Tertia Pars
Lecture 15: Divine Nature, Assumption, and the Incarnation

Transcript
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The second one goes forward thus, it seems that it does not belong to divine nature to assume, right? Because this has been said, to assume, is said as it were, to take to oneself, right? But the divine nature did not take to itself human nature, because union was not made in the nature, right? But in the person, therefore, it does not belong to the divine nature to assume human nature. That seems to be correct and orthodox, right? Is the town going to take to the other side? What's wrong with this guy? Okay? Moreover, the divine nature is common to the three persons. If, therefore, it belonged to the nature to assume, it would follow that it belongs to the, what? Three persons. And thus, the father would assume human nature, just his son, which is erroneous, to say the least. Or to assume is to act. But to act belongs to a person, not to the nature. The nature might be that by which you act, right? That the person acts. Which is more signified as a principle by which the agent acts. Therefore, to assume does not belong to the nature, right? But against this is Augustine. Augustine, that's what Augustine says in the book on faith to Peter, huh? That nature which always, right, remains, what? Begotten from the Father. That is, which is taken from the Father through eternal generation. That received, or took on, right? Our nature without sin. Well, they're just in these guys, they're really in trouble, I think. They're never going to get out of it. Never going to get out of it this time. Okay? It says, The answer should be said, that as has been said, in the word of assumption, two things that signify it. To wit, the beginning of the action, huh? What is acting, you might say, right? And the term, or end, huh? Of it. To which it's assumed. Now, to be the beginning of assumption belongs to the divine nature, secundum secundum, right? According to itself. In the sense that, what? Because by its power, the assumption was, what? Made, huh? But to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the divine nature, right? According to itself. But by reason of the person in which it is, what? Considered. And therefore, first and most properly, a person is said to assume, right? But some secondary way, it can be said that, what? The nature assumes a nature to its, what? Person, right? That's kind of a... Be careful as we're speaking, it seems to me. And according to this, also, the nature is said to be, what? Not, as it were, conversed or changed into flesh, right? But because it assumes the, what? Nature of flesh. Whence, Damascene says, huh? We say that the nature of God was made incarnate according to the blessed, what? Athanasius and Cyril. There's some tradition here of this way of speaking, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the pronoun, say, right, is reciprocal, right? It refers back to the same one, right? It refers to the same, what? Supposito, huh? Now, the divine nature does not differ in supposito from the person of the word. And therefore, insofar as the divine nature takes human nature to the person of the word, it is said to take it to itself, right? Because the person and nature are the same. But although the father assumes human nature to the person of the word, not on account of this does it take it to himself. Because there's not the same, what? Supposito, mother, father, the word. And therefore, it cannot be said properly that the father assumes, what? Human nature, right? So you say in some way the divine nature, insofar as it's the same as the, what? Person of the son, right? Takes the, what? Human nature to itself, right? Got to be careful about what you're saying there. Because taking it to itself, insofar as it's the person of the son, huh? Not his nature. To the second, the second objection is saying, well, the divine nature is common to the three persons, huh? If therefore it belongs to the nature to assume, it would belong to the three persons, right? To the second, it should be said that what belongs to the divine nature, say, kundum se, huh? By itself, in itself. Belongs to the three persons. As such things as goodness and wisdom and other things of this sort. But to assume, right, belongs to it by reason of the person of the, what? Word. And therefore, it belongs only to that, what person, huh? Now, this is what the distinction was talking about earlier there. That, what is the power of generating the son, right? Is that the divine substance? Or is that the relation that constitutes the father? Which is it? Well, you see, every agent makes what is like itself, right? So, if the power of generating was the relation that constitutes the father, then we'd be making another... Another father? Yeah. Which is not so, right? Interesting. Yeah. So, what he's generating is someone who's God, right? Oh, yeah. Okay. He's generating the same God that he is himself, right? Right. Okay. So, but nevertheless, you can't say, could the son then generate? Is it the power to generate? So, when Thomas finally says, what is the power of generating? It's the divine nature insofar as it's in the father. So, it's not, it's not, yeah, it involves both, right? Yeah. Okay. And I told you about that