Tertia Pars
Lecture 49: Predication in the Incarnation: Divine and Human Natures

Transcript
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He says, Augustine, those words and like words, he draws back, retracts, in his book of retractions. Whence after the foresaid words of the book of retractions, he adds, wherever I have said, right, that Christ Jesus is the Homo Dominicus, right, I do not will myself to have said it. I do not wish I had said it. I was thinking of washing the feet there by Christ, you know, and I say, well, as Christ himself says, he's giving them an example, right, but he's giving an example of what virtue? What? Humility, yeah. That must be a very important virtue that on this special occasion, shall we say, he chooses to give an example of that virtue, as if it's terribly important, right, huh? And, you know, a guy doesn't have the humility that Augustine has, or Thomas has, you know, I wouldn't trust him. For post-daya, means afterwards, I see it should be not said, right, huh? Although, um, it can be defended by some, what, reason, yeah. Oh, no. What? Oh, by no reason. No, no, no, I'm not sure that would be an emphatic. No, no, it can be with a reason. Yeah, he's saying, you could defend saying it, but, but, um, it's really best just not to say it. Yeah, yeah. Because... In a way you could understand it correctly. Yeah, yeah. Because someone's able to say that, uh, man is said to Dominicus by reason of human nature, which this name man signifies not by reason of the suppositum, right, huh? Watch your P's and Q's, yeah? I don't know what St. Thomas is saying, right? Being and Augustine is saying that, huh? Okay, now the second objection, huh? What about God being said humanatus, huh? Or the Dominicus. To the second it should be said that that one suppositum, which is of the divine human nature, first was of the divine nature, right? To it from eternity. Afterwards, from time, it was made the, what? Supposed human nature, right? So, that line on the left there was always. And so that end of that line was, what? Always the end or beginning, you want to say, of that line, right? But then in the course of time, when that other line is drawn to that point, it becomes the, what? Suppositum, right? At the other line, right? At the beginning of the other line, huh? And for this reason, it is called humanatum, right? Not because he took on a man, because then they have another person there, right? But because he took on, what? Human nature, right, huh? Just as this first line didn't take on an end point, didn't take on another point, right? It's just another line, okay? But it is not the reverse that the suppositum of human nature took on a divine nature, right? Whence it could not be said that the man is, what? Made God, or he is, what? Lordly, right, huh? You probably won't use this in your sermon as well, but... Not lately, anyway. We'll wait for Trinity Sunday. Now, the third objection, huh? Dionysius, Ames calls Christ, Ames Christ, the most divine Jesus, right? That's denomative, right? To the third, it should be said that this name, divinum, is customarily said of those things of which is said essentially this name, what? God, right? For we say that the divine essence, the divine substance is God, right? By reason of identity, right? And the essence is of God, or it's what? But divine, on account of a diverse way of signifying. And we say that, we speak of the verbum divinum, right? The divine word, I guess, huh? When nevertheless, the word is what? God, huh? And similarly, we speak of, what, the divine person, just as the, what, person of Plato, on account of a diverse, what, way of signifying. But Dominicus is not said of those things of which Lord is said, huh? For we are not accustomed to say that some man who is dominus should be, what? Yeah. But that which in any way is of the Lord is said to be, what? Lordly as the dominica voluntas, right? Or the dominica manus, right? Or the dominica possession. Yeah. Yeah. And therefore, that man, Christ himself, who is Lord, cannot be said to be lordly, but his flesh can be called, what? The Lord's flesh, right? You say? And his suffering, or passion, the Lord's what? Passion, right? Have you called it presidential? Well, I mean, not for... That's the person you're trying to figure it out, yeah. And then we can't go on president if that's that. Yeah. He's really doing some insane things. I called him insane last night, doesn't he? Okay. We've got time for one more article, maybe, huh? Okay. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that those things which are of human nature, right, are not able to be said of what? God, huh? For it is impossible for opposites to be said of the same. But those things which are of human nature, we'll say here, are contrary to those things which are private to God, right? For God is uncreated, unchangeable, and eternal. But to human nature it belongs that it be created, that it be temporal, unchangeable. Therefore those things which are of human nature cannot be said of God. Moreover, to attribute to God those things which pertain to defect would seem to derogate onto, yeah, derogatory. As he said in English, to the divine honor and to pertain to blasphemy. But those things which are of human nature contain some defect as to die, to suffer, and others. Therefore it seems that in no way of those things which are of human nature can be