Logic (2016)
Lecture 13: Substance, Categories, and the Trinity

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But he said, in comedy, the greatest is hope. And immediately goes to the plays, it does arouse, it's kind of a hope, right? And I was talking about that, right? It's kind of a confirmation, right? That comedy is about the chief passions, right? And the chief forms are tragedy in comedy. But then I began to see that there are plays of Shakespeare that are in between these, right? So there can be a transition, right? You get the love and friendship romances, which are closer to comedy. And you get the mercy and forgiveness romances, which are closer to pity and so on, right? And so it's kind of a continuum there, right? So the fact that you can go from one contrary to the other contrary, right, is tied up with this second property, right? It's not a more or less, right? So is one man more a man than another man? Well, by man you mean courage, yeah, one man more courage, more, but that's a quality, right? But in the case of the substance itself, is one man more a man than another man? Or is one dog more? I think I told you last, was it last time I told you that, you know, I was teaching a course one time, an assumption night course, and you had adults there, right? Rather than the students. And I'm talking about, you know, the statement, all men are created equal, you know? I said, well, some are created strong, some weak, some healthy, some sick, you know? Some prone to anger, you know? And are all men, you know, equal, you know, in terms of knowledge, you know? But the only way you could say that all men are equal is that one man is not more a man than another man, right? You know? It seemed like the substance. Well, this is the property there, right? So you're kind of getting to see this, right? Of course, even quantity, we speak of more or less, don't we, huh? Although one circle is not more a circle than another, right? You're circular, you know, if you're taking a strict sense, right? You can't be more or less a circle, right? Is it an equilateral triangle, more a triangle than a scalene or isosceles triangle? But we do use more or less sometimes when talking about numbers, right? But is one three more a three than another three? Now, even in the substance, you could say man is more than a beast, right? But one beast is not more a beast than another beast, right? Or one man more a man than that. That's what this second property is, right? The third property is to be susceptible of contraries, right? Or remaining one in number. So I, Dwayne Burquist, I'm a substance and sometimes I'm hot and sometimes I'm cold, right? Sometimes I'm sick and sometimes I'm healthy, right? Sometimes I'm good and often I'm bad, right? Okay? And this seems to be a property of what? A first substance, right? See what Aristotle's doing? He's trying to make these things distinct in your mind, only by, as we define them, but by giving these kind of what? Sort of properties, right, huh? Now we had a discussion there in the appendix there about what? How can one meaning of the word substance be what a thing is? Isn't that found in all genera? It's a difficult thing, right? But when you first distinguish the categories, you do by what? The way something can be said is the same thing. And then you need something in which everything else is said, and that's first substances, right? Okay? And only something in the genus of substance, right? Species or a genus of substance, right? Is said of individual substances as regards to what it is, right? But then I think we've spoken here before about the difficulty of saying how can there be a definition, which tells you what that thing is. How can there be a definition of what? Well, accidents, right? Because definition means what? Well, yeah, you've got limits there. It means it comes to the Phoenix limit, huh? In Greek, they'll have Horus limit, the horizon, right? Well, nothing should be the definition except the thing that's being defined, it seems, by what definition is. But if I define health as something, a good condition, let's say, of the body, something like that, right? I'm defining something by something outside of it, right? That's not a definition, or not in the same sense of a definition, right? So it's the way in which what it is is found primarily in substance, right? And especially if you distinguish them by how something can be said, individual substance, it's found when they're there, right? But in another sense, you can speak of habit saying what a virtue is, right? Numbers saying what an odd number is, an even number is, and so. Okay? So that's just kind of a difficulty there, huh? We don't want to get into the immaterial substances there so much, it's kind of a difficulty thing, huh? There's another subtle distinction that is made there, the later pages there, where we say that in natural philosophy, when you talk about the genus, you go down to what it's based on, right? The genus is based more upon matter and the difference on form. So if you have a different matter, like they thought the heavenly bodies had a different matter than the ones down here, then there'd be a natural way of saying they belong to a different genre, right? I don't know the same matter, but don't think we're too concerned about that. There's all kinds of subtle things here. I don't know if you want to dwell upon all of them, but I think it's time to stop, isn't it? Oh, you do? Okay, okay. No, no, no. I just, I would just, I want to see if in your faces, if you're like the students