Logic (2016)
Lecture 48: The Four Tools of Dialectic and Their Application

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Remember what the four tools of dialectic work? The first one is the selection of what are probable premises, right? Probable statements, right? What's the definition of probable statements here? What makes the statement probable? Because of the quantity or the quality of men owed it, right? So in terms of quantity, if all men say this is so, right? Or if most men say this, right? And your opinion is probable because of the number of men, right? Hold it, right? So maybe there's a time in which most men, if not all men, said the sun goes around the earth, right? All this nonsense about the earth taking on its axis, which you can believe, you know. And the error of this was correct. Yeah, yeah. So if all or most men are saying that the sun goes around the earth, right, that it rises in the east and goes across the sky, and it's being pulled over the harbor, it's getting across, right? And then down the other side, you know, what the French say, or something they say, the sun goes to bed, right? Yeah, well, that's because they had a big job, right? And so that's one part of probable statements, right? If all or most men think that, right? Or then there is a three-fold one. If all or most men or the most famous men, right, in some art or science say that this is so, right, then it's probable because of the quality of the men saying it, right? But you might want to add to that that you're saying this as regards, something that pertains to their art or science, right? So if all or most doctors or the most famous ones say that smoking is bad for your health, right, then that is a probable opinion, right, huh? They're trying to get this, you know, climate business, right, huh? They say, well, all scientists, you know, agree now that, you know, because they say that maybe that isn't really so, you know? I mean, maybe they're falsifying, you know, the fact that all scientists are saying that, you know? And as I talk to, you know, engineers and engineers, they really have some skepticism about this, you know, so I'm not sure, you know? And the people who are going along with it, you know, they've kind of created that large number of people. So it's got to be all or most or the most famous ones in a particular art or science, right? When speaking about the matter of that, what, art or science, right? So if a Hollywood actor is talking about this, he has no excellence about this, right, huh? I mean, if he says something about acting or something, that might be, you know, taken more important, right, huh? Because that seems to pertain to his art, right, which is acting, you know, pretending and so on, huh? Deceiving. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So in Thomas, I've been reading the De Veritata, you know, the distributed questions, and he's, in the objections often, he's quoting Damascene or Augustine or somebody else, right, huh? And so this is a man who's famous, right, huh? In his art or science, he's speaking about a matter of what, theology, right, huh? Okay, what he has competence in. So, there's those five men things, right, huh? All or most men, right? Because the number of them, or all or most men in a given art or science are the most famous of them, right? I think I was quoting last time, it wasn't a hiding, right? Mozart's last quartet of the six he dedicated to hiding. It's called the distant quartet sometimes. There's a little bit of distance in the beginning, right? People, you know, they're puzzled, you know, for stuff. Mozart made such a mistake, you know? And they, you know, brought up the hiding of this man who was competent, he says. Mozart bought it that way. He had a good reason for doing so. You know, I mean, I'd know if he had a good reason for doing, right? So, I mean, you find that, you know, that respect for Mozart, right? Mozart did it. It must have been good, right? I just noticed something when I was in the world that there's a phenomenon of, you could call it the celebrity intellectual. Where you have somebody who may be a pioneer in their own field, like Noam Chomsky at MIT in linguistics. Who goes into a completely different field, for example, politics and culture, in which he has no competence whatsoever. And yet is held up as an icon, a sort of guru, when he really, not only does he not seem to know what he's talking about, but he's also extremely ideological in a Marxist way. But it's amazing how charismatic people like him have such a cachet. Even some of the great physicists who worked on the time of Obama, you know, have his naïve opinions about quantum physics and so on. You know? Oh, in Heimer? What? Was Oh, in Heimer? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He had associates, you know, and so on. So, it's got to be a matter of their own thing, right? Mm-hmm. Now, I always, you know, compare Wagner and Mozart to an opera there, you know? Because Wagner says, in opera, you know, the words are the male element, right? And the music is the female element, and Mozart says, you know, that an opera, the words must be able to get the obedience to the music. Like Mozart said, right? That's high power, that's what opera should be doing, right? Everything's turned into something musical, right? In fact, sometimes, you know, the plots of Mozart's opera, you know, which he didn't write himself, you know, they're kind of stupider, you know, but, you know, everything's turned into something musical, right? You know, that's what's really all about. So, the first thing you want to say about the selection of probable statements is, what is a probable statement, right? Because you might reason from an opinion of all or most men, or all or most men in a given art of science about a matter that art of science, or the most famous men, right? Okay. Now, Aristotle seems to put in there also that you can divide these probable statements according to their subject matter, right? Okay. And also you can, what? Not only distinguish them that way, but then order them right from the general to the, what? In particular, right? In particular, right? You can always quote those words of Shakespeare, or stick not the modesty of nature. If anything so ever done is when the purpose of playing was in both the beginning and now, was an age to hold as earth and grew up to nature, to show but your own face, score in your own image, in the very age and body of the times, form and pressure. Well, I take this as a probable statement about what the dramatist should be doing, right? Because Shakespeare, you know, the greatest and most famous dramatist, right? He's performing all over the world, foreign languages even, right? He said, this is what a play is, right? It's a light of the sun. It's a natural, right? That's the first tool, right? Now, what is the second tool, right? You have the senses of the word, right? Aristotle, in the book on places, would give the, what? Places for this, huh? Flossers often, you know, get taken up with the word places, right? But I think, you know, if you take the adverb there and say, a place is where you look, right? To see if a word has more than one meaning, right? Aristotle gives different places, right? The most important places are to look at the, what? Opposite, right? And if it has more than one opposite, even a name, obviously it has more than one sentence, right? But even if you recognize the one opposite in multiplicity of meanings, then the other one has the multiplicity of meanings, right? Okay? Or you use the word in combination, right? So there's a whole bunch of places there, right? Here's the example of what's the opposite of conservative, right? What's the opposite of liberal? What's the opposite of liberal? What's the opposite of liberal? What's the opposite of liberal? What's the opposite of liberal? Sometimes it's conservative, sometimes it's servile, and sometimes it's stingy, right? So does liberal or liberality have one meaning? Because conservative and stingy don't mean the same thing. In fact, conservatives tend to be more giving to charity than a liberal. And then we speak of the liberal arts as opposed to the servile arts. So the word liberal has three meanings compared to those three opposites. So there are places where you can look. Now the third tool is finding the differences of things. It's interesting that he uses the word finding it, right? Finding the differences of things, right? Then the fourth tool is the consideration. And there he says that you can what? Find the likeness of things in the same genus, right? Species, right? Or the likeness of what? Ratios, right? In the same genus. Or a likeness of what? Ratios, huh? So like the ratios is the much more distant likeness. So I can say two is to three is what? Four is to six. Six is to nine, right? Eight is to twelve. And I can go up as high as I want to, right? Further and further away, I can still do what? A likeness, right? Two trillion to three trillion. It's like two to three, isn't it? Okay? So, the mind is what? Exercised, huh? Practicing these tools, right? But notice the difference in practicing the third and fourth tool, right? You know, which exercises your mind more. Finding the difference of things that are far apart. Or the difference of things that are what? Close. Yeah, yeah. It is harder to do, right? Okay. What about likeness which exercises the mind more? Find the likeness of things that are in the same species or genus? Or finding the likeness of what? Two different what? Ratios, huh? Well, there the mind is exercised, right? Because you can see the likeness of things that are what? Far apart, yeah? Makes sense, huh? And Aristotle speaks of finding the difference. But then he speaks of, you know, consideration of the likeness, huh? Because if you find the difference, right? You've found the difference, right? No real problem. But if you consider a likeness, you can often be deceived by likeness, huh? Because you might think that things are alike in a way that they are what? Not, huh? Now, I always take a simple example and I say, I'll start off with a proportion which is first known, or if it's called a proportion, like in arithmetic, right, huh? You say four is to six as what? Two is to three, right, huh? Okay. Now, two to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number, right? So, four is to six as two is to three, it must be the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Is that true? Well, you didn't consider the likeness, right? Is that what the likeness consists in, that it's a ratio of a prime number to a prime number between those two? In what way is four to six like two to three? Okay, but in what way they are like? What way is that? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not just that four is less than six, like two is less than three, right? Because then two would be to three as four is to five. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So what does it mean that four is to six is two is to three? Exactly what way they are like? You have to stop them to think about, right? And I used to say to the students, you know, I'd say, if you can supply the fourth term in a proportion, that's a sign that you understand the likeness, right? So if I say seeing is to the eye as hearing is to thee, if you correctly give the fourth term, that's easy that you see the likeness there, right? So then I'd say to my stupid students, I'd say two is to three is four is two, and they would say five. You know? You know, I didn't use the example four to six. Two is to three is four is two. And invariably in a class, college students say five, right? Well, the distance between four and five is the same as the distance between two and three, right? But is that in what the likeness of a proportion would consist? Well, the way that two is to three like four is to six is that two is what? Yeah. And four is like two parts of what? The three parts of six. So imagine six being made up of three twos, so to speak, and four made up of two twos. So four is two of the three parts of six, right? And that's obviously two is of three, right? So now you have considered the likeness in what way they are a what? Like, right? Now when Aristotle is investigating the first matter, the matter underlined substantial change, right? Okay? If a lion should eat me, for example, right? A man would become more lion, right? So Aristotle works out a what? Proportion, right? That the first matter is to man and lion, right? Man and dog, or what does he want to take? As clay is to what? Sphere and cube, right? Well, sphere, clay is an actual substance, right? And sphere and cube are two, what? Accidents, right? In this genus of what? Quality, right? Was the first matter like a substance or two accidents? Is man and dog, or man and horse, or man and lion, right? Are they, what, two accidents? Well, I don't see how the first matter is to man and dog like clay is to what? I don't see that, do you? You know? These are two accidents, right? The shape is accidental. Man and dog seem to be something more than a shape, you know? Two different kinds of substance, right? Well, you haven't considered sufficiently the likeness, right? In what way they are alike, right? Aristotle said this is the only way to know the first matter. It's not knowable by itself, right? It's knowable only by this what? Proportion. Okay. And what does the likeness consist? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Just as the clay is able to be a sphere or a cube, but not both at the same time, right? If it becomes one, it seems to be the other, right? So the first man is able to be a man or a dog or a man or a lion, right? And when it's one, it can't be the other, right? And it becomes the other, it seems to be the former, right? That's what the likeness is, right? So you've got to kind of think about that, right? What way they are like, right? But man and dog are not like a sphere and cube as both being what? Substances, right? Or both being accidents, right? You have misunderstood the likeness, huh? So it's kind of interesting the choice of Aristotle's word, the consideration of likeness, right? You have to see in what way they are what? The substantial form and accidental form are like, and they both are what, act, right? And the person is something, right? Do you want to overextend like this, huh? Now, let's come back upon the order of this four here, right? You can kind of see why this would come first, right? Because you want the tools for dialectical arguments, right? And dialectical argument is a syllogism or an induction, right? But the syllogism is what? From premises that are seen as probable, right? So obviously the selection of probable statements is most, what, close, you might say, to the, what, dialectical syllogism, right? Well, the consideration of likeness put last down here, right, is useful for, what, induction, right? But it's also useful for the if-then syllogism, right? So you sometimes reason from one, what, ratio to the other ratio, right? Now, why does he put the distinction of the senses of the word next to this, probable statements, rather than the third and the fourth tool, which seem to be talking about, what, things? Why is this distinction of the senses of a word, because I put second in order among the four tools? Statements are made of words, and so in order to understand statements, you have to see what the words may be. Yeah, it seems to be approximate to that, right, huh? Okay. Now, purpose might, you know, be quoting Shakespeare as his fond of doing, right, huh? And Shakespeare says, what, pretty smart guy Shakespeare, right? And he's wiser, I think, than the modern philosophers. Kind of scandal, right? I didn't say much of the modern philosophers, huh? But Shakespeare says that reason is the ability for a large discourse, right? Looking before