Logic (2016)
Lecture 34: Motion, Change, and the Three Acts of the Intellect

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So, why did motion show up as a post-pregnant? Why did motion show up as a post-pregnant? Yeah, but it's also found in more than one genius, right? But not in all gender, right? So when Aristotle gives the kindness of motion, he follows them in the order of the categories, right? He's distinguished, right? So there's generation corruption in substance and growth in quantity, right? And alteration in quality, right? And then locomotion in what? In where? Not in time, right? Because I'd be like saying there's a motion in motion. But I mentioned, you know, how in natural philosophy the study of change in place comes first, right? And then comes alteration, and then what? Growth, right? So if you want to have an alteration, if I want to burn these papers, I've got to bring the paper and the fire, what? Together. So the change in place is presupposed to an alteration, right? And then you have to alter the food, right? By chewing it and digesting it, right? Before you can make flesh and blood and bone out of it, right? And so there's an order. And locomotion, of course, is the kind of motion that's most known to us. So, you know, the division, you know, that we have, you know, even when I was in high school, you could take a biology course and a chemistry course, right? And biology, you could take in your sophomore year, if you were going to take it, or you had to take it. And the chemistry was in the junior year or something, I don't know why. And the physics, if you had it, it was in the senior year, you know. But that division into physics, chemistry, and biology goes back to Aristotle, right? Because the oldest part of physics is called mechanics, then. And that's a study of what? Change of place. So Galdiel and Newton didn't mean change of place, right? And then you have what we would call maybe chemical change, right? But this is called alteration, right? And then in biology, we have living things, then you have growth. Even plants, you have growth, right? Common to plants and animals, right? And even demand, right? You and I agree. So narrow the order is a little different, right? It's not that you follow the order of the categories, but how one is a cause of the other, right? But there's also the fact that change of place is a change that seems to be most known to us, right? You know, when you got to the early Greeks there, they didn't seem to admit any other change, but change of what? Place. And therefore, what seems to be a change of quality is just a change of place. You know, that's a good example I used to use in class, right? Marcus has a cup of coffee, right? And it's kind of bitter, you know? And he goes out of the room and someone goes over to the sugar bowl and puts some more sugar in there and stirs it up. Marcus comes in and sips his coffee again. Oh, there's been a change of quality. Yes, yes. Yes, it's changed from bitter to sweet. And the pedophiles would say, you know, fool, right? You know, far-reaching mind, right? You know, how could the coffee, you know, lose one quality to get enough quality? Did that quality become nothing? And the other quality came in out of nothing? You know? No. All there was was a change of place that you were too stupid to follow, right? You know? The sugar was sweet and still is sweet. There's been a change of thing. Coffee was and still is bitter, right? But there's been a change of place. And so the sugar's been mixed in there and it's too small for you to see, right? Because they steered it and glitzed, you know, grains of sugar left in there. And then they fooled you, you know, the dumb professors, you know? And so, and, you know, the change from cold to hot, right? You know, Booker's puts on the water to make tea in the morning and the water's cold and then it's hot, right? And a change of quality, right? Oh, no, Mr. Booker, there's these little things called molecules and they're moving faster and faster and faster. Just a change of place that you're too stupid, you know? Many of those changes of place in these little molecules that you're too stupid to follow, right? Booker? Oh, okay. So all there is is a change of place, right? I was telling you about Thomas there, you know, and the disputed questions on power, right? When he's taking opportunity there, he talks about procession, right? The Father proceeds from the Son, right? And the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, right? Procession, I mean, the English word for procession is going forward, right? Well, that's names, first of all, change of place, right? So Thomas has to explain the word, you know, and he says that Linux is a very interesting point, right? That the first meaning of a word equivocal by reason, right? Tends to be not only something sensible, but more precisely something, what? Yeah, the continuous or in the continuous, right? Well, change of place is more clearly continuous than change of, what, quality, right? Growth