Tertia Pars
Lecture 52: The Unity of Christ: One Person or Two?

Transcript
================================================================================

Let's see, Dian, give a little course on what a premium is, right, philosophy and so on. But I always mention how I like the premium to the Verbum Dei there in Vatican II, the one on divine thing. But if you have the official Latin text, it's very short, but it says premium, right? But the first English edition I had of the documents, it says introduction. Introduction. Introduction means what? Leading into. So as an old college professor, there's a lot of courses in not only my own department, but other departments, called introduction to economics or introduction to this or introduction to that. And you're being led into that subject, right? That'll say very far, but you're being led into it, right? And why a premium is what? It means pave the way, right? You see? But you're not leading the person into it, right? The most important thing in the premium is what you're aiming at, right? But then as you start to pursue that, you're leading the person into it. That work I mentioned by the great Boethius, it's called in Greek the isogogae, right, to the categories of Aristotle. A lot of times it's just, you know, abbreviated twice a goge, but that's etymologically the same as introductio. So he's leading you into what? Logic, at that, to be the son. But that introduction to logic, and especially the logic of the first act, has its own premium, right? Right? And porphyry has a magnificent premium, right? He says, you know, he's talking about the necessity of what he's going to talk about, right? And he says, he says, to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property is, what accident is, is necessary, he says, not only to understand the categories of Aristotle, which is the reason why the question goes, but for definition, for division, and for demonstration, right? So it's being divisive, you know? You realize how important the teaching of the isogogae is, right? And it passed down among, you know, the Arabic, I mean, the Muslim commentators, and the Christian ones. As I mentioned, you know, the first thing I did, I'll always read this 200-page thing by Albert the Great. And Kajetan has got a commentary on it, you know? Well, Cardinal Kajetan wrote the summa, it's printed in the Leonine. Cardinal Kajetan has got a beautiful commentary on the isogogae of porphyry, right? I had a copy, but I don't know what happened to it, but it was very good. So this is a magnificent work, right? That the great Greek philosophers, there's commentaries on it by the later Greek philosophers, and then by the, you know, Muslim Christians and so on. And tremendous work, right? Now, if you look at the definition, say, of genus and the explanation of genus in there, it's in the five of Aristotle's physics, right? And things about speeches are in other parts of Aristotle. But what porphyry has done is bring together, right, the teaching of Aristotle about these that's somewhat scattered in the works we have, and then you have a kind of what? You see a whole picture of something that you wouldn't see otherwise, right? And he gets all this respect from all these other commentators writing about the Isidogogae. So we're going to look at a premium here now, not a reduction. Okay? Then we're not to consider about those things which belong to the unity in Christ in what? In general, right, huh? Now those things which pertain to the unity of plurality in particular are determined in their places. Just as above has been determined that in Christ there is not one, what, science, right? There are many kinds of knowledge in Christ. There's the beauty of vision, there's infused knowledge, there was, what, experiential knowledge, and so on. And further, later on, there will be determined that in Christ there is not only one, what, birth. We had the nativity of Mary there. Did you people? Yes, it's our foundation day. Yeah, yeah. It's 34th anniversary. Each year of what? Foundation day. Huh? It was 31 years ago. Oh, yeah, yeah. Of course, they brought the kids in the grade school there, right? You know, they had the whole part of it. So, the pastor comes down and says, what does the word nativity mean? Let's see who you are explaining this, right? The final one gets his birthday. Okay. So, it ought to consider, therefore, first, about the unity of Christ according to his, what, being, huh? His existence. Secondly, as regards his willing, right? And that's the next question, right? So, 17, 18. Third, as regards his, what, doing, huh? And that's question, what, 19, huh? Christ had one will. I don't know what they call those guys. Yeah, yeah, one will. And you're careful about that. There's a harmony there, Wilson. Okay, now, in this first question, two things are going to be asked, huh? Whether Christ is one or two. Who would tell us to ask that? Okay. And whether in Christ there is only one, what, being, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. So, that's a short question, huh? We'll take a little break now, and then we'll start. We'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now, and then we'll take a little break now. Okay, so, let's go. For the Christ is unum, they'll do all. The first one proceeds thus, it seems that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, that because the form of God took on the form of a what? Servant, right? God is what? Both, right? An account of the God taking on these things, and both is man on account of the man what? Taken. But utrumque cannot be said whether or not what? Two. Therefore Christ is two, huh? I don't know in English how would you say it? If you said that Christ is both God and man, right? Yeah, both God and man. Now if someone is both, he's what? One or two. Yeah, yeah. So he's two. That's an argument in a sense, huh? Is Augustine here referring to, because the form of God took the form of a servant, is he referring to the Philippians of Kenosis? That part of the scripture? Yeah, yeah. How would a self empty, and you empty yourself out? How does that involve becoming two? Well, he says when he was in the form of God, he emptied himself and took on the form of a man. So he took on two forms, right? And he took on both forms. And another way of saying it more simply is he was in both God and man, right? So one became two. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Whoever there is other and other, there are two. But Christ is other and other, as Augustine says in the Inchiridion, huh? Now he's in that same text, in a sense. Since he was in the form of God, right? When he's in the form of God, he took on the form of a servant, a slave. Both, is it one? That is both, right? But other and account of the word, other and account of the, what? Man. Therefore Christ is two. Yeah, unusual number of objections here, doesn't he? Yeah, yeah. Moreover, Christ is not only man, because if he were a pure man, right, he would not be what? God. Therefore he is something other than man. And thus, in Christ there is other and other. Therefore Christ is what? Two. Those are two Olly and Olly arguments. Moreover, Christ is something that is the Father and something that is not the Father. Because he's God and the Father's God, okay? He's man and the Father's not man. So he's something that is the Father and something that is not the Father. Therefore Christ is something and something. Therefore Christ is two. Moreover, just as in the mystery of the Trinity, there are three persons in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation, there are two natures in one person. So these two mysteries are, in a way, contrary, huh? In the one you have a unity of nature and a multiplying of, what? Persons. In the other case, you have the reverse, right? Unity of person. So then you have, you know, the heresies are, in the case of the Trinity, we're taking what? Because there's one nature, there must be one person. Or because there are three persons, there must be three natures. In the same way, because there's one person, two natures, in the Incarnation. There's two natures, there must be two persons, like the story says. Or if there's only one person, then there must be, what? One nature, right? So they're very similar to those arguments, right? But you can see how truth is in between two, what? Extremes. Extremes, huh? All my reports go with the modest truth, Shakespeare says. Nor more, nor clipped, but soul, right? They say more or less than the truth. They are villains of the sons of darknesses. As Faustus says, they lie to himself. Well, when you say that there are three natures in God because there's three persons, are you saying more or less than the truth? And when you say that there's only one person, because there's only one nature, you're saying less than the truth, right? Now in the case of the Incarnate Word, if you say there are two persons because there's two natures, you're saying more or less than the truth. If you say there's one nature because there's one person, you're saying less than the truth. So going back then to words there in King Lear, all my reports go with the modest truth, right? The truth is the middle between two extremes. We've talked before about how in the courtroom, we're really talking about those two ways of departing from the truth by saying more or less than the truth. I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, which is again saying less than the truth and nothing but the truth. I neither add nor subtract from the truth, right? So sometimes they assimilate or see a likeness there between the virtue of reason and the moral virtues, huh? Because in the moral virtues, as Aristotle defines in the second book of the Nicomagian Ethic, it's a habit with choice existing in the middle, he says, huh? Towards us as determined by right reason, huh? So courage is in between foolhardiness and cowardice, huh? It's not equidistant from both, both of the one and the other, but still it's in between two vices, huh? And truth is in a sense in between two mistakes or two errors, right? One of which adds to the truth and the other subtracts the truth, right? Aristotle gets the Eighth Book of Natural Hearing and he's saying, well, is everything at rest as Parmenides and Lyses say? Or is everything in motion as Heraclitus says? Or is the truth lying between these two positions, huh? But the thing about the extreme positions is they can't explain, right? I mean, if everything is at rest, why would anybody think everything's in motion? If everything's in motion, why would anybody think that everything's at rest? But if some things are in motion, some are at rest, then there's some part of the truth in both of these extreme positions, but not the whole truth, right? But on account of the unity of the nature, this isn't the case of the Trinity, right? We'll read this in the Fifth Objection now. Not withstanding the distinction of person, right? We can say the Father and the Son are one, according to that of John chapter 10. I and the Father are one. Therefore, not withstanding the unity of person, on account of the duality of natures, Christ, Christ is two. That's kind of neat, the objection, huh? And it does touch upon that kind of a contrariety of the two mysteries, huh? Moreover, the philosopher says in the third book of the physics that one and two are said denomitively, huh? But Christ has a duality of natures. Therefore, Christ is two, huh? Christ, I'll speak of what denomitivism means there in the beginning of the categories, huh? First chapter. So I don't say that you are justice. I say you are, what? Chest, right? I don't say you are health, but you are healthy. So one and two are said denomitively, but Christ has a duality of natures. Therefore, he's two. Moreover, just as an accidental form makes one to the other, it's still a lot more precise in the Latin and the Greek there. So the substantial form... makes something to be what? Other. Kind. As Porphyry says, huh? Okay. So you don't have exactly in English two words to correspond to that, right? But in one case you're talking about other in quality, other in kind, let's