Tertia Pars
Lecture 39: Christ's Acquired Knowledge and the Agent Intellect

Transcript
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Yeah, I'm surprised he answers it that way, you know, rather than pointing out that in one form he can know many things. I mean, sometimes one wonders, you know, one's puzzling over the theory of relativity, or why did he explain these things, you know, why did he tell us more about these things, you know? But maybe he had more important things to inform us about, huh? That's kind of in accordance with this, huh? Now, people, a lot of times, they don't find in the Gospels Christ telling jokes or having a good laugh with the apostles, right? And, of course, this is one of the virtues that Aristotle talks about, Nicomachean Ethics, and people recognize this as being something necessary to human life, huh? But I would think in those 30 years that he spent there with Joseph and Mary, right, that there would have been some humor, huh? Are you talking about God? The last line is more than actually that, but I think he's speaking about God and my nature. Something to, great for him to show us, right, his humor, you know? Yeah. But some people try to, you know, force a couple of things to touch, you know, like when he says he would become like one of us, you know, Adam and Eve fell, you know? But, you know, I mean, Christ's public life there is very short, two or three years, huh? And not too much room for humor, right? But I would think for those 30 years, domestic life there must have been some humor about that. You know, I mean, the jokes saved that period, you know, but... The reason that he never mentions about Christ smiling is because he always was for something. I think it was Chester didn't want to. Well, you know, you would have mentioned something that's obvious, but it's always... Very good one about Thomas there, where somebody said, Hey, there's an elephant going down the street. And Thomas ran to the window to look out, and the guy started laughing at him. He said, I'd rather believe that there was an elephant going down the street than that one of my brothers could lie. Okay, now the third objection here is about the habit being perfection, something being more perfect than the soul of Christ. To the third, it should be said that good and being is said in two ways. In one way, simply, and thus being and good is called what? Substance. Which subsists in its being and in its what? Goodness. Another way is said being and good secundum quid. And in this way, being is a what? Accident, huh? Not because it itself has being and goodness, but because by it, a subject has being and what? Good, huh? Thus, therefore, habitual knowledge is not simply better or more worthy than the soul of Christ, but it is what? Secundum quid, right? For the whole goodness or habitual goodness of knowledge, yeah, gives rise to the goodness of the subject, huh? Okay? So, the grammar, I mean, the knowledge of geometry they have from Euclid, right, is a perfection of me, not a perfection of geometry, yeah? That is a problem that comes up again and again there about the substance and accident, which is better, right? Because accident seems to perfect substance. So, is accident better? Thomas will make a distinction here between being simply and being in some way. It's a little hard to understand, but anyway, we'll leave that for the time being. Now, as a knowledge... of the soul of Christ to be distinguished by diverse habits. We're into diverse habits. To the sixth one goes forward thus, it seems that in the soul of Christ there was not except one habit of knowledge. For the more a knowledge is perfect, the more it is, what, one. Whence the higher angels understand through forms more universal, as is said in the first part. But the knowledge of Christ was most perfect. Therefore it was most of all one. Therefore it is not distinguished by diverse sweat. Yeah, in many habits. Moreover, our faith is derived from the knowledge of Christ. Whence it is said in Hebrews 12 too, looking towards the author of faith and the consummator of faith. Jesus, I always like that text very much. The origin of faith and the rewarder of faith, so to speak. The factor of faith. Faith is said to be, what, substantia, kind of a foundation of things hoped for. But one is the habit of faith about all things to be believed, as has been said in the second part. So you don't have one virtue of faith about the humanity of Christ, another about the divinity of Christ, another one about the Blessed Virgin, another one about the last things. No, it's one and the same. Moreover, sciences are distinguished according to diverse reasons of the noble. But the soul of Christ knew all things by one reason, or the reason of one thing. To wit, the light divinely poured in. Therefore, in Christ there was only one habit of knowledge. But against this is what is said in Zachary 3.9, that upon one stone or rock, that is Christ, there are seven what? But through the eye is understood knowledge. Therefore, it seals in Christ there are many habits of science. That's an interesting text, doesn't it? Zachary, the place where you got the text there, that in that day there will be one name? Isn't it Zachary? Zachary, I have to look back at that thing, but it's probably the division there, right? That's why we have many names for Christ, I mean for God in this world, but we see God as he is, we have one name for him. Yeah, exactly. 