Logic (2016)
Lecture 4: Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories: Genus, Species, and Highest Genera

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So, every science divides some genus into what? Animals are divided into four-footed and two-footed and so on, right? Feathered. And a two-footed and... Feathered. Feathered. Yeah. But it's also useful, he says, for demonstration, huh? In a demonstration, you prove a property, right, of a species by an understanding of the nature of that. So, in the case of the triangle here, right, you've got to know what a triangle is, and then you extend one side and draw a line parallel, and that's the way you've got to prove the property of the triangle, that these three triangles will equal to, what? Two right angles. You know, this angle and what? So, in demonstration, you're actually proving a property of the, what? species, right, huh? Through an understanding of the, what? The nature of the thing, right? Which involves the genus, the difference, right? So, that helps you to understand what a demonstration is, in a broad sense, right? You're going to prove a property of a species by the genus and difference of the species. And that makes sense because the property is connected with the, what? Nature, right, huh? And this brings out the nature fully, right? So, enables you to see why that property belongs to species, huh? So, that's, in nutshell, what Porphyry's doing in the, what? I said go-gay, right, huh? Makes sense? So, the Greek commentators later on will call this the Book of the Five Names. Very concrete, huh? Models, you should never do that. Never be so concrete, never, to the point, you know? Okay? And the categories in the Book of the Ten Names, right? Now, let me raise a little question in your mind. Maybe we've got to start now? What time do we have today? I think these two? Five Names. Yeah, okay. Just ask a little question here, right? Notice the definition of genus and the definition of difference, right? We both define them by what they're said of, right? And what they say of what they're said of, right? And then we saw the difference, the one is said of them as regards what it is, the other how they are, what they are, right? That's why grammatically we tend to use a noun for the genus and, you know, an adjective for the difference, right? Okay. And what about the species? He didn't define that by what's below it, what it's said of, what's above. Yeah. That's a great inconsistency, isn't it? Or did the great Porphyry know what he was doing? What do you think? I mean, can we save the teaching of Porphyry here? After all these centuries, it's been basic introduction to logic. Among those, you know what logic is. Even symbolic logic, of course, you won't even know about these. What's the little things say? Twinkle, twinkle, little star. How I wonder what you are. What and why are the, what? Things that wonder makes you ask, right? So you wonder whether these guys are philosophers in the original sense. Because both Plato and Aristotle were the chief philosophers. As Thomas said in the Middle Ages, quite a long time after these two guys, right? Kicked the bucket. He says, what? Wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? There is no other beginning. Socrates is very strong. It's the archaic, he says, the beginning. There is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder. What do you wonder about? What something is? Or why it is so, right? And this is key to both definition and demonstration. Let's answer the questions, what and why. So why don't you begin there? I mean, you just think, you know where you're coming from, right? You're not coming from wonder, right? He says, yes, he calls God wonderful. My niece there, Lady Wisdom. I say, Sophia, what is wisdom? She says, the knowledge of God. And it's the knowledge of God in both senses. It's the knowledge in which you know God, and it's the knowledge which God most of all has, right? It's a beautiful amphibliate knowledge of God. Beautiful answer, right? The question. So I go back refreshed from Sophia's wisdom, right? Lady Wisdom's wisdom. Now, why doesn't he define species by what it's said of? How could he have failed to do that, right? He defines it in reference to genius, right? And always has that relation to a what? A genus above, right? It's always under, every species is under a what? A genus, right? And that genus is said of it and answered the question, what is it, right? But what's under a species? A species. Yeah, yeah, yeah. A species could be a genus in comparison to what is below it. Take an example here. Habit is a genus, right? Instead of virtue and vice, right? What's below virtue? A courage and temperance and justice, right? And they are what? A species. So it's a what? Yeah, yeah. And then you get down to what they call the lowest species, right? Then what's below the lowest species? Yeah. So does every species have individuals under it immediately? No. Some have what? A species, yeah. So, you see, we might not want to define species by its relation to what is below it. We'll need that to be developed later on, right? Because you wouldn't be able to get the same definition. That which is said of many other in kind? Well, yes or no. Circle might be said only one of individuals, right? You see? Maybe circle is the