say, right? You have to use, what do you know? It's the Isogogi, right? But in my text there, of course, you refer to it as predicabilibus, right? That's the way you have it. Yeah. So it's a treatise of Albert on the kind of paraphrase of Porphyry. It's called the predicabilibus, right? And the work of the categories is the predicamentis, right? But it has that word in there set up. So you speak of the predicables, you're talking about the way something is said of something, right? Genus is one name said of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, right? But in Christ there are two, what, substantial natures, right? Two different kinds of things, the human and the divine. Therefore Christ is other in other, right? He's other in kind. What do they call it in psychology? Split personality? No. Not split personality, there's only one person there. Both personalities. Split nature. You know, when they talk about how in the Gospel of St. John, Christ is saying there that he's preparing there his departure, you know, in the Last Supper, he's arguing or pointing out that unless I go, the Holy Spirit will not be sent and so on. But Thomas and the Church Fathers seem to be saying that if Christ remained on this earth, we'd have a hard time kind of accepting his divinity, right? We'd be sitting across the table here, you know. Familiar in him. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, but also the Apostles were kind of attached to his, what, his very humanness, his very, kind of a familiar way, right? And they had to, he had to be separated in a sense for him to have, maybe the proper attitude, for him to have proper attitude towards Christ. It kind of shows you the human nature there and the weakness of our nature and so on. It's not clear, you know, that all the Apostles firmly believe that he's God, you know, even up at the Last Supper, right? You know, show us to the Father and it's enough, you know, and he's been with you all this time, you know, and, you know, the Father and I are one and so, you know me, you know the Father. Again, this is what the great Boethius says in the book about the two natures, huh? So, it's a book about the, what, yeah, I guess we get the definition of the person, I think. But in, everything that is, insofar as it is, is one, huh? But we confess Christ to be, therefore Christ is one. Beautiful, beautiful, probably seven objections, huh? You do that, you know, in the Middle Ages because people would have respect for Boethius, right? If Boethius says the opposite, well, you better think twice, you know, why would they be Boethius that said this? If this was the whole truth, you know. The answer, it should be said, that nature, considered, what, by itself, huh, insofar as it is signified in the abstract, huh, is not, what, able truly to be said of the suppositum for the person, with the exception of, what, in God, right, huh? Because in God, there's no difference between the person and the, what, nature, right? But am I human nature? No. You might say I have human nature, right? So, I'm human, I guess. Some people might deny that. But am I human nature, see? Just like, am I logic? Logic? Maybe I'm a logician, in some sense. I'm not logic. So, you want to consider the nature by itself and what belongs to it. You might speak of human nature, right, huh? Like the human nature, he said, of a man? No. See, he has human nature, right? He is human. He says, nature, considered by itself, as it's signified in the abstract, is not truly able to be said of the suppositum or the person, except in God, right? And it kind of gives simplicity, huh? In which does not differ what is and that by which it is, huh? So, I am a logician, and logic is that by which I am a logician, right? But what I am, and that by which I am what I am, is not the same thing. I am not logic. Or if I am healthy, am I health? I am health. I am strength. Now, let me figure out a way of speaking, you know, if I'm really that. Speak of a woman as being a beauty, right? But is she really beauty? Now, she might be beautiful, but beauty is that, quote, that by which she is beautiful, right? Okay. Health is that by which I am healthy, right? But you can't really truly say of me that I am health. Now, in this unusual person, in Christ, huh, however, since there are two natures, the divine to it and the human right, one of these, to it the divine, can be said of him, both in the abstract and in the, what? Concrete. For we say that the Son of God, who stands under, huh, in this name, Christ, is the divine nature, and he is, what? God. Notice how Christ, in the Gospel of St. John, says, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right, huh? You used the abstract word there, huh? But human nature cannot be said of Christ by itself in the abstract. Is Christ human nature? But only in the concrete, insofar as it signifies in the, what? Underlying, right, huh? So he said to be a man, but not to be manhood, right, human nature. For one cannot truly say that Christ is human nature, because human nature is not apt to be said of its, what, underlying, suppositor, right? It is said, however, that Christ is man, just as that Christ is, what, God, huh? Now, God signifies having deity, right, huh? And, you know, Thomas explained that back when he talked about the names of God, right? That, as Aristotle pointed out, the proper object of our reason is that what it is is something sensed or imagined. And in these things that we sense or imagine, what they are and the thing are not the same. So the thing has that nature, right? But the nature cannot be, strictly speaking, predicated on it, or said of it, huh? Okay. Now, in the case of God, though, you see, Deitas, you want to use the Latin word, Deitas, God, the Godhood, right, the divine nature, and Deus are really, in reality, the same thing. Deitas, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word word, you want to use the Latin word But they differ in the way they signify, right? Because God signifies as what has the divine nature, and the divine nature signifies as that by