said of God. You see that God died? God suffered and died? Moreover, to be taken on, I guess, to be assumed, belongs to human nature, but it does not belong to God. Therefore those things which are of human nature cannot be said of God. But against all this is what Damascene says. Damascene is having a little life here in this Judas, huh? That God takes on or sees those things which are what? Private to what? Yeah. Idiomata is the Greek word, right? See, an idiom is something private to some language, right? An idiot is a man who lives in his what? His own world. But the Greek word for property, you know, proper, you know, it's idios, right? Idios. That is proprietates, right? When God is said to be, what, passibilis, able to suffer, and the God of glory was what? Yeah. Okay? The answer should be said that about this question, there was diversity between the Nestorian and the Catholics, right? Thank you. For the Nestorians, the vocal sounds which were said of Christ, they wanted to divide in this way, right? That those which pertain to human nature would not be said of God, nor those which pertain to divine nature would not be said of the man. Whence Nestorius says, and it has a reference here to the twelfth anathema of the Council of Ephesus, and the story said that if one tries to attribute to the word of God passions, he is, what, anathema. If already there are some names which are able to belong to both natures, right, such will can predicate those things which are both natures, as this name, what, Christ, or Lord. Whence they conceded Christ to be born of the Virgin, and to have been from, what, eternity. But they did not concede that the, what, God was born of the Virgin, or man was from, what, eternity. So they wouldn't approve of it. Theotokos is what was right. Like Christotokos. Yeah, right. Got a little infusion in church there when he says he seems to be called the Mother of God, the Mother of Christ, but not the Mother of God. Okay? But Catholics, however, truly lay down these things, right, which are said of Christ either according to the divine nature or according to the human right are able to be said both of God and of the, what, man. Whence the great Cyril says, right, is someone to two persons, right, or to two, what? Now there you see the problem that was between the Greek and the Latin, right, huh? Because substances, right, is taken in the sense of hypostasibos. Right? But in Latin, you have, what, you can stand for the nature too, right? That's why Jerome was saying there's poison under the word here. Because hypostasis in Greek is used for the person and more generally for the general, for the individual substance, right? By substantia in Latin, it can be used for the nature of what a thing is. So if one to two persons or to two hypostasis, those things which in the Gospels, right, and in the apostolic writings, right, if he should divide the vocal sounds, right, or those things which about Christ are said by the saints, or those things by Christ himself about himself, right, and some of them, from these he applies to the man, others to the word, only anathema said, be accursed. And the reason for this is because since there is the same hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is supposed, right, by the name of both nature. So whether he be called a man or a god, what is supposing there is the hypostasis of the divine human nature. And therefore, of the home of the man can be said those things which are of the divine nature and of what? God, those things which are of the, what, human nature. So you're not making two more articles out of this, right? Enough of that, two articles done. However, Thomas said, it should be known that in a statement in which something is said of something, right, not only is to be noted what is that of which it is, what, the predicate is said, right, but also by what it is said of it, yeah? And therefore, though we do not distinguish those things which are said of Christ, they are distinguished, nevertheless, as regards that by which both of them are, what? Yeah. For those things which are of the divine nature are said of Christ by reason of the divine nature. Those things which are of the human nature are said of him by reason of his human nature. When Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, we distinguish in the scriptures what sounds off, right? according to the form of God and what according to the form of the, what? The servant. It's interesting that the word form, you know, it's not standing for the nature of the thing, right? As Aristotle would tell you, right? And below, what, an account of what and what according to what is said, prudent, and a diligent reading, a loving reading and a pious reader will understand, right? As you gentlemen, I hope. Now, what about opposites, right? Well, the distinction now is from the last paragraph here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that opposites can be said of the same, it's impossible to be said of the same according to the same, right? but according to diverse things, nothing, what, prevents it. And in this way, opposites are said of Christ, not according to the same, but according to diverse nature, right? So Christ is immovable according to his, what, divine nature, but he's movable according to his, what, human nature, right? Does God, can he eat? No, but as man, he showed his true humanity by