Logic (2016)
Lecture 11: Substance, Equivocation, and the Division of Categories

Transcript
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This word, you know, substance, or the word to understand, right, is kind of a carryover, right? Isn't there a passage, is it in St. Paul, where the church is called the pillar of truth? Is it called that? Yeah. It isn't quoted in the Vatican. But anyway, that's kind of, you know, a pillar, right? It's something to understand, yeah. Or St. Paul defines faith as the substance of things hoped for. It stands on there. But you can see the connection between carrying the word undergoing up to the mind, right, and understanding, right? Now, we can go and look at the, now if you know the ten categories a little bit, right? Now we can go and Aristotle takes them up one by one, right? But mainly just the great ones, right? Substance and how much or quantity or how or quality and towards something, right? Is very briefly with the last six, right, huh? So you have the thing on substance now, in particular. We don't have too much time, but we'll get a little bit into it. So the fifth chapter has two parts, huh? The first part is about the distinction and order. It's in order, isn't it, there? You have to see a distinction before you can see the order, right? The distinction and order of first and, what, second substance, right? Notice he's going to call them first and second substance here and not individual substance or particular substance and universal substance, like he did in the anti-predicaments, right? But you see a connection there between order and first and second. Yeah, well, he chooses that way of speaking right here, right? And the second part is about the properties of substance, and we'll see what these properties are, huh, okay? Now, later on in here, there's an outline there of the, you know, page five, I guess. I think even later on, later on, it's even more like a division there. On page nine, okay. Yeah, the one part was kind of laid out like this, though, in a kind of very explicit way, like this. Yeah, yeah, okay, okay. Okay, distinction of first and second substance or what is contained in the genus of, what, substance. And there's the distinction between the first and second substance, right, what each is, and then the order of first and second substances, right? Kind of funny Greek there, huh? Ton, huh? Omega. Ton and anton, huh? Okay. And then among second substances, the species is more substance than genus, right? And then you have the properties down there, you'll see how they're broken up, right? So bear that in mind, huh? Now, one thing I'll notice when you compare this chapter on substance with the chapters on quantity and quality, he does divide quantity, the genus, into its, what, species, right? Discrete and continuous quantity. And then he subdivides, you know, the discrete quantity into its species, right? And continuous quantity. And he does something like that with quality, right? He divides into different species and so on. He doesn't do that here with the substance, right, huh? He divides it into first and second substance, which is not a division, into what? Species, right? Well, you might ask the question, why doesn't he divide substance into species, like he divides quantity, let's say, into species? He can still do it into the forfeiture of substance if he wants. You see, in wisdom or first philosophy, he will divide substance into material and immaterial substance, right? But it's very hard to know that there are immaterial substances by reason alone, right? Is it division or predicating substance of those two things unificantly? As far as logic is concerned, you are, yeah. Because they're both a thing that exists, not in another is in a subject, right? Okay. But if you go back to the foundation of genus and difference in things, we tend to say that the genus is taken from matter, right, huh? And the difference from form, well, there's no matter in the immaterial substances. So if they don't have the same matter, you know, they're not the same, what, genus, it seems, right? And, of course, Aristotle also thought that they have any bodies, huh? Sun, the moon, and the stars, right, were some different kind of matter than things down here, right? It is kind of amazing that the sun doesn't burn out, you know? I mean, it is burning out slowly, but as far as we can see, it's always the same, right, huh? And so they put the sun and the moon and the stars in the Psalms, praising God with the angels, right, huh? Because of their long living, you know? But they're not maybe, like Aristotle thought, that they don't change at all, right? Thomas, in the book on the universe, says, you know, that maybe it takes longer than the lives of many men, right, to see any change in the stars, right? So Aristotle's argument that they are unchanging is not, except for change in place, right, is not a necessary argument, right, huh? But it's kind of unusual, right, that the sun can go on so much, right? They say that Heisenberg's pupil, Heitzhakar, had a lot to say about why the sun can go on so long, right? But, you know, Herrick, Anne Shakespeare said the sun is a hot stone, right, a stone on fire. Well, if it was a hot stone or a stone on fire, it wouldn't last as long as it's left, you know? But in other words, to distinguish