Logic (2016) Lecture 6: The Ten Categories and their Enumeration Transcript ================================================================================ What time do we stop by the way? 4. Okay. So, see what he's doing here then, right? I think that's even more relevant to what he's going to do first, right? But this is also relevant to the distinction, the fact that only one of the, what? Highest genera is substance, right? And there are altogether nine genera of accidents, right? So the distinction between substance and accident here is relevant, right? But no one here is going to understand the difference between accident as opposed to substance, and accident as opposed to property, right? Because they'll escape all of you, right? Yeah. So you should even hope that you understand that distinction, right? No reason to hope. See if it's like, you know, he gets his exams and then he'd be out there and he'd burn the exams, you know? So people wouldn't be copying the other day's exams, you know? See if I was about there towards the end of the day. So, the one, the one they did, the magician guy teaching the predicament was up there, and he said, well, he's kind of a nasty guy, right? And he'd come down, he's a French guy, but he'd come down to, you know, he had a degree at Notre Dame and so on. But I was taking oral exams one time and Nicole went in the French building, right before me, right? And I'm ready to go in, the next guy coming in. And Nicole comes out there and she's mad as a... She almost knocked me down, she's like that. But I found afterwards what happened, right? You know, he asked her a question and she used to do a blank, right? Which happens in an oral exam, right? Now, you do that, you either help the student, you know, if you're a professor, or you go on to another question, right? Well, he just sat there, you know, and she couldn't answer the question, right? And after, I don't know, you know, a few minutes, you know, complete silence on her part, he said, do you have anything to add? That's what she stormed out of the place, you know? But it shows you how magicians have no feeling, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Nicole was a marvelous girl, you know, huh? I remember one American said he came down to the factory, he said, I never see what you saw in Nicole, Dwayne, but I came down to the factory the other day and I was really being depressed, you know? I ran to Nicole a couple of minutes, so the professor was gone, you know? So she was a very nice girl, but she was a dad, you know? Yeah. And the guy who taught ethics and politics, you know, he would come and take the exam, you know, and he'd be in there and he'd say, let's go over the window, he says, get some cold air, you know, wake up, you know? So he gets you kind of going, you know? He was a nice guy, you know? So he gets all kinds of professors, yeah. And what's the third chapter about, right? The third chapter is about the order, right, huh? Within a, what, genius, right? Or in the highest genius, right? Okay, let's see what he says about this, huh? Hmm. Keteran, one thing, right? Of another, right? Is, Kategorita, right? Is said, as of a, what? Subject. Whatever is said of the, what? Redicate, you might call it, right? All will be said of the, what? Subject, right? So if habit is said of virtue, as a genius, right? And virtue is said of courage as a genius, right? Then habit will also be said of, what? Yeah. You see something about the order of these things, right? So if substance, if man is said of me, right? And animal is said of man, then animal is said of me. And if living body is said of animal, right? Then living body will be said of man and of me, right? And if body is said of living body, it's all down the line, then body will be said of everything down the line, right? And finally, if substance is said of body and spirit, or whatever. Aristotle doesn't give that distinction here, because it's for wisdom to know that there are bodies and spirits. But if substance is said of body, and body of living body, and that of animal, and animal of man, and man of me, then substance will be said all the way down the line, right? You see that? So he's talking about the order here of being said of, right? Makes sense, doesn't it, right? So in the previous chapter, you got the distinction of individual substance from other things, right? And the categories will be distinguished by, well, something is said of individual substance, right? But now we're going to see something about the order within each thing, right? Does this make sense, right? It reminds you a little bit of what you have when you get to the syllogism, right? Because in the syllogism, the principle of it is the set of all and the set of none, right? So if every B is an A, whatever is a B is an A, right? If no B is an A, whatever is a B is not an A, right? This is similar, right? And that's the order you might say of what? Genus and species, right? The species and the species under the genus, and the genus is the species, right? And so on all the way down the thing, right? Now he talks about the third thing, right? Which is what? Differences, right? What do you have in predicament order, right? We have an order of what? Genus and species, right? The genus and the genus, right? All up to the genus that is