lowest species, right? A shape, right? So different circles. One might be bigger or smaller than another circle, right? But are they a different kind of figure? So circle is said only of individual circles, huh? But quadrilateral, right, is a species of octilineal plane figure. That is to say a plane figure contained by straight lines, right? And then under that is triangle and quadrilateral and pentagon and hexagon and so on. But then under quadrilateral was the ones that my master Euclid of Alexandria did, right? Square oblong, rhombos, rhomboid, trapezium, right? Maybe smarter than we thought this guy, right? He's a step ahead of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And then we bring this out, right, huh? It's an important thing to see, right? Now when Aristotle talks about the figures of predication, you know, that's how we distinguish being according to the figures of predication. This is the categories, right? But why do they say figures, right? Well, that name is borrowed from mathematics, right? And a figure is something that is contained by what limits, right? Some sort. Well, maybe there's a limit, huh? Yeah. And that comes from the word limit, too, yeah. But maybe the same thing can be a genus in a species. That's a great stepping stone. from this treatise to the categories right that the same thing same name can be both a genus and a species but a genus with respect to what is below it and a species with respect to what is above it like virtue is virtue a genus or a species so it's like it's like asking am i a father or a son well i'm both but not with reference to the same man right you know victor's victor burquist is from parker's prairie minnesota is my father not my son and paul burquist or marcus burquist is my son right you know so you can be both a father and a son but not towards the same man i don't think i've got it right but does that go on forever is every genus a species and is every species a genus first i was used to the word figure of predication right as if there is a what limit both in the direction up and the direction down right now trying to get students more interested in this i'd say you know that sometimes the greatest question right can something be both for example a cause and an effect but is every cause and effect would eventually come to be first cause and is every effect a cause you know can the same man be a father and a son yeah is every father a son well not adam but there's a first man right and there are sons who are not fathers right so there's an end of things right and then i go to you know be modern i go to to the two developments in the physics of the 20th century right quantum theory and what relativity theory right and i said well when heisenberg and bohr and so on got through with the quantum theory you know what they did they started looking at elementary particles right and see you know they're the end or something heisenberg said never thought this will go on forever so theody said water is the beginning of all things and we said well there's something before water we discovered it called hydrogen right it generates water right and then we discovered something before hydrogen with a proton electron electron so they were looking for a part that is not a what whole einstein was doing the reverse he was going from special relativity to the general theory of relativity that led to a kind of explosion in cosmology right and einstein came to the conclusion of the universe doesn't go on forever not like newton said or something you know that the universe comes to an end right so then the universe would be a whole that is not a what part right but notice after you realize what a whole and what a part is you make the marvelous discovery that it's possible for the same thing to be a whole and a part but not of the same thing right so new england is a party united states compared to massachusetts it's it's a whole right made up of you know the six states or six and uh and then you say well does that go on forever is there a well there's two questions is there a part that is not a whole and is there a whole there's not a part and einstein concluded that there was a whole that is not a part the universe was in fact like aristotle said finite right and heisenberg said i was convinced that there was going to be a part that is not a what oh he's thinking that direction right even before you you you conclude or you know they're not maybe they haven't come to the end yet right you see and uh but more generally the idea of cause and effect right because something can be both the cause and effect go on forever you know here's the first cause well i say this is the logic right now it's every genus a species because a genus something can be both the genus and species like fruit juice the genus and species right but not a comparison to what is above and one below it but the species of what's above it does this go on forever right well aristotle's book the categories is the discovery that there were what highest genera as well as the lowest what species huh but you know you get into this thing you know have i come to the lowest species right like when i was studying you know comedy right is comedy of lowest species right or there are two kinds of comedy right i'm kind of inclined to think that there's what i call the good-natured comedy