Logic (2016)
Lecture 20: Logic, Predication, and the Categories

Transcript
================================================================================

You know, see, I had a little quote there from Cajetan. Now, you know who Cajetan is? Huh? Yeah, he's a famous Dominican, right? I mean, there's other Cajetans, too, but this is the famous Dominican. And if you get the great, glorious, what, the Leonite edition of Thomas, right? They have, what, the Summa Helogiae, right? They have, yeah, they have Cajetan's kind of commentary on it, you know? Okay. But he has something on the ice of Gauguin. He has something on the categories, right, Cajetan and other things. And Thomas didn't finish his commentary on the Pyramonias, so Cajetan finished it, right? Cajetan, he became, you know, he was sent by the church to argue with Martin Luther, right? And I guess he became, I think he became the head of the Dominicans, too, the master general. And he's supposed to have said, I forget the exact thing, but he, you know, he said that if a Dominican doesn't study, I forget how many hours a day it was, five hours, what it was, four or five hours, he's living in sin, you know? Because Dominicans are supposed to be, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Notice this thing, though, from the beginning here, right, huh? That's the Latin word for, about the categories, right? Okay. I forget, in Albert the Great or in Cajetan, they'll speak of the isogogi as de predicabilibus, right? And they speak of the categories as de predicamentis. But they both come from the word predicara, right? Which means what? Yeah, it means, it means originally, though, Latin, set of, right? Yeah, okay. So when you define genius, you say it's a name, right? Said with one meaning of many things, you're talking about something said of, what? Another, right? I think I mentioned how, in wisdom, Aristotle sometimes takes us by the hand and leads us in from natural philosophy, right? And sometimes, at times, he takes us by the hand and leads us into wisdom from logic, right? And Thomas points out, you don't proceed the same way in logic and in, what, natural philosophy, right? But now, with the brevity of wisdom of which Shakespeare speaks, right, huh? Thomas describes the way of natural philosophy and the way of logic with one word. That natural philosophy proceeds by way of motion. So even nature is defined by motion, isn't it? You're defining motion and you're talking about time, which is the measure of motion and so on. And even the modern scientist is, what, watching motion, right, to know things, right? Or shooting some of the elementary particles and seeing how fast this thing goes or what goes and breaks up. But he says logic proceeds by way of, what? Predication. Just one word, right? Okay? So logic is always considering the way this is said of that. The way something is said of something other than itself, right? And so one of the fundamental distinctions in logic is distinction between a name said univocally of many things, right? And a name said equivocally of many things into equivocal by chance and equivocal by, what, reason, right? So that's, these are distinctions that the logician makes, right? Or points out, right, huh? So man is said of us three, right? Univocally, right? We say you're a man because you're an animal that has reason, right? And you're a two-footed animal that has reason too. I am a two-footed animal that has reason, right? Okay. Well, if we look at the statue of somebody up there, right, huh? Let's see. It's a man, right? It's equivocal, isn't it, now? But maybe not by chance, right? Okay. And so you can, when I say, I like you because you're like me, the word like there is what? Yeah, yeah. See? Isn't it? So this is what logic does, right? And so we go to the predicables, right? These are ways that something can be said univocally of many things, right? Either it's univocally as regards its, what, nature, right? Or outside its nature, and then you subdivide those, right? Okay. So the genus is said of many things differing in species, signifying what it is, right? But the difference is said of many things differing in species, not as many as the genus, but said of more than one, like equilateral is said of more than one quadrilateral, but it signifies how it is what it is, right? And then the species is said, you know, a little differently, right? It signifies what it is, but it's not said of many differing in species, right? Okay. Actually, the word species can become kind of critical in some ways. Okay. Okay. So, and the categories are, what, the ten highest, what, genus, right, huh? And they're, what, the genus, they've said many things, right? And said with more or less the same meaning, right? So a lot of musicians are always talking about that, right? They say the word category comes from, what, the law firm, right? So when the Pharisees or someone are accusing our Lord of blasphemy or whatever they're accusing him of, you have the word category in Greek, right, in the gospel, which is written in Greek, right, and so, but notice the idea of accusing you, right, huh? And if I'm going to, you know, bring you to trial, I'm going to accuse you of something, right? You're a murderer or you're a thief or you're an abyssler or something, right? And so they borrowed their word, right, or generalized it, right? So I sometimes call it the ten categories, the ten set-ups, right? But the set of vast multitude of things, right? So the magician is talking about that, right? Now, when you get to the syllogism, right, huh? The