and after, right, huh? Now, you might, um, take this as a probable statement about what reason is, right? But what does he mean by saying looking before and after? Yeah. Because the word before has, what? A number of meanings, right, huh? Okay. And is it just in one of these meanings that reason looks before and after? Or is it in two or three or, you know? So, um, you know, me being a dummy, I go to the, uh, the, uh, second host predicament, right? In the categories, right? Extend to my knowledge, right? And Aristotle's a pretty good distinction there of the, what, central, she senses of before. And the first sense of before is in, what, time, right? Why should that be the first sense of before? Yeah. Things in motion, right? It's tied up with the before and after in motion. Time is actually the number of the before and after in motion. So that's, uh, if things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs and our knowledge begins in our senses and motion strikes it most of all, well, then you might say that, um, a motion, uh, the first sense of before, for us, right, must be what type of time, right, huh? Now you could join to that, right, lay alongside of it, right, huh, before in the motion itself, right, huh? And before in the, what, road or path that you are moving down, right, huh? Okay. So, um, but those are the senses that are laid alongside, right, that first sense, huh? So that's the first sense of before, right, huh? And then what's the second sense? Yeah, I know what that means. And it seems to me you can lay alongside that the sense of what cause being before it, effect, huh? Because what's before in being, um, well, what's after in being, rather, depends upon what is before in being, right, huh? But if I have a pile of bricks, I might not make a brick walkway, I might make a brick house, right, or a brick fireplace or something, right? So, there seems to be some dependence upon a brick walkway or a brick house upon bricks, right? Bricks can be without a brick house. You can't have a brick house without bricks, right? Or I take, you know, for example, as you know, the letters C, A, and T can be without what? But, yeah, again, the word cat could help the letters C, A, and T. But you can't simply say that C, A, and T are the cause of a cat because the word cat, because it might be causes an act instead, right, or something, right? But those meanings seem to be, you know, somewhat similar, right, huh? And I think I was mentioning how I noticed Thomas when he talks about the first part of thinking about God, which is thinking about the existence of God, whether God exists, right? Well, in both Summas, he gives five arguments, right? And four of them are the same, huh? Okay, I don't mean to why there's one difference there. In the Summa Congentiles, there's two arguments from motion, right? The first two arguments from motion. In the Summa Theologiae, the first argument is from motion, but the second argument is from, what, the Maker. And that's the third argument in the Summa Congentiles, right? Okay. And the last two are similar, right, huh? But the Summa Theologiae has this argument from able to be and not be to something that must be, right? And it says it must be to another, but it must be to itself, right? To the idea that God is... Well, that argument is not given as one of the five in the Summa Congentiles, but in, that's in chapter, what, 13 in Book 1, but in chapter 15 it's given. In chapter 16, it's given. So there's seven arguments. Like seven? Yeah, yeah. I was kind of struck, you know, by the fact that I was talking about thinking about God, right? I like to do that. And thinking about God has how many parts? There are five parts. Three of them we share with Aristotle, right, and two of them just... Christian believers have, right? So the first part of thinking about God is thinking about his existence, whether God exists, right? Because if God doesn't exist, then the investigation is over, right? As Thomas says, the theology is over. Okay. And the second part is what? Well, yeah, Thomas refers to the second part here as a consideration of the substance of God, right? And then the third part is what? Yeah, the consideration of what God does, right? Both what he does that remains within him, like his understanding and willing, and what he does that produces something outside of him, like his creating and so on. And so we share those three parts of Aristotle, right? Aristotle talks about God existing and then God, what? The substance of God and then God's understanding, right? He understands himself and so on. And then we have an addition, we think about the, what? Trinity, right? Which Aristotle didn't think about, huh? And then because the second person of the Trinity, the Word was made flesh, right? And then there's a fifth thinking about God, right? Okay. So, there's five parts to thinking about God, but the first three we share with Aristotle, and the last two are unique to us Christians, right? who believe that there are three persons in one God, right? That there is, that the Word of God, that the Son of God, one of the three became man, right? Became flesh, huh? Right? It kind of struck me, you know, that there are five parts to thinking about God, and then when Thomas, in the first part, right, he's just thinking about the existence of God, in both Summas, he gives five arguments, right? And then he gets into the substance of God, how many parts does he have? Five, yeah. And the Summa Theologiae, those five are in this order. He first showed that God is altogether simple, right? Not composed anyway, right? And then secondly, he shows that God is perfect, and therefore good, right? And then third, he shows that God is what? In the Summa Theologiae. Unlimited, yeah. Or infinite. And then fourth, he shows that God is what? Unchanging, yeah. And then fifth, he shows that God is what? One, right? Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he first shows that God is unchanging. Not fourth, it's first, right? And, in fact, only does he do it first, but he gives two arguments, right? Instead of one, right? It's in the Summa Theologiae, right? And then he goes to what? The simplicity of God, right? And perfection of God, right? And his being good, right? So, and then what does he do? Then he goes to his being one, and last to his being infinite. Okay? Now, if you summarize the order of the two of them, you can say they both have this in common. They consider the simplicity of God and the perfection of God next to each other, and they both consider the simplicity before the, what? Perfection, right? And they both consider the unity and the, what? Infinity of God after those, right? Although Thomas, in the Summa, he takes up the infinity third, right? And he takes up the unity last. Okay? Now, Thomas, in the Summa Contra Gentilis, he takes up the, what? Right after the perfection of God, and so on, he takes up the unity of God, and then, it's in the first order, right? Now, Thomas looks before and after, you know? So why does he do this? But the wild card is especially, what? The unchangingness of God. He's immobile, right? Because in the Summa Contra Gentilis, that's number one, right? And here it's number, what? Four in the Summa, right? Four, four, those differences, right? Well, there's a connection between the unity and infinity of God, those two, right? Which they both take up after the other two, right? And what is their connection? Well, the unity, right, of God is very similar to the simplicity. In fact, one of the arguments that Thomas gives the simplicity of God is, from Plato, that the one is before the many. Which would indicate that God is one, right? And he ties up the infinity with, what? The perfection of God. That God's perfection in his goodness is, what? Endless. And Thomas follows those two after the funds, but he gives first the unity because it's closer to the simplicity, right? And in the little work by the compendium of theology, right? The unity of God is considered with the simplicity of God, right? To that close, right? Of course, the Summa Theologiae considers the, what, infinity of God right after the perfection of God. Because it's very tight with that, right? But why does he put the last, the, what, unity of God, right, huh? In the Summa Theologiae. But next to the last, in the Summa Conte Gentiles, right? Well, as I was saying last night to the class here, a lot of people, in their study of theology, they've heard this phrase, de Deo Uno et Twino, right, huh? In the Summa Theologiae, in the same first part of the Summa, as it's called, right? There's the first part, there's the second part, there's the third part. In the first part, he's going to take up the Trinity too, isn't he? So maybe he wants to emphasize that there's only one God, despite there being three persons, because people are scandalized, and you hear this, but the Muslim, right, think they were saviors to be gods, we're falling back into polytheism, you know, they're the thing for really, really terrible people, in that respect. So maybe he puts the unity last, because that's the last thing you want to consider, if you're considering Deo Uno et Twino, right? But Thomas, in the Summa Conte Gentiles, is not going to talk about the Trinity until the fourth book. It's not going to be the first book at all. Okay? That's the reason why he does that, right, huh? Because he's writing the Summa Conte Gentiles, not for beginners, like he's doing the Summa Theologiae, but he's doing it for the Dominicans, who are meeting the Muslims in Spain, right? And so you want to distinguish the things that can be known by natural reason, as well as by faith, and how you're going to talk about those things, and the things you can only know by faith, right? It's going to be quite different, how you're going to talk to Mohammed about those two things, right? So it's all in the fourth book that he has the things that are known only by faith, the Trinity and the Incarnation, right, huh? He doesn't have the same problem. He's got to emphasize the, you know, that's something, you know, forget about that for the time being, right? He's going to talk about those things that are known by natural reason, as well as by faith, right, huh? In these first three books, the Summa Conte Gentiles. Okay, so he can follow the order of the unity before the infinity, because unity is to the infinity a little bit like simplicity is to perfection. I mentioned how I was in time, I was doing some on the day night there, you know. Would you think of God's simplicity as being endless, or would you think