and then the satire right i don't like satire as much as a good-natured comedy right i started one of my colleagues there who taught shakespeare you know and i was talking about uh choice and christian which is something that's put the tragedies you know but it's really a comedy right and i was thinking he said yeah but i wrote a dark one he said you know because shakespeare really tears us apart there you know i mean and uh it's like swift you know the satire you know really kind of vicious you know huh it's a woman really beautiful you know look closely you know i mean take a microscope and her skin is very nice and so i'm embracing the the the awful part of things you know and so on so uh maybe maybe there's two maybe comedy's not the lowest maybe there's satire and good natured comedy like you know you said windsor you know before you get the invite even fall staff himself you know to enjoy the cheers and so on so should we start to look at the categories next time yeah okay so i would pass out that other one that there is a review you might want to take this here yeah it's all that's something yeah yeah it's called first distinctions and definitions and logic yeah yeah those those aren't numbered by the machine you maybe you know you had a number of things yeah i can figure out a number of these ones i wrote them in there of the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you have written. I was thinking of my guardian angel in the chapel over there, and right away when I left the church, I didn't even thought, right? I think I'll eventually communicate to you, but appropriate time, you know. About time to give you some help, you know. I found in my tradition here, I don't know what I hear from the Dominicans. It's beautiful about it. It's one of the Easter things, you know. And this guy here is looking over at the regular thing, or casket, we can call it, and it seems like he's scratching his head, you know. Where is he? Where is he? Yeah, I don't know how historically authentic that is, but, you know, it was not really above ground. little artist freedom there, but. And he says, why do you seek the living one among the dead? That's what the angel says, I guess, huh? Now, you've been studying the categories? And is the categories divided into two or three? One or the other? Yeah, the great guys that covered the great and so on, huh? Thomas and so on. They divided into three parts, right? And using the Latin word for categories, right? The predicaments, right? They call them the anti-predicaments, and then the predicaments, so you take up each of them, and then the post-predicaments, right? Now, it's a little bit easier to see the reason for the anti-predicaments than the reason for the post-predicaments. We'll talk about that when we get there. So, in the predicaments, you're talking about the ten categories, and especially the most important ones, substance, and how much, and how, quality, and towards something, relation. But you have something to say about the last six, too. And these are preparing the way for that, right? The anti-predicaments, huh? We'll see. Now, going back from what is a transition here from the isogogate, right? To the categories, huh? We raised a question, right? Which led to a great discovery. Why does porphyry, in Aristotel for that matter, define genus and difference by what they're said of, right? By what is below them, in the way we represent these things. Why he defines species, or edas, forms, with respect to what is above it, right? Towards the, what? Genus above it, right? Why doesn't he define species by what is below it? You know the solution to that? Yeah, below species, there might be only individuals, if it is what we call lowest species, like if man is our lowest species, right? Instead of individual men, or circle, even more clearly our lowest species, right? Instead of individual circles. But if the species is not that low, it can have what? Species below it. So what is it to what is below it? In that case, right? So does it, I mean, you did you say, right? Right, huh? Okay. So, Aristelle and Porphyry, they define species by what? What is above it? It's the name of a particular kind of thing, placed under a genus, right? And of which the genus is said, in answer to the question, what is it, huh? So if I divided habit into virtue and vice, they are a species of habit, good and bad habits, but virtue itself has got what? Species below it, right? Courage and temperance and justice and so on, right? Now, if you're a just man, and I'm a just man, and you're a just man, and you're a just man, then maybe that's only individuals below it, right? But notice that leads us to now another thing to be seen, and that is that the same thing, like virtue in this example, right? Or vice for that matter. The same thing can be both a genus and a what? Species. Now, does that mean that the distinction is not good? Well, then you have to say that father and son, that distinction doesn't make any sense, right? Because the same man can be a father and a son, can't he? You're looking at a father and a son here. Not towards the same what? So something can be a species with respect to the genus above it, right? And be a genus with respect to what is below it. And there are other examples of that, right? You know, a distinction that runs through our life is a distinction of whole and part. Good distinction? You ate the whole pie. You pig. Okay. I only want a part of your money, right? But it's not a whole and a part towards the same thing, right? So New England is a whole in comparison to Massachusetts, huh? Massachusetts is only a part of New England, right? But New England is a part of the United States, huh? Now, now as a little boy, I used to think, you know, I'm going to give my address. 