Logic (2016)
Lecture 7: The Ten Categories and Modes of Predication

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Thomas doesn't have a commentary on the categories of Aristotle, and I mentioned where the word category came from. It came from the courtroom, I guess. I accuse you of murder, or I accuse you of embezzlement, or I accuse you of adultery, or I accuse you of theft, or something. But if I'm going to accuse somebody, I've got to say something of you. So my friend Warren Murray refers to these ten categories as the ten supreme accusations. That's really sound interesting, you know. But the words have that concrete, right? And if you read through the Gospels, when they accuse Christ of something, right, you have the word category. It's the Greek word that you have in the Gospels, right? In Latin they'll say, you know, in English you'd say, right? I hate the ten set of us. But you've got to be more explicit than that, huh? When it comes in that word, huh? Now there's two places that I know where Thomas gives the distinction of these ten. And one is in the commentary on the third book of Aristotle's Physics, right? In Three PhysiCorum. The actual tab of the book is Natural Hearing, right? The third book of Natural Hearing. And the reason why he does it in that commentary at that point is that Aristotle in the third book is talking about what motion is, huh? And then he has a consideration of how motion involves acting upon and undergoing, right? So that's the occasion for Thomas to explain, well, those are two categories, acting upon and undergoing, right? And why motion is in the categories of quantity and quality and where, right? So you've got to kind of explain the categories here, right? So that's the reason why it comes up there. We'll look at that text first. And then the other text is from his exposition of the 14 books of, actually the first 12 books, and the last two, of wisdom, right? First philosophy, right? And Aristotle, in Wisdom, he points out that the Wisdom is about being in general, right? Okay? And why does Wisdom talk about being in general? Yeah, what he first shows is that Wisdom is about causes, right? And then that Wisdom is about the first cause. And we looked at that order of the knowledge there, the natural knowledge, right? Kind of see why Wisdom comes at the end, right? Being a knowledge of the first cause. But why should a knowledge of the first cause be also about being in general? Because the first cause is the cause of all in some way, right? So it's natural that the science that is about the cause of all would be about what is said of all, right? And I use a simple example to try to bring out that a little bit. Say, suppose you have a kingdom, right? And the kingdom is run by the king. He moves everybody around, right? But under the king, you have a general, right? Who's responsible for wars and so on, right? Now, does the causality of the general extend to everything? Well, the king's causality extends to everything. Like, ah, say, moi! Okay. So, um, you could say that the general's causality extends to everyone who is a soldier, right? But the king's causality extends to everyone who is a citizen. Now, how are citizen and soldier related? But not every citizen is a soldier, right? So, citizen is said of everybody in the city, right? Soldier only is some, right, huh? Citizen is said of more, right? That's the point, right, huh? So, if wisdom is about the first cause of all things, then it's going to be about what is said of all, right? That's the most universal. But Aristotle, he realized that these names said of all, as well as all the names used in wisdom and in the axioms, too, are equivocal, right? And equivocal by reason. So, there's a whole book, namely the fifth book, devoted to, what, distinguishing the chief senses of these words and bringing out their order, right? So, when Thomas gets to the commentary in that fifth book, right, then he, what, again, talks about the distinction of the ten, right, huh? And it's very similar to the one in the, in the, what do you call it, the one in the physics, right, huh? But if you see the other text in here, it's from the, what, fifth book of wisdom, right? Fifth book of the metaphysics, as they call it, huh? Now, the other main division of being is the division of being into, what, act and ability, yeah, and that's even more universal. But the division here that we're concerned with is a division of being into the highest genre of being, right? But act and ability are found in every genus. It's even more universal division, right? Even God is not confined to any genus, right? You can speak of God as being pure act, right? I mean, some may extend your knowledge there, huh? It's interesting that Aristotle sees those as the two most universal divisions of being as such, right? We can talk about accidental being, too, you know. That's kind of understood through this thing, huh? Like, I'm a Christian geometer, right? But by being a Christian, by being a geometer, are not really one