seems to be continuous, too, you know, but that's quantitatively, too, right? So change of place seems to be the motion that's most known to us. And so we borrow the words from that even to talk to the other one. The water became hot, right? Come to be, you know? Coming is first taken from change of, what, place, huh? All we have is talking about Trinity, right? The word is borrowed from that, huh? You have to borrow from, carry the word over, right? I like the word becoming, right? Is becoming like coming into this, coming to be in this room? Be, coming? As if, you know, being is kind of a house and you come to be, you come, go in there and then when you die, you go out. How the house called existence, right? Or being, right, huh? Coming to be, right, huh? But they kind of lost the sight of what Aristotle saw, right, huh? The basis of that division, right? It was on the basis of their three kinds of motion, right? Change of place, change of quality leading to generation corruption, and then growth, right, huh? And so, you know, why should atomic physics be, have the name physics, which is placing it with mechanics, right, which is change of place. Really, atomic physics should be put with, what? Chemistry. So my friend there, Werner Karl Heisenberg, right, when he divides up the physical sciences, he puts chemistry and, and what, atomic physics together, right? He didn't put atomic physics with, with change of place, right? But, uh, it's because they, they, uh, adopted Aristotle's thing without understanding it, right? The system came in there, and so on, but the original basis for it was two different kinds of motion, right? The chair of style was shown in the fifth book of natural hearing. Now, when you study motion in particular, you get the, what, three kinds, right? One is more general than the others, so, you order them, right, going from the general to the particular, huh? The change of place is more general, right? And alteration is more general. You find alteration in the non-living world as well as the living world, right? And growth is peculiar to living things, huh? Then you have the Greek philosopher saying, you know, learning causes the mind to grow. But it's kind of interesting, huh? Other bull days to be fond of these things, you know, be very concrete, you know, mental constipation, and so on, so we can't, can't digest the, you know. You know, the text right now, I guess. Okay. Now, the last predicate minute is what? Yeah, yeah. Now, to some extent, to have is to motion like high as to what? Before and after, right? Because I have a certain height now, I guess. I'm five foot nine, I guess. Or five foot eight, something like that. Okay. But I grew to be five foot eight, right, huh? And I guess I stopped growing, right? I got to be on a height, right? This man that just died there, he had been head of his basketball team there in high school, right? Tall. I'll see a picture of a guy the other day. He's seven feet something, you know, seven feet four inches. Yeah. One of my students comes on Wednesday night there, he's six feet four or something, you know. I used to play the guy who crossed the alley there from me, back home. There, you know, but he was, you know, the center of the basketball team, you know. So, I can help myself with the, you know, you know, these did shots, you know, but not to be playing the game with them, you know. So, growth is a kind of motion, right? But then you have something, right? And you alter something, it has some quality, right? So, there's some reason why those shots will go together, you know. A little bit like, you know, the second and the third go together, right, huh? Okay. And we talked about how the distinction, the base of the distinction comes before and after, right? So. So. Set aside another category, so we'll go on to the logic of the second act. The logic of the second act is much easier than the logic of the first act. Now, what time do we go here? Go to 4.30 or what does it go? So let's, I'll come back to this next time, but let me do a little bit, let me do a little bit of this here. Logic is divided into three parts. Three parts is all divided into two. Three. Yeah. Season. How do you distinguish the three parts of logic, right? Obviously Thomas did that in his pre-game. Yeah, yeah. Now, what's the first act? Now, the first act, you could say, is a kind of understanding, and Thomas says that about closely. Here, sit up. Is that the wrong one? Oh, this is down here. I'm just shocking, shocking. I'll take away these things that Thomas used. It's not a tool to use. Understanding. Thomas says the first two acts are both a kind of understanding, right? And the first one is understanding what the thing is, right? Okay. I'm pretty smart, and I think I understand what a square is. I understand what a circle is, right? I'm not too sure I understand what a dog is. Although I meet one as I come in here, and I understand what a cat is, you know? I don't think I understand him as well as a square and a circle, right? I