Logic (2016)
Lecture 12: Equivocation by Reason and the Properties of Substance

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When I say the sunset is beautiful, it means that it pleases me when I see it, right? It doesn't mean primarily that I love the sunset, but I can say I love the beautiful sunset, right? But what the first must be is that it pleases me when I see it, right? My wife and I were down in Virginia, you know, I think the southern sunsets were beautiful in the northern sunsets, and we were having a kind of dinner outdoors, and you know, in the sky, you see it, it's like waves, like, oh, it's got a tap, since the winter, impressive, you know, but it pleases me to see this thing, right, you know? It's closer to the sense of what a thing is, right? Because of the substance of God, doesn't he just takes it up? I don't think it divides the text. Uh, simple, right? Perfect, unlimited, right? And changing, right? Right? So now we turn into its operation, right? But the sense is the definition of faith, right? Well, yeah, but it's not even in the genus of substance, is it? It's in the genus of words that are equivocal, by what reason? Now, one thing that I think you got a little mixed up with, and I think I was someone mixed up with, you know, but Thomas was talking about naming God, right, in the 13th question, right? And when a name can be said properly, both of God and of us, it's said univocally, right? Or equivocally, or in some other way, right? And Thomas shows in that article that it's not said univocally, right? But it's also not said purely equivocally, right? And therefore he says it's being said, what, by analogy, right, yeah? And he gives in Latin, then, analogy comes from the Greek word, I guess, huh? And he uses, as a kind of synonym for analogy, proportion. Now, proportion, I think, is used by Thomas as a word somewhat equivocal by reason, right? But my teacher in geometry, arithmetic, Euclid, right, huh? He would speak of two to three as not a, what, proportion, but a, what, ratio, right? And then a proportion means a likeness of ratios, huh? But Thomas seems to use the word proportion like the modern physicist or chemist does, right? For ratio, right, huh? Although maybe sometimes for a likeness of, what, ratios, huh? Our style says the most beautiful, what, metaphors are by, what, yeah. Even when we speak of God, you know, as, you know, the Lord is my shepherd, right, huh? Is he really my shepherd? Are we his flock? Yeah, it's a likeness of ratios here, right, huh? That the leader, the king, so to speak, is leading his people, a little bit like the shepherd is leading the, what, flock. And just as we follow our king, Christ, so the flock follows the, what, shepherd, right, huh? So it's beautiful, beautiful things, huh? The similes that Shakespeare has, like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, so do our minutes hasten to their end, each changing place of that which goes before, in sequent toil, for which do contend, right? These most beautiful proportions, huh? I thought her chased as unsung snow. Beautiful things, huh? But I think there's sometimes a, and I'm responsible for this too, I think. I sometimes would kind of identify an analogous word with a word equivocal by reason, as opposed to one equivocal by, what, chance. And I wonder if a word equivocal by reason isn't more general than a name that's analogous, huh? Because when Thomas explains analogous there, he's doing it in terms of the ratio, right, huh? And that one has a ratio to the other, right? And I don't think that all names that are equivocal by reason are a result of the ratio of one thing to another, or even the likeness of, what, ratios, huh? You take a word like, um, I always take the example there that Aristotle gives, huh, of, what, healthy, right, huh? And the first thing about being healthy is a healthy body, right? But then you speak of a healthy diet. Well, that's not the same meaning. That's not really equivocal, right? Because there's a connection between a healthy diet and a healthy body, right? Or, um, he's always taking a tap of urine to see it, you know. But healthy there means what? A sign, right, huh? A sign of, uh, yeah, yeah. I took that. I was at the doctor yesterday, the other day, Tuesday. And, uh, there's a noose takes your blood pressure and slow, you know. And then, uh, and the doctor usually does it again, right, you know. So, I was nice and good at 120 or 70, something like that. It's healthy, that's healthy, you know. But that's a sign of health, right, huh? It's not a, what? It's not the health of the body. So, uh, but say if the word like, um, like before, I don't think the first meaning of it has other meanings because of the ratio of the first meaning. But there's a likeness of, what, ratios, right? And I think especially when you go, like, from the second to the third, right, huh? Just as this can be without that, but that can't be without this. So, this can be known without that being known, but that can't be known without knowing this. You see the proportion? The second meaning of before, right, is what? If this can be without that, right, but that can't be without this, then it's before and being, right? If this is more known than that, then it can be known without that, but that can't be known without this. That's, you know, yeah, that's the, that's not purely equivocal. That's a likeness of ratios, huh? But is that the only way that a word becomes equivocal by reason, huh? See, now I'm pretty bright there and I figured out how the word political in the term, political philosophy, is equivocal by what reason, right? And it's equivocal in the way our style of