, and so on, right? Well, it's kind of appropriate that the angels would come in here because they have the virtue of, what? Love, but they don't have faith and hope because they see God as he is. So it's kind of appropriate that the angels should be involved in the one that stays tied up with love, right? So grace is something, it's not the substance of the soul, it's something added if we call it an accident, right? But it's fundamental, sanctifying grace, and from that there arises these virtues, huh? In the reason and in the will. So grace is a certain accident as is had in the second part. But the union of the human nature to the divine is not made through any accident, huh? I'll get you down to Nestorius or somebody, right? Okay. Therefore, it seems that the union of the incarnation was not made by, what? Grace. That's a very good argument. And then the second objection here is what I was saying here, right? The subject of grace is the, what? Soul, right? But as is said in Colossians 2, in Christ dwelt the, what? Fullness of divinity, even bodily, right? Right, huh? Well, think about that when you say the Corpus Christi, right? Therefore, it seems that that union was not made by, what? Grace, huh? Moreover, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of the incarnation was made by grace, it would seem that Christ is not in another way said to be God than other holy men, right? But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the predestination of the saints. By that grace, right? From the beginning of what? Faith of each man, huh? Each Christian. It comes about. By which grace that man from the beginning was made, what? Christ, huh? But that man was made Christ, the union of the divine nature. Therefore, that union was made through grace. Well, of course, Tom's going to see some distinction in the meaning of what? The word grace, huh? Grace is one of those words that you can't quite translate except by the word grace, huh? If you want to keep the different meanings in there, huh? I answer it should be said that as has been said in the second part, grace is said in two ways, huh? In one way, the very will of God giving gratis, right? Something, huh? And then, in another way, the gratuitous This, what, gift of God, right, huh, okay? I know since some of these, you know, texts, they want to translate grace by favor, right, huh? Well, it kind of has something of the first meaning, right, here that he gives of grace, but not in the second meaning, right? Okay, I mean, God's favor, well, he approves of me somehow, you know? Yeah, I don't think he does, but I mean, but it's the second argument here. The second illustration, he approves of me. But that's something in him, right, you know? Not in me, right? Well, he's got to have the second sense of grace, which is something in us, huh? Now, human nature, huh, needs, huh, indigit, huh? The gratuitous will of God, right, huh? That's not owed to us, right? In order that we might be elevated to God, right? Since this is above the faculty, the power of his foot. Nature, huh? But now, human nature is elevated to God in two ways. Did you know that? In one way, by operation, by activity, by which the saints know and, what? Love God. So, knowing God and loving God are, what? Activities, operations, right? Okay? And one is raised up to God by knowing him in some way, and especially by loving him, huh? That's the old catechism answer, right? Who made me? God made me. Why? To know and love him, serve him, right? In this world. Yeah, but in the next. But now, there's another way that one is raised up to God. Another way through what? Being, yeah. As a personality. Which mode or way is singular or unique to Christ, huh? In which human nature was assumed to this, huh? It'd become, what? The nature of the person of the Son of God. Now, it's manifest that for the perfection of operation, it's required that the power be perfected through a habit, huh? So, the virtue of faith and the virtue of hope and the virtue of charity are habits, huh? Firm dispositions, huh? But the nature has being in its, what? Suppositum, huh? In the underlying substance. Does not come about by some, what? Habit. It's an immediate thing, right? So, now he's going to answer the question, keeping in mind these two senses of grace, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said that if by grace is meant the will of God doing something, not out of justice, but gratuitously, gratis, or having somebody as, what? Acceptable to him. Then the union of the incarnation was made by grace, just as the union of saints to God is through, what? Knowledge and love. But if by grace one means the gratuitous gift of God, thus, that human nature be united to the divine person could be, what? Said to be a certain grace, huh? Insofar as by no preceding merits was this, what? Done. Right? But not by this, that there is some, what? Some habitual grace, right? By means of which such a union came about, huh? Okay? Because, why? What he said before. It's united in an immediate way to the, what? Person of the, what? Son, yeah. The human nature is. So what Thomas is, is, uh, saying is, what? It's not by an habitual grace that the human nature is united to the Son of God, right? It's an immediate thing, huh? It might be called grace in some other sense that he, what? That human nature doesn't merit that union, right? Because it's united to him before he does anything to merit. He can merit on the cross and so on. Now he comes back to the first objection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the grace, which is an accident, huh? Is a certain likeness of the divine nature partaken in by man, huh? And I think that text, they always quote from, what? St. Peter, right? Okay? Consol is in Latin, right? The divine nature. But to the incarnation, human