thing, are they? Because Christian is said of me, and geometry is said of me, that you can say that I'm a Christian geometer, right? Or I'm a white geometer, right? Yeah. I'm a geometrical grandfather. Yeah. So on, you know. That's accidental being, right? But being as such, right, huh? Is divided either according to the highest general being or by act and ability, huh? And that shows the importance of logic for wisdom, right? And the importance of natural philosophy for wisdom, huh? Because you meet act and ability, most of all, in natural philosophy, huh? When Aristotle begins his consideration of act and ability in the ninth book of wisdom, huh? It's divided into, what, three parts, huh? And the first part he considers, he distinguishes the ability of reference to motion. It's a whole one of the three parts. You can see how it's tied up with natural philosophy, right? Natural philosophy is about things that move, right? And then in the second part, he talks about act generally, right? Where even form is said to be act, but you see that in natural philosophy, too. And then finally, he talks about their order in the third part, right? So, natural philosophy and logic are very important for what? Wisdom, huh? Okay? There wouldn't be any wisdom distinct from natural philosophy if there were not immaterial substances, and you reasoned them from motion, right? First time I met Monsignor Dian, right? The philosophers who studied Monsignor Dian there in St. Paul there, of course, they're paying his way down to St. Paul. See what's on Monsignor's mind now, you know? So, so, he says to me, you know, Monsignor Dian is talking about how logic is so necessary for wisdom, you know? Isn't natural philosophy more important for wisdom than logic, you know? You wouldn't even know that there are material substances without natural philosophy, right? You wouldn't even know that there are material substances, right? You wouldn't know that there are material substances, right? You wouldn't know that there are material substances, right? You wouldn't know that there are material substances, right? In natural philosophy, you argue that there's a motion and that there's an unmoved mover, right? The unmover is immaterial, right? You argue that the human soul is an operation that's not in matter and so on. Understanding. So this is natural philosophy, preparing the way, right? So on the phone, it gets right, knocks into my head again, right? So I go over to San Diego for the first time being this guy, right? I say, isn't natural philosophy more important than logic, you know, because I knew he was on this thing? And of course, by the way, beyond pointing out the difference in the way to prepare, right? Because he was talking about the fact that, what, logic is like wisdom in being about the immaterial. And therefore, in one way, it's preparing us for wisdom, right? Considering immaterial things in a way natural philosophy does it, huh? Natural philosophy goes from, what, the general to the particular, huh? And it goes towards matter, right? It goes towards matter twice, right? But wisdom goes towards what? The immaterial, right? So in some ways, another way, wisdom, I mean, logic disposes for wisdom in a way that natural philosophy does not, huh? That's why you find the modern natural scientists sometimes, even physicists, right? Who are the most intelligent of them, probably. But I mean, they're so down into matter, right? That they can't, they kind of tend to be atheists or something, you know, or have doubt, or they're polytheists like Einstein was, or something, whatever he was, you know? It doesn't kind of dispose your mind for those things, right? But actually, both of them are very important, right? And just one example of it is in terms of, you know, having a distinct knowledge of being in general, right? There's two main divisions of being as such. Being according to the figures of predication, the highest genera. And you distinguish these by the way they're said of something. You'll see that in here. Or else, act and ability. And it's natural philosophy that's leading you into that. So a lot of times, I put LaValle there, De Connick would teach the natural philosophy all the time, and they don't do some logic, right? There's two guys, yeah, very good man. Okay. So Thomas begins here, in the chapter here, in Lectio 5. Being is divided into the ten predicamenta. None univoce. I'm looking at the Latin here, so. It's not said of the meaning significantly, as a genus is divided into species, huh? What is our definition of genus that we gave before, huh? What's the name said with one meaning, right? Of many things other in kind, rather than species, they'll call those kinds. But said with one meaning, right? Of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, right? Well, since there's only one meaning, it can't say distinctly what each one of these kinds are, but only in general, right? So, Aristotle discovered that being is not said of all things, what? With exactly the same meaning