of this guy's side. The students, you know, looking at the kids in this class, you know, at some public university there in the West. And the students looking up, you know, why are you doing this to me? That's what the expression on their face. Why are you doing this to me? No, we know why you're doing this. Even the monastery adjusts to do this. Some sort of subtle things here about Christ, this body. Notice this one here, it's on page 8 of this thing here, but in the scriptum, I don't care about the sentences. Is the hypostasis of the word, right? Is that in the genus of substance? Or do you have to qualify that? See, we say the second person, we say, you know, person, and of course the Greeks say hypostasis, right? He's talking about hypostasis here. Although it is not in the genus of substance, insofar as it's the what? Nevertheless, it is the hypostasis also of human nature in Christ. Insofar as it's the hypostasis of human nature, it is in the genus of substance, just as it is in the species of man. I just asked people, let's just finish the passage here first. For hypostasis is not ordered to a genus or a species, except through the nature which it has, right? So, is the hypostasis in some way in the genus of substance? The hypostasis of Christ, the second person? Yeah. But in what way is it, what way is it not, right? Human nature. Yeah, but not insofar as it's the hypostasis of the divine nature, right? And the hypostasis of the second person is the same as God, right? It has less the meaning of hypostasis, as far as etymology of the word is concerned, right? And time mistakes. up the perfection of god in theology where does the word perfect come from yeah and that's because when they're made they are what perfected right so you can't go um identify the etymology of the word perfect with the meaning of the word right so when you say god is perfect you mean he's well made so that would be to confuse right the etymology with the meaning of it right but because when a material thing is what perfected it's it's um we see this form and so on right now it's made actual right now well then god who's pure act is going to be what perfect right then well we kind of borrow that word right then the etymology is if you use the word hypostasis you know for the the persons of the trinity hypostasis etymologically means what stand under right well does the hypostasis of the person stand under the divine nature you have a composition there right now when you compare the hypostasis of the of each person with the divine nature is there any real distinction between them it's very hard for us to understand right now but um are the three persons three gods three persons are one god right now and this one god is three persons that's the way to speak right why do you use the word hypostasis right if it doesn't stand under it right it's the same thing right when you say you know that the church is the pillar of truth right say it stands under truth right the church and truth are not the same thing exactly are they right but the church you know it's teaching and so on it's tradition and so on supports the truth right now you can see how you can see whether this is a connection between the etymology of substance right and standing under and saying the church is a pillar it's got a metaphor to say it's a pillar of truth right you can be kind of led by that well how do you do that with the trinity you've got you move a long way from standing under because if you stand under something you're not the same as if you're standing under are you and they compare you know faith to the foundation of the house and then hope to the walls and then the roof is charity which covers a multitude of sins and so on um but i think it's a little connection between the etymology right now and uh saying that it's the substance things hope for right now kind of this kind of foundation of it huh but how can you speak of uh three hypostasis right now as thomas points out in here in one of the texts we have in here substance of course can be what a thing is right and definitely sit in danger of saying that there can be substances right and when they took substance as a translation of hypostasis it was by the what yeah and they said johoma's warning them about this poison you know but if you say there's three hypostasis which you can say in greek right and then you translate this into latin you say there are three substances well now you seem to be getting a little bit uh unorthodox to say the least right you know it's a danger here right but what justifies using the word hypostasis there you know if one's not really under something right well if you go to if you go to wait this is a definition of person there in latin which they use there right yeah yeah that there's a real distinction between the father and the son and a real distinction between the father and the son and the holy spirit right but how are they distinguished right or they're distinguished by relations of uh procession right right now okay so we see in the creed you know god from god and light from true god and so on and so uh one is father and one is son right now so there's a real distinction right so you have something in the notion there of the hypostasis that's something what uh uh yeah yeah and the individual substance is distinct from from one from another individual substance right a lot of texts where they speak of one as being not only undivided but divided from all this so the father is really distinct from the son and god the father is not god the son is he no but god the