one text to Thomas. It's in the sentences I can find. I pull it out and put it in a special place so I can find the hope. But, you know, because the persons and the divine nature are the same thing, right? You can signify the divine nature by itself or the person by itself, or you can, what, combine the two in some way, right? Okay. And it seems you're doing something like that here, right? You can say the divine nature takes to itself the human nature, but the divine nature insofar as it's in the, what, person of the, what? Of the son. Oh, right. Yeah. Okay. So, he's making a distinction. To the second, it should be said that that which belongs to the divine nature, as it couldn't have been said, belongs to all three persons, right? As goodness, wisdom, and things of this sort. But with the potency generandi, I get that in my mind if I've been reading that, is the power of generating, the power of giving birth, does that belong to the divine nature, as it couldn't have been said? No. And now, like we should say something similar here, right? But to assume belongs to the divine nature by reason of the person of the, what, word, right? And therefore, it belongs only to that, what, person, right? She's speaking here of the fact of the Incarnation, the possibility that the Father could, but the Holy Spirit could. Yeah. Now, the third objection is saying, well, to act belongs to a person, right? Not to nature. Nature is more that by which you act, right? To the third, therefore, it should be said that just as in God the same is what is and that by which it is, right? It's like we say, you know, that God is what? The good is also goodness, right? So also, in him is the same both what acts and that by which it acts. Because each thing acts in so far as there's a being. Whence the divine nature is both that by which God acts, and it's also God himself acting. So, just be careful. Whence the divine nature is both that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God acts, and that by which God In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all its liberty. Thank you, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So I guess we're up to, what, Article 3 here? Question 3. The third one proceeds thus. It seems that, abstracting personality from God, personality by the understanding that nature is not able to, what, assume, right? For it's been said that it belongs to the nature to assume by reason of the, what, person. For what belongs to something, reason of another, and the other is removed, cannot belong to it. Just as body, which is visible by reason of color, cannot be seen without color. Therefore, taking away the personality by your understanding, the nature is not able to, what, assume, right? Moreover, the word assumption implies the term of the union, huh? Take to oneself, huh? But the union cannot come about in the nature, but only in the person. Therefore, taking away the personality, the divine nature is not able to, what, assume. Moreover, in the first part, it has been said that in divine things, abstracting the personality, nothing, what, remains, huh? But assuming is something, and therefore taking away the personality, one is not able, the divine nature is not able to, what, assume. Now, against this, it is that in divine things, personality is said to be a personal property, which is threefold, huh? These are the ones that constate the persons. Fatherhood, procession, which is the one that we use for the Holy Spirit for want of a name, and sonhood, right? This has been said in the first part. But taking these away, by understanding, there still remains the, what, omnipotence of God through which the Incarnation was made. As the angel says, Luke 1.37, I guess this is a text where you're talking about the Incarnation. There is not impossible before God any word, right? And then it doesn't involve contradiction. Therefore, it seems that even removing the personality, the divine nature is able to assume. Now, Thomas is going to talk about how our mind can consider God without the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And then God would be, what, still individual, right? And therefore, a person, he could be able to, what, assume, right? So we could talk about this even to Aristotle, who wouldn't know anything about the Trinity. Or maybe to a Jewish person who doesn't understand the Trinity either. I answer, it should be said, that the understanding has itself in two ways to divine things. In one way, as knowing God as he is. And thus it is impossible that something, have a line drawn around it, by the understanding that something else would, what, remain. Now, if you see God as he is, you can't make any separation, right? Because the whole that is in God is one, save the distinction of persons, of which, if one were taken away, the other would be taken away, because they are distinguished only by relations, which is necessary to be hama, simo, together, right? That's Aristotle. In another way, our intellect has itself to divine things, not, as it were, knowing God as he is, but knowing God through its own way of knowing him, which is to know in a multiple way, in a divided way, that which in God is, what, one. And in this way, our understanding can understand the goodness and the wisdom, the divine wisdom and the