Tertia Pars
Lecture 19: Universal Causes, Predicables, and Wisdom in Aristotle

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One, two, three, right? I have the same sense of the word common. Yeah, yeah. My time is usually an expression like common in radio, common in things, right? Common secundum revo, so to speak, yeah. And common secundum raziovo, right? Okay. So, you know when I confuse those two, right? Like kind of the great confusion there you have with, you know, Heidegger, I don't know Heidegger, but, well, maybe they have two, but. So Heidegger, right, huh? And going back to Spinoza, right, huh? But Heidegger takes the being, which is said of all things, right? And makes this the beginning of all things, in the sense of the, yeah, that for which everything proceeds, right, huh? So Thomas, in the Summa Codicentia, has a chapter devoted to refuting this. That God, when you say God is I and whoever, right? He's not the being which is said of all things. And he gives many arguments against this, right? But Heidegger and his logic is, not really logic in the ordinary sense, nor is it logical. But he identifies the two, right, see? And that's a tremendous mistake, right? But in a sense, Plato is somewhat in that same mistake when he says that the, what forms, right, are kind of universal causes, huh? And all men partake in the form of man himself, or all dogs in the form of dog himself, right? But now Spinoza comes before Hegel. Spinoza says, the order in thoughts and the order in things is the same. And therefore, our first thought corresponds to the first thing. Of course, our mind goes from the confused to the distinct. So the first thought of man is the most confused thought. It's a very confused thought of being, you know, something that is, right? And so he identifies that at the beginning of all things. And then the ego builds upon himself. Yeah? So how does Thomas acknowledge that in God there's something that can do with these things? Well, he says there are many things that God understands, but he understands them all by his own nature. So he has only one thought, you might say, right? One thinking. But he understands everything by that. I used to love to quote this statement of Heraclitus. He says, those who speak with understanding must be strong. In what is common to all. And in a way, he's anticipating what Aristotle does in the 14 books of wisdom. Because in the 14 books of wisdom, Aristotle becomes strong in what is common to all. But in both senses, it's not confusing the two, right? So Aristotle says that wisdom is about what is said of all, right? It's about being in one, right? And so he considers being in one in general, right? But then it's also about the, what? Very first causes. And they're common to all in the sense that their causality, or his causality, extends to what? All things, huh? So Aristotle doesn't, what, confuse those two. And actually, even in the premium to wisdom there, he, when he works out the six-point description of the wise manna, he explicitly argues in the first three, wisdom being about what is said of all. And for the last three, it was about the first causes. So he keeps the two quite, what, distinct. And yet there's a reason why these are both considered in the same, what, knowledge, right? And I often use the example there. You know, if there was a science about the king, right? This would also be a science about the citizen. Because the causality of the king extends to all, what, citizens, right? And if there is a science about the general, right, it would also be the science about the soldier. Because the causality of the general extends to all those of whom soldier is, what, said, right? And just as citizen is said of more than soldier, that is to say every soldier is a citizen, but not every citizen is a soldier. So the causality of the king extends further than the causality of the, what, general, right? And so there's certain correspondence, right, that the more universal or common your cause is, is the further its causality extends, the more common, in the other sense, you're going to talk about it. I often compare ethics there to medicine or a carpenter or something like that, right? Medicine is about health, but health is not the end of all things, even in human things, right? But ethics is about human happiness, which is the end of all human things, the goal of all human things. So ethics will talk about all human goods in general, as well as about happiness, then. And Aristotle, in the seventh book of the politics, right, he talks about, very explicitly, about all the goods of man, right? And Socrates, in the dialogues, talks about all the goods of man. And so the division of all the goods of man into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, the exterior goods, and then, which of these are better, and so on, right? That belongs to the philosopher, right? It doesn't belong to the medical doctor, as such. So, in some sense, ethics is like wisdom, right, in that it's very universal, and it's about, also, the end of the whole human life. But happiness is common to all we do, in the sense of being, what? A cause of all we do, right? Why, you know, human doing is common in the sense of being said of everything we do, right? So, Catholics will talk about both, but you don't confuse the one, two, right? So it's interesting