eating with the apostles even after his resurrection, right? You see how people get in trouble right away, though. You see, well, there are kind of opposites being said are the same. But you didn't say opposites are the same according to what? Different things, yeah. Now, same thing about defect, huh? To the second it should be said, if those things which pertain to defect were attributed to God, according to his divine nature, it would be, what? Blasphemy, huh? Which, as we're pertaining to the diminution of his, what? Honor, right, huh? Not, however, if, huh? They're not, however, pertain to the injury of God if they're attributed to him according to the nature that he took on, huh? Whence in a certain sermon of the Council of Ephesus, huh? It is said, God does not think, right, that something is an injury that is an occasion for the salvation of, what? Men, right? For nothing of the abject things that he chose, huh? On account of us does an injury to that nature which is not able to be subject to injuries, huh? But his own he makes lower things that he might, what? Save our nature, right? When, therefore, the things that are abject and vile, right, huh? Do not injure, right? But they work the salvation of men, right? In what way can you say that those things which are the cause of our salvation were an occasion of injury to God, huh? Look at this guy, huh? Theodorus, huh? I think the rest of the notes is down there. Yeah. Okay. And he says, to be assumed is not to be said of God. God was not assumed because it belongs to human nature not by reason of the, what, supposedly to him but by reason of itself, right? The human nature was drawn to that, right? So that point was not drawn, right? But the line was drawn to it. That's going to be a different answer to the next one. Whether the things which are of human nature can be said of the divine nature? What? It's a bit intense I've never heard of it. He's got the one that every question is yes, no, yes, no. Well, it's, it's like what they say, you know, the pit side is the answer in a dark, bold, yeah, you know, that's, that's cheating, yeah, I shouldn't be done, yeah. Let's see, we'll just go through and look at the, at the, at the ball print and get the answers, you know, but none, none of the reasons, you know, huh? Thank you. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, our guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you're writing. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I was looking at the marks of the Holy Father there when he was in Africa, you know. Now he's in the Near East, but this is... But he's talking again about reason and faith, right? He says, the following morning, and this is in the Catholic World Report. The following morning, Pope Benedict met with an enunciature with representatives of Cameroon's Islamic community. And then he quotes the Pope here. I believe a particularly urgent task of religion today is to unveil the vast potential of human reason, which is itself God's gift and which is elevated by revelation and faith. But notice how that vast potential of human reason is in those words of the definition of reason. You say it's the ability for large discourse, right? And discourse is called large because it's about the universal, and the less universal, the more universal, and the least universal, and the most universal. So it extends to all things, the ability of reason. And then also you can say that it's the ability for a large discourse because you can discourse about great things like the soul, or about human happiness, or even about the cosmos, and most of all, about God himself. So this is a nice confirmation of Shakespeare there, right? Now, this other statement is a little more surprising on the Pope's part here. Later on he says, Indeed, religion and reason mutually reinforce one another. He reinforce one another. Since religion is purified and structured by reason. That's a rather strong statement, huh? Because usually you would think of reason as being purified by faith, huh? But maybe he means from superstition or something, you know? He's also speaking of Muslims, so... Yeah. So their faith would be purified, yeah. And now structured by reason, I think you could say that structure means, what, ordered, right? Of course, that's in the other part of Shakespeare's definition. But reason is the ability for a larger discourse, looking before and after, right? So in that sense it does this, huh? And reason's full potential is unleashed by revelation and faith, right? Okay. I was just reading this morning there. I was reading this, my favorite book there. Now it's up to chapter, what is it, 129 in book three there, where Thomas is saying that these laws that God has given us are not just arbitrary, but they're based upon something natural, right? And then he gives seven strong arguments to show that they're natural. It's a very good reading for that purpose. But I happen to be reading Shakespeare's As You Like It, and of course, and As You Like It, you have two pairs of brothers, and in one case the older brother is being unjust to the younger brother. In the other case, the younger brother is a script, the throne of the older brother, huh? Like in Hamlet. And, but eventually they're reconciled, the brothers, right? So it's a beautiful example, you know, of something unnatural, or brothers being unjust to brother, right? But before