have some understanding of what a dog is, right? I usually recognize it. I'm getting very excited. There's a cat in the backyard now. I come across. I seem to know that I have a cat over here. So, I'm okay. Now, what's the second act? What is it called, huh? Well, I noticed that Thomas will often use the words that Aristotle uses, right? He'll speak of the second act sometimes. It's composition and division, right? He's thinking of the fact that you're putting together an affirmative statement, right? Or separating in a negative statement, right? So, if I understand what a square is, and I understand what a quadrilateral is, I might be so bright as to see that a square is a quadrilateral. And if I understand what a square is, and I understand what a circle is, as I think I do, I might be so bright as to say, to divide it to and say a square is not a circle, right? I can describe a square and a circle and vice versa, right? I mean, you can circumscribe a square around a circle. Not even that can make a square circle, you know? Okay? Muhammad came. Now, you know, Thomas is a little bit lazy here, because he's following Aristotle, and Aristotle speaks of the second act here, as composing or dividing these things, right? But Thomas himself said that the first act and the second act are both a kind of understanding, right? So, I sometimes like to call the second act as understanding what? Understanding the true or the false. So, when I understand that a square is a quadrilateral, I'm understanding something true, right? When I understand that a square is not a circle, I can understand something true, right? But I also understand a square is a circle, right? But then I understand something what I call false. And then I say square is what? So, suddenly it's called the second act understanding the true or the false, right? Now, sometimes they talk about the name of the speech that is involved in different acts of the reason, right? And we take these two acts, and then the third act, which will be reasoning, right? Sometimes they talk about three speeches, right? Now, do you remember the distinction that we made between name and speech and logic? It doesn't necessarily signify what something is, but it's a vocal sound signifying by custom or by choice, right? Rather than by nature. No part of it signifies by itself, right? So, Berkowitz is a, what, sound? It's a vocal sound. It's a vocal sound that signifies, right? But does it signify by nature, like a baby's cry? It would signify choice and by custom, right? No part of Berkowitz by itself. It's like I might say, well, aren't some names made by putting together two names, right? But then this baby's signifying, but as it functions as a name, standing as young Johnson, right now. So Johnson, although it's my name, but John is a son, right? That's the name of John? Yeah, but not considered this girl, right? My name was originally Berkowitz. My father got the geophysm. I'll explain these. And Berkowitz means mountain in Swedish, and Kvist means branch. But does Berkowitz mean mountain branch? You don't have to confuse that from which the name is taken and with its meaning, right now. Dwayne was my first name, and Hugo was my second name, right? But Hugo and Goh, sometimes you have people I have named Dwayne with a Y and E. It's kind of going in syllables, Dwayne, you know. Dwayne, Dwayne. But then Dwayne, Dwayne. In syllables. But they don't have any meaning, right? So, but a speech has what? Parts, at least two parts, that signify something separately, right? Well, they sometimes talk about the speech called definition as being a help to understanding what a thing is, right? We're trying to understand what the truth is, right? And what do they use to help us understand, well, speech called a definition. In this case, it was a definition. Why, the truth or false is found not in a definition, necessarily, but in a, what? Yeah, it's our quality statement, right? You call it a statement, right? Sometimes you call it a proper... Proposition, but etymologically, proposition meant pro-quonal place before, right? So proposition is really more like a primacy than an argument. So I don't like the word proposition, but you find it sometimes. You write a concept sometimes. But proposition is really... But reasoning, you could say you reason by a what? Argument, right? Okay, so argument is logical. It's still a primacy. So the same tongue had it. My grandchild in college said, Logically, the art of defining reasoning. But he's not talking about the middle act, right? He has all three parts in there. This is the argument, right? So sometimes we speak logically about these three kinds of what? Speeches, right? But maybe she began with the idea of these three acts, right? These are speeches that are used to... Now, is it square or circle or anything? A circle, right? Well, then it's understanding what a square is. The same understanding as understanding what a square is. Understanding what a square is is the same thing as understanding what a circle