what the great Heraclitus said, right? Those who speak with understanding, well, by antonia, those who speak with understanding are the wise. Not only do they understand, but the wise man most of all understands, huh? And what does the wise man do? He talks about the first causes, which are common in one sense. He talks about being in one, which are common in another sense. He talks about the axioms, which are common in another way. And he becomes strong with what is common to all. That's why he speaks with understanding. Others don't. But it's a very gross, in a sense, of confusion to mix up the, for the Latin, they call it universale in causando, and universale in predicando, right? In English there, you have these two things with the general, right? So the general of the army, Douglas MacArthur, he's an individual, right? He's not a, he's not said to anybody else. But he runs the whole army, right? But soldier is general in a, what? In another sense. So, it's. Said of everybody in the Army, right? Douglas MacArthur is not said of everybody in the Army, right? I was reading a book there and I thought, my dad is there, they're quoting a remark of President Roosevelt. I guess he's with his buddies there in the White House and got a call from Huey Long, you know, down in Louisiana. And after the call, you know, he was saying, Bobby, Huey Long, one of the two most dangerous men in the country. We were going, who's the other guy? He says, Douglas MacArthur. But anyway, so, yeah, I remember how Shakespeare puns in those two senses of general, remember that? In Taurus and Kressida. Because in Kressida comes over to the Greek camp, the general, like Memnon, gives her a kiss, right? She's a precious woman, right? And then Nestor wants to get her really into the act of kissing her, right? She's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general. But he's punning, right? So I often say, you know, Shakespeare is wiser, you know, and he puns in these because he seems to do different senses. And he's wiser than Hegel, right? That's what the general Schwarzkopf said. One of the few times in the news, one of the first golf work going on, they had a press conference, and some reporters said, well, generally speaking, they don't really ask a question. Schwarzkopf said, you've got to understand, generals always speak general. Okay, so we're down here to the implies and get to them. We're looking at the first objection, I guess, right? To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that the Son of God is incarnate, the incarnate Son of God, is the Savior, the common Savior of all men, right? Not by commonness of genus or species, which would be attributed to the nature separated from the individual. What is a genus? If you take the name and say, genus is a name said with one meaning, right? Of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, right? And the species is said, if it's lowest species, it's a name said with one meaning of many different one individually, right? In answer to the question, what it is. But he's not common in that sense. But by the commonness of a cause, right? Insofar as the Son of God incarnate, the incarnate Son of God, is universal cause of the salvation of what? Man, huh? And he has his universality and causality because he's God made what? Man, huh? Now the per se man, of whom Plato spoke, right? Is not found in Rerum Natura, thus that it be aside from in singulars, as a Platonist laid down, huh? Although some say that Plato did not understand the separated man, except in the divine understanding, right? And thus it would not be necessary that he be assumed by the word, since from eternity he would be, what? Present, huh? Now sometimes you say Plato arrives at his position by thinking that the way we know must be the way what things are if we know truly. You've heard me talk about that as a central question of philosophy. Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are, right? And at first sight it might seem yes, right? Because truth is a conformity of the mind with what? Things, the agreement of the mind with things. things. And, but Aristotle answers to the question, no, right? And you have to approach it, as they say, by mannedexia, right? You know, bit by bit, right? And when Aristotle and Thomas begin talking about it in the second book of Natural Hearing, they talk about how the distinction in order, right, in which we know things is not what? The same, right? So we can know in distinction things that don't exist in distinction. And we can know things in the reverse order that they come in things. So like Sherlock Holmes says to Watson, we have to reason backwards. And Holmes says, what do you mean? Well, from the effect to the cause, right? So is our mind false in knowing the effect before the cause when in things the cause is before the effect? And Aristotle, in a sense, is saying if you don't distinguish between the order in which we know and the order in which things come, then you're going to end up being mistaken, right? And that happens all the time, right? But the other way you could argue for Plato, you could say that, well, before what is through another is what is through itself, right? Are you a man through being Michael? Am I a man through being Dwayne? Is Socrates a man through being Socrates? Well, if it's through being Socrates that one