father is god and god the son is that same god and so in comparison to the divine nature there is no distinction between god the father the divine nature or god the son and the divine nature but compared to each other there's a real distinction not just a distinction of reason it was a heresy right oh god because he created us we call father and we call him son because he became man or something in something like that the same guy right so and then we had in this great division of the chapter right let's move on over it and we have some text there and the first text there we had from the sentences is is that distinction of the four way substance is said right okay you got you get to that place and it's called substance short text you know okay the first text is the one that we've been talking about here right now there's that text you might know what the fourth sense was in the fourth way substance is commonly in so far as abstract abstraction first and second substance and to individuum in the definition of person as it were through a difference is drawn to standing for first substance right yeah so you're not saying you know individua first substance right that'd be redundant in the text we've seen already now notice a little thing here in the sumphiologiae although universal in particular are found in all january because we had universal in particular what accident right nevertheless in a special way individual is found in the genus of substance right for substance is individuated by itself but accidents individuated by their subject which is substance or it is said to be this whiteness insofar as it's in this subject right we'll just take a typical example let's take two rubber balls in exactly the same size here is to make it simple right um this rubber is not that rubber right that's more more in the genus of substance right but this sphere is not this sphere because what this sphere is in this rubber and that sphere is in that pepper which is a different what substance right so the individuals in the genus of substance are distinct one from another per se you might say right by accidents or what if you and i know the same theorem in geometry and no complete you know and so on why is your knowledge that there my knowledge distinct individual knowledges of that theorem but because it's in my mind right and it's in your mind why is your mind different than my mind because in you the substance right And my mind is in my substance, right? So individual is, you know, per se, or originally, in substance than in what? Any other genus, right? And that's why you have these special names, like hypostasis and first substances, right? Those are kind of subtle things. Now, this text from the De Potencia, right? Again, this is a text which is pointing out that it's not a division of a genus into species, the distinction of first and second substance, right? But it's more, what, a division of an analogie than of a genus, right? Now, there it seems like it's proportion, isn't it, huh? The sense of a ratio, right? Because Aristotle speaks of the second substance as a species or genus of first substance, right? So it's looking back to first substance, right? But it's ratio to that, huh? It's the species or the genus of a first substance. So first substance is primarily substance, now. Most of all substance, substance or anything else, right? Why are you calling the species of the genus? Well, because it's sort of that, right, huh? It's the species of this or it's the genus of this, right? And more of the species than the genus, right? For the reasons we gave, right, huh? The next text from De Potensi is one that De Potensi gets into the question of the Trinity, too. You know, that's the most powerful disputed question the time I said. I remember when I was stitching out in California, you know, some philosophy department there, and when the University of California wanted us to come over and put on one of these medieval debates, you know, so they could get, we turned them down. I think De Potensi would have lost them, I'm sure. This is subtle things here, right, huh? I wanted to say that the human nature in Christ is an hypostasis but not a person. Well, again, all those very subtle things. That's where he explains if substance is not placed in the definition of person for hypostasis, but for that which is common for substance and, what, second substance, huh? This is making use of the distinction of substances, of the meanings of substance, right? We've seen that already in the other text. Okay, the next text, of course, is the distinction between substance and the way the wise man talks about it, where he rejects Plato's ideas and the, what? What the heck is Socrates doing, right? He's defining something that is, what, universal. See, Socrates is the first guy that we try to define humans, you know, among philosophers, huh? And what was he defining? Well, he wasn't defining singular, was he? He wasn't defining Zanthippe, his wife, or his teacher, or whoever he was, right, huh? Okay, or Solon, or anybody else, right? He was defining what? Man. And defining something universal. This is, what is going on here, right? Where is this universal that's being defined? Yeah, and this is kind of a key to real, you know, vigorous knowledge to be able to define things, right? To begin to see that definition was the key to this, huh? But where are you defining? There must be a universal there in separation from the signatures out in the, what, world, yeah, yeah? Makes sense, doesn't it? A little bit. So, yeah. Aristotle gets suspicious