divine goodness, and other things of this sort, which are called, what, essential attributes, not understanding, what, the fatherhood or the sonhood, which are said to be, what, personalities. You saw the sum here, right, because it took up the unity of God, the divine, what, goodness, among other things, the divine wisdom, before we took up the trinity, right? So it's not knowing God as he is, but in our way of knowing, we can have that separation. And according to this, or in this way, abstracting personality by one's understanding, we're able still to, what, understand the nature as, what, assuming it, okay? But we understand the nature as, what, in a way like a person, okay? That's what he says when he applied to the first objection, huh? But the first objection is saying that it belongs to the nature to assume by reason of the, what, person, right, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, because in God, the same is that by who something is, and what it is, huh? Another way of putting that, in God, the same is what you have, and what you are, okay? Therefore, whatever is attributed to God in the abstract, considered by itself, other things being, what, cut off, will be something, what, subsisting, huh? And consequently, a person, huh? So, first, I'll thought about God, meaning nothing of the Trinity, you'd think of God as, what, subsisting, right? And therefore, as being, what, a person. Since he is in, what, intellectual nature, which is, what, yeah. Just, therefore, as now, laying down the personal properties in God, we see there are three persons, right? So, excluding these by the understanding, excluding these personal properties by the understanding, there remains in our consideration the divine nature as something that subsists, and therefore, as a, what? Person, huh? So the Jew would think of God, if he didn't know anything about the Trinity, he would think of God as a, what? Person, right? Aristotle did the same, the old pagan, right? And in this way, it can be understood that he assumes human nature by reason of his subsistence or by reason of his, what, personality, right? He'd still be drawing him to his, what, himself as a person rather than, what, making one nature out of his nature and the human nature, right? He'd be drawing it to himself as a person. And a second objection. Assumption implies the term union, he says. But the union cannot be made in the nature but only in the, what, person. Therefore, abstracting personality, the divine nature is not able to assume. And Thomas says, to the second it should be said that even, what, cutting off, right, by the understanding, the personalities of the three persons, right, there would remain in the understanding the one personality of, what, God, as the Jews understand, right? You could add, as Aristotle understands, too. To which, and it may be, it may be a sense of, or veroes, right, and have a sense of understanding, right? To which could be terminated the assumption, right? Just as we now say it's terminated to the person of the, what, word, huh? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? To which could be terminated, right? More in the first part, it has been said that in God, abstracting a personality, nothing remains, but assuming is something, and therefore abstracting a personality, the divine nature may not assume. To the third, it should be said that abstracting personality by the understanding, nothing is said to remain by way of resolution, as if something else is what? So it's a relation, and that other is a what? Relation itself, because whatever is considered in God is considered as a what? Supposedly. Yeah. Supposedly. But something of those things which are said of God can be understood without another, not by way of resolution, but in the way already said. And that goes back to finding the article. Sometimes Thomas says that there are two kinds of abstraction you can make in God, in our mind there. And he compares it into two kinds of abstraction we make in things. So what can I separate from all you guys here? I can separate the common, right? Common from the private, right, or particular, right? And so when I consider God leaving aside the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it's like this, right? Okay? Okay? But now there's another one where I might say, well, let's take away for you something, right, huh? And let's start by taking away your color, right, huh? Okay? And then let's take away your what? Your soul, right, huh? Now I just got your body, your matter left, right? Now let's take away your matter, and then what? Nothing left, right? Okay? So this is kind of taking away the what? The form all the way down to its most fundamental. So in that case, you look at the person as underlying everything else, right? If you take away the personality, then what? Nothing is left, right? So you take away my personality, and my knowledge of geometry, and my humanity, and those other things are what? Are lost, right? Okay? Okay? So I think in this piece here, you're talking about kind of separating the common, the human, the divine nature, which is common to the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. And those common to them, they're different ways that human nature is common to you guys, right? Because you don't