14 verse 9, And the Lord will be king over all the land or all the earth. On that day, yeah, the Lord will be one and his name one. Yeah. His name will be one. So there's another quote from Zachary. You can't neglect Zachary. You've been a scripture as good for teaching as St. Paul says. I answer, it should be said, it has been said, that the poured in knowledge of the soul of Christ has the mode connatural to the what? Human soul, right? Is ever connatural to the human soul. That it receives species in less universality than the what? Angels. So that it knows diverse specific natures through diverse intelligible what? Species. There you see that word species used, at least in the adjective there, specific us, right? The thing itself, okay? Diverse as natura, specific us, right? Those are the natures of things in themselves. Through diverse intelligible species, right? That's in the mind. From this, however, it happens that in us there are diverse habits of sciences. Because according to the diverse genera, things knowable. Insofar as those things are reduced in one genus, they are known by the same habit of science. As is said in the first book of the post-analytics, the one science, which is of one genus subject. And therefore, the infused knowledge of the soul, Christ, was distinct according to diverse habits. Thomas often talks about man as being perfected by the virtues of these habits, right? In a broader sense, this is the way man is naturally perfected, right? And he's saying that this, insofar as it says, in part due to what the receiver, right? Insofar as he receives this in the human soul, right? It's appropriate that there be what? Perfections in the manner of habits and many habits even. You know, you get going through the secundae, secundae, where Thomas goes through all the virtues almost. We're really a complicated thing. All these virtues we need, you know, in order to be perfected, huh? You know, Thomas has a little bit in there about removing the vices and perfecting the virtues there and his prayers after communion, right? That's part of the thing, you see what you wish. You know, you can see how, you know, one thing wrong with us and everything gets fouled up as Shakespeare says. Now, to the first, it should be said that, as has been said above, the knowledge of the soul of Christ is most perfect and exceeding the knowledge of the angels as regards that which is considered in it on the side of what? God flowing in. But is nevertheless below the angelic knowledge as regards the way of what? Of the receiver, of the one receiving. And to this mode, it pertains that that knowledge be distinguished by many habits, right? As it were, through species, more particular, existing, right? Now, what about this objection from faith, which is the second objection? To the second, it should be said that our faith rests upon the first truth, huh? And that's what Thomas will teach here in the beginning of the secunda secunde, when he takes up faith first, huh? And therefore, Christ is the author of our faith according to his divine knowledge, which is simply, what? One, huh? So that's the knowledge that Christ has as God, huh? The first truth. You know, ho verbo veritatis verius. In the adorate devotee, huh? Credo quid quid dixi de filius. You know, ho verbo veritatis verius. It's a nice rhyme there, huh? To the third, it should be said, and this is talking about now the divine light, huh? But that's the other side of the picture. To the third, it should be said that the light divinely poured in is the reason of understanding, the common reason of understanding, those things which are divinely revealed, just as the light of, what? The understanding of those things which are naturally known. And therefore, it's necessary that in the soul of Christ, the species of, what? Singular things. To place them for knowing by a knowledge that is proper to each one. And therefore, according to this, it is necessary that there be diverse habits assigned to the soul of Christ. He seems to be making a comparison there, right? Just as the age intellect, Aristotle compares it to light, right? And this light is, what? One, huh? But as it illuminates different, what? Images, right? You have different, what? Forms, right? And different sciences, huh? So likewise, the divine light coordinate is one, right? But insofar as it, what? Illumines this or that thing in particular, knowed by this or that form, right? Then there's going to be a multiplication of what happens then. So he's an interesting mind, this guy's mind, huh? He knows a lot of stuff. Oh, that's right. Yeah. It would have been interesting to talk to him, huh? Yeah. You know. I mean, Nixon talks about going there to the Waldorf Astoria there to have a conversation with Douglas MacArthur, right? He says, no, there are different ways you have conversation with people, right? When you have a conversation with Douglas MacArthur, you let him do all the talking. LAUGHTER Is that what a conversation with Christ would be like, you know? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, a angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you've written. Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I remember coming down late to one month's New Dions, you know, of course, it's not the one I was taking, and just, you know, and hesitating out the door, because I go in, I want to be coming in late, you know. Great one, see you. Before we begin here on question 12 here, remember what I was saying last time about the connection of the three words on the cross there in Luke? And the way I connected the two with the third one, right? Because Christ is showing mercy towards, what, those who have crucified him, right? Father, forgive them, for they don't know what they do. And then mercy on the penitent sinner, right? Or penitent thief. And his days will be with me in paradise, and so on. And then it says, mercy for himself, right? Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit. And I was kind of connecting them by saying, blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy, right? They kind of tie together those three. Well, then I was trying to tie together the three in John. It's appropriate that those three should be together. And I was seeing a strong connection between the second and the third, huh? Because the second was saying, I thirst. And this shows both his thirsting for our salvation, therefore his love of us. But also he, what, hungers to do the will of God. He's thirsting to do the will of God. He's also obeying the will of God, right? And it's only because he's suffering out of love for us and in obedience to the Father that his suffering is, what, meritorialism. And therefore he can say that, what, it is, what, completed, right? It's consummated right after that, right? You're not saying, how would you tie in the, behold your son, you know? Behold your mother, right? Well, I'm still thinking about that. But anyway, a little paragraph here at the end of an encyclical of Pius XI. I've been kind of going through reading his encyclicals. And this is from Miserantissimus Redemptor, but just the last paragraph, where he brings in the present virgin. And now, lastly, he says, may the most benign virgin mother of God smile on this purpose and on these desires of ours. For since she brought forth for us Jesus our Redeemer, and nourished him, and offered him as a victim by the cross. That's a very strong thing, eh? It's almost like he's, what, almost in obedience to her, right? As well as his father, right? So if she offered him as a victim by the cross, well, then it ties in very nicely with the other two things said in the Gospel of John. And offered him as a victim by the cross, and then by her mystic union with Christ, eh? And his very spiritual grace, eh? She likewise became, and is piously called, a reparatress, eh? So, in a sense, he's also, what, repairing us, eh? Trusting in her intercession with Christ, who, whereas he is the one mediator of God and men, chose to make his mother the advocate of sinners, and the minister and mediatress of grace, as an earnest of heavenly gifts and as a token of our paternal affection. We most love him, and part of the apostolic blessing to you, et cetera. Okay, so, let's go now to question 12 here, and down to the human knowledge of Christ here. Then we're now to consider about the acquired knowledge of the soul of Christ, or the experiential, I'm going to basically translate experimentality there, huh? It didn't mean to be experiments. And about this, four things are asked. Whether by this knowledge Christ knew all things. Secondly, whether in this knowledge he, what, progressed, huh? Third, whether he learned something from some man. And fourth, whether he took something from the, what, angels. So, let's go to the first one here. To the first one goes for thus. Thus, it seems that by this knowledge, or according to this knowledge, Christ did not know what all things are. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did not, what, experience all things. Therefore, he did not know by this knowledge all things are. Secondly, man acquires knowledge through his senses. But not all sensible things were subject to the bodily senses of Christ. Therefore, according to this knowledge, he did not know what all things. Moreover, the quantity of knowledge is observed according to the number of things known. If, therefore, by this knowledge, Christ knew all things, there would be in him an acquired knowledge equal to the infused knowledge, or poured in knowledge, and to the, what, blessed knowledge, right? Which is unfitting, right? Therefore, according to this knowledge, Christ did not know all things. Maybe he's going to qualify, but since he knew all things by this knowledge, he's going to take that side. But against this is that there's nothing imperfect in Christ as regards to the soul. But this knowledge would have been imperfect if by it he did not do all things. Because the imperfect is that to which addition can be, what, made, huh? Therefore, according to this