of this, right? If the universal existed outside of our mind in separation of singulars, it would be, what, something very substantial, wouldn't it? And then individual men kind of in some way or other partake of this, right? They couldn't quite explain how this was so. So from the point of view of wisdom, the universal is not a, what, substance, right? We get the logician who likes to talk about the way something is said of something. He sees that the species and the genus is said of individual substance as well. Kind of secondary way of their substance, right? And species more than genus, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? So he says in the third paragraph there, it should be said that according to a logical consideration, the philosopher speaks in the predicamentis of the categories, huh? For the logician considers things according as they are in, what, reason, right? And therefore he considers substances insofar as by the taking of reason they are under the intention of universality, right? And therefore as regards predication, or to speak English, being said of, right, huh? Which is an act of reason. It is said to be, what, predicated of the subject. That is of a substance subsisting outside the soul. But the first philosopher, he considers things according as they are beings, right, huh? And therefore for him, to even be said of a subject is to not be a substance, right? And not only to be in a subject like an accident, huh? That's a very subtle text. I don't have to worry too much about, huh? Okay. I guess that's enough to torture you in substance, huh? You've been tortured enough, right? You've confessed to your crimes and so on. I don't have to torture you longer. So, you know, the text on the quantity we can start next time, or what? Yeah. I don't know. I don't know. Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. Holy Spirit, Amen. I was playing with the numbers of Thomas there in the Prima Pars, and it got to the place of the Trinity, right? And I was remembering what Thomas was saying when he comments on the symbolism of numbers, right, in Scripture, that the square of a number and the cube of a number have the same meaning as the original number. So, of course, with the Trinity, you think of three, right? But the square of three is what? And the cube of three is what? Yeah, okay. Now, how does three and nine and twenty-seven come into the treatise on the Trinity? What question of the Prima Pars is the first question on the Trinity? On the Trinity, I'm sorry. On the Trinity? It's twenty-seven. Yeah. Or twenty-eight, twenty-seven. Yeah, it's got to be twenty-seven. It's got to be twenty-seven. Yeah, there's twenty-seven. Yeah, okay, okay. Now, what is the treatise divided into? Three or nine parts? It's got to be one of them, right? Yeah, yeah. Thomas has this beautiful statement, huh? That the persons of the Blessed Trinity are distinguished by relations of origin, or relations based on procession, right? So, therefore, he says, following the order of teaching, right, huh? Teaching doctrine. We'll consider, first, the processions in God, right? And then, secondly, the relations that arise in these processions. And then, finally, the white persons. So, the consideration of the Trinity is divided into three, huh? Parts, huh? Starting in the twenty-seventh. Now, where does the square come in? Which is nine. Well, gentlemen, there are two processions, huh? And therefore, how many relations? Huh? Four relations. Four relations, huh? Yeah. So, the first procession is generation, right, huh? That Scripture speaks of. And the Father generates the Son. So, you get the relation of Father to Son, and the relation of Son to Father, right? And then, you have, you know, want of name, you know, but they're called procession. They used a common word. Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. And then, you have the breather and the breathe, right? I'd say, right, huh? Okay? So, you have four relations, right? But how many persons? The relations distinguish only when they are opposed, right? So, the Father and the Son are distinguished by relations of Father and Son. And then, by a common proceeding, right, of the Holy Spirit of both of them, that distinguishes them from the Holy Spirit and him from them, right? So, you have three, what? Relations. Relations, yeah, three persons. But four relations, right? Yeah, yeah. Now, two processions, four relations, three persons. Two plus four is six, plus three is nine. Yeah. Now, was that intentional on Thomas' part? Thomas was discovered. How many names does the second person have? Three, yeah. And how many names does the Holy Spirit have? So, Thomas has, you know, a question on each one of these. Well, he doesn't have a separate question on the Son being the Son, because he's already seen from what you said about the Father being the Father, right? But then you have the word and then the image, right? But the image is given last, right? Now, the Holy Spirit, the first name he takes up is the Holy Spirit, and he's got to explain that name, right? And then you have what? Gift. Love. And the last name is what? Gift, right? Now, why is gift the last name that Thomas takes up? Why does he take it up last? The second name is love, right? But you have to explain how this is love personally, not essentially, right? And creatures, so. But love has the aspect of what? Looking before and after, gentlemen. Love has got the aspect of being the first, what? Gift. Because any other good that I give to someone, right? I give to them because I love