Logic (2016)
Lecture 33: The Trinity and the Senses of Before

Transcript
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Now, does a cat have a four-chambered heart? There's a privation in my mouth. Yeah, you just don't know, right? But now if you try to say whether it's a four-chambered heart or a three-chambered heart or a two-chambered heart, you might be mistaken, right? So the difference between being mistaken, right? To be mistaken is to have an opinion, right? To be mistaken is not to have an opinion, it's to lack the... They give me a glass of dry red wine and say, what kind of grape is this, right? But Mark would know. Or Brother Mark would know, yeah. Notice, huh? The man who knows has the true thinking, right? And the man who's mistaken has the false thinking, right? But the man who's merely ignorant just... So these things are important, right? Is ignorance something bad? But it's as bad as a mistake, right there. So, so, we've got a little more insight into the opposites, right? Okay. And Thomas does divide them into what? Unfold, right? He divides them into two, right? And then he subdivides one into what? Three, yeah. So he follows the rule of two or three, right, huh? Aristotle didn't do that, right, huh? And when he enumerated the ten categories of Aristotle there in the text that we have in the thing, when Thomas distinguishes the ten, he divides them into what? Three. And he keeps them dividing into two or three until he's got all ten, right, huh? As if you can't understand it, really, without dividing usually into twos or threes, huh? So I've seen this over and over again in Thomas, you know? So, by induction of any other reason, I come up to rule, you know, that certainly for the most part, you know, to understand, you have to divide into two or three, huh? And if you divide into more than three, right, then you have to subdivide into twos and threes to get them, right? Let's look at a texture now in the senses of before, right? The short text, senses of before, the short text. This is the second of the, what, post-predicaments, right? Okay. Now, notice the title of this article here in the Thomas's Scriptum, Super Libre Fris Intensiarum. The sentences were what worked with that in the Middle Ages. What was that position of that work, huh? It's kind of the standard work, right? In theology, huh? You know, it's replaced by the Summa Theologiae. The sentences, everybody would write a commentary on the sentences, right? So Thomas did, and I guess Albert the Great did, and I guess he probably bet you, and so on, huh? Okay. So he's asking the question here, whether the father is what? Yeah. Now, as you know, we know more what God is not than what he is, right? So if the father is before the son, we'd have to ask him, what sense of before is the father before the son, right? But if we're going to have an example here of knowing more what God is not, or what is not in the Trinity, we'd have to go through all the sentences of before, right, huh? To the first, then, one proceeds thus, huh? It seems that the father is before the son, huh? For just as corruption has itself to what? I suppose non-being, right? So, generation is to what? Beginning, right? So all ceases to be when I corrupt, right, huh? Okay. When I was generated, I began to be, right, huh? But everything that is corrupted ceases to be, right? Therefore, everything that is generated begins to be by generation. Therefore, the son began to be. And therefore, he's, yeah, in the first sense of before, right? You know, it sounds like I have convinced a dummy like me, you know? Moreover, nothing receives something, right? Accepts something, right? Accepts what it doesn't have. But everything that is generated receives being from the one, what? Generating it, right? Therefore, everything that's generated before the generation does not have being. And that's the same thing as we said before, right? It's obviously the father is before the son, right? Convinces me. Moreover, a beginning is naturally before that of which it is a beginning. Well, I'll go along with that. It doesn't make sense to me. But the father is the beginning of the son. Therefore, even if not in time, at least by nature, he is before him. Sounds damn good, huh? I'm convinced, right? You heard the story about Voltaire's once a gun, too, you know? So we get these objections that Thomas has against his own thinking, and then he'd, you know, pull them up on these, you know, Christians and so on. Unrespecting clergy, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of embarrassing, right? You know, having dinner, you know, and being in a good time, you know, and also I hit you with this objection. Oh, my God, you know. I mean, I can't say anyway out of it, and it's going to be, I'll be not capable of defending the faith, right? It's terrible. Moreover, to give being is some, what? Dignity on something very worthwhile. But the father gives being, his own being, to the son. Therefore, the father, at least, what? In dignity, right? Is before the son, right? That's kind of like the fourth sense, huh? My brother Mark and I used to joke about getting some of these dumb professors, you know, locking in a room, you know, and just dropping in the objections to see what they can do with them, you know? Don't give them the exclusion, by the way, you know? I mean, ideally, you know, if we had all the time in the world, you know, the idea would be to give the students one day the objections and keep them away from the text, you know, and let them, you know, stew a little bit, you know, and be much more thankful, you know, for what Thomas does later on, huh? Moreover, but against this, contrary, this is on the other side, right? Everything in which, what? There was something before. If, therefore, the father was before the son, the son would not be simply first, huh? But all say that God