1769 Stanford, right? And St. Paul, Ramsey County, Minnesota, Midwest, United States, North America, all the way to find the universe, right? Because of my historical things, right? Long story, right? But these can be, what, part of and a whole with respect to something else, right? Even cause and effect, right? Can something be both a cause and effect, but not in the same thing, right? So what kind of question does all these examples give rise to, right? Well, is every cause and effect and every effect a cause, right? Or as you look before and after, this is a good example, looking before and after, right? Because the cause is before the effect. If you keep on looking before, right, with causes that are also effects of something before them, right, this go on forever? See, I'm rereading the 14 books of wisdom there, Thomas' exposition of them and Aristotle's Greek there. And I'm in the 11th book now, right? And in the middle of the 12th book, I'm going to find out what the first cause is. So I've been wondering what the first cause is. I'm really, you know, excited about this thing, you know, huh? Maybe another week or so, I'll be in there finding out what the first cause is. You know, satisfy my desire to know causes, right? Make sense? Okay. I mentioned how I used to talk to students, you know how the two main developments in the physics of the 20th century, relativity theories, right? And quantum theory. The one eventually led to a development of cosmology, right? And they're looking to see if there's a hole that is not a what? Part. If the universe went on forever, every hole would be a part of something greater, right? But if the universe, like Aristotle thought, was what? Finite, right? Then there's a hole that is not a what? Part. Part. Einstein came to the conclusion, right, in the general theory of relativity, and the cosmology came from that, right, that the universe is in fact finite, and Aristotle was right. That's a great question, right? But then at the other end, the students of elementary particles, right, the students of quantum theory were studying elementary particles and going in the direction of the, what, part. And does every part have a sort of hole in respect to something else, right? Well, the Greeks thought that the elements are earth, air, fire, and water, right? We discovered that water maybe in some ways made up of hydrogen, oxygen, right? So hydrogen is a part of water, hydrogen, right? It's named that way from its rule, right? But is hydrogen a hole too? Something smaller? Yeah, like an electron and a proton, right? I guess hydrogen is pretty low as far as the number of hydrogens. I mean, protons or electrons it has. But now does that go on forever? Well, Heisenberg says, I never thought this could go on forever. That's a profound question, though, right, huh? So in the two main developments of the physics of the 20th century, out of one of them, they eventually went looking for a hole that is not a part, right? And the other they went looking for a part that is not a hole, right? So we could ask the same thing with father and son, right? And I read somewhere that a guy named Adam was the first father, right? He was not a son. This took sense. Yeah. Call him a son of God, but that's using the word equivocal now, right? I know sons who are not fathers, right? Because they don't know whether they are or not, right? The crooked guy used to wander around the city there looking at the little orphans, you know, and see if anybody looked like him. He may have been one time a little bit guilty of things that make him wonder over there. He's got a little son there running around, being neglected there in the city, huh? But there are some sons who are not fathers, right? Okay. So the more of the question there is, is there a father who is not a son? So, you could ask this question about genus and species, huh? There's clearly something that is both a genus and a species, but does every, what, and vice versa. Yeah. Now it's kind of a question for the particular sciences to say whether we've come to a lowest species. And so I gave the example from geometry that a circle seems to be a figure that's what? Do different circles have a different shape? It seems not. It seems just that they're individuals, right? They have the same exact shape, right? Maybe one circle could be bigger than another, right? That's more difference in size than in the figure, right? Now maybe an equilateral triangle is like that, but maybe not an isosceles. There's more shaped isosceles triangles, right? So that's a question for the geometry to answer. There are low species, like circle, right? Okay. Is dog a low species or are there different kinds of dogs, right? You know, I get kind of a tough question. That's the question for the biologist, the zoologist, in this case, the answer, isn't it? Okay. But in the categories now, we're looking in