them, right? So the first thing I give them is my love, yeah. So it's good that he takes up love before he takes up what? Gift. Gift, yeah. Beautifully ordered, right? Now, why does Thomas take up son and word, right? Before he takes up imago? This is the same Paul, right? About imago. First two referring. Yeah, because the son is like the one from whom he proceeds, right? Same in nature and so on, right? And so he's the image, right? And the thought, right, is a likeness of the thing in which it is a father. It's primarily the thought of God, right? So imago is seen after you see that he's both son and word. You know, beautifully ordered, right? They tell you, this thing, another thing I ran across that was kind of interesting. Thomas talks about many places that I ran across in the Primo Paras again. And why doesn't God, you know, make everything immediately? For example, God immediately is the cause of what? Adam, right? Why didn't he make you and me and every other human being like he made Adam, right? Why does he, you know, do all this stuff about parents and grandparents and all this sort of stuff, right? You know? Why does he have these secondary causes, right, then? Okay. Well, one reason I've seen Thomas give many times when he talks about this is that God wants to share the nobility he has of being a cause. And the cause is a better thing than the effect, right? And God wants to share something of the nobility of a cause of us, right? So, therefore, he has these secondary causes, huh? And so, I thank God for creating my immortal soul. But I thank God for my body. But it came from God through my parents, right? So, I have to thank them, too, right? And they share in this, huh? Then Thomas gives a second reason this bigger text in the Primo Paras. It struck me because I think I mentioned I've been reading the 13th Book of Wisdom, huh? The metaphysics. And Aristotle was discussing whether you have good or beautiful in geometry, right? And he says, well, the primary meaning of good is the end or purpose, right? But you don't demonstrate in geometry for the end or purpose, huh? You don't see the triangle is pointed to defend itself, you know? So, something has a hard time eating it or something, right? Like a porcupine or something, right? A porcupine, you say, these needles have to drive off, you know? It's like the skunk has something to drive off people, you know? Well, the porcupine, you know? You try to bite a porcupine, you know what I mean? There's some kind of pines, too, that have, you know, stuff that the animals can't really bite into. It's going to be too painful for their mouth. So, Aristotle says, there's beauty in geometry, huh? Now, what's the definition of beautiful? Yeah. More generally, you can say, what pleases with no, right? So, the music of... Mozart, like my friend here, was talking about, it pleased the ear when heard, right, huh? Okay, and he says, now, the three main kinds of beauty and the order which he gives them is order first, right? And then symmetry, huh? And then what, limit. It's striking the order he gives them in those three, right? Now, you know how Aristotle praises Homer, right? They're teaching all the Greeks how to make a good plot. And when he talks about tragedy, he says the plot is the soul of tragedy, right? That's to show it's the most important thing, right? But what did Homer do with the plot? What did he do? Well, it's not like a TV continuing series here, you know, or one thing after another happens to the hero, you know? It's not about one man, what happens to him, right? But it's about a course of action that has a beginning, middle, and end, right? And later on, he says, tying the knots and untying the knots, right? But beginning, middle, and end, you can see that's order, right, huh? Okay? What's the best thing after God? Yeah, but the order of the universe, huh? The form of the universe, huh? Okay? I mean, universe as a whole is better than just one of its parts, right? But the ultimate perfection universe is in the order, right? You see it most perfectly in the order of the angels, right? Once you're in the audience to compare the order, you know, it teaches, you know, to the order of the angels, right? So Aristotle's like the highest angel there, and then Thomas is the one who can explain Aristotle, and then I can explain Thomas for you, and down the line, right? So I was struck by his giving as the first kind of beauty order, right, huh? And you can see that in Mozart's music, right? I was listening to the 18th Piano Concerto and the 24th Piano Concerto. Candace and Dahl know Mozart's music at once. I have to go from one piece to another, right? But it's, I have to keep up all the time if I don't, you know, I haven't heard this piece right now long, and it's so beautiful, it's just struck, you know? Having to take out my low opinion of the 18th Piano Concerto, I was like, this is really good. I didn't realize this is so good. How can I have been so deaf, you know? You know? You know, when Boswell's trying to get Samuel Johnson, you know, to appreciate good music, you know? And, uh, Paul Johnson realized what he's doing for him, right? You're giving me another sentence, he says. You know, Boswell, you know, he would, he would pass up an opportunity to be with Johnson if he could go hear a concert of Handel, because he realized that Handel is something, he's got a good judgment, huh? So I was struck with this passage, you know? I was trying to understand, what does he mean by limits, huh? You know, why does he say that, huh? And I was remembering