syllogism is based on the set of all and the set of none. If A is set of all B, then A is set of whatever B is set of. If A is set of none of the Bs, A is denied of whatever B is set of, you know? So these are great principles. The set of all and the set of none, they call them, right? Dice di omne, dicci di nulla. In Latin, huh? But it goes back to what? The idea of being set of, right, in some way, right? When I say every student passed or some students passed, sometimes I say it of all, sometimes I say it of what? Some, right, huh? Here's some students, they say, suppose I give an exam, right? The students say, are they passed or not, right? They say, do we pass, Prof? And I say, some of you passed. Have I said that some of you have not passed? Have I? See? You've got to be very careful there, right, huh? Because suppose I'm correcting the exams, right? And I've corrected half of them, right? And everybody I've corrected so far has passed, right? Now, can I say that you've all passed? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? See? And even if they all passed, would it be false to say some of them have passed? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? All I can say truthfully is, some of you have passed, right? It would be. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. So you might say, well, if we all passed, why would Berkowitz say that some of you have passed, right? Well, it could be because he's only corrected some of the papers. So he doesn't know if everybody's passed, right? I can say some of you have passed. But I can't say that all of you have passed. I can't say some of you have not passed either, can I? People might jump right now. Why did he say some of them have passed if he didn't mean that some of them have not, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, so the magician's going to talk about these things, right? Okay. And, you know, if some men are white, right? Can you conclude that all men are white from that? It might be that the men I've seen were all white, huh? My mother tells me. She came to a little small town in Minnesota, right? Watertown. I guess the little boy had never seen a black person, you know? And so they were walking down in the big town, right? And a little black boy comes by. And the little white boy from Watertown said, Go home and wash your face. It's a bad thing. It actually happened. It's about to tell me the story, right? But if you lived in the darkest Africa, you might think that everybody is what? Black. Black, yeah. But can you conclude from that, right? That some, or that all men are black, you know? A little teacher, Kisurita, I showed this picture one time, didn't I? He'd say, now, suppose someone went up to Mars, there's another planet, right? And he came back and he said, you know, there's pink snow on Mars. Would you say that's impossible? I'd be surprised, but I'd say, that's impossible. I don't see why it's impossible for snow to be pink, do you? There may be some reason, but I don't know the reason why it could be pink, right? But suppose you said, you know, the food situation on the Earth is saved now, and Mars, a half a stone is as big as a whole stone. Would you say about that? Yeah, I'd say. You know, I'd say it's impossible, right, for a half a stone to be as big as a whole stone. But that the snow is pink there on Mars, I'd be surprised, but, you know, I wouldn't say. So if you lived in darkest Africa, you might think everybody's black, right? You might be surprised if I found out there's white people, or vice versa, right? This little boy. That's his colour of skin, right? But you don't see maybe the reason why somebody can be, you know? What's the name of that vegetable there, the jolly green man, you know? All right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know. Maybe I see anybody who's green, you know, this green colour of skin. I don't know. I don't think there is, but I don't see why there's just be white and black and yellow and not green, do you? I mean, all these trees around here are green, and it seems to be a sign of life, you know? Evergreen, huh? Let's look at the texture now from Kajetan, right, in the middle of page three here. Notice what he's saying in the Latin, if you can read Latin at all. So, post-predicamentum quantitatis, right, huh? After the predicamentum, or the category of quantity, stop him right away. He treats the genus. He uses the concrete one, not relation, but ad aliquid, right, huh? Towards something, right, huh? In Greek it's pros-ti, so ad aliquid is a very good translation. We say it in English, towards something. Because it most of all follows upon, what, quantity, right? So double and half, taller, shorter, right? Okay, wider. And already in the predicament of quantity, the sermo, the speech, about ad aliquid was begun, right, huh? Because he talked about how you could have equal and non-equal there. It's kind of like a property, right, and those are things, huh? Where about magno and parvo disputatum est, right, huh? And also in the predicament, or the category, that's Latin word for equality, about it there will be had speech. Although, notice he says, nature e ordine, although in the order of nature, right, post qualitatum, both action and passion, set, right, huh? Okay? It goes on here, huh? I think myself right here, huh? I'm quoting here from Kajitana. I think the chief reason is connected with the two definitions of this chapter, right, huh? And those are said to be towards something, which as regards what they are, are said to be of another, or in