knowledge, Christ did not know all things, huh? Okay, now, in the body of the article. I answer, it should be said, huh, that acquired knowledge is placed in the soul of Christ, as has been said above in the first general question, if you recall, on account of the, what, suitability of the acting upon understanding. So you've got to know that from the third book of the soul, huh? Lest its, what, action be idle, right? Now, what does the acting upon understanding act upon, huh? What acts upon the images, huh? Separating out something, what, universal, therefore, something actually understandable that can then act upon the, what, possible understanding, the undergoing understanding, huh? Now, Plato didn't have to have this because he had the, what, universe was existing actually by themselves in the world, right? And, therefore, they could be known by the understanding. But Aristotle, seeing that that was nonsense, huh? Then, no, I'll take the nonsense, but not true. Then he said there had to be this other power, right? And we, to some extent, are aware of that power, right? The act of that power. So, just as the possible understanding is that by which, what, it can become all things. I'm sorry to say, what? Would you translate that again? By which it can become, yeah. That's what Aristotle will say after he's gone through talking about the sensing powers and the understanding powers. He'll say that the soul is, in some way, all things, huh? So, the acting upon understanding is that by which all things can be, what, made, huh? As is said in the third book about the soul. And, therefore, just as by, what, infused knowledge, the soul of Christ knew all those things to which the possible understanding is in any way, inability, potency for, So, through, what, acquired knowledge, it knew all those things which are able to be known through the action of the acting upon understanding. So, in our soul, not in our body, right, are these three powers, huh? The acting upon understanding, the undergoing, what, and in the will, right? And, this acting upon understanding would have no, what, activity at all, if Christ didn't have some kind of, what, experience. This is what made Thomas change his opinion in what he was saying in the, what, sentences. And he'll see again in the course of this question, you know, admit he's changing his mind, right? Just like he did in the earlier part. Can I ask a question? It's not a hard time to see. So his argument is that he would have this faculty in vain. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if this faculty wasn't actually actualized in the possible moonlight, it would also be invading, right? Yeah, it has some activity there to make actually understandable what's in the images, right? Right, and then actualize the possible moonlight. Yeah, yeah. But then how could the possible moonlight be actualized or is actualized? Well, these are different kinds of knowledge. It has the beatific vision as we saw before, right? It has the infused knowledge, right? And those would be gotten by, more like Plato, right? Not from the world of forms, but from God himself, right? God directly is acting upon the mind. But he would have, through the infused knowledge, he would have science. He would know geometry. Yeah, but he'd know it in a superior way to the way in which I'm knowing it. Because it would be, it wouldn't be his agent intellect that was making it. But if he has the science of geometry with infused knowledge, so in this other words, his possible intellect, and that's in his possible intellect, right? Yeah. So how could his agent intellect bring anything to actuality in his possible intellect? Well, it would be a different form, because by his infused knowledge, he might know many things by one thought, right? Or by one form, which in his acquired knowledge, experiential knowledge, he would have separate what? Right. Thoughts. So it's not the same habit. Yeah. It would be a different habit? Yeah. Infused? Yeah. In a different form. Infused geometry or an infused geometry? Yeah, in a different form, yeah. Oh. Now, infused geometry is different than acquired geometry. It's better. Yeah. It's better, yeah. And the BATI vision is even better. Yeah. It won't bang for you. I just have a hard time understanding what infused geometry would be like. I mean... Well, you have no experience of it, right? Yeah. You have no experience of it, that's the whole point. Yeah. As I mentioned how DeConnick was talking in an article one time about how this idea of knowing things by limits, you know, if you put a square inside of a circle, right, and you bisect the thing, so you get a polygon that is, I mean a polygon, rather, that's got more sides, but closer to the circle, and you bisect those, you can go on, right? So you can speak of the, what, circle as a limit of polygons being produced in this way. And therefore, by one thought, you're knowing, in a sense, what, circle and polygon, right? And DeConnick says, now here's our mind striving to be, in so weak little way, right, a little bit like the angelic mind, right, which by one thought would know distinctly what a circle is and what a square is, huh? Well, normally, you