the other direction, right? Does every genus have a genus above it, huh? Does every genus have a species with respect to something higher than it, right? Now, Aristotle thought out that, no, not every genus has a genus above it. Well, not every genus is a species with respect to it, but that there must be a highest genus or highest genera, okay? Now, what would be a reason for thinking, like Aristotle thought, huh, that there is either a highest genus of all things or a number of highest genera of things? What would lead him to think that, huh? What would lead us to think that, huh? Well, a genus is said of more than a, what, species, right? So if every genus had a genus above it, it would always be a name said of more things than any given name. How necessarily? It would always be a name said of more things than any given name. Okay, there are names said of, what, of everything, right? Now, they have a terrible name for these names in philosophy. You hear it, you know, the transcendentals, because they transcend the highest genera, right? But I call them the set of alls. I have a nice concrete guy, right? The set of alls, right? There's about six of them. And Thomas, when he talks about truth there in the De Trinitat, I mean, yeah. The De Trinitat, the De Trinitat, the De Trinitat, the De Veritati, yeah. Yeah. He's got to stop and explain something about them, right? Estelle talks about good as being, you know, the genera, right? In the categories and so on. But basically, the word, what, being, right, huh? Is a name said of all. If you ask this question, can there be something that is not a being? Being means what is, right? And can be said of anything that is in any way whatsoever. So can there be something that is not a being? No. So here you come to a name that is said of all, right, huh? A most universal name, right? So names don't keep on getting more and more universal forever, right? Now the fact that there is one name said of all, maybe more than one name, but there's at least one name said of all, is that enough to conclude that there's one genus of all things? There's one highest genus that covers everything? And the answer is, if you go back to the definition of genus, right, five parts to it, right? It's a name said of many things, other in kind, right, signifying, right? What did he have? Signifying what it is, right? It's a name said with one meaning of many things, other in kind, signifying what it is, what each is, right? Okay. Remember that definition, right? Okay. I'm being more explicit now than Porphyry, right, huh? He said to Monsignor Dion one time, you know, Porphyry should have explained he was talking about five names said with one meaning of many things. He agreed that he should have done so. So, if being is said with one meaning, right, of many things, which is something he has said, of, right, other in kind, right, signifying what it is, maybe, to be, it's something, same thing would be the word something, right? But is it. Is it said with one meaning of all things? If it's not, then we would conclude that there must be a number of Highest Janus. There can't be just one. But we first conclude that there's either one Highest Janus or many Highest Janus. And we do so by the fact that there is a name said of all. That means that names don't get more universal ad infinitum, right? You can't be more universal than said of all. Aristotle shows in a number of places in the 14 Books of Wisdom that the word being is not said with one meaning of all things. There's many ways to see that, right? How many are coming? Well, we're going to make dinner for people, so how many are coming? You say, well, two are coming, right? Who are they? Who are these two that are coming? Well, Duane Berquist and the Shape of Duane Berquist are coming for dinner. How is Duane Berquist and Father Michael one thing or two things? What did you say? Okay. Yeah. He's something, I'm something, right? Oh, you're something, I'm something else. You are something else, yeah. Okay. But now is Duane Berquist and the Shape of Duane Berquist one thing or two things? Or is Duane Berquist and the Health of Duane Berquist the same thing? But is Duane Berquist and the Health of Duane Berquist two things like Berquist and Father Michael? So, you know, you might say, Berquist is really one thing, you know? But in some sense, there's two things there, right? Berquist and his health, right? Or Berquist and his knowledge, right? Or Berquist and his size, right? I've got these 19 grandchildren, right? And their size is always their height and so on, right? You know, some of them are getting taller than their mother who's not getting tall, you know? But that's still Sophia, or still Cecilia, or where it might be, right? So you can see that the word being is not said with what? One meaning, right? You leave this room today, you will cease to be, okay? Now, if they bring me into court for threatening people, right? I'd say, oh, I meant, what is your honor, that he will cease to be in the room. No one would understand that, Mr. Berquist, and he said he would cease to be. Standing the word cease to be there to mean what? Just substantial life, right? Yeah. So to walk out of this room is not to cease to be, is it? Except in some particular sense, right? Okay. Another way that Aristotle shows now that being can't