some other way towards another. That's like the batonic definition of it, right? The first definition, right? And then those are towards something who's being, meaning being in the sense of nature, right, is towards something in some way, right? Now, sometimes I kind of exaggerate that a bit, and I say that the category of towards something is about those things whose whole nature is to be, what, towards something, right? In themselves, they're nothing, right? Like double and half, right? How much is, what? I gave you double, right? Sounds pretty good, right? But what am I doubling, right, huh? Maybe something very small, right, huh? So is double anything in itself? How much is double? Is double more than a half? Which is more, a half of ten or a double of two? So you've got to be careful here, right, huh? You know? Because double and half don't tell you in itself what it is, do they? See? They only say what it is towards something else, right? So is four double or a half? But towards two it's double, and towards eight it's half, right? But double and half seem to be in some way opposed, don't they, right? When Aristotle takes up opposites, he'll begin with relatives, right, huh? Towards something, right? Because he's already talked about them, right? Although that's the reason, the least kind of opposition, huh? If I get contours that hot and cold, I can't really be hot and cold at the same time, right? But I can be double and half at the same time, right? So when you read the text of Aristotle, right, huh? Before he gives the second definition that we give here, right, he's talking about how even the parts of a substance would be said to be of something, the heart of my body, right? The liver of my body, right, huh? The part of the whole, right? Well, then a substance would be just a bunch of what? Towards somethings, right? Make any sense? No. So the fact that something can be said to be of another is not enough to say that it's really a species fundamentally of what? Towards something. It could be fundamentally what? Something substantial, right? Like part of my body, right, huh? Probably something that's fundamentally a quality, right? Like my knowledge of something, right, huh? Or my power to do something, right? It's a subtle thing, isn't it? It's a subtle thing, isn't it? It's a subtle thing, isn't it? And so, we'll put something in the category where it most of all belongs, right? Later on, Aristotle, when he talks about quality, he will say that you can maybe say that the quality is in the genus of quality, but the relation that falls upon it can be put in any other category, right? You know? But it's not fundamentally towards something because it's said to be of something, right? It's got to be that its whole being or nature, right, is to be towards something, right? And that's what you can see about things like double most clearly, right? See, double is in itself, what is it? I was talking to a student there a couple years ago, and he said, I was an auditorium in my class, huh? Well, it's, you know, because we have a very small class, he said. She didn't want to make me think that I was, you know, that she was greater than she was, right, you know? I was kind of impressed that she was a valedictorian in the class, right? No, no, I wasn't in homeschooling, but it was, you know, some little minor school, you know? Yeah. But you see, I was a valedictorian in my Harvard class or something, right? Or, you know, Douglas MacArthur was a valedictorian at the West Point, you know, large class, right? And so, okay, that's impressive, right, no? There's three or four guys at your place, and valedictorian doesn't mean too much, right? He might not even be too bright even if it's a, you know, backward school and so on. He says, the first definition is said to be platonic, right, huh? But this definition is so broad as to include the parts of substance, right? And qualities that have relation following upon them, right? The nature of quality and the parts of substance is not primarily to be towards something. And the second definition limits this genus, huh? To that whose very being or nature is to be in some way, what, toward another, right? So since this book is about names signifying what things are, we must take into account, right, the distinction between something whose whole nature is to be towards something and something whose fundamental nature is not that, even though it may have some relation, what, following upon it, right? Now, how should essay be understood in the second definition of towards something, right? Are you talking about essay in the sense of existence or essay in the sense of what nature? Yeah, see, it's a little bit like the problem you have in English, huh? What does the word being mean, huh? Well, you could say one meaning of being would be, what, existence, right? But if I say you're a human being, does being mean there? Your human existence? No. It's more of a nature, right, huh? Being there, right? What kind of a being are you? You're a human being, right? I call Tabitha and that cat there, you know, feline being. So a being can have a sense of what? The nature of a thing. And that's the way I was talking about using the word being there, right? In the text or the Greek, huh? Now, I was mentioning before, you know, the, what do you came in? In the Loeb thing, you know. When he gets to that second definition, huh? Let me see what he says here. It's not very, you know, the Loeb is notorious for begging to that translation, right? The former definition applies to all relatives beyond any