between material and immaterial substance is something that only the wise man could really do, right, huh? And it seems inappropriate in logic to get into such a subtle thing, right? Yeah, he could go that, but then that would be more, you know, what natural philosophy does, right? You know, but with quantity, he's going to give it right away into discreet and continuous, right? And we'll see how he does that. So I talk about that difference there, right, in the way he proceeds, huh? This would not be clear to a beginner, right? The same guy wrote it with the letter that he asked me, you know, You know, why does Aristotle say, you know, the first philosopher has identified substance with body, right, huh? I said, well, reason doesn't, reason has difficulty separating things that are never separated in its experience. And so, you can see that even in the natural road of our knowledge where reason doesn't separate the universal from the singular until it has an experience of many, what, singulars that are alike in what they are, it seems, right? But if you saw only one dog, you wouldn't maybe separate dog from this dog, right? But if you see many dogs, you know, then you find the dog is found without this individual dog, and it's found out this individual dog, you can more easily separate what they have in common, right? Well, it's not until you really know there are reasons to say that they're immaterial substances, right, that you tend to separate substance from body, right, huh? You kind of confuse the two, right? You see? So our mind is kind of stuck there. That's true, though, right, huh? Miranda sees the young man, right? She thinks so. They're all like this, oh, brave in the world. That's what the word, oh, brave in the world. There's such creatures in it. CrossFit says, it's new to you, he says. So what kind of distinction is this between first and second substance that he gives there? It's a little explanation here from Thomas, huh? Thomas explains that the division or distinction of substance into first and second is not a division of a genus into its species, but a division of a genus by diverse ways of being in that, right? So this is what Thomas says. When substance is divided into first and second, this is not a division of a genus into species, huh? Since nothing is contained under second substance that is not in first, but it's a division of a genus according to diverse ways of what? a being. So it's kind of like a division of what? The meanings of the word substance, right? Okay? For a second, substance signifies the nature of a genus by itself, absolutely. But first, substance signifies it as individually, right, subsisting. Whence it is magi, see, divisio analogi, right? Of a, that's the word they use sometimes for equivocal by reason, right? Now notice, that's another example of equivocal by reason, though, right? Because sometimes Aristotle will use the word equivocal to mean equivocal by chance. And then, and then they'll give a new name to equivocal by reason, because that's something noteworthy, right? And what equivocal means is you have many meanings, right? If that's all you have is many meanings, with no connection among the meanings, right? That's all you have, right? So we'll call that equivocal. But if there's an order among the meanings, oh my goodness, this is noteworthy, right? And so we'll give a new name. I'm a little bit weary, I mean leery of the word analogous, because that means proportional, right? And it's like taking one of the kinds, one of the ways that a name becomes equivocal by reason, right? And giving it for all of them. So the word equivocal now becomes, what? Equivocal. Yeah, yeah, yes, yeah. Okay. Now he gets into a subtle thing here later on, but Aristotle's going to be, Thomas is going to rather be dividing the senses of substance that you have in the categories, right? And first substance and second substance will be two meanings of substance, right? But then in the beginning of the book, Aristotle used the word substance for what a thing is. Now you didn't see that maybe in your text there, but the Greek, when he's talking about equivocal and univocal and so on, right? He says, homonuma legatai, right? The equivocals are said, hononuma monan koinan. The name alone is common, right? The hodekatatunuma logos teisusias. The logos teisusias is what? Yeah, the thought or definition of what it is is not the same, right? Okay. Well, there usia means what? What a thing is, right? That's one of the meanings of usia, right? And that sense of substance, what a thing is, could be what? Found in any genus, right? What is courage? Well, it's a habit. It's a good habit. It's a virtue, right? So you can start to define this, right? Say what it is, right? When we speak of understanding, what's the first act of understanding? Yeah. But Thomas in the premium, the logic theory speaks of it, like Aristotle in the third book on the soul, understanding what something is. And the second act is composing or dividing, whereby you understand the true or the false, right? But the first act is understanding what something is. And I think I kind of know what a square is. And I suppose, you know, it's not pride that you think you understand what a square is. But a circle is, right? What a quadrilateral is. And, but notice, if one meaning of what a thing