Logic (2016)
Lecture 47: Demonstration, Definition, and the Four Tools of Dialectic

Transcript
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And so he divides them into two, right? And he said divides one into two into three, right? So, oh, yeah, you can, you know, even with the name of critical by reason, right? Now when I look at the second post predicament, which was four, right? And I was thinking, sure, how do you divide those four up, right? It's not, you know, Thomas very clearly explains the four opposites. He divides them into one and three, right? And so it's two divisions, right? One in one of the two into three, right? But maybe four can be really figured out, right? It's not as clear, right? Think about that more, right? So sometimes I say, you know, for the most part, you can't have a distinction of more than three without dividing the two or three, right? Maybe some exceptions, right? But still, I think we have a pretty good rule, right? And it makes things very thoughtful, you know, to have these things, right? And as soon as you understand better, right, why there's four kinds of opposites to why there's four senses of before, right, huh? I have to do a lot more thinking about that. I'm thinking about it, right? I'm saying it's quite as clear to me, right, huh? I'm saying a lot of thinking about the eight senses of N, right? So Aristotle says, huh, that a complete definition, right, in a sense, contains everything that a complete demonstration does, right? This is an example, right, huh? But it's in a different, what, form, right? On top, there, you've got it in the form of a syllogism, a demonstration, right? On the bottom, you have all these things together in one grand definition, right, huh? It might be better to do the demonstration before we get a grand definition, a connection between speech signifying what a thing is and being speech composed, or what. Sometimes at the house there, you've got to have the whiskey and the remove, right, huh? So, in a way, what the thing is put together from, right, huh? Purpose, right, huh? So Aristotle says that the end is the calling of all the other, what, closet, right? Augustine says, because God is good, we are. But the good is an ocean of an end, right? I mean, in God, you've got to be careful because, strictly speaking, there aren't really, what, cause and effect within God. And Thomas talks about this, huh? But he says there's cause and effect in the mood and the pretty clenitude, he says. Now, suppose you try to understand a bit of God, huh? Does God love himself? Now you ask the question, why does God love himself, right? Well, the first reason why does himself is because he's good, right? In fact, he's goodness itself, as Thomas shows in the book, right? The good of every good. It's a smooth bullet, right, huh? Now this is the first cause of good, isn't it? Yeah, the cause of love is good. Yeah. Now the second cause of love is knowledge, right, huh? So God is not only good, the good is itself, and the good of every good, and the highest good, but he knows he is. You kind of see why God loves himself, right? But can God now lose himself? What can he make to embark us? What can he make to make us like him? Are creatures like God? You see, even though those creatures like the stone, right? The stone is not as much like God as the trees out there are, because, as St. Peter said in his confession of faith, thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God, right? He says God is alive, right, huh? Okay, well, the tree is in some way alive, and the stone is not, right? So the tree is more like God than the, what? The stone. But is the stone in some way like God? Yeah. It exists, right? And metaphors which are based upon likeness, you see, the Lord is my rock, right? Don't you see that? So in some way, the rock is like God, right? But not as much as the tree, right? But the tree doesn't know anything. So is the dog or the cat more like, you know, it was Abiba or it was Abibus? Is he more like God than the tree out there? Does he? At least he sees and hears and smells. He smells in one of the ones in. He doesn't understand the dog, right? And so man who understands, right, is more like God than the dog or the cat. But man has to, what? He has intellectus abum bratum, overshadow him, right? He has to have discourse, right? When there's Alice in the book on demonstration, he talks about the axioms, right? Well, Alice talks about that we come to know that the whole is more than a part and what a whole and a part is. When we come to know what a whole and a part is, I experience the whole and a parts in the world here. So even for those little things we do know, without discourse, like the whole and a part, we have a discourse before we get to that, right? In a sense, really, so the angel, he doesn't have to go through that discourse. So he's more like God than we are, by nature, anyway, right? So God makes everything like himself, but not, what, equally, right? And why is that? And my old professor, he's joking, he's roughly the same thing. He says, God hates equality, he says. And when Thomas explains angels, he says, no two angels are what? Yeah, they're all different, right? And one angel is always more or less perfect than another angel, right? But they're never equally, what, perfect, right? They're never equally, what, simple, right? Angels, right, huh? To the highest, right? They get more and more simple and more and more perfect, right? Why does God make everything like himself, but not equally? Why is he so undemocratic? And so sometimes this is true, though, that would there be order in the things he made, right? Unless one was better than another, right? And Thomas speaks sometimes as if the order of creatures is part of the fact that one is better than another, right? And that's the fourth sense of order, isn't it? The fourth sense of better. Before, yeah, it was better, I guess. But also, if they're unequal, right, and one is better than the other, then the better one can move them. Yeah, so there's also an order there. So the higher angels illuminate the lower angels all the