which he is God. So someone says, by what is God, God? Well, it's by his divine nature that he's God. And so we have to speak that way, right? Even though we realize that either to call him God or to call him the divine nature has a defect in it. Because divine nature signifies more that by which he is than his actual being. And God signifies that which has the divine nature, and therefore, like it was something composed like in us. And so we have a real problem, right? And in some sense, no name is, what, adequate, right? Although maybe its fundamental meaning could be applied to God. So he's touching upon that again here. For God signifies habintim, having deity, right? But as we say, you know, in talking about the way the thing really is, we say, God is whatever he has. But that ain't true about me. I have some logic, but I'm not logic. I have some help. I have human nature, but I'm not what I have. I'm not what I have. That's strange, huh? But I do truly have it. What I have. What it is that I have. But in God, it's whatever he said to what have, right? We can't avoid using that way of speaking, because our mind is what, it's natural for our mind to turn towards what, sensible and imaginable things, and therefore what they are and what they have, what has them, exactly the same. So God, the word deus signifies having deitatum, having the divine nature. And man signifies what has what humanity is. Now, you're going to see another distinction here. But in another way, having human nature is signified by this name, man, and in another way, by this name, what? Jesus, or even this name, Peter. For this name, man, implies having humanity, but indistinctly, right? Just as this name, God, indistinctly implies having deity, right? That's why you can have God stand for what? The Father or the Son, right? Or the Holy Spirit. But how does this name, Peter, or this name, Jesus, signify, huh? Imply. Well, distinctly having humanity, right? That is under the, what? Limited, determined, individual properties. Just as this name, the Son of God, implies one having the divine nature, but under a, what? Definite, personal property, huh? Okay? Sometimes when I read, you know, one of these things that Thomas will say, I kind of understood that, you know? And I said, but maybe I'll look at it later on this morning, or maybe I'll look at it again tomorrow. And sometimes, you know, I see somebody I didn't see in there before, right? I'm a little more sure that I've seen what I thought I saw the other day. That's the way my mind works. I was reading about the angelic time, as I said, at 6 a.m. this morning, but I read about the day before, and I said, I think I'll leave that in there, you know? And then I'll look at it again next morning. And my mind is clear again, you know? And, yeah, I see it much better, you know? I said, okay. I mentioned how Deconic said, you know, now if you think you understood everything you read here, he says, that's a sign you've understood nothing. Because if you had understood something, you would see that you have not understood everything. It's like, you know, the supreme example here, you know, you say, I understand God completely, or I understand the Trinity completely. That's really a sign that I've understood nothing of the Trinity, if I think that, right? With Augustine or Thomas, I said, or Hilary, you know, or any of the other great minds, I have understood completely now the Trinity, huh? Yeah. When Thomas, you know, I love that part, and he's giving the reasons for the incarnation, right? And he says, here are some reasons. But he says, the more you consider it, the more wonderfully this thing appears, and the more you see profound reasons, and more reasons why he became man, right? Not in a much lesser scale there, you know, but C.S. Lewis, you know, talking about great works, you know. He says, what are you doing? The guy says, oh, yeah, I heard Homer. Yeah. Or I met you. Somewhere he gave a cursory reading, you know, of Hamlet or King there, you know. But you can go back to these things again and again, right? Even, you know, a great work of art like that. I mean, after all, Western civilization begins with Iliad, right? I mean, if you had to pick out something important, it's Western civilization begin, you know, which is a thing you can't get to besides an answer to, but probably the best answer would be, well, it began with Iliad. Why else would it begin anywhere else? Okay. So he's explaining this distinction, right, between the way in which the common name man implies having humanity, right, and the way in which a name like, what, Jesus, or, what do we call those in grammar names like Jesus and Peter? What do we call them in grammar? Proper names. Proper names, yeah. Private names. Private names. He says the number of, what, duality in Christ is placed about the, what, the natures, right, huh? And therefore, if both natures in the abstract, huh, could be said of Christ, huh? It would follow that Christ was, what, two. That's very simple on his part, huh? But only the divine nature can be said of him, right, but not the human nature. But because the two natures are not said of Christ, except insofar as they are signified in the, what, underlying, suppositum, is necessary according to the notion of the, what, suppositum, to predicate of Christ, one, or what? Two. Now, some lay down in Christ, and this is these subtle heresies, right, duo supposita, right, but one person, which seems to have itself, according to their opinion, as a, what, complete suppositum by the ultimate completion, huh? And therefore, because they lay down in Christ two supposita, or two hypostasis, right, they say Christ to be true in the neutrogener, right, but because they lay down one person, they say he's one masculinera, grammatically speaking. For neither genus designates something in, neutrum, the neutral genus, designates something unformed and, what, imperfect, right? At least they have a fun there. But our debate, you know, except he's an analogy I'm aware of, but his explanation of the word neutrum, right, is neutrum.