in mind, huh? You can kind of see that, right, huh? If you leave this room, you will what? Cease to be. Sounds like a threat, doesn't it? If you leave this room, you'll cease to be. Your Honor, I say to the judge, I only meant that he would cease to be in the room. Well, no one would understand that for you, Mr. Burkwest, huh? If you said cease to be, you know, that's more serious than being out of the room. So, being is not really said in the same way. You're substance, right, huh? You're being alive, right, huh? And you're being in the room. If you take your clothes off tonight, you will cease to be. Well, you'll cease to be in some diminished sense, right? You'll cease to be clothed, right? But you won't cease to be, you know? So, Aristotle discovered that the common words, right, they're all like the word before. We've talked about the word before, and the word before, right? That they are, what? All equivocal, but equivocal by reason and not by, what? Chance, yeah. Did I speak last time there about the probable argument that lead one to suspect that being is not equivocal by chance, but equivocal by reason? Well, if something is, by chance, would you think it to be always so? Well, but being is said of everything, isn't it? Being means what is. So whatever is in any way whatsoever is a being, right? Isn't that the way a name equivocal is going to be said of everything? Huh? That doesn't make any sense, doesn't it? I had this student coming to my house there on Tuesday night. His name is Richard. Now, see, you've got the same name as my older brother, Richard. Same thing as a manager. I worked in the package store, right? His name is Richard, too. Oh, some reason why you guys all have the name, the same name? Somebody look at the three of you and say, you've all got the same shape, no, so we'll call you all Richard or something. No. I don't think anybody but me has known all three of you. And I said, you didn't call me Richard. We were named Richard before I came to the world, before I existed. So it was by chance that these three guys all have the same name, Richard. You know, don't you expect everybody in the world to be called Richard and everybody to have the name Richard instead of them? It's by chance. Things happen by chance. They happen all the time. They happen rarely, right? Isn't it rare? Is it usually that we all have the same name? We always have the same name? I destroy the very purpose of naming, right? You know, so Aristotle discovered that these names are equivocal, right, by reason. And my other great teacher there, Charles de Connick, said every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason, huh? So Aristotle was distinguishing the senses of these words, right, but also thinking out their, what, order, right? So we saw that a little bit of the text from the categories and the word before, which is in the post predicaments, right? Modern philosophers never do that, you know? They don't understand the words that they use, huh? And Heraclitus says, you know, men don't understand the things they meet every day, right? But some of these words that they meet every day, they don't understand them, right? We're on the street here and nobody's going to be giving you the ordered senses of being or the ordered senses of before or anything like that, right? Yet the most common mistake in thinking is mixing up these words, huh? And even substance there, which is the name of the first highest genus, right? The word substance, not when it's functioning as a genus, but the word itself has many meanings, right? We'll see that in things that you're going to reproduce. So being is divided into ten predicamenta, huh? And we used to always say, you know, how come there's ten of them, right? Aristotle had ten fingers, right? And he couldn't count beyond it or something, you know? He'd probably make a little joke about that, huh? There's an odd text there in the 12th Book of Wisdom there. Aristotle was saying that sometimes the Platonists said the numbers go on forever, right? Always have a greater number, right? Other times the Platonists said the numbers go up to just ten and then you repeat yourself. Thank you. right? You know some truth to repeat yourself, right? But you could have maybe a system of six, you know, they say, you know, some of the Near East people had that, I guess, Babylonians or something like that. Do they have any reason why you go up to ten and then that seems to be it? Apparently the reason is something like this. You start with one and then you get two next, right? Then you get three next, right? And then you get, what, the first square number, four. Now one plus two plus three plus four as well. Yeah, that's it. That's the reason. Why you should go to the first, yeah, I don't know. There was no reason given to that. But someone was asking me at the college there years ago, you know, why is that number ten? I don't know. I think there's reasons. I understand the reason, you know. I've been thinking about, you know, the etymology of