is the first beginning, as even the philosopher says, right? I don't peg in there, Aristotle, right? Therefore, the son would not be God, which the Arians concede, right? Oh, my gosh. I'm now stuck with the Arians, right? So, what does Jerome say? there you know the church woke up and found itself grown he says to find itself arian because bishops you know were a lot of them were arians and emperors were arians and so on oh my god and i'm i'm in that class of those arians oh my god now notice the way thomas begins his response right huh he's the master right now they tell they tell the story you know of thomas coming in you know this kind of a brusque you know posing objections you know and so on everybody's kind of scandalized that he's challenging the great master thomas thomas was great you know very gentle with the students you know and answers his objections right huh i told you i had this student when i was first teaching in california at st mary's college there he'd come in every day just about he'd have an objection you know huh now i've heard all these objections you know and i'd answer the objection you know one time we're having a conversation after this the day after the course was over you know and he said i always thought i was going to have this day you know i answer it should be said that the father in no way is before the son right now so we're going to know something negative about god right that the father is in no way before the son and likewise the father and the son are in no way before the holy spirit but notice what he goes on to say neque durazione connects the first sense huh neque natura second sense neque intellectu neque dignitate yeah you see how thomas is following the four senses in exactly the same what order right it's interesting how that something like the second post pregnant in this case before right then is now being used in the highest at the other end you might say the now right because logic is just the what introduction in sense to philosophy right i mentioned before how how they came to see the ancient gogi you know as the introduction because logic is the way introduction to the first book of large erect you know well look at this he he's using you know in order to show uh adequately that god the father is not before the son he has to show in those four chief senses anyway right that the father is not before the son right okay so where would thomas be without aristotle i remember when cindy talking about the liberal arts right and you know he was a manichaean for a while right huh and the the great uh manichaean there what is his name faust came there he's talking about things that you know above uh augustine's understanding at that time you know but uh you came to see that he didn't you know know the liberal arts faust and uh so he didn't get suspicious of the man right huh i mean how can you know these things are very difficult to know he doesn't know the fundamental things right you know so diane said how would he custom be without the liberal arts right well i say where would thomas be you know in a question like this without knowing the uh categories right and knowing in particular the second but what's pregnant right where would he be in talking about the distinction of the father the son the holy spirit without the first uh post pregnant which is the opposites right because there has to be this is what thomas takes this as being a complete way of talking about formal distinction right and you can't have material distinction he eliminates that possibility right so it's got to be a formal distinction and then he's got to understand all the kinds of opposites in order to see which kind is that distinguishes the father and the son right and now he's using the second one right that's a good good beginning there right now in the part in the father and the son we're not able except two things to consider did you know that either that which is absolute right and that's the what divine nature right and this is common to what both both right whence from this one does not have any priority to the other right since the divine essence is not divisible as has been shown above in this distinction question one article now it's not absolute it's going to be in quadest ad aliquid towards something right i don't know how thomas sees the word ad aliquid there right okay of relatives there is the what now simul is which it's the third he said he's got to know that too right okay so our relatives they are simul by nature according to the philosopher himself right and also by time because placing they place each other right huh that's the kind of opposition it is right can i be taller than you for an hour and then it's not until another hour has passed that you become shorter than me can i even be a father without having a son paul burkus is my first son right was i a father before he was my son simul right it's the third it's the third uh post-prediments right i think aristotle was was thinking about the trinity he must have been thinking about the trinity this is so useful tom the trinity isn't it the first three what post-prediments right they're very useful in thinking about the trinity i think the first one tells you how the trinity are distinguished right and the second and the third about what that they're simul and not one before the other right okay so when shakespeare says there are reasons it looks before and after it does look before and after but it's going to have a negative knowledge here right but there is no before and after and they're also what in understanding right since one is defined through the other right okay so i know what it is to be taller but i know what it is to be shorter i know it is to be double i have the such idea what it is to be half can i really know what double is without knowing what happens okay how about can i know i mean i can although in men