have one in number of human nature, right? There's some similarity there, right? And so to some extent, you can, just as I can understand man without any one of you, so you can understand the divine nature to some extent, right? Without understanding the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. And Aristotle, and Averroes, and the Indian Jews, and so on, right? But understand something about the divine nature, right? And then they would see the divine nature as something subsisting, right? And therefore, as a person that could assume, right? Okay. Yeah, he speaks of taking away, what? The form from the matter, right? And then going down to the fundamental subject, right? You take that away, and you have nothing left, right? Okay. So we think of God as being three persons subsisting in this one nature, right? You take away the persons, and then everything's gone, right? In that way. But in this other kind of separation of the common from the particular, it seems you can consider the divine nature without the, what? What's the distinction between the two, as far as time is concerned? Well, if you look at the persons as what? As the ultimate subject, right, huh? In which everything else is. Because, like we sometimes might say, the divine nature is found in each of the three persons. Something, but not exactly like the way human nature is found in each of us. The difference being, of course, that it's one and the same individual, the divine nature that's in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But you and I, it's not one in number, right? But there was a sense of similarity there, right? So I think of human nature as existing in these persons here, right? Then if I take away these persons, right, that's underlying everything, everything's gone, right? But if I separate out what you have in common, I can consider that without individual differences. And that's where something remains in my mind, when I leave out your, yeah. When I leave out the rock that is black and the cane is white, I still have man, right, huh? Okay? But if you consider the fact that man exists only as a black man or a white man or a yellow man, take away a black man, white man, yellow man, there's no man left, right? Yeah. So sometimes he'll speak, you know, if you take away the persons, nothing remains, right? And sometimes he'll say, oh, that's how the nature remains, huh? So it's kind of a subtle thing that he's doing. He's not making a distinction as explicit here, but I think he could. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Fourth article, where the one person is able to assume a created nature with another one not assuming, right? To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that one person is not able to assume a created nature without another one assuming it. Unless you really follow up here. Theology is that. So, right? For undivided are the works of the Trinity, as Augustine says. So, just as there is one essence of the three persons, so there is one, what? Operation. But to assume is an operation. Therefore, it cannot belong to one divine person without belonging to another, right? Are you convinced by that? What the heck is Africa's teaching these guys? We never want to record it. It's a minute to the whole thing. Warmer, just as we say that the person of the Son was incarnate, right? So, also the, what? The nature. As Damascene says in the third book, the whole divine nature in, what? One of its hypostasis was made incarnate, right? But the common nature, but the nature is common to the three persons, right? Therefore, the assumption. So, that's kind of interesting that Damascene seems to be saying that you can say, what? That the whole divine nature was incarnate. What does that mean, right? Moreover, as human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so also men by grace are assumed by him, huh? According to that of Romans 14, verse 3. God assumed him, right, huh? But this assumption commonly belongs to what? All the persons. Therefore, the what? First ones, right? So, if God takes you to himself, it's all three persons taking you to. But against this is what Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Divine Deans, that the mystery of the Incarnation is said to belong to discrete theology, huh? I was just teaching the, these guys come to my house on a Wednesday night there, you know, we have to do a chapter on quantity there in the categories, huh? And the fundamental distinction in quantities called discrete quantity, like number, and then continuous quantity, like a line, or a surface, or a body, right, huh? This belongs to discrete theology, huh? It is. Yeah. And Louis de Broglie's got a, what, a book on discrete and continuous in modern physics, right? Oh. So, it belongs to discrete theology, according to which something distinct is said of the, what? Three persons, huh? Now, Thomas is going to solve this by pointing out that there's two things, right, in assumption, huh? I answered, it should be said, that as has been said, assumption implies two things, right? One is the act of assuming, right? And the other is the, what, term of assumption, right? Okay. It's like if you say that assuming is, what, taking something to yourself, okay? Now, the act of assuming, the