is, is substance, right? You see the connection, etymologically, between substance and understanding, right? It is similar, right? So it's appropriate that understanding, you know, there's a connection between what a thing is, yeah. And this is the first thing that Aristotle gives in the first anti-predicament, huh? He says these words are, the thing is being said equivocally when there's one word, but the logos, right? The thought or the definition is tesousias, that's the genitive, right? The definition of what it is, right, is not the same, right, huh? Okay? But he says tesousias, huh? Tesous is the article, but usias, right? The genitive of usia, or a substance, right, huh? So it's kind of, it's a different sentence, right? It's terrible, this, this, uh, hash of words equivocal by reason, right? That's what I said, I'm going to propose as a, as a italical question. When it is necessary to understand words equivocal by reason? Well, you can't really understand fully even the axioms, right? You can't even get through the category of substance without putting it into all these meanings, right? I remember the college of St. Thomas there, you know, the, the, uh, big shot in the politics department, political science department, I should say, you know, so, well, Thomas has so many meanings for the words he uses, he can't believe what he means. He had given up, right, you know? But the point is, you know, the words we use every day, like, whole and part, have many meanings, right? And not by chance, right? There's an order among these meanings. And, uh, I told you, in my example, I, you know, used to try to show kids in metaphysics that, uh, you have to understand, you know, the different senses, right? In order, and, uh, and I, I see them with the argument that I, I give them to you many times, I think, uh, I'd say, uh, my mother didn't like him when I called man an animal. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has a reason. That's a better Dwayne, she said. She never had to call him, but it didn't seem nice to say man's an animal, you know? And so I said, so therefore an animal is only part of what man is. Everybody agreed, right? But animal includes, besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant. So sometimes it's only a part includes more than the whole. Yeah, yeah. So they're all deceived. This is kind of the most famous example, the most common example of a, uh, accident, a statement known to itself by all. The whole was more than one of the parts, right? One of the axioms that you could give, right? And now it seems that, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh but not put together from them. The composed hole is put together from its parts, but not set of them, right? So the legs of the chair are not four chairs down there. But it's a part of it, right? A composed hole. So a definition, right, of man as an animal that has reason, that's a definition. And what kind of a hole is that? It's composed of the genus and difference, right? So a composed hole is always more than one of the parts composing it. And a universal hole is always set of more than one of its parts, right? There's a difference there, right? But there's a, what, likeness of ratios, right? So the composed hole is just parts that look like the universal hole as to its subject parts, they call them, right? The parts it's set of, right? So if you can't distinguish those, you can be deceived by Berquist the Sophist or someone else who's not going to lead you out of it, right? So I said to Warren Murray, you know, I can't think of a modern philosopher I read who really says, this was a critical by reason and this is the distinction of the senses and this is the order of the, you know? They just go along and run. Publish more books without telling anything. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But that was a good point this author was making, you know, about the distinction of the senses of opposites, right? Contradiction and contraries and having and lack and your relatives and so on. Marx doesn't do that, right? This is the key to his whole thinking, right? Analytical materialism. Everything develops by the opposites, you know? You think the man would stop and think and distinguish and see the distinction order of the senses of it. It's one of the things that's very important to me, you know, the force. But Aristotle, in the post-predigments, he'll give those, distinguish the senses of opposites, right? Yeah. Now some people want to, you know, see if they could avoid words having more than one meaning, right? Do we need words equivocal by reason? Yeah, yeah. It was a connection. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Start that, yeah. But if they did, you'd give it a different name of equivocation. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Our mind kind of... We might have other problems. We might have that problem. Our mind kind of, you know, naturally, you know, extends the words like this, right? Part of the thing is, you can see that, that, let's say, with words equivocal by likeness or ratios, that one sense is more known to us, right? And, like, we're seeing an orderly way, making a discourse, right, through the meanings of it, you come to know what you didn't know or didn't know so well from things that are more known, right? And you need the mind, you know, to see the likeness of the later senses to the first sense. And what does Hank Seager say? Things seen are a glimpse of what is not seen. There's a likeness, right, to it, huh? I say God is pure act I have in mind, right? Act and ability that I first saw in creatures, right, huh? Making me a glimpse of what God is, right? God is act with no, what, ability to be actualized or that has been actualized, huh? The interesting, I won't say creature because you're not a creature. So we'll be going through these things on substance here next time, right? Yeah. It's going to break into it, huh? It's going to break into it, huh? It's going to break into it, huh? It's going to break into it, huh? It's going to break into it, huh? It's going to break into it, huh? Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us God to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order them in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. So where would you put your guardian angel, by the way? Interesting that we say, where would you put, where, where? Because you're putting it in some, what, genus, right? And the first meaning of in, as Aristotle teaches us in the fourth book of natural hearing, is place, right? So when Thomas orders the eight senses of in, right, he does so following Aristotle, right, starting off with in place, and then what's most like that, and closest to it, part in whole, and genus in, what, species, and then moving to universal whole species in the genus, right? It's interesting how that later on in the post-predicaments you'll have the equivocal word by reason, have, right, huh? And Aristotle in the fifth book of wisdom, he says, talking about the equivocal words by reason, that the meanings of the word have, or correspond to the meanings of the word in. So this room has, what, some furniture in it, right? There it has an in, right, huh? The parts are in the whole, right? But the whole has parts, right? And you get the odd thing about the genus and the species, because you can say both are in the other, right? But in a different way, right? And therefore you can say that a species has a genus, and genus has species, right? Because there's both a sense of in where the species is in the genus, and one where the genus is in the species. The genus in the species is given first, right? Because that's actual, right? It's actually in there. But the species in the genus, in ability, and then you get the sense of form in matter, right, huh? But you can say the wood has a shape here, right? It has a form, right? And so, or else I can say, you know, put them together in one sense, the next sense there, I have you in my power. I have you in my power. Yeah. And you get the sense then of the, the whole is in the parts, right? You know, I always tell that, I always tell that joke, you know, about you showing the guy at the university, right? And you show him this building, this building, this building, and now he wants the university. Oh, I showed it to you. What do you mean? Well, it's in all these buildings, right? You know? So, in some sense, the whole is in the parts, like form is in matter, right? Because the whole is to parts, like form to matter. Matter is defined as that from which something comes to be and is in it. Well, the whole is from the parts and they're in it. So, it's similar, right? So, to have it. So, in the anti-pregnant, though, we had the distinction of those four, remember? This distinction that was involved in that, the distinction between singular, substance, universal. You had universal and singular, actually two, right, in that division, right? But now, what does he speak of here? What's the distinction he makes of two substances here? Yeah, that's a Latin word, primary, you know. Speak English. First and second. First and second. Yeah. First substance and second substance, we call this in there, right? Now, is this distinction and this distinction, they're named a little bit differently, right? Are they, would they correspond together? One to each other? Yeah. Isn't singular substance the same as first substance? And universal substance, he says that the species are genus, in which these are. So, species and genus are a set of the first substance. So, they correspond, right? But now, do you see an order, right? That this distinction here, came first in the anti-pregnantness, and this distinction came second in the, what, chapter on substance, right? Do you see something significant there? Well, they correspond to the thing. Well, I'm giving them the evidence to say order, right? But the singular and universal say anything about order. Yeah. And you can, well, actually, you mentioned this last, right? But you gave the reason for that, right? Remember how there's, what, two things, affirmed and denied, right? And he gives those ones where one is affirmed and one is denied, and then another thing is denied and the other is affirmed, right? And then the ones we have, both are affirmed, right? And then last of all, both are negated, right? Okay? So, universal substance is said of another, that's not the sort of thing that exists in another, right? Individual, the individual substance is, what, neither existing in another nor said of another, right? But notice, he distinguishes between these two things, right? And here you're making kind of the same distinction, right? But what do the words first and second even go so far as to say that, that among second substances, the species is more substance than the genus, because it's closer to the first substance. So I say, you're a man, I'm closer to you than if I say you're an animal, right? So man is more substance than animal, if you are most of all substance, right? Okay? Yeah. But notice this here, huh? Here you have what we learned from Shakespeare, from Thomas, right? Reason looks before and after, but always, you have to see before you can see before and after. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So here you see a distinction between these two, right? Just as you do here, but here you see the order, right? It's interesting that you should give this in the anti-predicaments, right? And this in the, what? Predicaments. I mentioned how the bulk of the categories should divide into three parts, huh? You used the last word, anti-predicaments, huh? Before the categories, before the predicaments. There's a number of distinctions there, and so, right? About the order things, and so. And then you're going to pick out the categories one by one, right? But mainly the first four, right? Which are the big ones. And then you're going to have the post-predicaments, right? It's kind of struck me that the fact that this is, in a sense, the distinction between the same two things, right? But here you have an advance and a distinction to, what? The order, right? That's what I was thinking. Would it be to say that that's going from the general to the particular, or is that from the... Well, it must seem a distinction between the two, right? Here you see the distinction again, but now you see something that comes afterwards, seeing the order. You have to see a distinction before you can see an order, right? That's kind of strange. I don't want to say that that's the whole reason for it. But it's kind of interesting. He gives this first, right? He makes you very much aware of this distinction, of these two, right? Before he tries to introduce you to the fact that there is an order, right? And this is the first substance. And then I have a text there from Thomas where he says that in wisdom, only this is called substance, right? Because that, that just, you know, you've got no such things running around unless you're thinking this, right? You think that there is man himself out there, right? And dog himself, and cat himself, right? And the so-called forms, or ideas as they say from the Greek word for form, ados, right? So this is very much more substance than this, right? So much so that in real philosophy, as opposed to what's in the body, right, huh? But notice, huh? Is it purely equivocal that you call both of these substance? See, if you admit that I, of William Berkowitz, am a substance, or that you're in regard to the age as a substance, right? Well, if a man is said to me is regards to what I am, you're close to being a substance, isn't it? I am a substance, but what am I? A second substance is said to me in regard to what I am. Well, you could call it substance, but in a secondary sense, wouldn't you say, right? This first substance, or singular substance, underlies everything else, right? It stands under, right? Of course, there are many things called substance, right? That's kind of interesting. But notice, didn't we think last time that other texts from Thomas there were pointed out how the word substance seems to be used in about, what, four ways, right? In the treatise on the categories, what are those four senses? And I said, of course, there's some understanding names. Equivocal Bergism? Well, maybe, you know, you don't have the Greek there, you know? Maybe that's, you know, translators or traders, right? They say, there's some kind of way of saying it in Italian, I guess, where it's very close to words, right? The word for translator and trader, you know, huh? And I usually paraphrase, you know, Plato saying, you know, until philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers, you'll have bad, you know, government. I say, until philosophers are translators or translators are philosophers, right? You will have, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. In the beginning of Aristotle was talking about how a name, right, can be said of many things, right? With the same logos, the same thought or definition, logos. Taste, you see us, which is the genitive. The logos of the, what, substance, right? The logos, or definition of what it is, is sometimes the same, right? And sometimes it's, what, not the same, right? And then you have an equivocal word, right? So what does substance mean there? You say the logos, right? Taste, you see us, right? And see is the Greek word for substance, right? If we translate it, it doesn't have the etymology of substance, right? Epistasis says that, right? But, that's one meaning of the word substance in the treatise, right? What a thing is, right? And these are two other, what, meanings, or these two, right? Now, what's the fourth sense of substance? Or even the definition of person, you know, going back to, wait, this is the definition of a person, right? A person is a, is a very distinguished, singular substance, right? I'm a person, right? I told you about this. We had a sister, uh, she had persons there in the parish there, and she had some liberal ideas, you know, like, to be priests and so on. But now, this, you know, when John Paul II said, but not from the sketch. Well, this one old guy, he, he said, a person. Oh, I didn't know you were a person. He said. That's kind of funny, you know, huh? And the last name was person, right? I didn't know you were a person. I know some persons, like. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of, kind of, uh, saw the new way about it. The last name was person. I didn't know you were a person. But, uh, the, the definition that he gives, huh? Individua substantia rationalis. Well, individua substantia is kind of the same thing here as singular substance, right, huh? When you say individual substance, does substantia mean singular substance? Well, then you'd be saying individual singular substance. Strange, right? So when you say individual substance, you're kind of taking substance here as common to both of these, right? And this here is contracting it to that, right? So if you take substance, it can be said of both of these, right? That's another meaning, isn't it? See? One meaning of substance is the only meaning of substance for the wise man, right? Individual substance. Another meaning is second substance. Let the magician get away at that. Because he likes to talk about the way things are in the mind, right? And something in my mind is said of me as it carries what I am, right? But it's also said of you guys too, right? And Ann. And Ann will say even of us. And our friend out here. He's very friendly. So, that's the four senses he gives, right, huh? Okay. And I mentioned there I was reading the Prima Pars that you continue to re-read if you do it in your life. A month or a year of your life. Over and over again, right? And you always say, hey, how did I miss that? You know? But Thomas, in the first question of the Prima Pars is about the nature of theology, right? And then the second question, the question that divides us into articles, is what? The existence of God, right? And then there's a series of articles, right? Question three, I think it is, is about the simplicity of God, right? God is not composed, huh? And then four and five and so on, right, huh? Are about what? The perfection of God, right? You've got to bring that in next because, as Thomas says, in the material world, the simplest things are very imperfect, right? So the stone is simpler than the tree, but the tree is more perfect. The tree is simpler than our dog out here, right? And we're more complicated than the, and more perfect, right? So you've got to bring out that God is not always completely simple. He's not like, you know, simple things in the material world, but he's altogether perfect, right? And therefore he's, what? Good, right, huh? And then he goes on to show that he's, what? Infinite, right? And then finally that he's, what? Changing, right? And then in question 11, that he's, what? One, right? Then he has come into Luke, in a way. He's talking about how God is known by us, right? And how he's named by us in his 12 and 13, right? But then he's going to go into the, what? Operations of God, right? His understanding and his willing, and so on, right? And starting in article 14, or question 14, right? There's no premiums, you know, right? He says, have you considered the substance of God? Now we're going to consider the, what? Operations of God. What does a rich substance mean then? It could mean, you know, in some sense, what it is, right? There might be another meaning of the word substance. Thomas has been given that text that he's talking about, you know, the categories here, right? And another place that's very famous for substance is what? In the faith, right? In the epistle to the Hebrews, right? And Thomas takes that definition. The substance of things hoped for, right? The conviction of what is not what is seen. The sight of what is not seen. The vision of what is not seen. The evidence, yeah. The evidence, yeah. But there is not even, in there is further removed, right? Because it's not in the genus of substance, right? But is God in the genus of substance? When we said, well, the very angel is in substance. And then we put him in there, right? And, you know, getting put in a genus is a little bit like getting put in jail, right? He can't get out, right? You know? It's, uh, I teach an iconocist to, like, the English word predicament, huh? Have you ever been in a situation that you could call predicament? Have you ever? Predicament is hard to get out, right? There's no way out, right? He says, it's kind of funny, huh? Well, it seems to be taken from the Latin word for categories, right? You can't get out of predicament, right? In Fort Seroe, you can't get out of the category for anyone, right? Well, is God confined in one of these? Thomas says, you know, that, uh, one can be, to some extent, confined in the category or for quantity of your number, right? Not that it's a number, but because it's a beginning, just a number, right? But God's beginning very deep, so you can't even in that way, put him in that thing. In the, uh, Summa Contra Gentiles, huh? Thomas, uh, explains that thing more fully, then. He says, uh, what is substance? What is this genus of substance, huh? He says, it's a res, he, he, he, he, he, when the