is. Well, you admit that a square is not a circle, right? Well, then it's understanding a square is the same thing as understanding a circle. Well, you're not him, are you? Well, kicking you is not kicking you. If a square is not a circle, then understanding what a square is is not the same as understanding what a circle is, right? So can I understand what a square is at the same time as understanding what a circle is? Well, it's kind of interesting, huh? In the second act, I might come up with this instinct that a square is not a circle. And could I understand that a square is not a circle unless at the same time I understand a square and a circle? Well, I have to understand a square and a circle at the same time to understand that a square is not a circle, right? And I'm making a similar comparison with a square and a circle, right? It's not the same, right? So I had them both in mind at the same time, right? But when I understand what a square is, or I understand what a circle is, I can't do it at the same time. But the second act is strange, I don't know. But now, if I understand that a square is a quadrilateral, then a square is not a circle, right? Can I understand the same thing? Are these two different truths? A square is a quadrilateral, and a square is not a circle. So I'm understanding two different truths, right? So is there one understanding, or a few different ones? There's an angelic mind over there. Where it understands, you know, in one, what, form, what a cat is or what a dog is, let's see. Maybe even more. I can't lie than mentally see. Or very angle-wormish. Yeah. You see the movie Rain Man, by any chance, had Dustin Hoffman, Tom Cruise, Dustin Hoffman, who played an autistic kind of idiot and so on. And he could see these mathematical relationships to things just like that, almost like an angelic intellect. And would it be accurate to say that some aspects of autism that would evolve these kind of idiot savant gifts, is that almost like a sort of blank and angelic perception of seeing just in the whole, in a holistic way, some sort of… Well, the basic point is that you can only understand one thing at a time. But you go into the different acts, right? You're understanding, in the second act, one statement, right? And it has just a unity, right? Maybe it's being said to another one. But then, it seems like you're understanding a bit, square and circle together, right? In the second act, which you can't do in the first act. And then we get down to the third act of reasoning, right? In reasoning, you may put together two statements, right? And draw a third statement from them, right? It's a conclusion, right? Well, now, if you're seeing how that conclusion follows in those two premises, don't you have three statements all together? But there's a certain, what, order among them, right, huh? And there's a kind of, what, unity, right, huh? It's just like an army is, in some way, one, right? Because it's got a certain order, right, huh? But if you break the army and lose its order, and there's a crowd of people here, here, seeking to survive, and running away, it's no longer an army, is it? Because it lacks the unity of an army, right? So it's kind of interesting, huh? You know, that as we go on from the first act to the second act, and from the second act to the third act, right, then, we seem to, what, in some way, right, understand the second act together, things that cannot be understood separately, right? I can't have one understanding in the first act, is understanding both of what a square is, and what a circle is. I have to understand, you know, the square through its definition, and I understand the circle through its definition, so I've got two different definitions. I can't pay attention to both at the same time. But in the second act, I seem to know, in some way, square and circle together, right? And then in the third act, right, huh? I seem to know, you know, the premises, and the conclusion together, right, and finally see them, right? My first reason, maybe, I might not be kind of seeing one, but not the other, but then, you know, I see that they fall from that. So we're going to be talking here about the second act and about the statement, right, then, next time, right? Joshua was talking about coming up next time, so he might notify you of his thing, but, uh... of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love and praise you. Help us, God, to know and love and praise you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you've written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. I was reading Thomas today about the prophecy, right? The sentences. And do the angels help in prophecy, right? There's two things involved in prophecy. What's most proper to the prophet is that he has his imagination stirred, right? Well, the angels can do that, right? But what about the other part, which is the light given by God to judge these things, right? Well, that light comes from God, right? But he says, you know, that the angel helps to proportion