taking, proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the, what, three persons, huh? But the term of assumption is, what, a person, which has been said. And therefore, that which is of action in the assumption is common to the three persons, huh? But that which pertains to the notion of the, what, term belongs to one person that does not belong, what, to the others, right? For the three persons made it, right, that the human nature would be united to the one person of the, what, son? That solves the problem, right? Simple enough, right? So, when it says in scripture, you know, that the Holy Spirit overshadowed the Blessed Virgin, right? They seem to be attributed to the Holy Spirit, but that is, what, what is the way of speaking this? Yeah, it's appropriation, right? It's not as if the Holy Spirit did this alone, right, huh? But because it's, what, it's a work of God's love and mercy, and these are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, but reason of his way of proceeding, that it's appropriated. We saw that, a lot of study of appropriation there in that text of the Trinity, right? And on the creed, he said, but even God, the Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, unto the Father alone, create, and not the Son and the Holy Spirit. So, it's interesting, even in these very formal things like the creed, right, that it's a perfection of our faith, you have, what, appropriation, right, huh? So, the taking of human nature from the Blessed Virgin, right, huh, and drawing it then, that's an activity common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, although appropriate to the Holy Spirit. Just like creation is an activity common to the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, but may be appropriated to the Father because of his personal property, right? But the term, but, what, to whom this nature is taken is just the, what, one person, huh? So, you apply it to the first objection then, where it says, undivided are the works of the Trinity. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that argument proceeds on the side of, what, the operation, the activity, and the conclusion that you have in the argument would follow if, what, it implied only that operation, right, without the term, which is the person, right? Now, the second one, what about this incarnate nature, right? The nature is said to be incarnate just as, what, to be assuming, by reason of the person to whom the union is, what, terminated, right? Not over insofar as it is common to the, what, three persons. For the whole, what, divine nature, right, is said to be incarnate, not because it is, what, incarnate in all three persons, in all persons, but because nothing is lacking of the perfection of divine nature to the person who is incarnate. It's the divine nature there in the Eucharist, like this, huh? This way of speaking. Now, the third objection was taken from our being drawn to God, right? To the third should be said that the assumption, which is by the grace of adoption, right, terminates at a certain partaking of the divine nature by an assimilation or a likening to, what, his goodness, according to that text we were referring to last week here, 2 Peter 1, 4, right, that we might be, what, partakers, right, of the divine nature, and therefore an assumption of this kind is cognitively person, both on the side of the, what, principiae, the cause of the operation, right, and on the side of the, what, term, right? But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the side of the beginning, the maker of it, right, not over on the side of the, what, term, huh? That's a nice little comparison there. Do you know? Do you know? Now, could some other divine person assume human nature besides the person of the Son? You must have asked yes, because the last one is going to be, whether it is more suitable for the Son to become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit, right? But you expect you're going to answer that they could, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus. Thus, it seems that no other divine person is able to assume human nature besides the person of the Son. Aren't you doing this in Catechism? Did the question welcome to Catechism? Not even the Baltimore Catechism, which I had in my time. Well, through this, the first objection, through this assumption, right, it was brought about that God is the, what, Son of Man. But it is unsuitable to be a Son, that this belonged to the Father or the Holy Spirit, right? For this would turn into a confusion of the divine person, son. Therefore, the Father and the Holy Spirit are not able to assume, what, flesh, huh? Speaking by synecdoche. Oh, I mean, sous-flesh, yeah. But if they were and were called there for the Son of Man, it would be the Son of Man, not the Son of God. Moreover, by the divine incarnation, men have, what, reached the adoption of sons, according to that of Romans 8.15. You have not received the spirit of slavery, again, in fear, but the spirit of the adoption of sons, huh? But adoptive sonhood is a partaking, huh? A likeness partaking of the natural sonhood of Christ, huh? Which does not belong either to the Father or to the Holy Spirit. Whence it is said in Romans 8.29, whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his, what, Son, huh? Therefore, it