way down. I'm carrying the angels illuminating me, right? That's what we've created the grand angels for in our class. And Thomas speaks of the wise will of God, right? In wisdom, so God makes all things like himself, but in orderly way, right? Because he's producing it by his wisdom, right? Thomas is always quoting that, and Aristotle said, right? Sapientis et ordinari, right? Along to the wise, to order things, right? And like you were saying, right? If creatures were all equal, you wouldn't have the, what? The creatures being like God and being a cause of goodness and others, right? The cause of illumination, right? Like I was saying, you know, Aristotle was too above me, right? For me to understand this distinction of 10. And I needed Thomas to break it down, you know, so the conclusion of my dear, because sir, he said, right, he's the wisest man at the College of St. Thomas. He says, compared to Aristotle, I thought the brain of the ankle would be six. So he stuck in my mind when he said that, you know? I mean, it's good though. And I was just a guy who, you know, we never stand up, you know, how can you say that? I need, you know, you know, it's like when Thomas explains how, you know, an angel illuminates a girl directly, you're immediately below her, right? And that one's the one, you know, below him, the alpha lion, right? Chain of command, so to speak. Like in the army, right? You know? And one friend of my brother, it's just kind of rough with that mancine, you know, because he would get so kind of, you know, fuck you, you know, to see, you know, and he's so excited about these teachings, you know, and there's a little text that he just, you know, illuminating it up. I remember he saw me one of them. I believe it bothered me for years, and everybody checked this out with mancine, and I ran down and started, and already waited and said, just, I know where you're going, and I said, well, damn it, don't go there. But Deconic did, you know, text, he was meaning, you know, there's a kind of order, you know, from Kasturik to Deconic, right? Yeah, right? Some of my questions, Kasturik couldn't answer, he said, well, Deconic has done that very patiently to me, you know? I can see he's a priority to take Kasturik, you know? Then I was writing my doctor thesis, I told you one time, Deconic asked him if he thought about saying something in my thesis. I'd ask me, you know, Kasturik is your advisor. So I don't know what you think. So he told me not. I was first impressed, you know, he's kind of, you know, like the angels there, you know? I mean, Thomas, you know, when you read Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle, and really the technical word is not commentary, but exposition, right? The laying out of Aristotle's thing, you know? You wouldn't hardly understand Aristotle without Thomas there to proportion what Aristotle was saying, you know? So he's really necessary, let's say for us, right? And scripture, you know, and scripture, you know, like that. Yeah, there's many other things you can say here about that. Four questions is a nice thing to see, right? The definition of demonstration, quote, or quit, but also the distinction between demonstration, quote, or quit, and quia, right? But also the connection here between the two sets of questions, huh? Let's turn that a little bit to dialectic now, huh? Aristotle speaks of the four tools of the dialectician. You know, of those? It's kind of strikes me, the use of the four term, the four tools, huh? Organically, because they refer, you know, to the, what, collection of Aristotle's books, you know, collection of books that come down to us in the father of logic as the, what, organon, right? So if you get the basic works of Aristotle, they'll put the logical works first, right? And they'll have the title there, the organon, right? Because logic is said to be the tool of philosophy, huh? But now, in the book on the dialectical reasoning, the book of places, huh? Aristotle speaks of the four tools, right? So these are the tools within the, what, tool philosophy, right? A very toolish subject, right? Now, I'm not too bright, but as I follow Aristotle, in order for tools, right? I see more and more, more impressed, you know, as I go further, because it's harder for me to see what these were, right? They refer something, right? Right, right? Is that the word? Let's part ways. The four tools of dialectical, or the four tools of dialectation, if you could say that right in here. Now, even a demo like me is not too surprised by the first tool. The first tool of the dialectation is the selection of probable things, right? And under that, of course, is, part of your old friends, the distinction and order of them. The distinction and order of them. So you want to select the opinions of all or most men, right? Or all or most men, the most things that have been in a particular art of science, right? And speaking about the matter of that art of science, right? So you want to distinguish the probable opinions. Well, these are probable opinions that pertain to ethics, and these are probable opinions that pertain to the natural world, right? Or something of that sort, right? But also you want to put them in order, right? From the, what, general to the, what, particular, right? Because you might use the more general to reason to something about the more particular, right? Or to apply it to the more particular, right? Now, even them, you're like me, right? I'm kind of a dull mind here, right? I can see that since dialectical reasoning is reasoning from probable opinions, this has to be the first tool, right? But what else could be the first tool, right? You're going to reason dialectically. You're going to reason from probable opinions. It's a demonstration, right? And so the first thing you need is to be able to select, right? Probable opinions, right? And if you're going to be reasoning in ethics, you want opinions that are relevant to ethics, right? And if you're in natural philosophy, you want opinions that are relevant to that, right? And so on, right? And so on, right? And so, and you want to order them