is a man, then Socrates would be the only man. Therefore, it seems like Socrates is not a man to himself but to another. And therefore, there must be someone or something that is man through itself. And that's the parasyon. But then, as Aristotle shows in the seventh book of Wisdom, it's not possible for man to be, what, without matter, right? And universal would have to be without at least individual matter. Just like you have these people who think there must be something that is bad to itself. When you realize that bad is really a lack of something you're able to have and should have, well, then it's got to be something besides the bad in the bad. And therefore, there can't be something bad to itself. People get a little mixed up in finite principle, right? You get to the third injection now, right? To the third, it should be said that human nature, although it is not assumed in the concrete as if a, what, suppositum or hypostasis is understood before the assumption is nevertheless assumed in the individual, right? Because it is assumed that it might be in the individual person, namely, the word, yeah. That's the way he explained it before, the word animal, here in intimacy. So he answers the play to this, you know? But notice how in that position that he assumed human nature extracted from the individuals, they're kind of confusing the, what, universal cause with the universal predication, right? I'm kind of mixing up the two, huh? You've got a universal cause there, the word of God and God universal predication. The two are joined together in this false understanding or this misunderstanding of what the incarnation is, right? Thank you. One more article. The fifth article here, right? Whether the Son of God should have assumed human nature in all individuals, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that the Son of God ought to assume human nature in all individuals. For that which is first and per se assumed is human nature. What belongs per se to some nature belongs to all existing in that nature. Therefore, it is suitable that he assume human nature in all. Yeah. It wouldn't be you anymore. I would be you. I got to be. Moreover, the divine incarnation proceeded from the divine charity. Therefore, it is said in John 3.16, God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. But charity brings about that one communicates to one's friends as much as possible. But it's possible that the Son of God assumed many, what, natures of men. We talked about that before, right? And for the same reason, he could assume all if he wanted to. Therefore, it would be suitable to show his charity, right? But the Son of God assumed nature in all supposita. I know it's in the bottom of the page here in the parallels. They have reference to this third book of the sentences, right? So these opinions must come up, right? Moreover, the wise man, the wise operator, perfects his work in the briefest way possible, right? But it's a more brief way, if all men were assumed to the natural what? To the Son of God. Then that to one natural Son, many were brought into the adoption of sons. Therefore, human nature ought to be assumed by the Son of God in all what? Supposita. But against this is what Damascene says in the third book. That the Son of God did not assume human nature, which is considered the species. Nor did he assume all what? Apostasis, huh? Thomas doesn't make sense on this now. I answer it should be said, huh? It was not suitable that human nature be assumed in all supposita by the Word. First, because it would take away the multitude of what? Supposita. Of human nature, which would be what? Connectual to man, right? Because in the assumed nature, one does not consider any other suppositum apart from that of the person assuming. If there were not a human nature except that what? Yeah. Second, it would fall that there was not except the tomb of human nature, which is the person assuming. Second, it would derogate, take away from the dignity of the Son of God incarnate One, insofar as he is the first one generated in many, what? Brothers. According to human nature, just as he is the firstborn of every creature, according to his divine nature. For then all men would give equal dignity, huh? And God hates equality, as we don't teach you, because there is a case to say. Third, because it would be suitable that just as one divine suppositum is made incarnate, so one human nature alone, right, would be assumed, so that from both parts there would be found, what? Unity, huh? One to one, right? Marriage, I guess, must be one to one, huh? Okay, let's look at the first objection there again. The first, therefore, should be said, that to be assumed belongs, secundum se, to human nature, because it does not belong to it by reason of the person, just as it belongs to the divine nature to assume by reason of the, what? Person. Not because it belongs to him, secundum se, as such, as pertaining to his essential principles, or as its natural property, to which mode it would belong to all, what? Supposita. What's he saying there? He's basically denying that it belongs to man, or human nature as such, to be, what? Yeah. In the way in which you'd say it belongs to the triangle, such to be, what? As interior angles, you're going to do right angles, or something of that sort of thing. Or belongs to two as such, to