substance there, if you stand under, right? And I was thinking of the St. Thomas' prayer there before communion. One of the prayers begins by saying, Adorote, devotee, latens, deitas, que subis, under these, huh? Figuris, severi latitas, huh? That prayer has got, what, how many, it's divided into quatrains, huh? And each quatrain, the first and the second lines rhyme, and the third and the fourth line, so each of the quatrains, huh? How many quatrains are there in that prayer? That's it, yeah. And I said seven, just tell me, seven times four is twenty-eight, which is the second perfect number, right? It helps you remember it, too, doesn't it? Yeah. Okay. Now the second thing he says here, the modes of being are what? Proportional to the modes or ways of being set up, huh? Predikandi, huh? Now, I think I mentioned this other text of Thomas there, where he's talking about Aristotle, sometimes in wisdom he will lead you from one of the lower sciences, right? He takes you by the hand and leads you up, you know, to wisdom. And in wisdom you sometimes lead somebody by the hand from logic, right? And sometimes you leave them by the hand from natural philosophy, huh? But with the brevity of wisdom, huh? That Shakespeare talks about, huh? Thomas says, uh, the way of, um, natural philosophy is by way of motion. And the way of logic is by way of predication. So nature is defined by motion, huh? It's the beginning and cause of motion and of rest, huh? So on. And the way we know things, their natures, is through their motions, right? Come to know that. And, uh, we're talking about act and ability, right? Moshe is going to be defined by act and ability. And as my friend Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, right? And motion is kind of fundamental for us, huh? But one thing is said of another only in mind, in reason, right? And so, um, when I was at Laval there, we were in logic in the beginning there, we were studying two books of, uh, the great Albert the great, right? One was called the predicability books, right? About the, uh, predicables, genus, difference, species, property, and accident, as you say, Latin. And, uh, then the book of the categories, which was called the Latin de predicamentis, right? So really, when you study those two books, you're being much, very much aware of the fact that, what, the way one thing is said of another is the way that logic proceeds, right? And when I study the syllogism, as you teach the syllogism, you know, the syllogism is based on the said of all and the said of none. If A is said of all, B, it's said of whatever B is said of. If A is said of no, B, it's denied of any of B is said of. So that's the fundamental thing, right? So he's going to logic right here. In some sense, to get the predicamentis, the modes of being said of, right? But, no, it's even the, one of the first things we do in logic is to point out that a name can be said of many things. You know, my, my teacher, Albert the Great, said the first thing to be considered in logic is what? The universal. Yeah. Yeah. Now, the great Boethia said, A thing is singular when sensed, universal and understood. That makes sense, you know, the universal would be the first thing. I try to be even more sensible and say the first thing to be considered in logic is name, which is something sensible, right? Said of many, right? And one of the first distinctions we see is that sometimes a name is said of many with different meanings in mind, and sometimes it's said of many with the same meaning in mind, right? And if it's said with many meanings in mind, sometimes there's no connection among them, like my three Richards here, I guess. And sometimes it's said with, what, connection among the meanings, huh? Okay. Of course, Thomas says sometimes, sometimes the name is said many things with exactly the same meaning in mind instead of each of them. And sometimes it's said of many things with entirely different meanings instead of each. And sometimes it's in the middle. And said of many things with things that are not entirely the same, but not entirely different either, right? He divides it into three, right? Okay. Because that's very fundamental for logic, right? And so when I was studying, you know, the great work of Porphyry, the Isagoge, which is more or less, you know, gathering things from Aristotle and trying to put them together, but I said to Monsignor Dian, you know, shouldn't Porphyry have said, you know, these things are being said genetically? He didn't say that, you know? And Dian said, yeah, he agreed that Porphyry should have done that. So he saw it, correct him. Porphyry, right? But, I mean, that's, you know, fundamental to logic, right? In the way something is said of something, huh? Something is said of something only in the mind or reason, huh? So he says, the ways of being are proportional to the ways of being said of, huh? What does the word proportional mean, right? What is a proportion? Well, now you're getting up the confusion of Thomas, right? I had to go back to