the one who is a father right is before the one who is a son right i was before my son okay as socrates was before plato right now nevertheless these two relatives eva insofar as their relatives father and son are simul right in all the foresaid ways they're simul in time right they're simul in what by nature right they're simul in knowledge right then you can see me in deity too yeah once it is clear that the father in no way is what before the son either going to that which is absolute right or crying to that which is towards something right let's go to the first objection right Nothing accepts something except what it does not have, right? Everything generated accepts being from the one gen... No, excuse me, the second one. Corruption, yeah. Okay. As corruption has itself to ceasing to be, so generation to beginning to be, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the generation which is opposed to corruption is a what? Change. And to such a generation, there is always what? Joined a beginning, right? But generation, insofar as it's found in divine things, is not a what? Change. There's no change in God, huh? But it's the operation of the divine nature insofar as it's in the Father. And because a natural operation, always what? Which it is, since the divine nature is eternal, so the generation will be what? Eternal, right, huh? You'd say he's always generated from the... The son is always generated from the Father, right? He doesn't begin to be generated. Strictly speaking, what does it change, right? What does it mean to say that something has changed? In fact, I'm in our next class, and what way it's changed now? Professor Perkist has changed. I'm not the same this week as it was last week, right? So you've got to have something that is, what, composed, right, huh? So it has to be something that was there last week and this week to say that I've changed, right? So is there something, is the son composed or something that changes? Well, he's altogether simple, right, huh? His generation. Now, the second objection there about the one who, what, receives something, right? Doesn't he not have it before he receives it, right? But if he always receives it, he always has it, yeah. Okay. To second, it should be said that the one who receives something, huh, does not have that from himself, right, huh? But nevertheless, it does not follow, right? That he does not have it simply. Because it is possible that, what, that never began, right? He always received it from the father, right? The father's giving the son, the divine nature, is in, what? Not measured by time, right, huh? But it's measured by eternity, right? Okay, so the father always gave the son the divine nature, so the son always had the divine nature. Now, to the third, it should be said, huh? That's the one from the argument from the beginning, right, the father. And Thomas does say, huh, the father is the beginning of the son, right? Because the beginning, in the general sense, is that from which something goes forward, right? From which something proceeds in some way, right, huh? Well, the son goes forward from the father, right? So he's the beginning, right? God from God, light from light, true God and true God, right? To the third, it should be said that a beginning can be considered in two ways. Either that which is a beginning, and this is naturally before that which it is a beginning, right, huh? Or according to the relation of the beginning itself. And thus it is together, simul, naturally with the begun. Now, if there was something from the same thing, having that it is something, and that it is adequate, altogether it would be what? Simul, with that which it is said. And because in divine things, the father from the same has that he'd be someone, right? And that he'd be the father, right? Then simul, by nature, with the son, not only insofar as he's the father, but simply he must be, huh? There's no distinction between the father and... To the fourth, it should be said that the property by which the father gives being is his, what? Dignity. But because dignity is of the absolute things, therefore there's the same dignity in the father and the son. And the same dignity which in the father is fatherhood, and the son is sonship. Just as the fatherhood in the father is the divine essence or the divine goodness, and the same essence and number or goodness is the sonship in the son. Now, that's a very profound, you know, treatment. But Thomas takes it up. The thing I want to emphasize is the fact that his opening sentence, right, and, you see, on Dale. I answer that the father is in no way before the son, neither in duration, nor by nature, nor by understanding, nor in dignity, right, huh? So in a sense, he's taking that distinction of the four chief senses of before as being, what, complete, right? Otherwise, his defense, when he investigates the distinction of the... He takes the distinction of the four opposites as complete for, what, the basis of formal distinction, right? So it's got to be one of these four, right? So there he's trying to find which one of the four it is. Because there is a real distinction. We believe there's a real distinction, right? But we think the father and the son are altogether equal right now, and one is not before the other in any way, right? One duration, nature, and goodness, yeah. You know, you've got to, you know, you've got to, you know, the kind of said, Aristotle is somebody. You know? And it's kind of amazing, huh? The Aristotle is called the father of logic, right? And the first book that has come down to us in Aristotle, right, is the book called the categories, right? Not that there weren't other things to be said, maybe, you know, but this is kind of the most essential book. Aristotle is going to look at this first, right? And the first book that's come down to us in the father of logic, and it's kind