be, what? Half of four, right? Okay. So when you say it's suitable that human nature be assumed, we don't mean that it, what, follows from the very essential principles of human nature that it be assumed, huh? Because then it would be common to all men to be assumed, huh? And to the second objection, it should be said. This is the one from the love of God, right? He's not showing enough love here. The second, it should be said that the love of God to men is made known not only in the assumption of human nature, but most of all, right? Especially. To those things which he, what? Suffered in his human nature for other men. According to that of Romans 5, verse 8. Our Lord commended his love for us, because when we were, what, enemies, Christ died for us. Which would not have place if he assumed human nature in, what? All men, huh? So is Christ's love for us shown more by his, what he suffered for us than by his becoming man? If it said... I mean, the fact that he joined human nature to him is a sign of love, because that's the first effect of love to him. Yeah, that's right. But he shows love for us more by that, or by what he suffered. Mm-hmm. That's sort of part of the resolution. He shows the love of the incarnation through what he suffered for us. Yeah. When he says, greater love than this hath no man, right? He laid down his life for his friends, right? Maybe his life, his love is shown more by that, right? Mm-hmm. Than by the fact of the incarnation. It's shown by that, too. Yeah. It's shown by that, but also the fact that he suffered shows the love of the incarnation. He couldn't show that if he, what, assumed all of us. Mm-hmm. That would be way too deep. Now, as far as the brevity of life, the brevity of the way, the brevity is the soul of wisdom, right? To the third, it should be said that to the briefness of the way, the wise man, what, observes, huh? It pertains that he does not, what, do through many what he could, what? So, let's go. So, let's go. Just do it through one. And therefore it's most suitable that through one man he saved all the rest. Praviti. You can't have less than one. Can you? Can I ask you a quick question or two? You say something else and one thing first. No. So in the body of the article you said the Son of God assuming many human individuals that they're underlying or the supposed power will be taken away. What is natural to them? Yeah, natural to them and they have many persons in the same nature. Okay. So in a sense if you go against human nature I'd do this. Okay. Is that, because I was trying to see if that would be, what the distinction would be between that and saying well if the Son of God assumed a human person why that human person wouldn't be taken away as well. like when you Yeah, they've been a problem but they've been a problem but I mean in a sense he's addressing that when he says that there wouldn't be any persons in human nature if he assumed human nature and all the individuals. Okay. Because I think that's kind of what I was thinking of when he first asked if he assumed a person. I was thinking well that person would kind of be annihilated into the divine person. Yeah. Taken away and then all it's left is the divine person in that sense. Yeah. The divine person, yeah. kind of goes back to that argument against the angel because you have a nature without its own person. When a man of course you can have what? A person of the same nature. You can have many persons of the same nature, right? But if you destroyed that but assuming all nature is right then you've got that same problem you have with just assuming more angelic nature. And this nature would not exist with its own personality. Do we have time for another article or not? I think I'm going to be sure. We can try. Okay. 2-6 one proceeds thus. It seems that it was not suitable that the Son of God assumed human nature from the, what? Stop or add it now. For it says, for the Apostle says to this little Hebrews chapter 7 it was suitable it was suitable that the, what? There would be a pontifex son a priest for us segregated from sinners, right? But he would be more separated from sinners if he did not assume human nature from the root of Adam the sinner. Therefore it seems that he ought not to have, what? Assumed human nature from the stock of Adam. Moreover, in every genus that is a more noble beginning or in every genus that is more noble beginning than that which is from the beginning. If therefore he wished to, what? Assume human nature he ought to more have assumed it in Adam himself, right? Moreover, the Gentiles were more, what? Sinners than the Jews as the gloss says in Galatians chapter 2. We, by nature, are Jews not from, what? Not sinners from the Gentiles. If therefore from sinners he ought to wish to assume you in nature he ought to more assume it from Gentiles than from the seed of what? Abraham. Abraham, right? Who was just. Against this is what is said Luke 3, chapter 23. The generation of the Lord is reduced or led back to what? Already Adam. The answer should be said that as Augustine says in the 13th book of the Trinity or about the Trinity that God would be able to, what? Receive men elsewhere, right? And from the genus of Adam, huh? That's one of the other senses of genus, huh? The multitude of men descended from one man. One of the meanings of Aristotle gives in the fifth book of