be a genus, huh? Is the genus the definition of the difference? No. Then you'd be putting the genus in twice in the definition, wouldn't you? No. But can there be a difference that it isn't? No. Being has to be part of the understanding of everything, right? But a genus can't be part of the definition of the difference, can it? So being can't be a genus instead of the whole thing, you see? And therefore Aristotle rightly concluded that there must be many highest genus, right? Now Aristotle later on in his anti-predicaments will enumerate the highest genus, right? Exemplify them, right? But in a text that we'll look at next time, right? Or a couple of texts of Thomas. Thomas, following the rule of two or three, right? Distinguishes these highest genus. We'll see that when you get to that point, right? At this point it's clear that those names like being or a name like something, right? Are not said univocally with one meaning of all things. I'm something in a way that my shape is not. Or my being seated, right? It's a very strange kind of something, isn't it? Being seated is something, isn't it? You have a chair, don't you? You see it, you know? Is that something like I am? No. I'm doing the sitting, right? The sitting isn't sitting down, is it? I don't think so. But I'm sitting down, right? I'm a fundamental something, right? And that sitting down is just kind of a, you know, kind of a minor thing. Something compared to me, right? That's said of me and my sitting down the same way, is it? We're both something in the same way? Now another way of seeing that there must be highest genus, right, huh? If every genus had a genus above it, right? How many genus would you have to know to know anything? You'd be known to them, right? So could you know what anything is? You couldn't begin to know what anything is, right? There would always be something you'd have to know before that, before you could know that. You'd know nothing, right? To start with, right? Yeah, yeah. It's like we were saying before about statements, right? Suppose someone says that every statement must be known to other statements, huh? Every statement, you've got to reason out. I want to reason for every statement you make. Well, if every statement is known to other statements, would any statement be known? I'd be knowing statement A to at least statement B, right? And statement B through statement C, and then statement C through D. If I didn't know D, I wouldn't know C or B or A. But I couldn't know D until I know E for it. I couldn't, you know? I'd have to know infinity of statements before I'd know any statements, right? And I couldn't begin to know any statements, right? If any statement I tried to use to prove something, you'd say, prove that before you use it! And then whatever I tried to use to prove that, prove those before you use them! And so on, right? It would go on forever. So if every statement was known only through other statements, even that statement that you just made, every statement is known through other statements, wouldn't even be known. So you can't possibly know that every statement is known through other statements. Well, it's impossible for any statement to be known if that was so, right? It's the same with definition, right? So if every part of every definition was in need of definition, you can never define anything. The definition is by genus and differences, right? So if every genus had a genus, there would always be a definition before you could use this to define anything. You couldn't begin to define anything, could you? So do we know what some things are by definition? So it must not be true then that every genus has a genus, right? Just like it's true, there must be some statements known through themselves, right? And not through other statements. statements. So there must therefore be a highest genus or a number, many highest genus. Aristotle has thought that out and he's got to think out what the highest genus are, right? But the reason why there can't be one highest genus is because those names said of all are not said with one meaning of all. So look at Aristotle's beginning here now, the categories. In the Greek he says homonuma, right? Things named what? Equivocally, right? It's one word in Greek, homonuma, are said of which the name only is what? Common, right? The logos, the meaning, right? According to the name, right? Of what it is, is heteros, other. He gives an example of that. He has name Zoan, animal. So again, the word zoology, you know. Zoan is said of a man and of the, what? Painting of the man or the statue of the man, right? Painting of the man, I guess, in the year. So when our friend, who was the Frenchman that was served as a general in our army, the college named after him here, Lafayette. And Lafayette and Washington became very good friends, huh? He had some of the letters between them and so on, right? Well, Lafayette eventually went back to France and got a little trouble with the French Revolution and so on. But eventually he came back to America, right, after Washington had died, right? And he'd see these statues of, what, Washington here and there, right? And that's not really Washington, you know, because he was, you know. Then he got to the statue of Washington, which I guess is down now in Virginia State Assembly, something somewhere down there. There