being was equivocal, right? Because political refers above all to what? What's the first meaning of political? The city, the polis, right? I was born at St. Mary's Hospital in Minneapolis, Minnesota. And my parents had already bought a house in St. Paul. But Minneapolis means what? The polis of what? Lakes or waters. Mini, I guess, is Indian for waters or lakes, right? We have a nice stream there, a nice place there in Minneapolis called Minnehaha. And it means the laughing waters, right? But Minneapolis means the city of waters, the city of lakes, right? I guess they claim to have altogether 20 lakes in Minneapolis. It would be impressive. I used to go with my friend Roy Monroe over there. We'd go swimming over there and go on the lakes, right? Okay, just drive across. It wasn't very far to drive. But polis is a name for the city, right? Especially the city in the sense of, you know, sovereign, sovereign city. And so, what do you talk about in political philosophy? First of all, about the polis, right? But why do you talk about government? That's not a polis. Yeah, there's a ratio to that, right? Rules, right? You talk about law, right? Yeah, yeah. Okay. And then you talk about, what, things that are further removed than government. How about revolution? So I started his books on revolution and then a book on... 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See, but they all, by their ratio to what? A city, right? Some more, close or not. That's the way our status is at being, right, huh? You know? Being is primarily substance, right? That's why we've got to study substance. It's book seven and eight. The wisdom are all about substance, right? Well, material substance, right? It's not until middle of book 12 you get the material substances, right? Eventually God, huh? Well, that's what Thomas is explaining, you know, the word that's analogous, right? But there are words that are equivocal by reason that are not by a ratio or by a likeness of ratios, huh? Because sometimes we use the word analogous kind of to mean the same as equivocal by reason. But I always thought it was kind of a little bit misleading because, you know, you say is that the only way that you can become equivocal by reason is by reason of a ratio or a, it's interesting that the word ratio can also mean reason, right? In Greek they might have logos, right? It shows you the connection between reason and logos ratio, right? So that kind of stands out, right, huh? But I was saying that I had made this distinction of names equivocal by reason, and there are at least two other ways that they take place. They're not really by ratios or likeness, they're ratios. What are the other two ways? I think I've explained that before, haven't I? One is where a name is said of two or more things, right, with more or less the same meaning, right? But then it's kept by one of them, right? That's its own name, right? For a new name is given to the other. Now, is there a good reason why this is done in some cases? Well, sometimes it's because one of these two has nothing worth noting, right? Nothing noteworthy beyond what's the common meaning of both, right? But sometimes one of the two has something really significant and noteworthy, right? So we give it a, what? New name, right? Now you take the word disposition, right? Disposition can be said of a very stable disposition and of a easily change, right? So in English, you know, we speak of somebody's mood, right, huh? And sometimes you meet your friend, you realize he's in a certain mood. And sometimes you can get your friend out of this, right, huh? You see these signs up, you know, for cocktail hours, you know, after work, you know, and so on. And it has an attitude readjustment. So it can be quickly changed the mood, right, huh? This one, when I was in Quebec, there was one girl, really, it was nice to talk to, you know, huh? And I was very, very, very, very interesting. And this, one of the other Americans, you know, said, you know, I never saw what you saw in Nicole, he says. But I came down to the faculty the other day, and I was feeling really down in the dumps. And it rhymes with Nicole, and a few minutes, I don't know how to do this change. You know, it's all about her. Well, that's, it's an easily, you know, changed disposition, right? But then there's another one called the habit, which is kind of a firm disposition, you know, and it's really got a hold of you, for good or for bad, right? Depending upon things. And so it's got something noteworthy, right? That's firmness, that's stability in disposition. So sometimes we let the weak disposition, or the ease of the loss disposition, the temporary one, right? At least let it keep the name disposition, it'll give it new names, it'll be called a habit. So sometimes Aristotle will distinguish the chapter on equality, right? He'll distinguish habit against disposition, right? Other times they'll say habit is a disposition, a firm disposition. So how can he say that it is a disposition and divide it against disposition? The word has now become, what? Equivocal. Oh, is it becoming equivocal by chance? No, there's a very good reason why one kept the name and the other was given a, what, new name. Now in logic, if we ever get to the book on places, right, huh? Aristotle will speak of speech that is convertible with something. Now you know what that means? A and B are convertible if every A is a B and every B is an A, right? So Aristotle calls speech that is convertible with something as a, what, idios, huh? Or a property we'd say in the Latin word, right? Property, right? But now when you examine these speeches that are convertible with something, something