of his perfection and goodness as being endless? Oh, his perfection, you know, right away, they say like that, you know. You see what I mean? And so Thomas follows the same order in the Summa Conte Gentiles, right? He speaks of the simplicity of God before the perfection of God in both Summas, and then he speaks of the unity before the, what, infinity, right? The perfect order, right? But the Summa Theologiae, you're going to talk about the Trinity in the same part, right? See what I mean? You don't know, there's only one God, you know, and get them to your head, you dummy, and however we understand the Trinity, it's not going to end up there being one God. Who's that? Well, you'll find out when you get to the part of the Trinity, but I mean, okay, but you know, if you understand the Trinity in a way that goes against, then you've got some problem here. We'll see when we get to this recent fidelity over here. Okay. Now it's interesting what Thomas does in the Summa Kedogiae, when he takes up last the unchangeableness of God and the unity of God, right, he proves them both by three arguments each, right, and two of them, one is taken from the endless perfection of God, he doesn't have to, what, change, because he's got everything. He's got it all there. Yeah, and he's got, you know, universally perfect, there can't be two gods, because there'd be no difference between the two, right? One of them might have something the other one didn't have, but one of them wouldn't be universally perfect, it wouldn't be God, right? You know, so he can, he can use the endless perfection of God, and then the, what, the simplicity of God to show that God is, what, one, and that he's, what, unchanging, right, huh? When you study, you know, natural philosophy is basically about motion, right, or ends mobility, as Thomas says, right, movable thing, right, huh? And the first thing you learn about a movable thing is in book one that's composed of matter and form, right, huh? And so, if God's not composed anyway, it can't be a movable thing, right, huh? You know, so it's, and if he's universally perfect, nothing he can gain by changing, so there's always a way to change, right? Like, he's seen something, he's got everything, you know, but he gives the guys everything for Christmas, right, you know? You know, and I don't even know, and he's got everything, you know, and, well, God's got everything, right, huh? What can you really give God, right, huh? As you compare it, you know, you know, in this kind of a parable way, you know, I'd say, you know, when your mommy and daddy give you a little allowance as a kid, right? And it sounds like allowance, you have to buy them a Christmas present, right? Well, you're giving them something, or you're not, because you, you know, you're giving them back what they gave you, right, huh? You know, sometimes all we could afford was a rose, a single rose for my mother, you know. My mother always thought that the clerk in the forest store didn't pay enough attention to us with our one rose, you know, a couple dozens or something. But anyway, it's kind of beautiful the way he does the summa, right? He's done the simplicity of God, right, and the perfection of God and the infinity of God, and then he has, what, two middle terms to be used both to show that he's, what, unchanging and to show that he's, what, only one. He's definitely done, right, huh? Now, in the summa contra gentiles, he begins, you know, the treatment of the substance of God by showing that God is, what, unchanging, right? And he's very brief, but he goes back to the arguments for the existence of God. In the summa contra gentiles, there's two arguments, twice as many as there are in the summa theologiae for saying that God is the unmoved, unchanging, you know? And he develops the two arguments much more fully than he does in the summa, right? You know, say, oh, it's based upon these two premises, and the first was A, B, C reasons, and for the second, A, B, C, you know? And, oh, boy, you know, huh? So, I mean, you're really, you know, you're more than twice as, what, in the summa theologiae, right, huh? Okay? And it's really impressive, right, huh? So, when Thomas gets, that's in the 13th chapter, right, because of the five ways in the summa contra gentiles. In chapter 14, he spends most of the time saying, you're going to know more what God is not than what he is. It's only, you know, you need to envision that you know God as he is, huh? And so, he almost takes it for granted now that we know God is unchanging, right? But then, before he goes to the next one, which is, what, the simplicity of God, right? Where he goes, like he does in the other summa, to say that God is, what, eternal, right? He's attached to, you know, to God being unchanging, right? And so, that's the 15th chapter, right? And then comes the, what, glorious 16th chapter, this is the summa theologiae, right? And what's the 16th chapter? You know, there are five arguments in the 15th chapter that shows God is, what, eternal, right? And then the 16th chapter, there's six arguments. Five and six, and 15 and 16, right? That's the one we remember. He gives six arguments to show that God is, what, pure act. And that's, you know, the major, the middle term for showing that God is simple, right? And so, just to