first. Okay, I think it's even in them, I think you can kind of see that. Does it make sense to say that it's the first two? Now, what is the second book, right? These probable opinions are ones you've heard, right, or read, and they're expressed in words. Maybe you need to be able to distinguish the senses of words, right? That's what they mean, right? Or if they mean many things, right? I mean, here, let's take a famous guy named Shakespeare, right? Yeah, Shakespeare says that apparently in the exhortation is recent, the reasons ability for large discourse looking before and after, right? What does it mean by before and after, right? And so, if I can distinguish the senses, is before and after just one mean? And does Shakespeare mean all of those senses? The father of logic points out in the book, that this clarification is the most common mistake, because if we get the sense of the word, right? Maybe I have to have distinguished the senses of words, right? So, this is going to be the second two, obviously, right? The ones I've heard, you know, have been stated in words. So, we can say the second one is the distinction of the senses of the word. Aristotle, under this pargarity, gives what we call places, right? Where do you look to see if the word has more than one meaning, right? Well, let's take the example of the class there of the word liberal, right? You're at a liberal arts college, right? In the political world, there are liberals and conservatives, right? And then, again, in the ethics, you find out there's a virtue called liberality, right? What's the word liberal mean? The same in these three? Well, what's the opposite of liberal, right? In the political world, the opposite of liberal is conservative, right? In the arts, the opposite of liberal is what? Serified, right? And in the case of the virtue, the concern of money, called liberality, right? The opposite of liberal is what? Stingy. Stingy, yeah. So, if the word has many opposites, this is one place to look, right? Look at the opposite. If it has different meanings, right? Then, the word itself has many different meanings, right? And they see who gives, you know, money, charitable money, right? They find out that conservatives give more money, charitably, than liberals. More liberal than the liberal? Yeah. Liberal money. So, it's a joke. They call liberals or other people's money. That's what you're saying. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. And you find that conservatives are interested in liberal education, too, than liberals. Real, real liberal education, right? So, this is important, right? That you don't mix up these senses of the word of the word, right? But notice, if it's a probable opinion that reason looks for order or looks before and after, right? And I can distinguish the senses of before and after, right? Then I can multiply the senses of the probable opinions, right? Reason looks before and after in time, right? Looks before and after in cause and effect and being, right? Looks before and after in what? Reason. No. Yeah. There are all kinds of courses, you know, reduction, too, and looking at the principles of the science, right? That's supposed to come before, right? And we're always looking before and after in the sense of what is better, right? Okay. So, you can multiply, in a sense. In a sense, you're multiplying probable opinions, right? If you distinguish these senses, right? As well as avoiding, you know, confusing, right? I saw this reason I saw this. It's a little more difficult or surprising. I'm not surprised that this should be the first tool of delegation, right? But you have to stop and think, hey, those opinions are expressed in words. And words have many meanings. And people are obviously deceiving them, you know? You've got to really have the second tool, right? It's right next to what the opinion is, right? In a sense, opinion is what Einstein said, or what most men say, or what they say. What they say are words. What the hell do these words mean, right? And so on, right? I can see where this comes second, don't you? Not nerd and fourth fool. Well, now it's a possibly be, right? There's a thought that I don't see, right? But now, something's kind of clear here, right? When you distinguish words, you're opposed to distinguishing what? Things, right? So I say he's liberal with his money, and he's liberal in politics, right? We're talking about different things, right? So, the third tool is going to be the ability to what? To find or to see differences, right? Not just difference, not just different meanings, right? The difference is of what? Of things, right? Now, if you need the ability to find differences, this is what other ability do you need. Yeah. The same knowledge are opposites, right? It would make any sense to say this doctor knows a lot about health, and some other doctors know a lot about sickness, but... A little doctor that knows both, right? It doesn't make sense, doesn't it? So, the ability to consider sickness, right? Now, it's kind of interesting that Aristotle speaks here of the ability to find differences. It doesn't here say the ability to find likeness, but the ability to consider likeness. Now, Aristotle says that there can be likeness, you know, which is very close, like the cat and the dog, they're both four-footed animals, something like that. See, so the likeness of the dog and the cat, right? And sometimes a little child will call a dog a cat or a race or a race, but they don't quite see the differences yet. But then, the likeness of, what, ratios, right? Is a more, what, distant, what, likeness, huh? And they say that most discoveries are made in science by seeing the likeness of, what, ratios, right? And, of course, Aristotle's works are filled with likenesses of ratios, huh? Now, the first meaning of, what, proportionally is found in, with medication. Now, I see the rest of the class, and I'm frankly educated. I'd say, two is to three. If you can supply the fourth term, then you see the, what, likeness, right? But they would say, what? Yeah. And they'd say, well, the distance between 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 