they're reconciled. But they're reconciled in the forest of Arden, right? Of course, in Exodus, the forest of Arden, you know, he says, And this, our life exempt from public haunt, finds tongues in trees, books in running brooks, sermons in stone, and good in everything. So the forest becomes a, what, kind of a symbol of nature as being the measure of what is, what, good. And the brothers are, what, in their unnatural state, are, what? Yeah, yeah. I remember a friend of mine being in conflict with his brother, right? And Angelica happened to be showing at that time. So I said, let's go see this play. I came back, I thought, but for a mildly disposed, or his brother, you know. But, I mean, I'm reminded of that when I'm reading Thomas, where Thomas was talking about how it's not arbitrary, what God's done, right? Beautiful arguments there, but they're not getting to that. We're up to Article 5 here, I guess, huh? Whether those things which are of human nature can be said of the, what, divine nature. So notice the difference in the way that, what, God, the word God signifies, and the words, what, divinity or the divine nature signify, right? That's why there's a difference here, right? And you can say things of human nature about God, right? That God died for us, and so on, right? But can you say, you know, of the divine nature, huh? See? So, to the fifth one goes forward thus. It seems that those things which are of human nature are able to be said of the divine nature. For those things which are of human nature are said of the Son of God, right? And of God, huh? But God is the same thing as his own nature. Therefore, those things which are of human nature are able to be said of the, what, divine nature. You know, I notice the subjection is, what, reasoning for what the things are, but overlooking the difference in the way they, what, signify, right? Okay. I just happened to be reading that part on the first chapter of John there, and Thomas is giving all these explanations, all these, that the church focus have for the first words. In the beginning was the word, right? And, you know, one meaning of beginning there is God himself, huh? Because God is the beginning of all things. He's the Alpha and Omega, right? So, if the word is said to be in God, and there's a distinction there in the way they signify, right? But they're really the same thing. There still is a difference in the way they signify. They say what is in the other, right? Okay. Likewise, you might say the divine nature is in God, right? Well, God has a divine nature. But we have to realize that what he has, he's said to have, he is. Moreover, flesh belongs to human nature. But, just as Damascene says in the third book, we say that the nature of the word was incarnate, right? According to the blessed, what? Athanasius and Cyril. I don't know, and I was going to have to say it's not the best way of speaking, or what he's going to say to that, I wonder. Therefore, it seems that for a like reason, those things which are of human nature can be said of the, what? Divine nature. Moreover, those things which are of the divine nature belong to the human nature in Christ as to know the future and to have saving power, right? Therefore, it seems, for a like reason, those things which are of human nature can be said of the divine nature. It's an interesting objection. Well, I guess he's going to solve that. What can participate, what cannot participate, huh? But against this is what Damascene says in the third book, that in speaking about the divine nature, right, we do not name or say those things which are private to human nature, huh? That's the word hiomata there, right? Ideas in Greek, as we said before, means what? Private. And so an idiom in language is something that's what? Private, huh? Private. Private. Private. Private. My French teacher said, you know, this is a French idiot, he would say. Don't fight it, he says, accept it. That's the way they speak. We don't speak that way, but that's the way they speak. That is proprietates, proprieties, being private to them. For we do not say that a Deitata, which means the divine nature, is able to undergo or that it is created. But the Deity is the divine nature. Therefore, those things which are the human nature cannot be said of the divine nature, right? So you can say, verbi sinori nati pro lati, you get in trouble. I answer it should be said that those things which are properly of one thing cannot be truly said of, what, another, unless of that of which it is the same to that. Just as to be capable of laughter, right? Visibulae. Does not belong except to that which is man. Now, in the mystery of the incarnation of the divine nature is not the same thing as the human nature. But there is the same hypostasis of both, what, natures. Going back to my example, right? There's one point there, right? Beginning of two lines, but the two lines are not each other, right? And therefore, those things which are of one nature are not able to be, what, said of the other, as they are signified in the, what, abstract. As that by which, right? So, I mean, the divine nature signifies as that by which God is God, right? It's distinct from the name God, right? So can what pertains to human nature be that by which God is God? That's in a sense that you'd be saying, right? If you say that what is proper to human nature belongs to the divine nature, you'd say that