Euclid, right, huh? So a proportion means a likeness of ratio, huh? So 4 is to 6 as 2 is to? Yeah. Or 2 is to 3 as 8 is to? Yeah, okay. 2 is to 3 as 200 is to? Yeah. 2 is to 3 as 2 trillion is to? You're talking about the dead, aren't you? They're going further and further away, right, huh? See? But you can see. there's a likeness there right now and the fact that you can supply the fourth item is a sign that you see the what like this now we carried over this idea of proportion to non-mathematical things right we say seeing is to the eye is hearing is to the yeah the fact you can supply the fourth term is a sign that you see the likeness of ratios so two to three is a ratio but four to six as two to three is a what a proportion yeah a likeness of ratios huh this is very important well there's a proportion saying between the way you know things are said or something and the way they what are right now okay how do we know that well you'll see it as you go go through this right now okay so we're going to see how the ways of being are proportional to the ways of being said of them and it gives a little explanation up there in the next sentence for when we say this of this other thing we say this to be that now there's some connection there between um being and being set up whence also the ten genera of being are said to be the ten what predicamenta right he's going to follow the rule of two or three right now in three ways takes place all predication all being said up because you take the lack of word in predication right but being said up right you have to probably say you want to speak english right now at this point you know going back to the text of aristotle he had this distinction in one of the anti-predicaments right of universal substance and singular substance and universal accident and singular accident right and one reason why that is presupposed to the distinction of the ten right is that the ten are distinguished by the way something is said of what individual substances right so you have to distinguish individual substance from universal substance and from all the accidents right and it's because everything else is said of individual substances or exists in them right so that can be said denomitively at least of it right everything else is said in some way right of individual substances like you and me or habiba what's your name or his name yeah yeah okay or champion huh did you ever meet champion you ever met champion oh my goodness a little boy there my mother took me down to see geneathrius bringing his show to to the auditorium downtown saint paul and uh i was crazy about geneathrius at the time you know and so on and uh he brought his prized horse champion right and uh i remember you know at the end there he he brought a champion and he put this he's on top of the top of the champion champion side stepping all around the whole thing you know wouldn't make a difference of course beautiful looking horse you know but a very intelligent horse right yeah champion okay a champion is example it gives a horse to buzz right horse right okay it's an example of the substance right man and then champion that's the second example right you should have seen champion one of the most beautiful horse i've ever seen in my life and the most intelligent horse i've ever seen in my life you know so everything exists in things like you or me or champion or tabitha or my daughter's cat and so on that are individual substances right so you have to make that distinction that her style brings out and then uh you can see the basis right of how they're going to be distinguished huh right away something is said individual substances so thomas with his brevity of wisdom here right in three ways all predication comes about meaning he doesn't mean everything can be every distinction about predication no but um every uh what predication about of individual substances everything that can be said of individual substances right can be distinguished into what three and notice a lot of times you know they'll divide the categories into two substance and the nine general accidents right but thomas is going to divide them into three right well you know when i state the rule of two or three i sometimes say two or three and sometimes i say two or three or what both right but when we come to talk about statement right sometimes aristotle divide statement into noun and verb right fundamental parts of statement man thinks man walks man runs okay the noun signifies without time but the verb with time right that's a distinction into two right but sometimes we divide the names we divide the statement into three the subject the predicate and then what they call the copula the is or the is not right okay so you say man is an animal man is not a stone right okay but seems to make sense to say the subject is man the predicate is animal and then the copula is is right now so you can divide the statement into two or three or actually both okay aristotle divides the plot into how many parts yeah he divides it first