not a species. All the way there ordered, right? But in particular the order being that the, what is said of the higher genus would be said of the lower genus and lower species all the way down the line. Makes sense? Yes, that's clear enough. Now he talks about the differences, right? Because the species would be separated, right? By differences. And the difference will be what the species has in addition to the genus, is Porphyritatus, right? But now he points out the distinction here. Of heterogenon, of different genera, right? And which are ordered, right? Tittagmenon, right? And are not ordered under each other, right? Other in form or species are also the, what? Differences, right? As for example, the differences of zoo, animal, and of what? Epistemes, science, right? For of animal, differences would be what? Footed, two-footed, right? Winged and aquatic and so on, right? These are among the differences of what? Animal, right? But they're not of any, what? Species, right? They're two-footed. For one science, not different other science in being two-footed. Okay? Now, my first great teacher there was Roman Cassuric there, right? The wisest man at the College of St. Thomas, right? The man who claimed his mind was the mind of Aristiles like the brain of an angleworm, right? But he said to me, you can tell a man's understanding of the matter by the examples he chooses, right? And he used to say, you know, these bad philosophies, choose an example that strikes imagination, right? But the purpose of the example is to clarify something, right? Make it more clear. Well, notice the magnificent example Aristiles gave, right? What are the differences of animals? Well, we distinguish, you know, very much by two-footed and four-footed, right? And so on, right? And you find those as differences for another genus, right? It's not... And he takes episteme-based science now, right? Is one science different from another because some are two-footed and some are four-footed? It's just so clear, right? You know? You know, that was a beautiful observance of the Baromic Cirque, I thought, you know? You see? Of course, you get into modern philosophers, I like to take an astuce example, you know, that's kind of weird, you know, and kind of puzzles you. And it's kind of contrary to the purpose of it. But, he says, when genera are under one another, right, nothing prevents there being the same differences because the differences of the higher ones will come down, right? So if good is a difference of virtue, then when you get down to the species of virtue, good can be said of them too, as well as virtue, right? So justice is both a virtue and it's something good, right? See? But is it odd or even? Those are differences of another genus, right? Which is not above or below, what, quality or virtue, right? Okay? So, so, clear if all this is, you know how well-ordered this is, huh? So that the differences of the, what, predicate, huh, the category, so many are those of the, what, yeah, yeah. And notice the word category here has not yet got the sense of what we call the ten categories, right? Because the ten categories are, what, the highest, january, right, highest predicates, you might say, right? But, uh, it's kind of almost by, uh, what? Yeah, yeah. So you gotta be careful, right, huh? And I think I mentioned how the word category comes from the law courts, right? See? Because then I, and from accusation, right? So, if I accuse you of some crime, I gotta say you're a thief, or you're a murderer, or you're, you know, an adulterer, or whatever it is, right? So I gotta say something of you, right? And of course, you realize the necessity of, of what, you know, manslaughter and murder, and so, you have to distinguish these different things, right, huh? But it's gotta say something of you, right? And so when I read the Gospels, and they, they accuse Christ of something, the word is this category, right? I mean, it's taken from a quick word. Now, in the last chapter here of the, uh, anti-predicaments, right, then, before he takes up them one by one, he now enumerates the tent, right? And also he says, of those said according to no intertwining, simpokane, right? Not things like white man, but things they said without any intertwining of different kinds of things. Each either signifies, usia, which is the Greek word for what we translate substance, huh? You don't even see methodology, right, huh? Now, the word hypostasis in Greek has got the same, what, as substance, right? But the Greeks used the word hypostasis for a individual substance, right? And maybe even by custom for, for person, right? But it's really, you know, could mean, analogically, any, what, individual substance, right? Because that stands under everything else, right? So, yeah, yeah. Yeah. But the, the word substance, um, uh, in Greek, in Hati rather, can also mean what, what a thing is, right? The substance of a thing. And so they got into some troubles, you know, and they say that there are three hypostasis in the Trinity, right? Going from the Greeks, and then they translate three substances, right? Well, then, then you seem like you're saying, what? Heresy, right? You know? So you gotta be careful, right? About these words, huh? Okay. Um, so of those things said, according to know intertwining, each either signifies