has something remarkable. Not only are they convertible with the thing, but they bring out what it is. That's very important, right? So let's give a new name to that property and we'll call it, what, definition, right? And then the property that is convertible but doesn't bring out what the thing is, right, keeps the name property, right? So Aristotle will say the definition is a property. Definition will be divided against property. It's the same thing, right? It's become equivocal by reason now of the word, what, property, right? Now there's another way that a name is kept, right? And that is when one of the two things of which it is said is what? Yeah, yeah. So your guardian angel has got understanding, huh? This faculty of understanding things. And I've got a faculty of understanding things, right? Was it Dwayne's definition? Reason is the ability to understand and so on. But man's not very good at understanding things, right? And the Latin said he had, the Latin word for understanding was intellectus. And Thomas always quoted this one guy who says we have an intellectus abum gratus, an overshadowed, darkened reason, right? An overshadowed with what? Images and so on, right? And we need to reason out things and think them out and then we get a little bit of understanding, you know? Well, let's keep the word understanding, what the angels have, right? Because their mind is full of forms and they're created, right? You know, being able to use all these forms and understand things right away. You don't have to reason things out and think them out, right? I told you how my son Mark was in, little boy, can't we be born one? What do we have to know, you know? I said, you want to be born an angel, I said, and not a human being. That's true, what he's doing, right? All but a full movie, you know, to me. That's true. Yeah. So, angel, what? I mean, the angel keeps the name understanding because he has a perfection of this thing, right, huh? And we give man now a new name, we'll call it, say man is reason, huh? So sometimes Thomas would say reason is understanding, right, huh? To understand. Other times he'll divide reason against understanding. So the word understanding has now become what? Equivocal by reason. So there's two ways that the name is kept, right? Sometimes it's kept by the thing that only has the common meaning of the, that's common to the two. And the one that has something noteworthy that strikes us, you know, is very important, right? It's a new name, right? And, but sometimes, right, it's kept by the one that has fully the common meaning, right? And the other one gets, those are both good reasons, right? I have another example there. We've got to kind of multiply these examples a bit. Someone asked me about the election. Do you know who's going to win? I would say probably no, I don't know who's going to win. But I think so-and-so's going to win when I was thinking mean there. Yeah, something uncertain, right? It's a guess, right? Thomas says opinion and suspicion are two forms of guess. Opinion is stronger, right? So dialectic argument can produce opinion, right? But the rhetorician produces what? Suspicion, huh? I'm suspicious of this person. I think he did it. I suspect him. I suspect him. When a wife gets killed, the first thing they suspect is a husband. So if you ask me now, what about two is half a four? I know that two is half a four, right? Now couldn't I say, if you ask me now, do you think that two is half a four, Dwayne? I might say some un-garden, yes. I think that two is half a four, right? But I let the guess keep the name think, right? I give a new name to my thinking that two is half a four. That's knowing. I know it, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? So those names seem to be, those two ways of naming things, right, is different from, by like this, the ratios, the ratios, right? But still, it seems the word is equivocal by reason. There's a reason why this is done, right? And this is done very often in the daily life. We don't stop and realize it, huh? Now there's one other way that I see very common. What's that way? Do you remember that way? We had an example there when we were doing the ice of goge, right? Remember how genus and difference in species signify something essential to the thing, right? What it is, or how it is what it is, right? But accident and property, right, huh, signify something outside of what it is, right? But what is the difference between an accident and a property there in the ice of goge? Yeah, it's connected with the nature of the thing, right? But the accident doesn't do that, right? So half a four could be a property of two, right, huh? It falls upon being two that you have for four, and a third is six and so on, right? But the triangle is green, right? It doesn't seem to have any connection, right? But the triangle has its interior image at the right angles. Ah, and that falls upon what a triangle is, you know, if it's in a little geometry, right? It's fine, right? Now, porphyry defines a property as what belongs to one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? So half a four belongs only to two. Any other number? Not any other number. There's a million of them. There's even more than a million. Infinity of numbers. But you're never going to find any other number that is half a four. So it belongs only to two, right? And he says it belongs to every two, right? And what else? Now, what about two being less than ten? Is that a property or an accident? What would you say? Just happened to two? Two happened to be? This two happened to be less than ten, like this triangle happened to be green? In fact, every two is less than