doubt. But the fact that a thing is explained by a reference to something outside it is not the same thing as to say that it is a necessity relative. That doesn't get the proper idea, right? But the Greek says, right, huh? Hodea protorocerismas, the former definition, right? Paracoluthe follows upon pasia all, right? Tois prosti, all the things that are prosti, right? But it's not the same thing, right, huh? The prosti to the east, to the outa haper esti, what they are, right? Heteron, legosti, right? What they are, in their very nature, right? To be of another. And he has the footnote here. There seems to be something wrong here with the text. But here Aristotle is giving the reason why he's correcting the definition of Plato, right? And some truth to it, right? But you're talking about things that are not fundamentally towards something, right? But they have an aspect of being towards something as a result of what they are, right? So I turned 81, so I'm older than most men. Yeah, yeah. It was the same thing to be 81 years old and to be older than other men. But the kind of relation follows upon being 81, right? So older than most men, right? You know? My wife's saying, hey, these people are dying younger than you. If you look at the, you know, the obituaries, you know, the deity and newspaper, you know, I mean, most of them are younger than 80, you know, and white bad, you know. So there's a difference, right, between something whose fundamental nature is something other than towards something, right? And something whose whole nature is to be towards something, isn't it? And you put, therefore, knowledge and power primarily in quality, right? And the relation to the father of the father, if you want to put it in relation, makes some sense, right? But simply speaking, you put it in the category of towards something, something whose whole nature, whose whole being is to be towards something, right? There's nothing in itself, right? So when Thomas distinguishes between relation and quantity and quality, quantity and quality are what? Something absolute, right? And relation is nothing absolute, right? There's nothing in itself, right? It's only towards another, right? Okay? What is it to be double? What is it? What is it to be taller, right? I remember when I was first getting into astronomy, right? Into astronomy in sixth grade there, and you'd read about Metal Juice, there are some of these stars, and you'd say, oh, the solar system could be fitted into this thing. Wow! You're impressed with the size of these, you know, some of these big stars and so on, huh? And after a while, you'd see it's all kind of relative, right? So I could take, you know, a line that is what, greater than this other line, you know, by as much as this star is greater than our solar system, right? You know? These things are divisible forever, right? Big deal, right? I can get things just thousands or a million times, right? You know, try the line once and it's something twice as big now, you know, four times as big. I can go on forever, right? Make it greater, greater, greater. So I get a little more cynical about these things. It's something relative, right? We have some of the texts here where we explain the different senses of what being, you know, the special that you find in Aristotle. It's a good name for the sophomore in the fifth. Book of Wisdom, Metaphysics. Essay to obis modis digitur. It said in two ways, right? In one way, according as it signifies the truth of a, what? Proposition, right? According as is the copula in there, right? And thus, as the commentator says there at Severoes, being is a predicato macidentale. And this being is not in the thing, but in the mind, which joins the subject, the predicate. As the philosopher says, in the sixth book of Metaphysics, huh? Let me ask you a question, huh? Would you say that nothing is nothing? You wouldn't say nothing is something, would you? No. At no some reason, the word is, right? You're saying nothing is. Right? It's an odd sense of being, isn't it, right? It's in the mind, right, huh? It's true to say that nothing is nothing, right? My teacher, because Zurich said, you know, floss is the only place where you can get paid for talking about nothing. I mean, Zurich, you get somebody going there, you know, they get kind of confused about the thing you say. Does the word nothing mean something? Well, in natural philosophy, there's a famous thing, you know, that you can't get something out of nothing, right? And you know what King Lear says to Cordelia, right, huh? You know King Lear? Shame on you. Shame on you. It's funny when I was at Laval there, Chris. Some of these references to his native language was French, you know, they would be quoting Shakespeare, you know, and kind of embarrassing us Americans. So she'd know Shakespeare because we're English with our native language, right? And he's the master of English, right? But, you know, the King Lear is kind of synod, right? And he wants to retire from his throne, right? And so he's got three daughters, and he asks them, you know, do you love me, right? And of course, you know, the first daughter, you know, she's talking about how much love she had. And it's time to honor her, you know, and Cordelia, she can't just throw her heart into her mouth like that and kind of flatter the King, right, huh? And so she's loving him according to how she loves him, you know, but she's not, you know. And then I was like, oh, you think I love daddy so much, right? And he says, is that all you can say, you know? Nothing will get you nothing, he