what is proper to man makes God to be what he is. Well, that's laughable, right? Irrisable, yeah. But concrete names stand under, right, or suppose, the hypostasis of the nature, and therefore, indifferently, they are able to be said those things which pertain to, what, either nature. It can be said of the, what, concrete names. Whether that name of which they are said gives one to understand both natures as this name Christ. And I noticed that Thomas, from time to time, will say that, you know, that Christ, in a way, signifies, what, both. So, other times, he'll say, well, no, Christ means anointed, and it's the human nature that is anointed, not the divine nature. Therefore, Christ is the name of him as, what, man. And suddenly, when you explain Peter's confession of faith as being a complete profession of faith, which it has to be, because, as Paul VI says, the whole church is built on this faith with Peter. The faith is, what, thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God, right? So, he's, both the human nature and the divine nature must be in there. But sometimes, I think he takes, you know, the fact that he's anointed by the Holy Spirit and so on, by God, right? That's a reference to the divine nature as well as the human nature in the idea of being anointed by God. But, be careful about that, though. Which is understood, what, both the divinity anointing, right, and the humanity anointed, huh? Okay, we'll let you say that, Thomas. Be careful, though, now. Or only the divine nature as this name God or the Son of God, right? Or only the human nature as this name man or what? Jesus. Again, myself, you know, the word Jesus means saved, right? I'd say, isn't that more apt to be applied to both, right? Because as God is saving us, too. Even more so, in some sense. But, anyway. But, self-referencing, I can't get to. I've got to watch myself. Whence Leo Papa, must be the other great, right? In his epistle to the, what? The Palestinians, huh? Just like the present Pope there has gone there and spoken to them. It does not matter from which, what, substance Christ is named, right? Since, inseparably, remaining the unity of the person, right? The same is, what? Yeah. The Son of the whole man, right? An account of flesh. And the whole Son of God, an account of being one with the, what? The divinity of the Father, huh? He's the whole Son of Man on account of the flesh. Not only the flesh, but. And the whole, what? Son of God on account of one divinity with the Father, right? But, I mean, the main thing in this body, this article, is the distinction between the abstract name, right? And the concrete name, right? So, God signifies, he wants to explain the way they signify, right? The word God signifies is that which has the divine nature, right? Even though the have and the have are the same thing, right? But signifies as someone having the divine nature, right? Why, deitas, right? You get one word there, deity. Deity, I'm not sure how deity English means, same thing, deitas. But deitas signifies as that by which one is God, huh? Or is the divine nature, right? Okay. Now, Thomas has talked about that before, you know, when he talked about how we name God and so on, right? And how we can say both that God is, what, good and that he's goodness itself, right? But yet, they signify somewhat differently, good and goodness, huh? And we can't really avoid those two ways of signifying because, as the philosopher explains in the third book about the soul, our reason's own object is of what it is, of something sensed or imagined. And in these, the form and what has the form are not the same thing, right? And so our way of speaking reflects the nature of material things. And so when we come to talk about an immaterial thing like God, we have these two ways of speaking, neither one of which is adequate to him, right? And so we want to say both that he is, what, good, because he is good. But we want to say that he's good as itself because of the simplicity of God and there's no real distinction in him between his goodness and himself, huh? But we can't avoid those two ways of, what, speaking, right? And we at the same time realize neither one is adequate, huh? Now, the first objection is kind of overlooking the fact that even though the divine nature is the same thing as God, they signify, right, in a different way. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in divine things, really, the person is the same thing as the nature. We saw that in our study of the Trinity, right? You compare the persons with the nature, right? And by reason of this identity, the divine nature is said of the Son of, what, God. But, however, there is not the same way of signifying. And therefore, some things are said of the Son of God, which are not said of the divine, what, nature. Just as we say that the Son of God is generated, we do not oversay that the divine nature is, what, generated. as has been brought out in the first, what, part. And likewise, in the mystic incarnation, we say that the Son of God has suffered. We do not, however, say that the divine nature is, what, we suffer not. But again, maybe to understand that, you should realize, as I said before, that the divine nature signifies as that by which God is God, right? And you certainly can't say that he's God by reason of something, what, human. Why God signifies as not that whereby God is God, but that