Lucian, right? Or, posan, right? Or, posan, right? Now, posan, I don't know if you have one word in English, because maybe this can mean how much or how many. Well, it's a concrete word, like how much or how many, right? Rather than the abstract word, what? Quantity, right? And my teacher, Roman Kassari, used to point that out, right? Because I used a concrete word, right? Or, posan, huh? And posan, we might translate English by how, rather than quality, right? And how is more, you know, how are you today, right? You know? It's more, uh, known to us, right? Than say, what's your quality today? It sounds kind of abstract, right? You know? I'm depressed, or I'm, you know, sick, or whatever it is. Yeah. Or, prosti, right, huh? Now, in Albert, they translate that, ad aliquo, right? It means towards something, right? Now, you know, if I read this English translation here, right? Each uncombined word or expression, that's not said very well, means one of the following things. It doesn't mean, well, signifies, okay. What or substance, how large, okay, that's not too bad, that is quantity, he says. What sort of thing, that is quality, how, related to what, or relation. So, it's not, he's lost the concreteness, right? And so, I always say that when I started to read, think about the beginning of John's Gospel, he says. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was what? Yeah. Prost, don't think. Toward God, right? And there, God is standing for the Father, right? And the Word is toward, right? So, the distinction between the members of the Trinity is by relations, right? And by toward them, right? And so, God the Son towards the Father is the Son, right? But is God the Son towards the Holy Spirit a Son? He's not the Son of him, right? So, the relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit is different from Father and Son, right? The Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father, God the Son, right? But you can say the Father and the Son breathe on the Holy Spirit, right? He's like their breath, right, huh? So, he's called a Spirit. Okay? So, it's a different relation, huh? But the breath proceeds from the breather, right, huh? Okay. Now, in a lot of the textbooks, you know, they would use the terms quantity-quality, which you could use, but I mean, it's a nice thing, nice to go hairstyle this way. Or poo, where, right? Or pote, right? Now, again, they make the mistake of calling it where. That is place, this guy says, right? When or time. Well, when you get to the category of quantity, they'll put place and time in the category of quantity. And now he's making it another, what? Jesus, right? Yeah. But it's where and when, really, should be the name of those things. Poo and pote in Greek, right? Ubi in Latin and quando and where and when, right? But time itself is put in quantity by Aristotle. Time is a number of the before and after in motion. The number is a quantity, right? And I'm contained by these walls in this room, right? And they've got length and width and depth, so they're kind of a quantity. The place that contains me, right? And the surface of the bottle or something, right? The container. Surface, surface. Two-dimensional. It's a quantity. Okay? So that's a bad translation, you know, to make it. He says, when, that's good, huh? But then he says in parentheses in this tradition, or time, you know, huh? You say, that's not time. It's the denomative, huh? When. Or case thigh, right, huh? Now they use the term attitude. Now posture or position you've got in parentheses. That's a little bit better, right, huh? Case thighs, huh? But how you're, what? You know? Your position, so to speak, is probably a good way of doing it, huh? Okay. Thank you. laid out, so to speak, or echin, right, that's the one which is, they have here, what, clothing, right, huh, habitus, they call it in Latin, right, they translate that sometimes, okay, or poion, or paschina, now, I, in English, I'd call that acting upon, or what, undergoing, right, huh, so, if you take the word, say, warm, that would be in category of quality, right, but if you say warming, that's acting upon, yeah, being warmed, I'm sitting in front of the fire, being warmed, and undergoing, yeah, yeah, so you've got to be careful, you know, how you're saying those things, to know what a category it's in, right, now, it's going to stop now, okay, he's going to stay exemplifying them, right, huh, that's, we're going to look at that text of Thomas if we have it next time, you know. the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, speak in the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you have written. Amen. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Amen. So we are coming to the last part, I guess, of the anti-predicaments, right? And Aristotle, what, enumerates the highest genera, and he gives their names, and he gives, what, examples of them, right? Okay. So we're going to look at what Thomas says in his other thing there to understand a little bit better. So he says, of those, let's look at chapter 4 there. Of those said, of those things said, according to know, what? Intertwining, right? No simploké. Each signifies either what? Substance, right? Sion? Or posan, huh? Now, you can't really translate posan in English, huh? It's like how much or how many. It's a kind of concrete thing, huh? But I guess posan in Greek can cover, to some extent, either kind of quantity, huh? I was talking to one Marie on the phone there. He was saying that in French, combien? You can do it for both. So apparently posas in Greek, you know, could cover both how much and how many. But we don't have really one thing in English, huh? Although sometimes we have a word in English that you could use for both discrete and continuous quantity, huh? And that would be the word size, right? So you can speak of the size of a man or the size of a mountain, and you're talking about continuous quantity. But you could talk about the size of the crowd, right? Or the size of the family. You've got all the children, right? And that's a discrete number, right? So my daughter's got ten children, so that's size, right? And family, right? And so, but notice Aristotle is using the concrete word, right? He's not using the word quantity. And so in Latin, they'll translate this quantus, right? Maybe that can cover both too, I don't know. But it's concrete, huh? And he gets more of the character of a, what? Accident, huh? Because an accident is something that exists in another, right? Or you say quantity, you kind of, you know, or a substance, right? Quantity is one kind of thing, you know? And, you know, and a dog is another kind of thing. And you kind of give it kind of a name that, you know, maybe fits better substance, huh? So it's significant that he takes the concrete word, kind of the denominative, you might say, right? And then poion, we translate that as how, right? Okay? Posas would be how much or how many, right? Not one word, huh? And then the fourth highest genus is in Greek prosti, right? Now, in Albert the Great's paraphrase of the categories of predicamentis, he calls it ad aliquid, right? Okay? So he doesn't use the abstract word relation, right? I don't know what he'd think of the word relationship, you know? That's a, that's an abstraction of an abstraction, huh? Okay? But my first great teacher there at, uh, uh, Kisurik there, an undergraduate, huh? He, uh, used to point out to me how, or still was using these concrete words, right, huh? Rather than the abstract word, huh? And as I mentioned before, that put me in good stead when I started to read the Gospel of St. John, right? You don't really translate the word correctly, maybe, huh? So, in beginning was the word, and then the Greek says, and the word was toward God, right? Pros, the same word that Aristotle uses here. So if you read, you know, Aristotle and Augustine and so on, and Wathius, you know that the persons of the Trinity are distinguished by, what, relations, right? Okay? But you have that word pros, you know, right there. If you, if you know this, this has been, you know, put into your head, you're struck by it right away, you know? So he says the word is toward God, God is standing for the Father, right? So the Son is, the Son towards the Father, and the Father is the Father to the Son. So they're distinguished by what? Yeah. But it's very concrete, huh? By how they are towards each other, right? Now, the next two categories, they sometimes mistranslate too, huh? The Greek is what? Poo and Potet, which we translate in Latin by what? Ubi and quando, right? And in English by where and when. And it's especially dangerous here to translate it as what? Place and time. Because when you get to the category of quantity, we'll see that place and time are in the category of quantity. So this is something derived from place and time by denomination, as he says in the first chapter, right? But so if you translate where by what? Place, you're really making a mistake there, right? It's got to be where and when. But I know it's in the English, you know, that you'll find that, right? If you look at the notoriously bad translations and the, you'll see. Examples to speak but an outline. It's a bad way of saying it, outline. Examples of substances are man and a horse of quantity. Now, see, he's got the abstract word, right? Two cubits long, three cubits a length. And the like of quality, right, huh? Okay. And then he has, what, terms such as half, double, greater, how to denote a relation, right? See? So you lose that, huh? In the marketplace, in the lyceum and cylinder phrases mean place, while times and tend to break phrases like yesterday, last year, and so on. Well, that's a mistake there, right, huh? I used to paraphrase Plato, you know, until philosophers are kings or kings or philosophers, you'll have bad government, right? So I'd say until translators are philosophers or philosophers are translators, you'll have bad, what? Translations, yeah. They don't succeed, huh? We still, we find some passages in the, in those ones, uh, where, uh, they actually succeed in translating it into the opposite meaning of what Aristotle's saying, right? But this isn't bad enough, I mean, you know? So, yeah, yeah. That's why my, uh, I told you my, historic, right? He was the wisest man at the College of St. Thomas in those days. And he said, Duane, where is your Greek? My Greek? Yes. Why aren't you taking Greek? And I said, I don't think there are other things I'd rather take. He said, that's no reason. You're going to be a philosopher, you take Greek. So whatever little Greek I know, it's because I teach you're a