know, the definition of circle in Euclid is one definition and one thought, and the definition of square is another one, right, and the definition of, you know, cube is another one, and so on, right, so you need a separate thought and a separate definition for each thing you want to know distinctly, right? You can know many things together in a confused way, like figure or something like that, but you can't know distinctly. But here when you see the circle as a limit of polygons increasing in this way, right? And if you understand what a limit really is, you don't reach it, but you always approach it. Then you see the irreducibility of these two kinds of figures, right? You can never really get a polygon equal to a circle. But you seem to be knowing, right? Polygons circle by the same thought. So he says it's a sign of the decadence of the human mind in the modern world, that we're not struck by the fact of what is going on here, right? That in a very, you know, weak way, but nevertheless a real way, our mind is striving to be a bit like the angels in their knowledge, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He has a huge geometry, and he hasn't got a required geometry yet. Because if we were to ask him to do a proof, he would, you see, I just have a hard time seeing how, if we use your infused geometry to do us a proof, how would it differ from if we asked him to do a proof? Well, in the infused knowledge, it's not going to be discursive. The angels don't syllogize, you know? They understand what a syllogism is, right? You know, tell you what a syllogism is, right? But they don't acquire the knowledge through the discourse, right? I noticed in this opium here, I've seen it many times in Thomas, you know, but it's a beautiful division of discourse there, and discourse ex unu in alliud, secundum rem, right? That our reason, right, can know one thing through knowing another thing. And the four-fold distinction that I've mentioned, I think, before, I see it many times in Thomas. I notice it's here again, right? You can know an effect by its cause, and sometimes reverse, you know the cause by the effect, and you know light by light, and opposite by what? Opposite, right? Okay. And this is kind of, I think, if you think about it, is there any other way to know one thing by knowing another thing? Because if there's no dependence of one thing upon the other, right, which involves these two things cause and effect, and they're going either way, but that's because there are dependencies of one upon the other, right? And if there's no likeness between the two, right? Or no opposition between the two, what other way would there be whereby you can know one thing, you know any another? You know? I think, you know, this is a four, right? But sometimes when I'm explaining, you know, the definition of reason there and expanding on discourse, right, I'll give this four-fold division of discourse, from one thing to another, right? Because it's beautiful. It seems to me to be exhaustive, right? Is there any other way of knowing one thing to another? Is there any other way in which one thing could be helpful to know another, apart from these four ways, you know? It's very common when we try to explain ourselves, we often look for a light. It's like this. What is it like? Yeah. That's what we often do. That's why our Lord made all the parables. Yeah. Yeah. One was right here. I see it in many places in Thomas, right? So the first objection is saying, well, he didn't experience all things, right? Okay. So to the first, it should be said that knowledge of things now, right, is able to be acquired. This is the ad primo. Not only through the experience of those things, right, but also through the experience of some other things. And this is hitting upon the idea that you can know one thing sometimes through knowing another thing. That sounds strange at first, right? Since from the power of the light of the acting upon understanding, man can go, what, forward to understanding effect through the causes, and that's what we do in geometry, and the causes through effects, which we do especially in natural philosophy. And like, similia, parisimilia, and contraries through what? Contaries. Opposites through opposites. If, thus therefore, although Christ would not have, what, experienced all things in the material world, right, from those nevertheless that he had experienced, he could, what, by this good discursive power of his mind, arrive in a knowledge of, what, all of them, right? So, quite a quick learner, right? You know, Thomas Aquinas sometimes speculates into this love of Christ for, say, John, the evangelist, right? Why do you have this special love for him? And, of course, some, Thomas says, well, Christ was a teacher. A teacher has a love of a, you know, a student who's really a good student, right? If you have a student like this, of course, he'd end up teaching you, of course, because you'll find out later on he doesn't learn from another man, right? He gets all his knowledge by, what, discovery, right? You know? Aristotle quotes Hesiodo in the ethics there, and this is repeated by Thomas, repeated by Boethius, repeated by... And this is repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, repeated by Thomas, Machiavelli, but Hesiod said first, at least that's the first one we know, he says, best of all, as he says, is the man who can discover these things himself. Next is the man who can, what, learn them from the man who discovered them, right? But the man who can neither discover them from himself nor learn them is a, what, useless white is the way the old English translation is. I'll tell you the commentary on this very charitable, he says, useless, as far as acquisition of knowledge is concerned. It doesn't mean he's so easy to work at his prison, he doesn't mean that, no. He can shovel out the barn. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He can work in a kitchen. He's only useless. Well, you forgive me, my, playfully, I call the, those who can discover something great by themselves, I call them the wits. Those who can not discover them by themselves, but can learn from those who have, we call them the dimwits, right? And then those who can neither discover them nor learn from another, the dimwits. So I pass by myself as a dimwit. I mean, take that in context, please. But then I make a distinction, you know, between the upper level and the lower level dimwits. Yeah. And the upper level dimwits are the ones who know who you can learn from. As the Pope was saying, you know, you can learn more from a year of studying this man than from a lifetime studying the rest, no? Or as he quotes Cajetan, you know, he says in Summa there, he seems to have inherited the mind of all the church fathers, because he so, what, reverenced them, so respected them. So that's a beautiful division there, but you'll find it in many places in Thomas that he'll distinguish those four ways in which one thing, in a strict sense now, can be known from, what, another thing in some way, huh? Again, I'm having a hard time seeing the, it seems to me that what he's saying would go for anything that Christ could know from the common experience of a human being, but we also have this particular experience that we get from microscopes and telescopes, so could he know from common experience, could he reason out presence of, you know, what DNA is, you know, and could he find out what the sub-economic problem is? Yeah, that's what Thomas seems to be saying, you know, what we could know by our, you know, our experiential knowledge, experiential knowledge at any time in history, I suppose, right? If Christ, you know, would be ahead of us, right? But, so he could reason from just his common experience of sub-atomic particles and DNA? Maybe so, maybe so. Maybe so. Was it, there were some introbeat philosophers who actually did have a sort of fledgling sub-atomic theory in a way that they put together through reason, just as an example of being able, without equipment, to reason pretty profoundly? You said atoms and things like that? Yeah, I'm pretty ignorant about it, but I seem to recall reading somewhere that there was some sort of notion of... Yeah, Heisenberg talks about how far the mind can get, you know? Just with this discursive power, so. Okay, now the second argument, that not all sensible things were, what, acting upon his senses, right? To the second should be said, that although not all sensible things were subject to the bodily senses of Christ, nevertheless, there were to his senses subject some things that are sensible, right? From which, on account of the excellentissimum, the most excellent, power of his reason. Okay, now remember how Euclid defines that, Euclid, but Shakespeare defines reason, right? Reason as reason. It's the ability for a large discourse, right? Looking before and after. So it's defined by discourse, right? So when he speaks of the excellentissimum vim rationis, he's taking the discursive power of Christ's what? Reason. That's what it is. It is the ability for discourse, huh? As Shakespeare has defined it there. He could, what? Arrive at a knowledge of other things in the foresaid way. That's the way in the first primo, right? Just as in seeing the, what, heavenly bodies, he could comprehend their, what? Powers. In the effects which they have in these lower things, which were not even subject to his, what, senses, huh? And for the same reason, from other things, he could arrive at a knowledge of other things. Now, what about all things, though? He's got to qualify that as he said, right? To the third, it should be said, huh? That by this knowledge, the soul of Christ did not know simply, it's a pitchy tear, all things, huh? But those things which, through the light of the acting upon understanding, are knowable for man. Whence, through this experiential knowledge, he did not know the, what? What it is, the essences, the natures of the separated substances. That's the angels, huh? Nor even, what? Past or future, what? Singulars. Which, nevertheless, he knew through his, what? Infused knowledge, right? So it's not, I can do all things, but the things that we're apt to know by... Improperate to this knowledge. Yeah, to this knowledge, yeah. Now, the second article. Whether, according to this acquired experiential knowledge, Christ...