ten, right? And always a two is less than ten, right? But it's not only two that is less than ten, right? Now, if I call it a property of two, is the same sense as half of four is a property? No. But you've dropped out part of the meaning of property, right? It belongs only to one species, right? Now, it's a property of man to be a logician. Well, it's part of his penance. Well, is every man a logician? Sorry, just looking at the votes, huh? Well, your experience in teaching school, you know that I'm a logician. And is man always a logician? Not even the, what? Man who is a logician, right? He's not always a logician, right? But is any other animal that's a logician? Okay, so there's some connection with the nature of man, isn't there, right? Now, I've dropped out two parts, right? So, this is another way that a name becomes equivocal by reason, huh? By dropping out part of its meaning and kind of generalizing it, right? So, Aristotle in the great three books on the soul, right, huh? He talks about how we know the powers by their objects, right? And either the power acts upon the object, like my digestive powers and my teeth act upon the food, huh? Tearing it apart and grinding it up and stuff. Or the object acts upon the, what? Power. Like sound acts upon the ear, right, huh? Okay? And so we speak of hearing as an undergoing of sound, right, huh? But the first meaning of undergoing seems to have the idea of something, what, bad, right? And, uh, there might be some kinds of music that's bad to hear for many reasons. But, uh, it's not bad to hear the music of Mozart. It's perfection of your ear, right? Your ear is most perfect when it's hearing Mozart. So if you're concerned about the perfection of your ear, you will listen to Mozart, listen very carefully, right? Yeah. And I got through reading Ospreys yesterday there, right? And I'd put the record on of Mozart and I'd go out there and lay there by the machine and make sure I hear it. But you keep on hearing things that, yeah, it wasn't. Sometimes I'm driving the car and you turn on the Costco music station, there's one in Boston, and they have a piece of Mozart on, you know. I haven't heard it for a while and it doesn't occupy my mind much driving the car, so. And I say, hey, this is really good. I didn't realize how good this was, you know. Mm. So my ear is reaching its apotheosis, right? I told you tonight about, about, uh, reading some of the lives of Mozart there, and they were producing an opera, right? And they write this beautiful aria, you know, for one of the sopranos, one of the only singers. And, uh, no one realized how beautiful a woman's voice could be until Mozart wrote these arias. And the singer, she's beside herself, you know. She's going to be singing this, this is the sariah, Mozart, you know, on the stage. And everybody's going to be, oh, you're looking up at her, you know. And so, a woman liked to, you know, to kind of show off a little bit, you know. And so, and, uh, just like a bride, you know, she's really adorned, you know, and everybody's going to be, ooh, ooh. And I was an altar boy, you know, I used to serve weddings sometimes. And the little girls from the neighborhood, you know, who were not part of the bridal party, or part of the, even invited thing. They would just come in to sit and watch the bride, and so on, and so on, and dream, I don't know what they do. But, uh, there were never even no boys, no girls, you know, kind of. So, she's beside herself, you know, you could be singing this, the sariah, and you could, you could write something so beautiful, you know. And, you know, and, uh, she didn't realize. a beautiful voice could be. We had a singer there that sings, she's in high school, right? She's a senior in high school now, but she's a beautiful voice, beautiful voice. We have a lot of female talent in the parish, you know, and so on. And I think she's an adopted girl too, that's what I thought. But we were having to run into her after mass, you know, the other day goes around. So I asked her, you know, where she was, and she was a senior in high school, she said, you know. She might be going to North East College, I guess, so up the stairs, another place. But what was she thinking of majoring? And, oh, she wants to do mechanical engineering. I was so surprised, so surprised. But she had a beautiful voice, you know. Yeah, yeah, I know. I admit, you know, one time we had to be up in the front of the church where she sings, you know, and when they sing the Our Father, you know, because she was holding a hand over it and stuff. And when she comes down, she, you know, she took my hand and held my hand, you know, so. And so I know she comes down here, I was down in the fucking pew, you know, happens to be there, you know. And so you expect she'd be going, you know, to the other things you said here. I mean, I don't know how she learned how beautiful. I was going to ask her, you know, how she got trained. Okay, but the first meaning of undergoing, or the Latin word is possible, right? It's like you have in the Passion of Our Lord, right? Where you are being acted upon in a way that's painful and, what, harmful to you, right, huh? So I'm sticking my pin in you, or my knife in you, and jabbing you, you know, so. But then I'm acting upon you, right, huh? You're undergoing. Yeah, yeah. And, but then when you apply it to the ear being acted upon, right, you keep the idea of, what, receiving something, but you drop out the idea that it's actually harming the ear, right? Perfecting the ear, right? And when you see some beautiful sight, it's perfecting the eye, right? Seeing such a beautiful object, huh? And then, but there's still a, what, a