teacher, right? Of course, my brother Richard was looking for me, out for me because he was four years old, right? So he arranged for me to have a private meeting with Kisurik before I went and started college. And Kisurik gave me some fatherly advice as to what I should do. He said, the wisest man in the College, but the man who said, compared to Aristotle, I've got the brain of an angleron, he said. My first great teacher, then he introduced me to both De Connick and Dion. So it's a fixed thing, you can see. And then Kisurik, or being, what, positioned, right? Or ekin, to have, right? And then poin and paskin, how do you translate those? Sometimes in Latin they translate them by axi and pasio. But in English I translate them by what? Acting upon and undergoing. Okay. Now in the book on places, which is another book in logic, Aristotle gives exactly the same thing, and exactly the same thing, and exactly the same thing. the same order, except instead of saying usia, for the first one, he says tiesti, what it is. Okay? And he's thinking there about the fact that, as Thomas will say here in this things, how do you distinguish these highest genera of being? Well, you go back to the distinction we had before in the anti-predicaments here, distinction of universal substance and singular substance, or individual substance, and universal accident and singular accident. And then Aristotle points out that everything else is set of or exists in individual substances. Well, if everything else exists in or is set of individual substances, that suggests that you could distinguish the, what, highest genera by the way something is said of individual substances, like Michael or Robert. And, but now some things are said of Michael or Robert by reason of what they are. And that's what, man, more generally animal and all the way up to substance, right? So you can see why he calls it tiesti, right? But when you get into wisdom, you know, you also find out that substance can be defined in a way that accidents cannot be defined. And by a way that is more proper to what the word definition means. The word definition comes from what? Yeah, I'm in it. I'm in, yeah. So in a definition by the very, you know, meaning of the word almost, you shouldn't have anything in there that doesn't belong to what? The thing itself is being defined. Well, if someone asks you, you know, what is health? Take an accident like health. You'd say something like, well, it's a good condition of the body, right? Is the body health? But you have to define it as something of another, as it's something that exists in another and is therefore something of another. It's something of another, something other than itself. And so you got to bring in something outside of health, right? To define it, right? That seems to be contrary to the meaning of definition. So you have definition in kind of a secondary sense and you get to the other what? Nine categories, yeah. Even myself and I start saying, you know, wisdom is the name of the highest perfection of reason, right? The greatest knowledge of reason has. Well, I'm defining it by reason, right? And that's something other than what? Wisdom, huh? Okay. So he calls it TST there, right? But he gives them, he gives the ten in the same exact order, huh? And we'll see that a little better when we go more into them, right? Now, what does he give as an example of a substance than a horse? Now, De Connick said, you know, if a modern philosopher gave examples, I wouldn't look for any particular order in them or anything like that. But when Aristotle or somebody like that or Thomas gives examples, they, what, show some order, right? So why does he give man as the first example of a substance and then horse as a second example? He doesn't give stone as an example of a substance, does he? He doesn't even give tree, huh? Why does he give man first, huh? Yeah. It's most known to you, right? It's your one substance, huh? This is part of me, you know. I hate to lose an arm or a hand or a leg or something, right, then? You know, I mean, I've lost a part of myself. You've seen that movie there where, uh, Ronald, uh, Oregon, you know, he's playing a guy who has his leg cut off, you know? Where's the rest of me? You know? They were pulling these things out, you know, when he was running, you know, in these old movies, you know? But, oh, where's the rest of me? And he discovered that his leg is missing, you know? I'm like, yeah, it was terrible, terrible how great the acting was, but it's scary what's out of me, you know? So, my teacher, Kusurik, used to say I could tell man's understanding by the examples he chooses, huh? And the horse is closer to man than the, what, tree or the stone, right? And you're not too sure if the stone is one thing anyway, right? Trees, you know, you can, you know, you can graft in a branch of some other kind of tree in there, right? And so, it doesn't seem to have the same unity, right? So, he's chosen very good examples, right? Smart guy, this guy. It's a sign of Aristotle's understanding, right? And then, of how much? He has what? Two cubits, three cubits, right? Okay. Now, what does he have of, of how, of quality? What does he have? Lucan, right? Which is white, huh? And grammatican, huh? Well, he takes the sensible example first, right? Lucan is a, uh, different