do, right? For showing that God is perfect, to showing that God is infinite, right? Everything falls into place, right? Now, he makes use of, you know, God being pure act, but it's kind of, what, it's not going to develop a whole chapter to build it to it, huh? Six arguments, right? Very, very impressive, right, what he does there, huh? He gets the six arguments, it's in the 16th chapter, too. So, you know, what's in the 17th chapter? Well, and I was talking to Warren Murray on the phone there, because I said, Warren, you know, you know how to get the little title, they gave me a chapter in the summa kind of shit, and he goes, Warren, is that really in the original text? And Warren thought it was not in there, right? And when I look at the, you know, I have the one that they took from the Leonine, right? And it's got those titles, but the 17th chapter is not saying what the title says. The title says that there's no matter in God, which is true. But what he actually shows in the 17th chapter is that God is not matter. He's not the cause called matter, see? Which falls immediately from his being pure act, right, huh? He has other arguments for it, too. He's got four arguments there all together. He's absolutely innocent, right? And if the first cause was really matter, everything would be by chance. That's all the arguments he has in there, right, huh? And if the first cause was, what, matter, then things would proceed from it by its motion, by its being changed. We always say, God is changeless, right? And then he spends the second half of the chapter with this stupid opinion of David and Danone, who said that God and the first matter are the same, and he can't, they're not distinguished by anything, right? Well, they're distinguished by themselves, because the one is pure act, and the other is pure, what? Post-passivability, right, huh? So it's really powerful, right, huh? You're really impressed with the idea that God is pure act, right? And then chapter 18, the composition. Well, in chapter 18, he does the reverse of what he does in the Summa Theologiae, right? In Summa Theologiae, you have a questionnaire of eight articles, right, on the simplicity of God, right? And the first six articles are particular kinds of composition that are, what, denied of God. It's not until the seventh article that you argue that there can't be any composition whatsoever in God, right? And, of course, since you've gone through the six main kinds in the real world that we know, right, you are struck by what? Inductive argument. And then you have a syllogistic argument, right, huh? Well, in the Summa Cana Gentiles, you see that God is, what, pure act in much more, what, formal way, complete way than you do in the Summa Theologiae. And then this is the main reason for saying God is not composed. Because if it's composed, either one part is, like, to the other's ability to act, or all of them are to the whole as ability to act. So, I mean, he begins the syllogistic right away, right? And then he goes down to particular kinds in later chapters, right? God is not a body. God is, you know, there's no distinction in God to his being. God is, you know, there's no distinction in God. and his nature and so on, right? The distinction between God and his nature, right? And so on. So the word is a little different than the two sumas, right? The suma theology is more for beginners, right? You've got to be even by hand, by propositions, less universal, right? A powerful mind has really been prepared by understanding that God is correct, has got the middle term, you know, see all these things like that, you know? And I always say, I'm an easy son of a gun, you know, I don't want it on little term. You know, but he starts, he's a more picker artist, too many descends, you know, to be something, a body, right? Even more developed than it is in the suma theology. But, so it's interesting, right? But if you go back and have me say, my goodness, it goes all the way back, of course, the understanding, ability, and act is the ninth book of first philosophy, the ninth book of wisdom, as I call it. The ninth book of wisdom has how many parts? Three, yeah. Now, what you're doing in the ninth book of wisdom is in following Shakespeare. You're talking about the distinctions of ability and act and the order of ability and act. Now, it's in the third part that you talk about the order of ability and act. And that's the basis for eventually seeing that the first cause must be, what? Pure act, right? But in the first two parts, you're talking about the distinctions of what? A built-in act. What does Aristotle do in those two parts? There's two parts devoted to that, right? Well, in the first part, he talks about the act, which is motion, right? Which you consider, most of all, an actual philosophy, right? And then he distinguishes the various kinds of ability for motion. The ability to be moved and the ability to move, another, right? And then the distinction between a natural ability and a rational ability, and so on. What you realize, as Aristotle pointed out in the ninth book, is that, what? The first meaning of act for us is what? That's kind of profound. Let's think of that, right? So he begins in the first of the three parts, right, of book nine. Thomas says three and nine are the same