of various. And now it's being used at the other end of our knowledge, right? And you're talking about the, what, trinity, the distinction of the persons and their order. Of course, the third one is involved too, right? Hama, right? Because you're showing that there are Hama in all of these, what, four senses that are, it's opposed to the four senses of what before, right? You can say that the son is from the father, though. And for the father is his beginning, right? But you can't say he's before. Again, this text here in relation, but I won't go back to that right now. Let's do this one thing here, though, on page four here, right? Let's do this one, in short text here, page four. Moreover, from eternity, God was before the world. But the relation of priority in God was for eternity. But laying down one of the realtors is necessary to lay down also the rest. Therefore, from eternity, there was the posterity of the world to God. Therefore, from eternity, there was something outside of God, to which in some way belonged what truth. Thank you. Thank you. That's the same as before, huh? And this next objection, right? But you say that that relation of priority and posteriority is not something in verum natura, but in reason only. Again, this, Bwetthia says at the end of the book on the consolation of philosophy, right? God is before the world by nature, although, what? Even as the world. Always was, yeah. Therefore, that relation of priority is relation of nature and not of reason only. Oh my gosh, you know, huh? That can be crazy, this distinction, huh? To the first, so that's the 15th and the 16th objections, right? To the 15th, it should be said that since, what? The other genera, as such, right? Quantum huyus modi. Place something in verum natura. For quantity from this fact that it is quantity says something, right? Relation alone does not have this, huh? From this that is of this sort. That it places something in verum natura. Because it doesn't predicate something. I thought it could, yeah. Yeah. Whence there are found some relations that place nothing in verum natura, but in reason only, huh? Which happens in four ways. That's interesting, huh? He goes to not only the philosopher, but to have a center, right? Okay. We don't have a text of Aristotle where he's maybe fully distinguishing relation to the reason. He doesn't say he didn't know it, right? After all, he's somebody. But in the words of Aristotle that come down to us, right? We don't have all the words of Aristotle, obviously, right? And so we see something behind the center, right? Of course, Thomas brings these together, right? He's a pretty sharp guy, that Thomas, you know? In one way, when something is referred to itself, right? Okay. As when something is said to be the same as itself, huh? For if this relation placed something in, what? Verum natura, right? Then we're going to have to proceed forever in relations, right? Because that relation to which something is said to be the same will be the same also with itself, with some other relation. And so, infinito, right, huh? Okay. Now, this is one of the kinds of things that Aristotle talked about as being relation and reason, right? Socrates is Socrates, right, huh? You know? In the second way, when a relation itself is referred to another, huh? This is the one that Episcenia, I guess, came up with. For one cannot say that paternity is referred to its subject to some, what? Middle relation, right, huh? Because that middle relation would need another little relation. And so on forever, right? Whence that relation, which is signified in comparing fatherhood to its subject, is not in verum natura. It's not in reality, huh? We say in reality, but they say in verum natura. Nature things. But in reason only, right, huh? Third, when one of two relatives depends upon the other, right, but not the reverse, huh? Just as knowledge depends upon the noble, but not a conversative. This is an example that Aristotle gave again, right? Whence the relation of the knowledge to the noble is something in verum natura, but not the relation of the noble to, what? Knowledge, huh? But it's in reason only, huh? And then fourth is the one that, again, Avicenna is emphasized, right? When being is compared to what? None being, huh? As when we say that we are before those who are, what? In the future after us, right? Otherwise, we follow that there could be infinite relations in the same if generation extend forever in the future, right, huh? Now from these last two ones, and that's why I gave them this order, it appears a relation, that relation of beforeness, right, priority, places nothing in verum natura, but in the understanding only, because God does not depend upon creatures, right, huh? Because such a priority would give us the comparison of being to what? Un-being, right? Whence it does not follow from this that there is some eternal, what, truth except in the divine mind itself, huh? Which only is, what, eternal. And this is the first truth, huh? And to the sixth objection, or sixteenth objection, it should be said that although God is by nature prior to created things, it does nevertheless not follow that that relation is the relation of nature, because it is understood from the consideration of nature of that which is said to be before and that which is said to be posterior, just as the knowable is before by nature the knowledge, although the relation of the knowable to science is not something very material. Very subtle, huh? I'm going to take the texture from the powerful De Potencia, right? It was difficult to consider the generation of the son to the father as what? Yeah. An account of the accustomed of human knowledge in consideration of production of natural things in which one thing is produced by another, by what? Motion. But the thing produced by motion in being begins to be in the beginning before it's