it is. That's Washington, okay? When he's pointing to the statue, that's Washington, right? Is that Washington in the same sense in which the man he knew was Washington? Is that flesh and blood and bones? And so that's an example of a name that is, what, equivocal, right? And why is Aristotle talking about a name that's equivocal? This is not truly equivocal, is it? It's got a reason for it, right? But the names that will be said of all the highest name, right, like the word being, right, will be a name of the sort. That's equivocal, right? But equivocal by what reason, huh? I said, I stopped off at the chapel there and I said, look, praise my guardian angel. So when I got out, he put a thought in my mind, right? He said, look, Dwayne, he said, if a name is equivocal by chance, how many things do you think it'd be said of everything? I kid this guy who comes to my house on Tuesday night, you know, from seven to nine, his name is Richard, right? And I say, well, Richard, gee, that was the name of my oldest brother, right? That was the name of my maternal grandfather, I guess, was Richard. And I worked in the package door part-time once and the manager's name was Richard. Why are you guys all called Richard? Somebody line you up and say, hey, these guys all got the same shape, nose, so we'll call him Richard or something like that? No, just by chance, right? If this student, my brother, Richard had the same name, right? But would the name Richard be extended to everybody in the universe? If the name is equivocal by chance, it just happened, it's going to happen all the time, everybody gets that name, everything gets that name, right? No. But if the name is said of all, my guardian angel said, right? There must be some connection among the meanings, right? It must be a name equivocal by what? Reason, yeah. Yeah. So our style is talking a bit about the kind of name, right, is going to be said even of the highest genre. It's going to be equivocal, right? Maybe equivocal by reason rather than by, by chance, right? Great wording this guy Aristotle, you know? Then what does he talk about next, huh? Well, I'll finish the thing there. If one is to give what each of these is to be an animal, right, he would give what? The one would be property of each one, right, huh? Now the second thing he says, sunonuma, right? In the Greek, right? Unless you have to translate that, things are univocally named, right? But sunonuma, numa is one word in Greek, yeah. We'll forgive him that, and it's just okay. Which the name is common, and the what? Yeah, you see us, huh? According to the name, the logos, the Greek actually says the what? The according to the name, okata tunama, the name, the logos, right, the thought of something, teisusias, meaning of what it is, right, is the same, right, huh? And he gives example as zoan, which means animal, said of man and what? Poos, which means ox, I guess, right, okay? For animal said of dog and cat, right? For man and the ox are called by a common name, zoan, animal, right? Interesting, I guess the Greek word for animal, zoan comes from the Greek word for life, huh? Because although there's life in the plants, it's kind of hidden, but the animal, you know, jumps around, and it's obviously sensing things, right, huh? Okay, so he said why the Latin word for animal comes from what? Anima. It's interesting to see. So those two words mean the same, but the etymology is what? Yeah, one is named from soul, the other from life, right? Well, soul names the source of life in the living body, right, huh? So the similarity in the etymologies, but they're different, right? But both soul and living are used now to name the animal, right? Because life is manifest there, and it's hidden in the, in the, yeah. Well, I know my teacher in graduate school there, my second grand teacher, right, to Charles DeConnick, his wife is named Zoe, yeah. I had 12 children, so that was good. He was on the thing, you know, about birth there in the Second Vatican Council, so it's a joke, you know, a lot of stories. So they're called by a common name, right, huh? But also the Logos of, O Logos Trisusius, you actually use that phrase a lot, huh? The thought of what it is, right? Um, is, O Autos, huh? The same, huh? So you get the word automobile, right, from Autos, self-moving, right? You see the farmers, when they first sell a car, you know, they look at the hood, looking for the horse right in there, or the animal, just pulling the damn thing. Where is it, you know? No, it's going to happen somewhere, right? But automobile means what? Self-moving, yeah. If you're being pulled by a horse, the carriage is not an automobile, it was being moved by the horse, right? Heteromobile. yeah yeah for if one was to give the logos for each of them about what it is for each of them to be a what animal one would give the same logos right the same meaning right okay now this is the way the highest genera will be said of what are below them right sara style's proceeding in beautiful order right names that are said in the highest genera will be said what equivocally more precise you can say equivocally by reason right but the genera themselves the highest genera will be because of genera they're said with one meaning they're significantly of their what species and this will be true down the road down the file now what