you know praising the great omer he taught all the greeks how to make a good plot it's got to be but i have a beginning a middle and an end but then later on in the book on the poetic art he says that the plot involves tying knots and then untying it the family can be divided into parents and the kids or father mother and the kids the priest is kind of fudging the thing about the man you know the wife's supposed to obey the husband right now and uh it's saying this thing paul is saying this because that's that was the custom at the time right you know but now we're democratic well i was thinking you know the old rule the rule of prayer is the rule of faith so in my in creating of intelligences right now with the prayers that are selected by the church for special mention there is a litany of saint joseph right one of the six litanies and he's called of all things the head of the holy family he had quite unusual son and most unusual wife and you might say that mary is is even more elevated she's the queen of heaven and earth and christ i mean without saying right but despite that he's still called the head of the family you know and the the rule of prayer is the rule of faith right the reason to say that then we go back and check to make sure that he does say they have the family i kind of remember that and i said yeah it's there i had a family someday i might do you know yeah someday you know i passed some some trump signs on the way to church and i passed a couple you know hillary signs and so on then they should stop and find Hilary's signs and say, bring the doorbell and say, why are you advertising your stupidity? I said to Rose, I said, how's that hurt for a first line? Start a nice, calm conversation. We'll hear about it in the newspaper. Man's shop's head on one doorstep. Why would you want to advertise your stupidity? I don't know. I am stupid. So as I say, sometimes they divide them into two, right? Substance and accident, right? And in a sense, before when he gave the distinction of universal substance, right, and singular substance, universal accident, singular thing, he's crisscrossing two divisions, right? But one of them is division into substance and what? Accident, yeah. But Thomas is dividing into three, right? Now, sometimes when you speak of a name said of many things, equivocally or univocally, it's a division into two, right? Said with one meaning or many meanings, right? That's it. And then you can subdivide, right? Said with many meanings, right? Into equivocal by chance and equivocal by reason. But in the other example, sometimes Thomas divides that into three right away, you know? Entirely the same, entirely different, and then partly the same and partly different, right? You know? And both make what? Makes sense, right? Okay. Nerstau divides plot, right? The soul of tragedy, right? It's the plot. He divides it both into three and into two, right? So that's why I give us a rule of two. We should divide into two or three or both. Sometimes we can do that, huh? You divide the Our Father, the petitions of the Our Father, rather into those about the good and those about the bad. That makes sense, doesn't it? Or that about the end, that about the means, and that's the impediments to the end. Makes sense, right? You know, we, our mind is, what, in the beginning ignorant and then confused, and then if it gets far along enough, it gets some distinction, right? And we might need more than one distinction to make any much progress, huh? So, expanding the words of Thomas then, in three ways all predication comes about, huh? All predication of what? Something, things said of individual substance, right, huh? In one way, when of some subject, meaning individual substance, is said that which pertains to its essence or nature, right, as when they say Socrates is a man, right? Or more generally, that man is a, what? Animal, right? A champion is a horse. A horse is an animal. Or Tabitha is a cat. We had a review of a book about cats there in the National Review, just the last issue there, and they said that there's 100 million domestic cats now. Is that in this country? Yeah, in this country, is that many? Just in this country? Yeah. I don't know, it can't be that high, can't it? It seems strange to me. Some people at 35 and they're a small apartment. Yeah. Yeah. That's it. Then a cat is, you know, more prominence than the horse, that Aristótus is an example, right? My wife and I always joke about when Ria was a little girl there and Tabitha was giving birth to her kittens, right? And tears were coming down her eyes and so on. And now she's got 10 children, right? A good woman interested in those things, obviously. And according to this has taken the predicament, the set of substance, right? In another way, something is said of something. When it is said of something, not that which is of its essence, right? Its nature, what it is. But nevertheless, what? Yeah. Inhere is in it, right? Exists in it, right? But now this one is going to subdivide, right? Just have