body being acted upon, which is in the first meaning of acting upon, and undergoing is the body being acted upon, right? It's kind of a spiritual thing, the sensing compared to my jabbing, my pin in you, and so on, right? And so you're dropping out. The idea is something harmful to you, but you're keeping the idea that the body is being acted upon, right? And then Aristotle applies it to the act of reason, right? To the reason, what? Yeah, it receives its object, right? Aristotle speaks of the undergoing reason and the act upon reason, right? It separates the universal from the, what, images, right? Okay, and that's what really acts upon the, or what it receives. As the Boethius is often quoted as saying, the thing is singular when sensed, or universal when understood, right? Now, Plato thought, you know, there are forms out there, the existing independently of the singulars. Aristotle concluded this was not so, and therefore he had to recognize the existence of this acting upon understanding. So you're dropping out. Part of the meaning of it is it goes from punishing you to sensing and then to, what, understanding, right, huh? You see? So that doesn't seem to be by a ratio so much. Generalizing the meaning by not part of it, huh? You gotta be kind of careful there, right? Calling, trying to use analogous for synonymously as equal, equivocal by reason, huh? You know, Thomas, the textbook Thomas says that, you know, but he does talk about those other ways of naming things, right? They seem to me to be giving you equivocation by reason again, huh? So, be careful of these words, yeah? Now, you don't have the same number, I guess, huh? Okay? But Thomas is a texture that we had from the De Potentia, I guess, was it? Where, um, yeah. We talked about the difference between this in, in wisdom and in, what, logic, right, huh? Logic is concerned with, what, the way things are in, in the mind, huh? And so that the universe in the mind might be called still substance, right, huh? Now, after that, we had a text from Thomas there where he's talking about the, the, uh, I guess it was before we talked about the distinction between first and second substance. So, it's not a distinction of two, what, January, right? But a distinction really kind of a, what? Hmm? Yeah. But also a distinction, therefore, the equivocation by reason of this, huh? First and second implies this by reason, right? Because first and second is, what, order and reason looks before and after, right, huh? Okay? But the, the, the, uh, wise men would say that's a lot of nonsense, right? That's not, that's not substance, right? There's only individual substances in the real world, right? Outside the mind, there's no universals running around, are there? When I taught college there, you know, you had to get a list from the office in the first day of class, right? You had to read these names to each other. And, uh, and Judy and Jane and Bob and Philip and so on. But never a man or woman on that. A man or woman never showed up for my class. Yeah. There's no man or woman out there. It's just Judy and, and Philip and Tom and David and so on, right? A wise man would say, you know, who's the real substance in that world? A logician talks about the way things are in the mind, right? And therefore, you know, man could become something universal in the mind, right? And because it's sort of first substance as regards what it is, it's both the species and the genius, right? So both man and animal are said of me, for example, I'm a real walking substance, right? But man and animal are said of me in reason of, as regards what I am, right? Well, why not call them substance, right? But in a kind of what? Second way, right? Okay? That's clear enough, huh? You saw the distinction of the four meanings of substance, right? In the, in the what? Categories, right? I added two outside there, right? The substance of God, right? And faith being called substance, which is even further removed, right? Because that's really an accident, right? Categorical sense. Now, which is more substance though, species or what? Genus. Yeah. Does it give more than one reason for that or not? One is that it's closer to first substance, right? So when you ask, what is Twain Berquist? You could say he's an animal, or you could say he's a man. But you're closer, I hope, to me when you say I'm a man. Animal is further away. So that's one reason why species is more substance, right? Than animal, because it's closer, right? Now maybe another reason would be by likeness of what? Ratios, yeah. That just as, what? Species in general are said of first substance, right? So what? Genus is said of what? Species, huh? So species seems to underlie. You wouldn't say man is Twain Berquist, would you? That's right. That's right. You say, I mean, Berkwist is a man, right? And you say, man is an animal, wouldn't you? Or an animal is a man. You might say some animals, you know, you care what you're saying, right? But you wouldn't say simply that an animal is a man. You say, what is doing Berkwist? He's a man. What is a man? He's an animal, right? What is an animal? It's a man. So man is to animal something like, doing Berkwist is to what? Man, right? Is that the kind of reason he gives? So, Aristotle was just distinguishing in the anti-predigaments, right? But now he's, what? Looking before and after, right? He's advancing in his thinking, right? He sees a distinction first, and then he sees, what? The order, yeah. Even the master, right? Now, what are the properties of substance? Well, I could say one more thing there, of course, that only what the genera and species, the species and genus in which the first substances