does he give the third thing here for though huh the greek word is what paro numa right huh okay now how should one translate that they direct this guy translates derivatively in latin they'll use the term uh denominate huh but it's a name that is taken from another name right now why is he introducing this he doesn't define it too precise to her but he says paro numa right and i think the best thing is that latin denomination right they don't like the word derivatively but it is derived from another thing from something but differing in what ending right what those say right now common name um as grammatic grammatical from what grammar we say right now and from what now they say hero and heroes but i think the greek word is courage right and courageous right so now you're thinking of the fact that not only are the words said equivocally right of everything equivocally by reason of everything and therefore said of the 10 highest genuses turn out to be one of the many highest genera right but then within each what genus the name is said uniquely of what's below it right well how about taking something from the later genera and saying it of the first one which is the substance so if you take um me what am i i'm a man right i'm an animal a living body a body substance right and then you take something like my health or my knowledge of geometry right now would you say that burquist is health do you say health of burquist you see burquist is geometry no but you could say something that because health is in my body i guess it is more or less and geometry is in my mind right you can say something of me with a name derived from this right you might say burquist is something of a geometry right or burquist is what healthy right you see that okay notice how thorough our style is right what is said of the highest genera right and the way the highest genera are said of what's maybe at the end of them right and then how something in one genus can even be said denominatively right of something another genus right so i'm over in the genus of substance and my health or my knowledge and maybe over in the genus of quality or how right and well the name of a species of uh quality like geometry or courage right or temperance or something right these cannot be said of me duane burquist except denominatively right so i'm said to be temperate if i am right or courageous if i am right we said if something something in a different highest genus right instead of the fundamental highest genus substance denominatively right it's not said as the species would be um geometry right species of virtue might be purge right it might be what justice right but you wouldn't say i am justice you might say i am just though right if i am right to say i'm just to say i have justice right i have the virtue of justice not that i am the virtue of justice right and you kind of figure a speech if i said euclid is geometry aristotle's philosophy mozart is music right no mozart is a musician right he's not music is he mary holiness or would you call her holy right you know name directly it's kind of kind of interesting why she says i am the immaculate conception right why does he say that right i say there's a reason why she's saying there's a special reason why she's saying that right but notice these denominative words you could also translate as i have this right i am not the knowledge of triangles and squares and you could say i have because there's knowledge of triangles and squares in me right and it can't be taken out of me and put over here next to me right exists only in me but i can't be said to be that because i am i'm a man i'm not but i have the knowledge right and if you might give me a name derived from this huh am i logic the students might say that you know yeah he's logic yeah yeah but no you would say something denominated from logic right now i'm a different ending right you'd say breakfast is a logician right which means that he has some of this knowledge called logic in himself right berkowitz is not even i'm very healthy right so as long as the doctor says i'm very healthy you know at least for my age so i say okay he didn't say i'm healthy yourself he kind of figuratively you know is deception but properly you should say she's a liar right he says as many so you see what he's doing in the first chapter there right that's how he's going through words right because he's following the natural road right even on logic right well logic is a very abstract science in many ways it has the greatest difficulty time it says right because of that but even there you bring out the fact that hey we're going to be talking about the categories the highest genre right and there are names said of all of them right but they're a set of them what equivocally or more precisely equivocally by reason right but his example kind of shows that right okay just like in in the um the senses of before there you know you get to the third sense and aristotle seems to be saying that the third sense is ordered well no he got the examples he gives there right now because he's talking about the order in the discourse of reason the order in our knowledge right so talking about the names that are said about and each highest genus is sort of what is below it you never claim that's the second thing he talks about now how about something in one