is the same, right? But is 4 meaning to 5 as 2 is to 3? That's what they think, right? But are they really the same, right? That's not even a question of likeness, right? You're talking the same distance, right? They have to consider the likeness, right? And exactly what way they are like. And I say, now, it'll help, right? Imagine 6 to be a bit up of 3 2s. Or, excuse me, 4 to be up of 2 2s, right? What would 4 be 2, like 2 is to 3? Be 3 2s, which would be 6, right? Not 5, right? Okay. So, if you kind of imagine 6 as being 3 2s and 4 2 2s, right? And it's kind of easy to see that 4 is made to 6, like 2 is to 3, right? Ah, now, you see that, right? But you have to stop and consider it, right? Aristotle's fix that. It's a good consideration of what is, right? And what may I like, right? Okay, now, to get into Aristotle and these difficult things, right now. And Aristotle says that the first matter, which is the matter underlying substantial change, right? The first matter is known by, what? A proportion, right? So, the first matter is to man and dog, or man and lion, but clay is to sphere and cube. Now, you have to consider the likeness, right? In what way they are like, right? Because are sphere and cube two different, what, substances, like man and lion are? And is the first matter underlying substantial change, from man to lion, when the lion eats the man or something, is that first matter an actual substance, to accidents, like sphere and cube are two different shapes? Why don't you like this? Well, you haven't considered it like this, right, huh? Solution here, right, huh? See? In what way are they like, what way they're not, right? Well, now go back to something more known, and illustrate this point, right, huh? You said, four is to six, as two is to three. Now, four is to six, as an even number is to an even number. Therefore, two is to three, as an even number is to an even number. What's wrong? You have misunderstood, right? Four is to six, like two is to three, not because they're both the, what, ratio of an even number to an even number, right? Or two is to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. So four is to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number, right? That's not the way they're like, right? You have not considered, right, like this. In what way they exactly are they like, right? In what way is two to three like four to six? Not to me in those ways we just mentioned, right? Four is to six is the ratio of an even number to an even number. One to three is the ratio of an even number to an even number. Can't you ask how to think though, right? Well, to state it fairly strictly here, four is the same parts of six that two is of what? And again, going back to help your imagination feel soon. If you imagine the four, in a sense, you think of it as being two twos, right? And the six is being three twos, right? Then four is the same parts of six that two is of three, right? Okay? It's two twos and four and three twos and six. So it's the same parts. Oh, that's the way they're like, right? So in what way is clay to sphere and cube, like the first matter is to man and lion, right? But not insofar as man and lion are two different substances, right? Sphere and cube are in the species or the genus of quality, in the shape or form, right? One of the species, right? Clay is an actual substance. The matter, the first matter, underlines a lion and what? Man is not a natural substance, right? Well, how do I think that? Well, the clay is able to be a sphere or a cube, but not both at the same time, right? And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other. But if it becomes the other, it seems to be the former, right? Yeah. Well, the first matter is able to be a man or a lion, right? And if the man is the lion, right, it will be a lion and not a man, right? Okay. And when it's a man, it can't be a lion. And when it's a lion, it can't be a man, right? And if it becomes the other, it seems to be the former, right? That's in what way they're alike, right? You see that, right? But they're not alike in the sense of man and lion being two qualities, like sphere and cube are, right? Okay. You can say now that the first matter is to man and a lion, dog and cat, I think so. Something says, right? Like what? Man is too healthy and sick, right? The man is able to be healthy. He's able to be sick, but not both at the same time, right? And if he's one, he's not the other, right? And if he becomes the other, he seems to be the former, right? And the first matter can be a dog or a cat. It can't be both at the same time, right? And when it's a dog, he's not a cat. But when he becomes a cat, he seems to be a dog, right? And so on. So you've got to stop and consider what way they are what. Remember how we talked about the legisary between what? The definition is to the first act, like what the statement is to the second act, right? It's proportional, right? If you want to understand what a thing is, you might need a definition, right? If you want to understand the true or the false, you need a statement, yeah? The statement is not a definition, right? And understanding what something is is not the same thing as understanding true and false. But just as the definition enables you to understand what a thing is, so the statement enables you to understand the true. And that's very important, right? Aristotle is always what? He talks about virtue, right? In class, he said, what's the virtue of a knife? Well, when they define virtue, they say, virtue is a what? Yeah. It's what makes its power good and what it does good, right? Well, what is the virtue of a knife, then? Sharpness, yeah. What's the vice of a knife? He's a moron. But you see, there's a difference there, right? But you see a proportion there, right? So you wouldn't want a knife without its virtue. Why would you want a man without its virtue? Yeah, right. It's just annoying to have a knife that's dull, right? Yeah, it's dull, right? A robber, I think, probably is. I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right? I don't want a knife that's dull, right?