says. You know, so what? But this is the thing, you know, can you get something out of nothing, right? And of course, it's the problem that people raise when they ask about creation, right, huh? Is creation making something from nothing? I must understand that, right, huh? Does he make it from nothing if you're speaking affirmatively? Or is it really that to make something from nothing means to make it not from something, right? To not make it from some matter, right, huh? So there's a lot of problems with nothing, right, huh? But he has to have some meaning to the word nothing, right, huh? What's a square circle? Is that something? Well, square circle is nothing, then, huh? That's what it is, right? That's a very diminished sense of what, right? A very diminished sense of being, right, huh? But when I say that nothing is nothing, I seem to be saying something that's true, don't I? So what kind of being is that, right? Aristotle talks about that, right? Being in the mind only, right, huh? He said nothing. Because the problem is to what that means, right? Did you really say nothing? Is that what you said? Or do you mean you didn't say anything, you know? What do you mean when you say, he said nothing, huh? I gave you nothing. Did I give you something? I gave you nothing. Didn't give you anything. But we kind of, you know, there are problems there, huh? But there's a kind of truth, though, right? It signifies the truth of proposition, right, huh? And this being is not in the thing, but in the mind, which joins the subject with the, what, predicate, right, huh? Another way, that is said to be being, which pertains to the nature of the thing, right, huh? According, it's divided according to the ten, what, genre, substance, quantity, and so on, huh? Sometimes it is taken for the essence, right? According to which the thing is, and so on. Okay, so this next text of Thomas, huh? It seems that these relations are not the divine essence, right? For either of the things I said relatively in God are either relativa secundum esse, or only secundum dicci, right? Now that's, from Thomas now here, he's speaking in the way that the medieval is dead, right? The first definition, right, of relativa, is a definition of relativa secundum dicci. They're said to be of another, even though they're not be fundamentally a, what, relation, right? And then the relative secundum, what, esse, right, huh? But these relations in God are not, what, only secundum dicci, because then there would fall the heresy of Sibelius, huh? As Hillary points out in the note above, right? Therefore, these are relativa secundum esse, right? But in such relations, according to the philosopher in the predicaments, adaliquid esse, to be towards something, is to have oneself towards what? Another, right, huh? Since, therefore, the divine essence is not adaliquid sehabere, but something absolute, right? It seems that it's not the same thing with relation, which is secundum esse, according to its nature, adaliquid, huh? The first, therefore, it should be said that those relations are not only according to dici adaliquid, but also secundum esse. But it should be known that esse is said in three ways. The reason why I'm giving you this text is just to, you want to know, Aristotle's foot sense is used the word essay, right? In the, in the, this guy, here is a puzzle, right? But it should be known that esse is said in three ways, huh? In one way, esse is the, what it is, the whatness, or the nature of the thing, right? As when it is said, the definition is speech signifying what it is to be, right? What it is to be a man. What is it to be a man? A two-footed animal with reason, right? For the definition signifies the whatness of a thing, right? In another way, to be signifies the act of essence. That's what we call existence, right? Just as vivere, which is the essay for what? Living things, is the act of the soul. But not the second act, which is operation, but the first act. So you've got to be before you, what? Do something, right? Even Descartes saw that, right? I think, therefore I am. You can be without thinking, but you can't think without being, right? In the third way, being is signifies the truth of the composition that we talked about before in the last text, right? According as S is the copula during the subject and the predicate. And according to this, it is in the understanding. Ding. Ding. Ding. Ding. Ding. composing in an affirming state, or dividing, right, as it regards its confirmation, but it's founded on the Essay of the Thing, which is the act of essence, just as in above has been said about truth. I see, therefore, that when it's said, ad adicud sunt, whose being is to have itself to another, this is Aristotle's second definition, right? He's referring to that, that has his girl puzzled, right? Right? It's understood about the Essay that is the, what, quantity of the thing, right, which is signified by the definition, right? If I asked you what is to be a human being, I'm looking for what? A definition of human being, right? And so the being there is referring to the nature of the thing, right? But the other sense of being is what? Existence, right? Cease to be. Because the very nature of relation, which is constituted in such a genus, is to be referred to another, right, huh? And it's not understood about the Essay, which is the act of essence, which would be the, the, what, existence, right, huh? It's, again, a little difficult for our purposes right here, huh? So, there is the Ratio Paternity, and other the Ratio Viscence. As every student of