are, are called substances in the secondary sense. The accidents are not, right? Even though they said it, right? They don't say what the thing is, right? There's something that happens, huh? He had that part there. It's on page five of this, maybe a different page in yours. On page three. In the first group, in the second part of the chapter, it says like that, Aristotle gives properties of substance. They fall into two groups of three. The first group pertains to substance alone, right? While the last three can belong to something else, right? Okay? So it's going to help you kind of separate substance and other things, right? In the first group, Aristotle gives a property of substance common to first and second substance. And then a property of second substance. And then a property of what? First substance, huh? The property common to both is that they're not in a, what? Subject, huh? And that was in the anti-predicaments too, right? So universal substance, it's said of something, but it's not existing in another, right? Now the property of first substance is to be a, what? Excuse me. The property of second substance is to be said only, what? Yeah. In the narrow sense of the first chapter, right? What does that mean, huh? I think it means significantly in the sense of what a thing is, right? And not being said, what, denomatively, right? Thomas was beautiful when he was talking, if I make a little digression here, right? It's kind of related to this thing about denomative things. You know, he's talking about whether you can name God or anything. And some people say, well, you can't name him because they can use the concrete word or the abstract word. He says, well, if you use the concrete word, then you're saying that God is composed. Never that simple. And if you use the abstract word, then that signifies that by which you are something. And God is not really there for this. Okay? And that's the problem, right, about these things, huh? And Thomas says, well, man's mind is tied up with the material world, right? And material world, what do you have? Things are composed of matter and form, right? The form exists in the matter, right? I'm expecting the matter. Now, why do we have these two words? Let's take an example of this. Why do we have these two words, health and healthy? Yeah. And the composite can be said to be healthy, right, huh? The body can be said to be healthy, right? Now, would you say that the health is healthy? Health seems to signify that by which you are healthy, right? So health is really naming the form you have, right? And then healthy, what you have by that form, right? But it's not that form. I've got a problem, right? God, right, huh? Is God good or goodness? Well, if you say he's good, you seem to be saying that God has goodness, right? And that implies some kind of distinction between the haver and what it has. Now God ends up being what? What did he spend question three on, huh? Eight articles, right? To show that God is entirely what? Simple. Very thorough what he does there in question three. So what are you going to say about God? Are you going to say that he's good or he's goodness itself, right? Well, if you say God is goodness, you don't seem to be admitting that he's good. Yeah, yeah. If you say God is good, then you seem to be saying God has goodness and then you've got the distinction between the haver and the had and I get composition, huh? So one of the objections says, well, then, I can't have any names that said of God. Sad, right? Yeah. I won't be able to talk about God, right? Because there's no names we can use to talk about God, right? St. Augustine says, if you say that God is ineffable, you've said something about God. Now, when Thomas takes up God being good there in the Sima Congentiles, maybe Sima Congentiles, too, he first shows that God is good, right, and then that he's goodness itself, right, and then that he's goodness itself, than the other words because our mind is designed to know what it is is something sensed or imagined, and that's a composition of matter and form, so we only have these two ways of name here, right? So we say that God is good because he really is good. He's not something that good when something is good, but we say he's goodness itself because he's altogether what? Simple, yeah. And so no name is what? Complete, right, perfect, right, and the way of speaking, right, fits material things, right? And so we have to kind of adapt it, right, so far as we can for God, right? And one way brings out what? That he is good and the other that he's in a simple way, right? Now, sometimes we say, you know, that God is whatever he has, which is not true, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But no, it's in the original meaning of the word have, right? If the body has health, the body is not health. I guess my body's healthy and he's healthy enough for an 80-year-old man. But my body is not its health, is it? But in God, we have to say, you know, that the have and the had are what the same and we can't have a perfect way of speaking about God because our minds adapted to knowing things that are composed of matter and form when Aristotle in the eighth book of wisdom he talks about a material substance starting from natural philosophy he talks about in terms of pattern form right so it's not until the twelfth book he talks about something that's not a substance is not composed of matter and form right but it is just what form right now okay but shows the problem we got right okay so healthy seems to be a denomination from health right and that was one of the three ways he spoke of speaking there in the first anti-predicant right but then