the things that I've read, you know, from people who are very sharp, you know? And one guy was a guy named Shaw Holmes, right? And, uh, there's a famous story of his, I think it's called the Norwalk Builder, or something like that. But anyway, this guy is kind of a nasty character. He's been, uh, told to get lost by this woman, and he's trying to get in with her, right? And he's trying to make it appear like she has committed, her son has committed this murder, this crime, you know? And he's a very clever guy, right? He makes it very convincing. And even, you know, Shaw Holmes is kind of, you know, taken in by it to some extent. But then he went one step too far, right? Holmes caught him, right? And so, like there are in a lot of these Shaw Holmes stories, there's kind of a conversation between Holmes and Dr. Watson, right, his good friend, after the thing is, you know, solved and it's settled and so on. And he's talking to Watson, he said, he was really clever, this guy, and he had me kind of fooled for a while, you know? And I never got to show Holmes. I mean, it's really, really well done, you know? But he said he lacked the supreme gift of the artist knowing when to stop. That's an easy thing, right? And I have a beautiful book at home there on Italian paintings, you know? And I know I'm talking about Titian's painting of the Assumption of Mary, you know? It's beautiful. The church has done its own church and so on. But in the course of praising Titian as being the supreme master of this kind of thing, he always knew where to stop, you know? These guys are very sharp, you know? It's the same thing that my friend Sherlock Holmes was saying, you know? The admirable stories of Sherlock Holmes, as Albert Einstein said, right? The admirable. And then I've read many books on Mozart, you know? And I say the same thing by these great critics, you know? Mozart always arrives at his goal, but never goes beyond it. He always knows when to stop, right, huh? I just think that I'm struck by the way he ends the greatest opera of all, the opera of operas on Don Giovanni, right, huh? As Kierkegaard says, Don Giovanni is the opera of what the Iliad is to epic, right? There's never going to be anything better than the Iliad among those epics, huh? There's never going to be anything, you know? My good friend Washington Irving, right? Don Giovanni is the opera of operas, right? Oh, yeah. We appreciate it, huh? I just, the way Mozart didn't say, you know? I said, gee, you know, I would go on, Beethoven would go on from bar to bar, you know? I'd be like, I've done such a great thing, you know? So Mozart would just win the stop, right? I used to talk to my girl's students there at Sumption there, and I explained that the Greek word cosmos, right, which is the Greek word for universe, huh? But it means a beautiful, ordered whole, right, huh? Now, do you see the connection between that and the word cosmetics, right? Father Harden calls the art of reducing cosmetics as role-playing. Yeah. Except everybody's trying to look. But, because men just can help with women look more beautiful, right, huh? But you have to know when to stop. There's something when they've slobbered on, and it just, it just, yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's what that Horace Menas means, right, huh? The idea of limit. I can see it in these things, right? The beautiful woman's face, the great music of Mozart, the paintings of Titian, right, huh? The shock home saying the same thing, right, huh? But the first thing you always talk to us is that of what order, right, huh? Well, what I was struck by was, I had that in my mind. I mean, around for a week, you know, with the same sentence in my mind. You see that once in Indiana all the time. You know, lay down and you still lay down yourself thinking it was one sentence, you know, that once in Indiana was, I told you that time, when I was trying to solve a problem I'd had as an undergraduate, you know, and it became relevant to my doctoral thesis, right? And I was writing on the Monsignor Dian, and I put together something Thomas said, something Monsignor Dian said, and BAM! Like that, you know, like that. He said, I'm going to check this out. This has been four or five years since I got to solve this problem. And I said, I ran down to see Monsignor Dian, you know. I started off on a nice roadway. He said, I know where you're going, you know, he says. I said, damn it. I said, could I go there, you know, what? I'm using a marvelous mind, you know. So, but the first thing Aristotle says is order, right? Now, I was struck by Thomas. He gave us two reasons why God doesn't cause everything immediately himself, right? He wants to work through what? Secondary causes and so on, right? And the one reason I said I already gave was to give us a share in the excellence of what? A causality. A causality, right? A causality, right? You know, if we were just, just effects, all the effects of God, then the creatures would have no share in the causality of God, right? And that would be a great defect, right? And the other reason he gives is so that there could be the beauty of the order of causes. That's something, right? I was struck by using the word, what? Beauty there, right? But in terms of what? Order. Order, yeah. That order is something very beautiful to the mind, right? He says about the Church, right? He talks about the Contemplative Life Act of Life. He talks about orders, duties in the Church, and states. Yeah. And he says part of the reason for these distinctions in the Church is... Yeah. ... ...