seems that no other person could be made incarnate beside the person of the, what, Son, huh? It's a very interesting objection. As I was saying, an objection, I don't know if it's all up here, but it's another work, I think, before I saw it. It was argued against the incarnation of just the Son, because we should love the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit equally. And if the Son became man and not the Father and the Holy Spirit, then we have, what, more reason to love the Son than the Father? Supposedly, you love the Son, since he is a form of divine nature, without necessarily realizing it. Yeah. But Thomas says, you have another reason to love him, right? Yeah. But not a reason to love him more. Because each of these divine persons is infinite good, right? Can't love them more. Thomas can go a long ways with this infinity of God, huh? I was looking. Pretty far, yeah. I was looking at the compendium of theology there, kind of reading it. It's kind of nice to read it. And sometimes he gives an argument, you know, that you don't have in the Summas, but usually there are, you know, some ones you have there. But he was asking whether God produced the world naturally or by will, right? And he gives three arguments in this one little chapter of the compendium. And the first argument kind of is based on something he's just shown in some of the earlier chapters, that God created the angels, he created matter, and so on, right? And so there's a diversity in what he's made, but nature is determined to one. So if he's producing this thing naturally, he produces just one. Okay, hit that argument. And then he has a second argument where he says, well, nature acts for an end, and this presupposes a mind that knows an end that the person thinks in the end. So those terms I've seen before, right? The third argument he gives is that God's power is infinite. So he wouldn't have produced anything in particular, right? Unless his will had, what, determined he's going to use his power for this, rather than for that, right? So it's kind of interesting what he argued from the... It's kind of surprising when I saw it. I've never seen the argument in Summas, but it's kind of interesting the argument. I've got to save your time with his arguments, you know. I've got to do a good piece of candy or something. I don't know how these suckers used to have in the old days. I remember this guy, a guy who's four years older than me, but he's in my brother Richard's class. And he kind of came down and did a lecture there, you know, and one day he'd get to talk at the college. And, gee, I wish you had a guy kind of get to talk at that every day, because then he's enough to think for the rest of the day. He's enough to talk, you know, enough to think about. Well, that's why we, little Thomas, can go back and say, oh, gee, an hour later, what were those arguments, you know? And your mind kind of comes back upon them and chews them, huh? Don't they say that in the Old Testament there, was it? The animals that... Yeah, yeah. Ruminate, yeah. There's some symbolism there, yeah. The Gustavs people say that. And Goethe talks about that, huh? You wonder, ruminating animals, right? That they're more sacred or more edible or something, right? But your mind's supposed to ruminate in these things, huh? It's like you said to those. It doesn't do so. Well-named. Yeah. In the Gospel this morning there, they were... Was it the Pharisees warning Christ about Herod, right? And Christ kind of, you know, addresses some words to be taken to Herod, right? And they called something that fox. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah. What was it? Mark, he values it up here on lion and fox and so on. And Christ is using that. What was that? Using that image, you know, the king's got to be sometimes a fox and sometimes a lion, right? Sometimes he's got to be, you know. Oh, I see. He's just powered and opened away like a lion. Other times he's got to be more crafty and, you know, like a sneaky, like a fox. This is kind of a compliment in one way, you know. Like, you know, the unjust servant, you know, who's praised for some cleverness, right? In this thing. Sons of this world are more prudent sometimes than the sons of the kingdom. Moreover, the son is said to be sent, right, and generated by a, what, temporal nativity, born in the Virgin Mary, according to which or by which he's made incarnate. But it doesn't belong to the father to be sent, right? And one of his notions was inashibili son. Therefore, at least the person of the father cannot be out there, right? Not so. You see? Okay. Again, you could argue that that is being unbirthable, right? It's taken, what, in his divine nature, right? No. Not in the other. But again, you kind of see, it seems more appropriate to the son to be incarnate than the other guys, other persons, but is that, strictly speaking, you say that it's impossible for them? But against this, whatever the son is able, the father is able, otherwise there would not be the same power of the three. But the son was able to be incarnate, therefore likewise the father and the Holy Spirit. The answer should be said, that has been said, the assumption implies two things. One is the act of assuming, the act of taking a sense. I guess assumenti, assumens, assumcio, it