univocal was taken just when something is said or something what signify what it is right so it's kind of more narrow sense of univocal right than broad sense huh you could see the healthiest said univocally of my body and the dog's body and so on right okay so the property of second substance is to be said only univocally right and not what denominatively huh in the property of first substance is said to be a this what something the whole call liquid of the latin song you see that famous controversy thomas speaks of the human soul as being a god liquid in some way you'll get very excited about this but i mean the immortality of the human soul is a sign it is to understand a god liquid uh this something uh this something is something by itself right distinct from all other things and complete in its nature which the human soul is not right therefore for our ultimate happiness we need what uh our body to be joined to our soul again right so those are the properties that are what pertains to substance alone right but one to both first and second substance right one to second substance alone and one to first substance so he's kind of making you get these things distinct in your mind right by these properties huh the second group of properties revolves around contraries the first property is not to have a contrary this is a property shared by quantity hey how can something be shared by quantity property in a broader sense right huh and this is a property shared by quantity which perhaps points to its closeness to substance huh what are contrary some contraries are said to be species furthest apart in the same genus right so in the genus of color what are furthest apart black and white right and uh green and white are not as far apart right yellow and white are even less far apart right so there's a kind of a continuum you know from what white all the way to black right so blue is closer to black right okay okay yellow is closer to white green is maybe in between yellow and what blue right so on so it's a property for substance i mean excuse me the first property is not to have a contrary right okay and this is a property shared by quantity which perhaps points to its closeness to what substance that's why it's put the next category the second property is not to be said more or less this seems to to fall upon not having a contrary because the contraries can be what mixed you know can be a continuum between white and black right so i put white bread in the toaster and i keep on pushing it down and it gets golden and then it gets what black black and it just dissolves and it goes to right you take another pair of contraries hot and cold right well i put the cold water on in the morning and it gets hotter and hotter and it starts to whistle at me you know but i come and pour it on the tea leaves right the second property is not to be said more or less this seems to fall upon that having contrary this property is also shared by quantity what numbers are furthest apart in the genus of number and aristotle has a famous uh thing there in the ninth uh in the eighth book i mean of uh wisdom right where he compares the natures of things to numbers huh you remember how um shakespeare said what is the man if his chief good and market of his time would be but to sleep and feed a beast no more and my mother objected to my calling man an animal i said he's not just an animal mama he's what an animal that has reason huh what does just mean huh see it's kind of precise huh it means equal in the sense right so if you call it a stone one you could call plant two right stone is just a body right but the plant is a body with something added right yeah so that's two and then the animal is something that's a body that's what senses so that's three and then man has got something in addition reason and so man's what four right so the natures of things are like numbers right one also shakespeare says huh a beast no more if man had no greater good than the beast has then he's no more than the beast it seems right he knows the word more right more or less is tied up with what number right so when aristotle takes up uh tragedy and comedy he takes them as being kind of contours right so we've lost part of the book on the poetic art on comedy right the more detailed thing so when i got studying these things under the influence of australi and so on because he got talking about the poets too you know that these are the things that he talked about music well then i said what um how would you define comedy right i was trying to argue from comedy being the contrary of what tragedy so tragedy is aristotle and shakespeare teaches us moves us to pity and fear right well comedy should move us to the contrary of pity some kind of joy and to the contrary of what okay and so i'm saying um some kind of joy maybe mirth merriment and some kind of opposite of uh fear which is boldness right now and that was a good deletive argument by burquist right but then when i got into it more deeply i got really thomas aquinas about the emotions right then i found out that the principal emotions are what joy and sadness and fear and not boldness hope hope well maybe maybe the two contrary forms should move us to a form of sadness which is pity right very noble sadness right or the misery of another right undeserved misery of another and fear right and then um comedy should move us to the other principal passions so then i started to read more deeply comedy and so on i was reading uh book on the black and comedies right and the guy was quoting you know the famous words of what saint paul remain these three things faith hope and charity and the greatest of these are charity right