wisdom. who by his sin obligated human race. But he judged it better, right? That from the one who was the, what? Victim, was it? Oh, okay. Yeah, you may assume it from the one who was overcome, right? By the devil, right? To whom he might overcome or conquer the enemy of the human race, right? And this then account to three reasons. First, because it seems to pertain to justice that he satisfied who, what? Sinned. And therefore, from the nature prepped into it, you have to assume that to which satisfaction would be fulfilled for the whole human nature. That touches upon one of the reasons why the incarnation, remember? That the one who sins in the preparation, right? Secondly, because this pertains to the greater dignity of man, who from that, what? genus, the victor over the devil would be born who was, what? Or come through the devil, yeah. There's a reason they're very close together, right? And third, through this also the power of God would be shown more, right? Who of a corrupt nature and infirm one would assume that which was promoted, right? Into so great a power in, what? Dignity, right? Now, how about the first objection about being segregated from sinners? The first, therefore, it should be said that Christ ought to be separated or segregated from sinners as regards guilt, right? Which he came to destroy. Not, however, as regards the nature which he came to, what? Save. According to that, that he ought to be likened to his brothers in all things, as the apostle says. And in this also, more marvelous is his innocence, right? That from the mass subject to sin, he assumed a what? Nature assumed would have such purity, right? Of course, maybe Mary, more than Thomas understood, right? Would be pure. Okay, the second objection. Why not assume Adam, right? The second should be said that, as has been said, it is necessary that he who has come to take away sin to be segregated from sinners as regards, what? Guilt, huh? To which Adam was, what? Subject. And whom Christ let out from his, what? Right. It is necessary that the one who came to cleanse all ought not to be, what? Cleansed himself, right? Just as in each genus, the first mover is immobile according to that motion. That's the common white that Aristotle made. Just as the first thing altering is inalterable. And thus, it would not be suitable that he assumed human nature and Adam himself. Now, what about getting it from the Gentiles? To the third, it should be said that because Christ ought to be most of all segregated from sinners, as regards guilt, as it were obtaining the, what? Height of innocence. It was suitable that from the first sinner, as far as Christ would arrive, right? Through many just in between, right? In which there would shine a little bit certain signs of the future sanctity, right? And the kind of which also the people from whom Christ was to be born, God instituted certain signs of sanctity, which began Abraham, who first received the promise of what? Christ. And circumcision as a sign of the federation, the contract, being consummated, as is said in Genesis 17, 11. God bless you. God bless you. God bless you. God bless you. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand what you've written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I noticed that the Inquiridian symbol arm, that's on the internet. Have you seen that? Oh, no, I didn't. Yeah. In fact, I took out a couple of things there in the Trinity there, you know, I was going to reproduce you with my darn machine. Reproducing the machine was, you know, leaving things kind of fuzzy, you know. But it's interesting, it was using one of these texts for the concept, it was using the expression, you know, talking about the divine substance and what's common to the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. Everything is, I'd say, right, then? Why, the Father is only ad filial, right? And the Son is only ad patra, right? And the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, right? But I think this expression, I'd say, is really to be understood, or the absolute, but understood negatively, right? Because nothing is really towards itself. So, that's what he said. That's really in meaning, not towards another, right? It's just like sometimes, you know, they'll say that an accident is a thing that exists in the another's of the subject. Then they'll say substance exists in itself. Well, even where Aristotle shows in the fourth book of the natural hearing, that nothing is really in itself. And so you can understand it may be negatively, right? Something is in itself meaning not in another, right? And so what Thomas kind of defines substance, he'll say, you know, res cui convenient essay, non in allia, right? A thing to which it belongs to be, not in a what? None. But just for the fun of it, you know, reading the compendium of theology, right? Of course, when Thomas takes up, you know, the incarnation, and then he takes up the things that Christ did, you know? That's as far as it goes in the compendium. It doesn't go into the sacraments as you would do into sumas. But just as far as kind of the articles of faith are concerned. But the interesting thing's in there. He's talking about how, with the words of St. Paul, how the death of our Lord is freeing us from our sinfulness. And it, in a way, represents this, his death, separation from his