the Seventh Book of Wisdom knows, Aristote often contracts his phrase, what was to be, to, to be, huh? Which I find kind of confusing, but anyway. We can now examine the distinction between relations made in the two definitions. This is in the chapter now, relation there. There is a fundamental distinction of relations made in Latin, or named in Latin, between the relativas secundum dicci, right? What is said to be of another right, whether it's fundamentally relation or not, and relativas secundum esse, whose very nature is to be towards something, right? So, you can kind of see it with the idea of double, right? Double is nothing in itself, right? It's only something towards another, right, huh? The same way for half, right, huh? But knowledge, right, and power, right, ability, are something in themselves, right? Even though you might have a relation following upon them. And so they, in Latin, were called relativas secundum esse, right? But esse means their sense of nature, right, huh? But they are, right? What is it to have some ability? Just to be towards another? No. It's more than that, right, huh? It's fundamentally equality, right, huh? Rawr! Now, this distinction tells us nothing about whether the relations are real or of reason. But this is another distinction that's made of relations, huh? This is going beyond the text now, huh? Because in the chapter on towards something, the chapter on relation, Aristotle, he doesn't use these words, obviously, but he's distinguishing between relativea secundum dicci, which is the Italian definition, and the relativea secundum esse, which is the one that really puts things in that category, right? But there's another distinction between real relations and relations of what? Of reason, right? Now, a fundamental text on the distinction between the relativea secundum dicci and the relativea secundum esse is this text of Thomas, right? This is a very difficult thing now to understand this, right? And this is why Aristotle had to take up relation before what? Quality. Because he had to distinguish between those two, right? Because only the relativea secundum esse are primarily and fundamentally and wholly in the category of towards something. And the relativea secundum what? Dicci, right? They can be fundamentally in some other category, right? Even in substance or more often in quality, huh? And that's what Thomas says here in this beautiful text. Guess where it's taken from? Yeah, the most powerful, huh? The disputed questions on power. It feels like we, the thing in my mind is being, you know, you know, yeah, I'm just being pulverized by the, by the, by the, by this thing, huh? Well, let's look at the English here that I've translated here. And that, that'll get translated there. Let's look at the Latin. And I like that translation. I know we've got that there. The distinction of their relative, that's right? Secundum esse and secundum dicci, nihil facetana says, right? In order that a relation be what? Real, huh? For some relativas, secundum esse, are not real. As right and left in the column, right? And some are relative, secundum dicci, which nevertheless imply real relations as is clear about what? Science and sense, right? Now, names are called relative secundum esse, when the names are placed upon things to signify what? The relations themselves, right? But relative secundum dicci, when the names are placed upon something to signify qualities or something else chiefly or principally, right? To which nevertheless there follows certain what? Relations, right? As Aristotle first saw this, right? And as far as this is concerned, it makes no difference whether the relations are real or reason-only. That's an even more difficult distinction to know, right? The famous example that you find in Aristotle that they take out from knowledge is really related to the thing known. But is the thing known really related to the knowledge? It's just that when we have one thing towards another, we tend to think of the other in a reverse way, right? Towards the first thing, right? But why isn't the relation of the known to the knower, right? Or to the knowledge not real, especially in material things? Well, yeah, but I mean, it's a very subtle thing about what's the basis for knowing, right? Suppose I have a lump of clay, right? And let's say it's in the shape of a cube, to make it simpler. And I say, now, could you give that clay the shape of a seer? What would happen to the cube shape that it had? What? Yeah, yeah. So... matter receives a shape that it doesn't have it loses the shape it does have right now what happens when the eye receives the shape of something yeah yeah and is the shape of the chair over there when i receive that shape in my eye right did my eye lose the shape that it had so it's something very subtle not annoying right you're receiving the shape of another not as your own shape but as a shape of another right but that reception is is in the eye right it's not out there in the wooden chair is it so the reality of knowing is based upon something that only the eye has the ability to receive the shape of another without losing its own shape right and without what and receiving the shape of another as that of another right so i'm knowing the shape of another right the eye doesn't really i mean the thing out there doesn't really have that kind of way of receiving does it so knowledge is really in the what knower and the relation of the knower to the known is really in him right is it really in the chair out there someone's up there you know there's an actor's looking at