one, huh? Which either is on the side of the matter of the subject, huh? And according to this is the predicament of what? Quantity, right? There are times using the abstract word quantity, right? For quantity properly follows upon what? Matter, right? Whence also Plato laid down magnum, right? On the part of matter, right? Or it follows upon form, and thus it is the predicament of what? Quality, right? Whence also qualities, some of them, are founded upon what? Quantity, right? As color is in the surface of the body, you know, in figures, in lines, and in surfaces. Or it has itself with respect to another. And thus it is the predicament of what? Relation, huh? Look at Thomas, she's in these abstract words, huh? Falling, you know, departing from the concreteness of Aristotle, right? In the way he comes. And he was, that God, in his exposition of Apu there in the Gospel of St. John, right? He had a Sunday. She said, Thomas, if you're going to be a philosopher, you've got to learn some Greek. Because he knows some of the Greek, but I don't know. For when I say that man is a father, there is not said of man something absolute, but a respect which is in him towards another, right? Okay. Well, it would be by very nature, you see. You know? Your coin doesn't belong to your very nature? Well, it follows upon my nature, right? Just like my qualities follow upon my nature. But it's not my very nature itself. No, but can you have two without half or four? We're here for the, I said, go get me, what? Oh, well, that explains it, see. Can you have two without half or four? You see, half of four is not really two. It's something that follows upon two, right? The nature of two, and every two, right, and always, right? But it's something that follows upon it towards another, right? So, half of four, or a third of six, right, follows upon that, right? So, a property is not the nature of a thing, but it's something that follows upon the nature as opposed to, yeah. So, your quantity is a property. Yeah, yeah. So, it's essential and essential. Yeah, the distinction in the Isogogae between property and accident, right? I told how Father Dulac, the teacher of logic that I had in college, he'd gone to Laval, too. Father Dulac said, you know, after teaching logic a number of years, he had despaired, right, of the students ever getting to see the difference between accident as one of the five predicables and accident as opposed to substance, right? And it shows you how much trouble, you know, a word that's equivocal, right, even equivocal by reason, gives people, right? I mean, the poor man had despaired. I mean, he's good natured about it, you know, but he was kind of almost a joke with him, you know, but it was experience, you know? What is the famous joke of Samuel Johnson, you know, where this guy had made not too good a marriage or something, I don't know if the wife died or what, but then he got married again, right? And it says it was a triumph of experience, I mean, of hope over experience. Yeah. It's very Basel so attached to Johnson in trying to save his words, right? And that's what the man's experience, right? It led him to despair, and we've never seen the difference. But the difference between property and accident, as the exagoga, right, and accident as you have it in the categories, an accident in the sense of the categories could be a property, right, in the sense of exagoga, because both property and accident are outside the nature of the thing, something added to nature, but one follows upon the nature in some way, right? And the accident in the exagoga is something like green instead of triangle, right? It doesn't follow upon it, okay? So a property is essential in a certain sense of essential? Yeah, Porphy says a property is what belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? And he's kind of defining property in a very strict sense, right? So half of four belongs only to two, to every two whatsoever and always, right? But now, to be a logician could be said to be a property of man, because it belongs only to man, right? No dog or cat or horse is a logician, at least to my knowledge. But not every man is a logician, right? So it's not as strict a property, but it still has a connection with the nature, right? That's why only man, you know, can be a logician or a geometer or something of that sort. But say less than ten, right, could be a property of two, but not in the strict sense, because other things besides two there are less than ten. This is another way that name becomes equivocal by reason, right? By dropping out part of its meaning, right? So if you drop out part of the meaning of Porphyry's definition there of property, you have a equivocal use of the word property, but not a purely equivocal connection. It's still the nature, right? So, you'll state this a little bit differently in the metaphysics, but you get the same thing basically. So you have three, the second, the third, and the fourth highest genes, right, are here in the second part of this three-fold