that light to us, huh? Which, in a way, is like the angels, you know, where we say that this angel is, in 19, the angels say, two ranks below him, right? Like going through the intermediate one, there's more proportion to that, huh? It's kind of interesting, huh? To see what the angels, there's kind of interesting quotes to about the angels being afforded. I was torturing my students last night. Somebody could testify. And I said, you know, Aristotle begins with the dianima, you know, by saying that all knowledge is such as good, right? Yeah. And I said, you know, Aristotle begins with the dianima, you know, by saying that all knowledge is such as good, right? And I said, you know, Aristotle begins with the dianima, you know, by saying one knowledge is what? Better than another, right? Yeah. So he started to reduce an order in the fourth sense of order, right? Okay. And so I was saying, you know, the knowledge of the body is good, but the knowledge of the what? Is better. And why is it better? Yeah. Yeah. And then I said, the knowledge of the soul is good, right? But the knowledge of the angels is better. Why? Because the angels are a greater thing than the souls, right? And then the knowledge of the angels is good, right? The knowledge of God is better. Why? Because God is really that much better, right? Okay. But notice in that thing, huh? You're looking before and after and what senses of the before and after do we have in the categories. What senses are you looking before and after? What? The fourth sense, yeah. Because you're saying how one knowledge is better than another, that's the fourth sense. Better, right? But is there another sense that you're looking before and after besides that in this discourse? Yeah. But maybe more directly is if all knowledge is such as good, right? And he's going to say that one knowledge is better than another, right? Then the question arises, why? Why is one knowledge better than another? And then you're looking before and after in what sense? Cause and effect. Because why look for the cause, right? And you're saying, well, the reason why one knowledge is better than another, the main reason, is because it's about a better thing. And then you could ask again, you know, well, why is the soul better than the body, right? And you'd again be looking before and after in the sense of what cause and effect, huh? When you ask why, you're looking before in the sense of what cause, right? And you try to see what the effect of a cause would be or after, right? But that's that sense that he mentions there, right? So it's kind of striking, you know? That's not one of the four central senses, but I see that there are five chief senses, right there, but four central senses in order, right? And that fifth sense kind of is attached especially to the second sense by its proximity, but it's a different sense nevertheless. And it's used here in talking about why one is better than another, right? You have to know why one knowledge is better than another before you can see that the knowledge of the soul is before the knowledge of the body in the sense of being better knowledge, right? And the knowledge of the angels, knowledge of the what? Soul, right? Okay. Now, if you ask the question, you know, should you study the soul before you study the angels? You know, many of the great authors say that this is the doorway for us to know these immaterial things. Well, you might then say, but why should you what? Study the soul before the body, I mean, for the angels, right? And then you'd have to look before and after in the sense of cause and effect, right? In order to see the before and after in knowledge, right? Now, it shows you how picky things those are and how good it was that Aristotle mentioned that, right? Now, we've talked a lot about distinction, right? Okay. Now, would you say that confused knowledge is before distinct? Isn't distinct knowledge better than confused knowledge? Yeah. So in the fourth sense, distinct knowledge is before confused knowledge, right? It's more perfect knowledge. But in the third sense of before, confused knowledge is before what? Distinct knowledge. Right? And so when you see a distinction, you're moving from the confusion, right? But now someone asks you, why is confused knowledge before distinct knowledge, right? And Aristotle in the first, the premium to the eight books of natural hearing, St. Francis de Boncoye, correct me, right? But they call it the physics, right? He shows what kinds of examples, right? That we know things that confuse the way before distinctly. But why do we know things that confuse the way before we know distinctly? He says this is true both about the senses and about reason, right? So if you see a beautiful girl, you take a little while to study her, right? To know more distinctly, right, huh? And if you hear the last moment of Jupiter Symphony, right, huh? You have to go back and Warren Murray tells you that he's combining four or five melodies together there, right? And it's news to me. You've got