comes with the word to take, doesn't it? Sumerian. And then the idea of ah, right? So he has those two aspects of this, right? But the beginning of the act, the source of the act, is the divine power, right? And the limit is a, what? A person, huh? But the divine power, commonly and without difference, has itself to all the, what? Persons, huh? In the same way, there's a common notion of, what? Personnel to the three persons, huh? One person is not more a person than the other, right? Even though their personal properties are, what? Different, huh? Whenever, however, some power has itself indifferently, without difference towards many, right? It's able to, what? Terminate or limit its action to, what? Each of them, right? Just as in rational powers, which have themselves to opposite, both of which they are able to, what? Do. Thus, therefore, the divine power is able to unite a human nature, either to the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, as he united it to the person of the Son. And therefore, it should be said that the Father or the Holy Spirit could have assumed flesh just as the, what? Son, huh? It's just so much a person to see us, right? So it could be joined to their person. And there's something infinite about the personality of these three, you know, they can be the, you know, have several natures there. Now, the first objection is talking about the confusion of being the persons, well, maybe it would be the words, but the first, therefore, it should be said that temporal sonhood, right, by which Christ is said to be, what? The Son of Man does not constitute his, what? Person. As does his eternal sonhood, right? That is what his eternal personality is, right? That's what his constant, right? But it's something falling upon his temporal birth and time, right? His being born as a virgin. Whence if through this way the name of sonhood was transferred to the Father of the Holy Spirit, there would not follow any, what? Confusion of the divine persons. It might be confusion in our mind, but would not be, what? Confusion of the divine persons in the case you wouldn't have two, what? Sons by, in? In the event, yeah. Okay. Of course, God doesn't want to confuse us, but that's. Now, the second one, the most interesting objection, the one here from the adoptive. The second, it should be said that adoptive sonhood, right, is a certain, what? Partaking, partaking likeness of the natural son, right? It comes about in us, appropriately, yeah, from the Father, who is the beginning of natural, what? Sonhood, right? And also by the gift of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and the Son, right? According to that in Galatians 4, 6. For God sent, what? The Spirit of the Son into our hearts, prime, Father. And therefore, just as the Son being made incarnate, we receive adoptive sonhood to the likeness of his, what? Natural sonhood, right? So, if the Father was incarnate, right, we would receive adoptive sonhood from him as the beginning of natural sonhood as the Father when he's right to the Son, right? And from the Holy Spirit, as it were, from the common connection of the Father and the, what? Son, right? And so you do appropriate the Holy Spirit, you know, that he's becoming man, right? The activity, right? The Holy Spirit overshadowed the Blessed Virgin, right? Because it's similar to, along these lines, anyways, it makes me think of the, Isaiah, that Christ is foretold as the Father, Father forever, because he is the source in a certain way of our being begotten. It's appropriate to be a Father, even as man, as man, as man said that. So, in a similar way, I suppose you could understand these words. Yeah, you get to be a son through your father, right? Yeah, depending on the, the, you know, person incarnate you could understand. Yeah. There were some women complaining about, this term, illegitimate child, right? So, when I was young, they had much nicer name, love child. But there you see, love is being, you know, and then you say, well, that's the Holy Spirit then, right? You know? We're a love child. We're a love child. Now, to the third, the third one is from the argument of the, one of the activities of the Father, as he's unborn. To the third, it should be said that it belongs to the Father to be inashibirem, huh? Unbirthable, right? According to what? Eternal activity, which should not exclude the, what, temporal activity, huh? The Son is said to be, what, sent, according to the Incarnation, in that he is from, what, another. Without which, Incarnation would not suffice for the notion of mission. Okay? But he's arguing, you know, whether you could say that the Father was sent if he became incarnate, right? But he could be said to be incarnate even if he could not be said to be, what, sent, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Could he take you on human nature? Makes sense? You can see how, who is it, Sebelius, who said that there's only one person and he's called the, what, son because he became man? Mm-hmm. Ah, you can see how the heretic might disuse these things, right? Mm-hmm. His next two articles are kind of strange. You can see how Thomas said it. Where the two Christians could assume one and the same one and the same one and the same one and the same one and the same one and the same