genia, esse, allia, right? It's a thing to which it belongs to me, not in another. Notice, when you say, a res, pre-convenient essay, it's as if the res and its essay are not, what? The same thing, right? The res, it's what it is, right? And the essay is the act of existence, right? And only in God are those two the same, right? And as Thomas says, in a genus, huh, you've got to have, of what it is, it's common to these things, but the essay is always different from the individuals. So, to be in a genus, you have to have, you have to be a res, that is not the same as its essay. So, when you say God is a substance, we talk about the substance of God, right? Because, what? He's a res, who is its own essay, right? I am who else, right, huh? He says, huh? So, this is another negative word substance, right? I think when you start, it's somewhat related, though, to, to, uh, what? That sense of substance is what a thing is, right? But because we know God started from creatures, right? In creatures, what a thing is and what it does are not the same thing, right? Its substance, what it is, and its operations are not the same thing, right? So, what I am is not by thinking, right? Not by willing, but in God, they're, what? I'm the same, right? But that's why, knowing God from creatures, right? Okay, there's something like substance in God, and there's something like operation in God, but they're not really different if they're in creatures, right? Okay? And you have to approach God both from what substance means in the creature, right? And what operation means even though they're the same thing in God, right? Because the excellence of God is found in a simple, like a simple thing, right? Any creatures, it's like divided. I was reading a few of the bars there, and Thomas is talking there about the good, right? And the beautiful one. And he says that, not really the same thing, right? The good and the beautiful, right? But they're connected, right? Because they're both based upon the perfection of form, he says, and so on, right? But he quotes a common definition of the beautiful. The beautiful is that which pleases when it's seen, right? Okay, we need to talk about good and true, right? Good is clearly the object of the will, right? True is clearly the object of the reason, right? But what is beauty for the beautiful? Remember when I was first thinking about this, you know, years ago in college and so on, I was kind of being led by the fact that we have a kind of syndrome for beautiful, we say something is lovely, right? Oh, a lovely one. It must be that it's more the object of love, right? And that's why he's falling in love with some beautiful girl. I said, yeah. It must be that beauty is the object of love, right? That you love a beautiful girl. He said, here, Thomas, that's the same there, right? And if you define the beautiful as how it pleases when seeing, well, then it's the object of what, see? Of some kind of knowledge, right? And so the higher senses like the senses, sight and sense that you're in, right? You see a beautiful sunset, you know? In our house there, we had a place there in the living room there where at one time you could look out the window where there were trees there at the time or something and you could see the sunset, right? And if it was a beautiful sunset, I'd say to the children every night, I'd say, come and look at the sunset that you're coming in the 5th century, you know? Y'all went over to see it, right? And there you do some beautiful sunsets, right? It's incredible. And they don't come that often once or twice a month or something like that to give you a beautiful sunset. 5th century, right? And then, you know, I hear the vision of both sides and say how beautiful that is, right? Twice yesterday. I've heard it for a while, you know? I'm wondering, you know, in heaven, you know, when you see God as he is and you see him face to face, he's, what? It's most pleasing to see God face to face. But you're seeing him with your, what? Reason, not with your will. But you're loving God because of his goodness that you see, right? I was trying to remember, I read for a long time the Confessions of Augustine, right? I thought Augustine sits here somewhere in the early part of the Confessions. He's kind of, you know, regretting his slow conversion, shall we say, or his delayed conversion. And he says, I thought he said, too late that I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty. Have you read the Confessions? Remember him saying that? Yeah. Do you remember me correctly? Did he say that? I read it in time where I wasn't fully conscious, but I don't remember that, so I'm not with the exact quote. I think he says, link that by book 10. This one here, I mean, if he said, so I'm going to go back and check the video, too late that I come to know thee, or ancient beauty, right? They're kind of indicates that you're seeing the beauty of God as the object of what? Knowledge, huh? You know, so to say, too late I come to love thee, right, huh? He says, too late I come to know thee, of ancient beauty, but I just, you know, I don't know, trust me, I remember you, but you can't remember that, huh? Well, you're going to cross it, you know, it's like, in some sense, beauty is not clearly, you know, one or the other, right? It's just both, but maybe it's more the object of knowledge.