in the term of motion. It's in eternity that the father generates the son, right, huh? Father T, is that a no movement? No movement, yeah. In fact, you see, when Thomas takes up the eternity of God, right, in the consideration of the substance of God, it's attached to the consideration of God being unchangeable, right, huh? Now we know that God is unchangeable because he's pure act, right? And change is the act of what he's able to be as such, right? It's the act of the able to be insofar as he's still able to be. So there can be no change in God and that's why we say that he's eternal, right? Now, in a sense, I think I mentioned how when De Kahnik would teach the fourth book of natural hearing, right? That book is about, what, place and time, right? And De Kahnik didn't try to do both in one semester. So there's one course on place and another course on time, right? But at the end of the course on time, he would, maybe in the last day or so, talk about the definition of eternity, right, huh? Kind of a bonitatum doctrina, right, huh? But the definition of eternity is what? What's the definition? Well, the one that Thomas uses comes from what? Boethius and the great Boethius, huh? I guess it's in the Consolation of Philosophy, huh? So he's a great man, huh? And sometimes I'm tempted to say, you know, that the greatest mind in the Church between Augustine and Thomas, right, is what? Boethius, right, huh? Of course, he learned from Augustine, right, huh? But Thomas learned from Boethius, huh? Great, great. Great mind, huh? So, I get the back back here. What's the definition of eternity, huh? The Poetis says, the consolation of philosophy, as it is. Even framed, Tony Tegere, and eventually martyred, anyway, the philosophy. And watching earlier, he has great respect for the consolation of philosophy, right? So it's... Let's talk about my life, eternal, or my life life. It's hard to see the smell. The darker ones, I think? I think so. It might work better. It's yellow, as opposed to white. It's something, I don't know. Okay, it's a bit bigger. You know, we don't got more negatively than affirmatively, right? So, what do we negate, huh? It pertains to life and time, right? I was born on January 18th, 1936. Very cold weather in Minnesota in January. My mother says she didn't mind going to the hospital. She had to make some warm out. I don't know where the house is. And if I was born in January 1836, I assumed I was in my mother's womb, you know? Maybe starting around April, right? In 1935, right? So that's when the main purpose began. Now, I don't know when Heather just died in 1993. I mean, it's a footer since now. Well, I'll be young. My soul won't have it. I was so perfect, you know. I told you how you kind of, you know, the session with Pius XII, right? They were defining the assumption, right? Kind of said, you know, argument in favor of the assumption was that if her body not been assumed into heaven, Mary would not be there. Her soul would be there, but not Mary. The first thing is, you know, it's a selector from St. Peter's Day, right? So, my life has a beginning and end in time, right? And that's being negated when he says, what? Vitae terminabilis. Because in, as Aristotle points out, you know, is a little broader than the beginning, right? So we can speak of the end of the line and the end of the line, right? But we can speak of the end points, right? And sometimes the end is extended. We don't speak of two beginnings, right? Two beginnings, huh? So Vitae terminabilis, that's going to be referring in there, you know, has no beginning and no end, right? So you're beginning that, right? My life and time has a beginning, which I know more or less. And in the end of the line, I'm not quite sure exactly what they're being. So, but even in my life, between those two, the beginning and the end, they would say what? Before and after, right? So time is defined as what? The number of the before and after, right? So I'd have to know what? Before and after. So, when you say all at once, totesimo, right? This is the negation of what? Before and after. And this is the negation of beginning in, or the two in points of my life, right? I said, I'm always struck with the fact that I was there for the 200th anniversary of Mozart's birth. And the 200th anniversary of Mozart's birth. Yeah. I was there at the concert she had on in Mozart. And you realize how short his life was, right? He died in his 36th year, right? Didn't even see his 36th birthday, right? Oh! Yeah! You know, the crucial numbers are what? It's up to 620 or something like that, right? And there's, you know, all kinds of aquas that make big works, you know? Not just low works. So, here you have one negation, right? This is the negation of the before and after of time. And here's the negation of the what? Beginning and in. So eternity has neither a beginning nor an end, right? Nor does it have any before and after. Now, it's very important as a child that you read fairy tales. You don't read Shakespeare. And I didn't. You know, it's very important for a father to sit down in the evening there and read to the kids, right? And eventually they pick up the habit of reading and they want to read themselves, right? My son Paul made a fist one up in the morning, you know? And one time he got propped up, you know, three or four teddy bears, you know? And they put a book in the end of each one. And they put a book in the end of each one. What else do you do? I wrote it right back and laugh and laugh about this, you know? And, uh... But now what is the use I want to make of fairy tales, right? Well, you've heard about the evil witch, you know? And she shows up at the wedding or the thing she's mad at and so on. It's a curse here, right? What happens? Everybody's frozen, right, huh? And it's not about maybe the prince charmer turns up, you know? Kisses the bride, everybody comes