nature is not said to partake of some likeness of the divine nature. Which is not to say that Christ doesn't have grace, it doesn't have that too, right? But that's not what you're talking about when you talk about the, what? Incarnation. But it's said to be joined to the divine nature in the very person of the Son. The hypostatic union. And greater is such a thing, right? Than its likeness partaken in. Now, in the second objection, Thomas is agreeing that grace is, what? Habitual grace, right? Is in the soul, right? He says, habitual grace is only in the, what? Soul. But the grace, that is the gratuitous gift of God, which is to be an add to the divine person, that you know the sense of the word grace, right? Pertains to the whole human nature, right? Which is composed from the body, from the soul and the, what? Body. And in this way, the photos of divinity is said to dwell in Christ, even, what? Bodily, huh? It's kind of interesting that prayer, the Deion Mark Christi scientifica me corpus, you know? Insanguish, you know? It's very, but it's because the punditudo divinitatis dwells bodily, right? Why? Because even the body, right, is united, right? Because the divine nature is united, not only to the soul, but also to the, what? Body, right? When they talk about the Eucharist, they say that the, by words of the consecration, and they say, this is my body, then the body of Christ is there, but his blood and his soul and even his divinity are there by being joined with them. And so when he says, this is my, you know, cup of my blood and so on, then by the words of the consecration, the blood is there, right? Because the blood is joined to the body and the body and blood to the soul and the thesis of the divinity, all the rest is there, right? But this is tied up with the idea that it's being corporally, right? Bodily. And one thing that's kind of interesting about the Eucharist, the Eucharist is the end and the culmination of all the sacraments. They're all ordered to the Eucharist. And the sacraments all get the efficacy from Christ's death on the cross. And sometimes, you know, they'll point to the baptism of the Eucharist, those two sacraments in particular, and see if something in the blood and the water that comes from Christ's side is referring to these two sacraments, right? And, you know, it seems that in those two sacraments, especially in the Eucharist, there's a greater symbolism of the, what, passion and death, right? So St. Paul would say, you know, you were buried with Christ in baptism, huh? I suppose it was more explicit than the old times when you went down the stairs in the water and then came up, right? There was a more explicit representation of that, right? But that doesn't mean that our practices aren't legal, right? We do it now. But, um... We do it now. We do it now. We do it now. We do it now. You priests, you know, correct me if I'm incorrect here, but it seems to me that, you know, if the priest were to consecrate the body, right, consecrate the bread here, and then stop and not consecrate the blood, right, the bread would have been turned into the body of Christ, right, okay, but this would be a great irregularity, right, and the priest would not be allowed to consecrate one without consecrating the other, right, and part of the reason for that, even though it's enough for us, you know, as laymen, let's say, to receive just, let's say, the host, right, but that the separate consecration of the body and the blood, right, represents the separation of the body and the blood on the, what, cross, right, so in that sense, it's more most essential to the Eucharist that you represent in a sensible way, right, the death of Christ on the cross, and, you know, that's the source of all the sacraments, right, it's most explicitly represented in the greatest of all the sacraments, the one to which all the other ones are, what, ordered, huh? I was saying to a priest one time, I said, now, why do you have these two consecrations? I said, you know, what, so I don't know why they, you know, they said they would have talked it somewhere along the line, you know, that they would realize that this is to represent the separation. At least he didn't say what consecration. So that's the explanation he gives there in that first paragraph of Christ, the fullest divinity, dwelling, what, bodily in Christ, right? Why this habitual grace in the saints is in their soul, right? Although it can also say that it is said to dwell in Christ bodily, that is not in a shadowy way, huh? Um, um, brawly there, huh? It's not shadowy, it's like an adverb almost there. As he dwelt in the sacraments of the Old Testament, huh? About which is then joined afterwards, that they are the shadows of the future things. The body, however, is what? Christ, huh? Against, insofar as body is divided against, what? Shadow, right, huh? Some say that the divinity is said to have dwelt in Christ bodily, in three ways, huh? Just as the body has three dimensions, huh? In one way, through essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures. Another way, through grace, making one, what? Acceptable to gods and the saints. But in a third way, through a personal union, right? Which is proper to him, right? Whence, he says, is clearly the answer to the third objection, right? Because the union of the Incarnation is not made only through the habitual grace. He doesn't deny the habitual grace of Christ. As other saints unite to God, but in this unique way, right? According to what? Subsistence. Or according to the very person, huh? The sacred heart is substantially divided. The sacred heart is not made only through the habitual grace of Christ. The sacred heart is not made only through the habitual grace of Christ. The sacred heart is not made only through the habitual grace of Christ.