division, right? Well, that's again a division. Sometimes you divide them into three, but sometimes you divide the first two, right? It's absolute, right? And then it gets relative, right? Because how much really is double, right? We'll always give examples too, and he says, I'm going to give you half of the money in my, half of my money. How much money do you have? It doesn't mean much, you know, half of the money. I might have just, you know, two pennies in my pocket, you know, that's all I got in my pocket. You're getting half of it, you know? But how much is it, you know? It's not something absolute, right? And is two one, or is it three, or is it five? It can be anything, right? You know? It's not something absolute, right? It can only be half towards something, right? Three is half of six, right? It's a third of nine, you know? Okay. How can it be half and a third? To be half and a third is not the same thing, is it? But how can three be half and a third? Well, if it's something absolute, then you'd have a problem, right? But it can be a half and a third, right? But towards other things, right? Am I a father or a son? I'm both, but not towards the same man, right? I couldn't be a father and a son towards the same man, could I? Am I taller or shorter? Well, some basketball pair are probably taller than me, right? You know? But I could be taller and shorter, but towards different men, right? Okay. Now it comes to the third way of being said of, right? And the third way of being said of is when something extrinsic, right? Something outside of you, right? Is said of you by way of some, what? Denomination, right? Aristotle talked about that way of naming, right? In the first chapter there of the anti-predicaments. Thus also, what? Accidents, extrinsactions are said of the substance. Now it goes back and shows that we often speak denominatively of things that exist in the man, right? For we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is what? White. Okay? That's why it's important to use that concrete way of speaking, right? Okay? I've learned some geometry, so am I geometry? You wouldn't say that man is geometry, would you? Except figuratively, you'd say that Euclid is geometry, you know? Mozart is music, you know? Well, that's kind of a figure of speech, right? Sturkey speaking, Mozart is a musician, right? He's named denominatively for music, right? And the great Euclid is derived, named denominatively, right? From what? Geometry. Okay? Now, to be denominated from something outside of you, right? Extrinsic, is found in one way commonly in all things, at least in the material world, right? And in one way, especially in those things which pertain to man alone, right? And this category of what? Teher, right? Abitus, seems to be man's category, right? So my teacher did kind of give a lecture on that, right? A public lecture, right? Okay? Okay? But notice how we change our clothing, right, huh? So, you know, we're getting married, you're going to dress in one way, right, huh? We're going to play a game, right? To get dressed another way, right? We're going to go swimming the other way, right? Okay? And for serious occasions, you know, and so on, and merry occasions, and so on, you might dress differently, right, huh? All these things, right? If you're a soldier, you might dress differently, right, huh? Even my son there, you know, he's a lieutenant colonel now, but he wears one kind of clothing one time, and he's going to go to a, he's going to speak, you know, he's going to buy this fancy stuff, you know? They want him to speak at the Trivium banquet, you know, and, you know, about his experience at Trivium school, right? So they asked him to do that, so. He comes all, he's thrown off. So one guy said, I thought I was the best dressed man, he said, I'm telling you, the sun came out, and he got his fancy stuff, you know, you know. Now, Thomas is a very smart guy, huh? Commonly, he says, right, in a way it's not just private to man, right? Something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic, either according to the ratio of a cause, huh, or according to the ratio of a measure. For something is said to be caused and measured by something, what, outside, huh? Now, Thomas is going to go into the four kinds of causes, right, to see what causes are pretty tied up with, huh? And it's tied up with the extrinsic cause, of course, but with the mover, right, huh? So I can kick you, right? I'm kicking you, and you are being kicked, right, huh? That's something being said of you, but there's something outside of you, right? I'm kicking somebody other than myself, right? Or if I kick myself, it's one part of me kicking another part of myself. I kick myself, you know, say that, okay? And you're being kicked by something outside of you, right? And this is a thing he's got to explain by acting upon and undergoing. It's nothing to do with motion, right, huh, in this context, huh? Now, how, by reason of a cause, well, now he goes on. So, let's go. Let's go. Let's go.