back. Movement of life, right, huh? Okay. Now, I remember, you know, seeing Mount LaHoya in the fairy tale books, you know? You have a surgeon bringing in the thingies. These. These. These four years on this, right? Okay. And you say, um... How much life do you have in the now time, right? Because the past is no longer, right? And the future doesn't exist yet, right? How much time is there in the now, in the strict sense? It's between the past and the future, right? The now, in the strict sense, is what? Is there any length of time? I mean, sometimes you use the word now to include a little bit of the past, right? You know? The class we're having now, right? You know? But then, part of this class of war, part of the remains, right? And how much so good is here? In the now in the strict sense, huh? That includes nothing in the past, right? Nothing in the future. How much? You know? How much is really here? Time, right? How much? It's invisible. I can't even syllogize in the now. I can't even rattle off the definition in the now. I'm trying to know, right? I can't even eat a piece of candy. I can't drink a glass of wine. So, perfecta possessio. And, you know? My great friend who weighed this, right, he says, the now that flows along, it's always what, different, right, huh, makes time, the now that what, stands still, but is it like that now that the witch had, right, everybody that stood still, there's practically no life at all in the now, but God in the now, the eternal now, right, that stands still, right, the now that stands still next to Trinity, there's a, what, perfect possession of life, right, huh, so God does in the now of eternity, which has no before and after, right, no beginning, no end, right, the perfection of life, right, is the fullness of life, right, and the way that you're in heaven, what that would be as full as his life is, right, and so you're negating, it seems to me, this is my idea anyway, that here is a third negation, right, in negating the imperfection of life in the now of time, you see, a possession is something that you have firmly, right, huh, you know, you think you have a car, you got a house, you know, a possession right now, it's mine, you know, there's something you can hold on to right now, but the now of time, you can't be possessed anymore, it's always, like, moving along, right, it's very quite the same anymore, right, Aristotle says that the time is tied up with the, the, what, before and after motion, right, but the now is like the thing in motion, right, you know, and this thing is falling to the ground, right, people always come in and fall to the ground, it's always in a different place, right, it never stays in any one place, right, it's strong, it's in motion, so, I know we have possession of it now, right, right, like, yeah, right, find something in the motion, now, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say, can't say. Now, is he saying that according to his human nature or his divine nature? But, it's kind of a funny sense of before, right, because in duration, right? But he didn't say before Abraham was, I was, because then he would have been before him in what? Time. And he's not before him in time, right? You could say maybe in duration, but, you know, eternity is before time, but he'd say, I am, right? So, the past and the present and the future of time, it's all present to God in his eternity, right? So, the extent that you compare, you know, God to the point that's the center of the circle, right? And then the points of the circumference are what? In time. One of them comes before or after another one, right? But they're all directly, you know, related to the, what? The center, yeah. And they're all present to God, right? You said that some particular saints may have had an experience of eternity. If that's even a question, it would make sense. Yeah, well, you know, Augustine apparently and Thomas, you know, say that St. Paul, right, carried out to the third heaven, right? He saw God as he is in a transitory way, right? I mean, it wasn't a permanent, you know, and that they seem to say the same thing about Moses, right? They're kind of partaking of eternity, right? But our life in the next life is called eternal life, right? Because you will partake of eternity, right? And when we see God as he is, that seeing God will not be in time. It will be in eternity, you know, not partake of eternity, you know? An amazing, amazing thing, you know? I often wonder, you know, I say, I assume that we'll see each other in heaven, you know? But I mean, how would you get your friends that you had in this life to talk to you about, you know, heaven and other things? And, you know, they'd be so absorbed in God, right, huh? You know? How would you get their, what, attention, so to speak? Well, I was thinking about the text today, and Thomas there, he's talking about charity there, right, huh? And he says that charity is chiefly a living God, right, huh? And the objection was trying to argue, you know, that, well, charity is not only loving God, but also loving your neighbor, right, huh? And Thomas is, because of the fact, this is being used in objection, right, huh? And Thomas says charity is chiefly loving God, and loving your neighbor in God, in God, yeah. And it's kind of interesting, right, huh? But maybe that's a deeper understanding of what charity is, the kind of love it is, huh? You hear the saints say things of that sort, don't you? So the same Bible distinguishes between the same kind of human compassion. Mm-hmm. Do any misery to another, because he's like me. Mm-hmm. But that's not what piety is as a fruit of the gift of the Holy Spirit, right? That compassion sees misery in what is, by nature, the image of God. Mm-hmm. It sees the misery. And he says, but piety sees the image, the need, because the focus is the need here, but the image is the focus.