body, right? Separation from the mortal part of us. And then the resurrection, of course, has a different effect. It's resurrecting our soul as well as our body. But then Thomas distinguishes three ways in which the death of our Lord is a cause of our redemption, release of our sins. And one, he says, as an instrument of his divinity. Another way, as an exemplar. That's another kind of cause of hell to you. And then it merits our thing. But then it comes resurrection. In what way is that a cause of our resurrection of our soul and our body? Well, also as an instrument of his divinity, right? Same kind of cause of hell to you. Also as an exemplar, right? But he says, not to merit it. Because Christ is no longer able to merit it. He's now completely, what? A comprehensible, right? Not a viator. He's no longer on the way, right? Once he resurrects, he can't merit anything any more than the saints can merit. Kind of interesting, huh? Another beautiful passage there in the compendium there, where he's talking about, quoting St. Paul there, where Christ is said to be the primo geniturus, the firstborn of those resurrecting. And then he says, well, what sense is he primo? First. And then going back, you know, to the five senses that Aristotle has, he says, well, first in time. First is a, what? Causes before an effect. And first in dignity. Because he rises more glorious even than we all rise, huh? So it's beautiful the way he uses the different senses of before in Aristotle to unfold the truth of what, I guess, St. Paul was saying. So where was that? From the compendium of theology, right? In the compendium of theology, Thomas was writing that for his companion, right? Who wanted a shorter thing to carry around that he could constantly refer to. And Thomas there, like he does in his catechetical instructions in Naples, at the end of his life, like Augustine does in Incheidion, he divides it according to faith, hope, and charity. And the part in faith is complete. The part on hope he began but didn't finish. That's really kind of like a commentary on the Our Father. And then the part in charity is he never got to. But that first part is beautiful. Very interesting things in there. He doesn't go into as many questions as he does here, but sometimes he says things a little different and kind of one mind delights in that. When my teacher comes down the hall there and I met by a little thing where you keep your books in, you know, on Twain, you know, and he's got some new thought, you know. Well, it's kind of interesting to see that, right? It's like Thomas said, you know, it was a new thought, wait. Well, my son, Mark, he sent me some interesting thing I'll have to maybe show it to you sometime. But I guess there was a guy in one of the Eastern European countries there, the communist countries, who was kind of a chief abortionist, right? Yeah, we heard about it. Did you hear about it? He still went to that, some sort of indigenous intelligence. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He had a dream and there was like a field with little children and so on where they saw him and they all started running away. And then there's this monk here, right there. They got talking to him and he didn't know who Thomas Aquinas was. But the monk, you know, told him he was doing wrong and said, all right. And he said, who are you? I'm Thomas Aquinas. So it's kind of interesting, huh? Yeah, so it gives Thomas, you know, a sudden proximity to our terrible situation. So we're up to question five, I guess, huh? That's where we left off. And most of what Thomas is doing here, just look for a moment back at the premium to this particular part of it, huh? Look at the beginning of question four there, right, huh? That we're in kind of now. Now, then we're not to consider about the union on the side of what he took on, right? And about this, we're not to first consider those things that were taken on by the word of God. Secondly, the things taken on with them, which are the perfections, right, and the defects, right? Meaning the mortal flesh and so on. And then he subdivides the first part. The son of God took on human nature and its parts. So when it's about this first thing, there's a three-fold consideration. First, as regards, what, human nature itself. And that's what question four is about, I guess. Secondly, as regards, what, its parts. And that's what the one we'll be looking at today is. And third, as regards the order in which he took these on. And that will be the, probably the following bit, huh? Question six, huh? Okay. So now we're up to question five. Then we're not to consider about the taking on of the parts of human nature. And about this, four things are asked. Whether the son of God ought to assume a true body. There's a history behind all these things. There's someone who always denied these things, like the Manichaeans or somebody. Secondly, whether he ought to assume an earthly body, huh? To wit one with flesh and what? Blood, huh? Third, whether he should assume a what? Soul. Because some said, well, no. It says the word was made flesh. There's no mention about a soul there, right? And the word was in place of the soul in other heresies of this sort. And third, whether he ought to assume a what? Understanding, right? Doesn't he have enough understanding without taking on a human understanding, too? Yeah. Yeah.