it all before the Jupiter Symphony before I knew this, right? And so my senses know things that name what? Confused way before I know distinctly. And that's the same thing for my recent, huh? Aristotle says we name a thing before we what? Define it, right, huh? And you have to know a thing very distinctly to name it. I always remember a comic strip when I was a little kid there. And the older guy there was with the other woman, and she was talking about she's in love with somebody or something, you know? He says, that's a big word, he says. You sure you know what it means? And I was thinking, gee, this is pretty good for a comic strip, you know? You know, people bring out the thing they love somebody, you know, and they didn't know what they mean by them, right? Okay? So they are confused now, right, huh? And now if you ask yourself, this is a before and after in the third sense, right? But now if you ask, why do the senses and every senses, why do both of them know things in a, what? Confused way before distinctly. Now you're looking before and after in what sense? Yeah, the fifth sense that Aristotle gives. He's kind of, he's still giving the four senses, and then he seems like an afterthought. It's kind of funny because we have to talk after he's been explained before and after, right? But he begins in some sense, right? Which I insist doesn't come fifth in order, but it's . He's a lot. alongside the second sense, right? It's being closest to that, right? So why is confused knowledge before distinct knowledge? If distinct knowledge came before confused knowledge, we wouldn't have to look for distinctions, wouldn't we? And Thomas would be making distinctions or pointing out distinctions all the time. So why? What does he start to speak out about the senses last night? You know, when you talk about the abilities or the powers of the soul, right? And sometimes they call them the powers of the soul, right? I like to call them the abilities of the soul, right? Even took the liberty of shorting Shakespeare's definition, right? Capability to ability, right? But the reason why I like the word ability better than the word power is that there's a distinction between a what? Active ability, right? And a what? passive ability, right? So the carpenter who made this table, right? He was able to make this what? Table, right? But you could say that the wood was able to be formed, right? Different kinds of ability. And you can use ability, the word ability for both of these, right? And so I often point out the fact that we have words like, well, first of all, first of all, I'll point out what Aristotle points out, that the first sense of ability is the active sense of ability. So when this man over here is playing his cello, right now, you see his ability, right? But you wouldn't think of the cellos having ability, would you? See? When the great concert pianists display, you know, you could see his ability, right? You don't think the pianos have an ability, do you? Would you? No, it's nice to admire the ability of the pianos, right, you know? And I was saying, I'm going in. And, uh, but yet you could say the piano is able to be played, right, huh? And then we have all these words with able, like, burnable, breakable, beatable, right? Which are, by some ability, use the word able, right? So, able is used, either in daily speech or an ability that is an ability to undergo, as well as an ability to act upon, as well as one is more known. Why the word power is kind of what? It's kind of stuck on the first meaning, in English at least, right? And it's not moved, right? I wouldn't say the word here was powerful, right? You know, so much, you know? But it was able to be, what? Formed, yeah? So, that's why I prefer the word ability. Now, you can have some, a lot of my friends have used the word potency, as Thomas used it all the time. But potency, even with trans, you know, the word English, it seems to be kind of stuck in the first sense too, doesn't it? The word able is very much, huh? Wakeable, buildable, gainable, burnable, destructible, all these kinds of ability, you know? That's the sense, huh? What does Aristotle point out, huh? He says there's going to be some connection between the, what? Abilities of the soul, and their, what? Act and their object, right? And so he says they're going to, what? Distinguish the abilities by the act for which they are an ability. That seems simple enough, right? So the ability to hear, the ability to see are different. The seeing and hearing are different, right? And seeing and hearing are both sensing, and how do you distinguish them? The one is sensing sound, and the other is sensing color or light, huh? Okay? So basically you distinguish the powers by their object, right? Okay? Well, then there's a distinction that Aristotle sees, huh? Which he gives a whole book to in the Book Nine of Wisdom, huh? And what does he do in the Book Nine of Wisdom, huh? Yeah. In the first, there are three parts of it, right? So we divide it into two or three, as you know. And the first two parts of the Book Nine are distinguishing the senses of ability and the senses of what? Of that. Oh, I'm sorry. Oh! Yes! What is it? After all you've said. You see how his dad happens? You know what? That's the easiest thing, right, huh? We're working on it. We're working on it. Well, we'll beat it into it. He's beautiful. Yeah. Yeah. He's beautiful, quick-able, fertile. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Well, what's the connection between the ability and the object, right, huh? What's the relation between them, right, huh? If you go back to what we studied about relation, relations are based either upon quantity or upon acting upon undergoing, right? And what's going to be the connection between the object and the ability? Or vice versa, right? Now, it's interesting. When Aristotle takes up the abilities of the soul, right? The first ones he takes up are the most common ones, which even the plants share with the animals, right? The ability to what? Nourish themselves, right? The ability to grow. The ability to reproduce. Is this an active ability or an undergoing ability? Yeah. Same here. Then when you get to the senses, you find out that what? It seems to be what? Yeah. It seems like sound acts upon your ear, right? If you listen to the wrong kind of music, you can even go deaf, right? Because color acts upon your what? Eyes, right? And if you, you know, if they pop open up in the French, there would be the Spanish Civil War there, you know? Well, gone here, right? But the lights are shining around. Gotta watch out the sun there, you know? And the bird over, you know? Get out these things. So, one is acting upon the what? Yeah. The other, right? Now, later on, we have a Wednesday night class where I'm coming through to the understanding part of the soul, right? Huh? But, it's going to have the object acting upon the ability or the ability acting upon the object, which will it be. Oh, my goodness! Okay. Now, it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle, you know, he's taking the, he's going from the general to the particular, right? You do that because you go from the confused to the distinct, the general is infused compared to the particular, right? And it's interesting, he takes up the most general first, right? The plant powers, the living powers, and then the sense powers, and then finally the understanding powers then. But the first one seems to be what? Just active powers, right? The second one undergoing one of the five senses. And then the third is both, right? We'd be forward, right? You know? Where else? You know? Now, you can see that this is so, right? This is, I like your cell dressing, you know? What if you use your cell dressing? You see? And I was talking to every brother Mark, you know? He's out in California, and he goes into the wine tasting room of one of the vineyards there. And they had a wine, you know, it's one of these, they call it Burgundy or something, but it's actually a mixture of different grapes, huh? And each house has got its own red mix, right? So, my brother, you know, was tasting it and so on. He said, what do you use in there? I was, you know, who the hell is this guy? What's he trying to try it out? You know? So, he wouldn't, you know, he just, you know, don't you have this? And then he starts to name the things that are in there, right? The guy says, go to the back room here and taste all these combinations, tell me which way you can do the best, you know? So, he went for this, you know, person thing. But, my brother Marcus put in do that when he first went out the cup for me, right? And I put in, so they're going to say, you know, confused nouns here, right? Now, why is it that both the senses and the end of the going reason, right? Know things in a confused way before distinctly? Why? So, which is more actual and which is more, well, just an ability, right? Well, obviously, confused knowledge is between not knowing a thing at all and knowing it what? Distinctly, right? So, if sensing is an undergoing, right? If sensing is a going from ability to act, right? And, as I would say, understanding is also kind of undergoing, as far as the undergoing understandings. Then you are going to know things in a confused way before you know them distinctly, right? Confused knowledge is actuality, right? In comparison to ignorance, right? When the mind is ignorant, but compared to distinct knowledge, it is still, in some way, inability. So, it naturally comes before this, right? It's interesting that you are seeing one before and after because you saw, what? Another before and after, right? And one is a before and after cause and effect and the other. Now, I forget how far we got about into the second act last time, right? Yeah, that's... Now, I was torturing my students last night with the eight senses of in, which I keep on coming back to. And I had a course from Charles D. Connig at Laval. I had one course on book one of natural hearing and another course on book two. These are all semester courses. I had two, one course on definition of ocean on the semester. One course on place, which is half of book four, kind of. And another semester course on time, which is another one, right? Well, the kind of used to say that every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason. And we had a great love for the eight senses of what? In, right? Because that comes into the, what? Fourth quote when Aristotle is talking about place, right? Because the first sense of in is to be in this room, right? To be in some place, right? And then Aristotle gives, in the text that we have, the eight chief senses, or the eight central senses. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. I call them sometimes. But there's eight central senses. Eight chief senses. But in the text that comes down to us, he doesn't order them. Like he does in the fifth book of what? Wisdom, right? Where he orders the word, beginning in the word, end, and so on. So, Thomas says we're going to order them. But in the way Aristotle showed us, you should take the most known meaning, right? And then you order the other senses by their connection to that one by one, right? Okay? And so you get how many sentences at the end? Eight sentences, right? Now, here's some nice English here. I said to my student up at the Addicting Monster right now, Let us think about the second act, right? Now, when you think about something, right? You think about something before you do what? What comes next? Well, something a little closer to what we've got here in words, huh? Thinking about? Yeah, yeah. You think about something before you think out something. So, I was curious last night and yesterday, so I said I'll look at Origins, right? That's a book that was recommended by the linguist to me as, you know, a one-volume edition of etymology in English language, you know? It's done with a great magnet project. So, I looked up the word about, and what is the word about me? Which means outside, right? So, when you're thinking about something, you're kind of going outside of it, and knowing something in a way, kind of outward way before you know it. Yeah, yeah. By thinking out, means to bring out something that is in the thing you're thinking about. So, thinking about comes before thinking out, right? And this points out and touches upon another before and after my knowledge, right? One of the most universal before and afters is the confused before the distinct, right? But another way is that we know things in a, what? Outward way first, before we know them what? In a way, right? Now, why is that? It's a different reason why we know things in an outward way before inwardly, although it's somewhat similar, right? To knowing things in a confused way before distinctly. Well, when we say that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, this is throughout the senses in themselves and reason in itself. They both go for the ability to act, and therefore they know things in a confused way before distinctly. But what's the reason why we know things in an outward way before we know them what? In a way. In some ways because we're dealing with singulars, we're sensing singulars, but we come to get an abstract out there. Essence, you could say? Or is that, uh... Okay. ...universal form, from singular to universal. The great Herod Clevese said that nature loves to hide, right? And why does nature love to hide, right? Because they asked my colleagues at Assumptionary. But the point is that nature is a cause within, right? What's within is hidden to us in the beginning, right? So, yeah. The senses know things in an outward way, and reason tries to live in with you, right? Now, Thomas, in the Latin, the word is even more suggested here. Because the word, intelligere, Thomas gives the etymology of it. Intus legere, right? To read within, right? And, uh, so, he's touching on the fact of reason and understanding those things in the way, in the way the senses go into it. And so, what happens, when I was a little boy there, they made me learn the definition of sacrament, huh? The definition of sacrament that I memorized and still know was an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace, huh? Now, what did they mean by an outward sign? So, one reason why we know things in an outward way before we know them inwardly is because we sense before we, what? Understand, right? The Roman Wilson said something to understand, right? It's a little different from Confused and Distinct then, right? It's really similar, right? Now, how many senses are there thinking out something? Well, I'm pretty smart when I look at the opposite of out, which is what? In. And now I can go with Aristotle and Thomas in the Fourth Book of the Actuary, right? And there are eight senses of what? To in or to be in, right? And at least in six of those eight senses, right? They correspond to a different sense of thinking out, right? Now, what's the first sense of Kendra to be in, right? What's the first sense of place? Yeah, to be in place, right? Yeah, to be in place, right?