denominative of white, huh? Whiteness, yeah. And grammatican, but one is a bodily quality, and the other is more in the soul, right? In grammar, right? I'm a grammarian, or I'm a geometrist, or something, right, huh? Okay? I'm white. So, of course, sensible accident is more manifest there, right, huh? But he's, it's the name that he takes Lucan and grammatican, one in the body, one in the, what, soul, right, huh? So, you have kind of a broadness there in your examples, huh? Rather than taking two from the body, you know? Now, in prosti, which is towards something, huh? He has double and half and what? Yeah. They're all taken from the most obvious examples of, towards something in quantity, right? Now, Apu, right? He has, as in the Luqueo, I guess, which is his school, right? The Lyceum. And the devotion was all modern. Yeah, yeah. The French have, you know, they have a Lycee, they call that a school right now. So, the Lycee is named from Aristotle's school, right? But the academic world is named from whose school? Yeah. So, he didn't take, see the Academy, more famous, you know? When I grew up, you know, we had a movie theater downtown, it's called the Lyceum. So, Aristotle's school has declined. Yeah. That's the school now. Oh, boy. Yeah. More Rad is a book on, you know, how we're influenced by the movies, right? And how we're movie made, you know? It's, it's terrible. Okay. And then, in the Agora, right? Which would be a very public place, right? Huh? He's got a private place and a public place, huh? And then, what? When? What does he have for that? Yeah? And what? Yesterday is a little more clear, right? Last year. Case thy is, has his, what? Sitting, right? Okay. Ekin, to have, needs to translate it in the Latin, in the English dictionaries. Or, logical, I should say. Call that habit, you know? Because Tape would have, right? I suppose. And it's to be, what? Yeah? Got the shoes on, right? Huh? Getting shod today, very shod today, huh? Okay. Diskelster. Yeah. Clothes and so on. Poien, huh? In the Greek, huh? Acting upon, to what? Cut, to burn, I guess, huh? Call that. Hmm? Okay. Well, that's okay, yeah. Aristotle was the son of a doctor, right? A very good doctor, right, huh? Court of Macedon. So he became known to the Court of Macedon, got to be chosen for the teacher of Alexander the Great. I still wrote a book just on Homer for Alexander, yeah. And then he turns around, right, for the undergoing, right? Okay. I usually give an example of kicking and being kicked. Mozart was kicked down the stairs by some nobleman, you know, some dastardly nobleman. Poor man. Somebody had no respect for the Sido Promonti, without what they helped, you know. He says, each of the four Sido, right, itself by itself, is not Sido in any, what, affirmation, right, huh? But by the intertwining of these things, you can get a, what, Karifasis, huh, okay? Yeah, Karifasis, yeah. Sido, right? I actually call these ten things the ten Sido, right? You know, they talk about these names that are Sido of all ten, right? And you know what they call them in the books? They call them the transcendentals. Because they transcend any one of these size janitor, right, huh? Well, I call them the Sidovals. But Aristotle discovered that the Sidovals are Sidoval equivocally by reason, right? By these janitor, so genetically, of what comes. And he says, every, what, Karifasis, right, huh? Seems to be either true or false, right? And says that what is, is, you're being true, right? And what is not, is not, can be true or false or negative, huh? And the opposite would be when you say that what is, is not, or what is, not is, then you're being false, right, huh? But if those things said by no intertwining, they're neither, what, true nor, what, false, huh? As example, man, white, runs, wins, so... It's interesting, right? I was reading the Twelfth Book of Wisdom, a verse, the other day. And he's talking about God's knowledge, right, huh? And he's trying to ascend to God's knowledge, you know, from our understanding of our own understanding, right? He says, the trouble with us is that we have to understand what something is, and we have to put together or separate these things. So there's a certain emotion, right, huh? So God can't have any emotion at all. So when God understands what something is, and primarily understanding what he himself is, right, he understands everything at once. It doesn't have to go, you know, from one to the second, huh? He's kind of pointing that out here, right, huh? Okay? So this is the end of the, what, first of the three parts of the categories, huh? Now in the Latins, they called the categories the predicamenta, right? So they divided it into three parts of the book. These first four chapters, they called them the ante predicamenta, because it's before he takes up them one by one, right? And then the predicamenta, right, the chapters five here, starting with substance first. And he mainly takes up substance and quantity and quality and relation, right? And it says very briefly about the last six. And then he has some things called the post-predicamenta, right? We'll talk about what they are when you get there, right, huh? Okay? So let's stop right now from the text of Aristotle and look at this text of Thomas now, huh? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.