symbolism, right? The number and the square number have the same meaning, right? In the first of the three parts, right, of book nine, he talks about the act, which is motion, and we know ability through the act for which it is an ability. So he talks just about those abilities that are known through motion. Our motion is the act most known to us. So he started with us the act which is most known to us. And in the final part of book nine, right, you realize the order of act and ability. And although the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act, it is what? Simply, some pictures there as opposed to secundum quid, actually for ability because you go from ability to act only by reason of something already an act, right? So in the water when I make tea in the morning, it goes from being cold to being hot, right? From being able to be hot to being actually hot. But it does so by reason of the stove or something, right? That it's actually hot, right? So simply, what? Yeah. Because you realize now why the moderns, Hegel, Hegel, not Hegel so much, but Marx, right? And he speaks of doctrinal materialism or the early Greeks and they made matter at the beginning of all things. They're making the fallacy from things of confusing what is so simply with what is so in some respect, right? Aristotle points out in the thing that goes from ability to act, ability is before act. But since it goes from ability to act by reason of something already an act, simply speaking, universe, act is before. and that's why the first being, the first cause will be pure act. Now you realize how the summa contra gentiles, right, in having two arguments for motion instead of one, twice as many arguments as the summa theodogiae for motion and they're much more developed, much more explicit, right? So it's four times as much maybe. You're starting from the act which is most known to us and you're going to go all the way to the pure act, right? Which he does in the 16th chapter, right? It's amazing, right? He goes through motion to see that God is motionless, right? And then from there to see that God is what? Pure act, right? That's absolutely marvelous what he does there, right? Far, far superior to the... Again, that's right, that's the summa contra gentile, that's the summa theologian. Okay, I mean, there are differences, right? So if you look before the consideration of substance, right, in the summa contra gentiles, you have the cruisances of God but much more, more than twice as much, I would say, you know, the argument for motion, right? So it's natural, kind of, that he begins the conservation of substance by saying God is unchanging and eternal, right? And that's how he can lead into this full development of God being pure act, right? Very impressive, right? But then you see some things you look after, right, in the summa theologian, you say, well, in the same book he's going to talk about the trinity, you know, he'd better, you know, have solidified the fact that there's only one God and no matter how you understand that trinity, it's got to be understood in a way that doesn't make you have more than one, what? So it's kind of beautiful to see these two ways, right? They both have the same five things to show about the substance of God and the order is somewhat different, especially where Moshe is concerned, but a little difference I mentioned too, infinity is taken up before the unity in the summa theologiae, more logically. You can say that the unity of God is to the infinity of God more like the simplicity is to the perfection, and that's why the opinion of theology and unity is right in the earth to consider simplicity, right? Everybody sees that the infinity is tied up with the endless perfection of God, the endless goodness of God, right? And when he argues for God being unchanging and for God being one, he argues from the endless perfection of God, combine the two together, right? Would you say that the summa contra Gentilius really did its job as far as the reconquista and the reconversion of Spain? Yeah, if you talk to a man, yeah, yeah. You know how to meet the Muslims, right? Because you don't defend the Trinity by trying to prove it by natural reason, because then you'd realize that's not a very good argument that you have, right? You can't really have an argument that's necessary by natural reason, that there are three persons, right? Even though Aristotle says we use the number three in praising God, but I mean that's very weak, you know, to argue that Aristotle is the Trinity because of that, right? And so what you do with the Trinity is you have to know it by what? by scripture and the teaching of the church, and what you do with the Muslim is to show that this does not contradict the truth that we know by natural reason, and by faith too, that there's only one God, right? And we can show why, you know, it's not observing what we're saying, right? Although it's above our mind, right? Okay? you say that we had heard a talk by earlier somewhere that it's based on the book that's called The Closing of the Muslim Mind about where there was a time where philosophy was possible in Islam, but then that branch of Islam lost out to these anti-philosophy factions, so that reason essentially was abandoned. And was the Summa a bunch of Gentilius written before