you down there you don't know he's doing it is you're being seen by him anything in you but he's seeing you is good added to you isn't it so aristotle says the relation of the knower to the known is real but of the known to the knower is not real right it's a very subtle thing right now the more common thing is you know if you say oh let's say the uh they used to take example of pillar right the left and the right side of the pillar right if i understand for the pillar the right side of the pillar and the left side of the pillar is that distinction between left and right and the pillar really in the pillar but in me there's real distinction between left and right because i haven't raised handed huh somebody else i don't know obama's left hand is like you're in the side you want some siding you know and uh so there's a real difference you know in the distinction between left and right huh in the body right but it's not really in the polarism but we could talk about the left side of the right side of the pillar right got chipped here on the left side you know something about the image you know we do you know because that is there really a distinction the left and the right thing you know call that a relation of reason right now it's spoken of but it's not really what in reality right this is a different distinction between real relations and relations of reason huh and the distinction between simply and and uh and uh and relatives couldn't message couldn't teach you right because left and right even instead of the pillar are what their whole nature is to be what relative right they're not something else right primarily it's not real it really gets difficult to get into you know saying um is the relation of the creature to god real he really depends right on it but is the is god really related to the creature that's the very see yeah yeah there's no change in god right huh absolutely but uh when god knocks uh peter i mean paul off his horse and so on a little change is going to take place in paul there right now you know but god never changes right god is unchanging this is one of the five attributes of the substance of god right it's unchanging so god never changes there's no movement in god huh he's always the same sounds awfully dull or no you know i'm always quoting this proverb when i heard as a little boy you know variety is the spice of life right you know what the same thing for dinner every night you know and do the same thing every day right and so on two of my my grandchildren came out you know before the rest of them did right they flew out right so rose and i were entertained them you know and taking them here taking them there right so they do one thing one day another day another thing right it's the spice of life right so that's that's something that i think people you know you've probably heard that that proverb i would shoot and uh otherwise your life is kind of dull and boring right now well if god never changes right now um there's no variety in god's life oh my god yeah yeah yeah you're a hard time understanding that right now you know when uh shakespeare or not you know aristotle rather he makes the first sense of before and after is time right now and time is the number of the before and after in motion right so motion is what seems most real to us right so our knowledge starts with our senses and shakespeare says things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs right and so god never moves since he says didn't seem to be real you know yet you know when uh aristotle and and we eat this and so on to get through showing that god is unchanging right that he never changes then they say that god is not in time right god's life is not measured by time well what's it measured by then well if you want to say it's measured by i'd say by eternity right well thomas always follows uh his master there the definition of eternity that weight is right and the definition of guarantee is totesimo all at once right and perfect possession right so in the in and wait is kind of takes us by the hand and says the now that flows along it's always different right the now in the class here is always what different yeah that the now that flows along makes time right now stands still makes what yeah yeah when i was a little boy you know i can still remember these pictures in the fairy tale books right now you know the wicked picture somebody puts something you're frozen right huh and you remember in the book there you know it has a picture of the servant coming in you know with with the cake or the or this meat or whatever it is you know he's frozen right well if you froze the now of time how much life would you have in the now of time i couldn't read i couldn't read one page of thomas right one paragraph right of time it takes me some time however little time may be to read the paragraph i can't do all these little paragraphs what what life would i have in the now of time in the now of time if it could be frozen like that right it's not until the prince comes along and gives the princess a kiss and then you know the whole everybody starts moving again right huh you know gee whiz is god frozen in one now right see this is but in that now he has a perfect possession of what an unending life right you know he's you know compared to god's life we're like what dead almost right you know we're hardly uh right compared to god right and because the past away has gotten away from us and the future is not here yet and how much life do i have in the now i can't even hear one melody of mozarts in the indivisible now right