which is God, that which has the divine nature. And because God, the person, can have another nature, right? And did have another nature, then there can be what? Things said of God by reason of human nature, right? Because it has that nature as well, right? So the word was made flesh, right? Now the word incarnation, the second objection here, a text there from Damacy, right? Where Damacy seems to be kind of to himself. He says, to the second it should be said that the word incarnation more implies a union to flesh than the, what, properties of flesh. Now both natures in Christ are united to the other in the person, by reason of which union the divine nature can be said to be, what, and human nature to be deified, huh? Okay, Thomas, I didn't realize you were going to be so subtle. That's pretty good, pretty good, huh? You know, the, the, we were impressed with this Greek commentator there among the Neopatetic ones, Harmonius Hermaeus, right? And he has this beautiful commentary on Aristotle's Peri-Hermaeus, right? And Thomas, you know, he goes through the Peri-Hermaeus, he'll often, you know, in a difficult point, quote several authors, right? And he will usually see some defect in them and so on, but he doesn't do this in the Moines Hermaeus, right? And Thomas' commentary on the Peri-Hermaeus, you know, is incomplete. And it breaks off, you know, where one of the medieval Latin translations of Monius Hermaeus breaks off. But Thomas' example is, you know, he's supposed to, you know, he's supposed to say it was the Monius Hermaeus, you know, so. So, Monius Hermaeus got a lot of, you know, credit with us because of Thomas, huh? And so on. But one place where Thomas seems to not go along with the Monius is because his explanation is too subtle. Thomas has a little simple explanation. But I wouldn't dare do this with Thomas. But this is the way Thomas is explaining this. This way he's thinking is not being incorrect, right? And these are pretty strong guys, you're Athanasius and Cyril, right? You don't mess around with those guys. You don't mess around with them. Now, the third objection, huh? That was the one, you have some things that seem to belong to divine nature are said of, what, human nature, right? Now, to the third, it should be said that those things which belong to the divine nature are said of the human nature, not according as they, what, essentially belong to the, what, divine nature, as if, therefore, they essentially belong to the human nature of Christ, right? But according as they are, what, participative, huh? They're partaken of. And they're derived to human nature as partaking of them in some way. That means to have in a partial way, right? Whence those things which are not able to be, what, partaken of by human nature as to be uncreated, right? Or to be, what, omnipotent in no way are said of human nature, right? But now the divine nature in the reverse is not true because the divine nature can receive nothing in a participatory way from human nature. In fact, the divine nature can in no way, what, partake of anything because it's, what, yeah, and it's purely, what, perfect, yeah, completely actual, right? And those, for those things which are human nature in no way can be said of the divine, okay? And, you know, in ethics, you know, when you take up the virtues there and you say that the will and the emotions can partake of reason, right, huh? Can reason partake of the emotions? Not really, huh? It can be impeded in some way by the emotions. Yeah. So it can be impeded. Impeded, huh? Or shaped. Yeah. I know we might speak of our, can you speak of angry reasoning or fearful reasoning? Well, they can more so, right? It seems to me, you know, reason can partake in some way, right? Of the influence of these things. But God in no way can partake of something. That's why one of the arguments there, Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he's taking up the goodness of God, right? And as I mentioned before, there's five chapters there. He shows that God is good and then he's goodness itself. And nothing bad can belong to God. Then he's the good of every good. Then he's the highest good. But one of the arguments that he can't be bad, if he was bad, he'd have to be essentially bad. He couldn't partake of badness, no? He had to be badness itself. And that's an impossibility, huh? Because then he couldn't even be, because to be, he says, good, right? And badness itself would have nothing good in it. So, beautiful argument there. So God can partake of nothing. Doesn't St. Paul say we see in part, you know, it's parte. It's a way of speaking of the perfectionist. You know, in the second book, in the fifth book of wisdom, when Aristotle gets to the third group of words there in the fifth book, and they revolve around the word perfect and the word whole, right? And Thomas in the commentary says, well, as he said already in the physics, in the third book there, whole and part, I mean whole and perfect mean almost the same, right? So they're different words, but they're almost meaning the same thing. Well then, imperfect and partial mean almost the same thing, right? And the idea of partaking is the idea. Perfect. If you partake of something, do you have it fully? Partake means to take apart. Yeah. So we're partaking of the mind of Thomas Aquinas, huh? Who's partaking of the mind of God. So we're really a part of a part for that much.